812.00/14664½
The Counselor for the Department of State (Lansing) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: Looking to the possibility of the necessity of employing force in Mexico if Carranza and Obregon continue to pursue their present policy, I believe the following will result from such action:
- 1st.
- The Mexican people generally will consider that the United States intends to occupy the territory permanently or exercise control over the government, and will resent and resist any use of force regardless of faction.
- 2nd.
- The other Latin American republics will view the act with suspicion as to motives of the United States and it will create an undesirable impression in those countries.
- 3rd.
- There will be a considerable party in the United States which will advocate permanent control over Mexico and possibly annexation [Page 530] of portions of its territory. This movement will increase the feeling in Mexico and the suspicions in Latin America.
- 4th.
- The European governments will expect this Government to protect the interests of their nationals and seek to have it continue in control of Mexican affairs if force is employed.
The foregoing possible consequences of the exercise of force by this Government might be avoided by joint action by the United States and the A. B. C. powers. It could be introduced by a declaration of the four powers that the political and industrial conditions in Mexico could no longer be tolerated and that in the interests of the Mexican people and humanity the four powers had united to restore order and stable government in the Republic, and that they guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of Mexico when the purpose of their intervention had been accomplished.
The advantages of this course would be—
- 1st.
- To allay alarm in Mexico as to the ultimate purpose of intervention.
- 2nd.
- To remove Latin American suspicion of the motives of the United States, and to cause a friendly feeling particularly among the governments acting with the United States.
- 3rd.
- To deprive of force any agitation in this country favorable to continued American control over Mexican affairs.
The objections to joint action are—
- 1st.
- The judgment of this Government as to its action would have to be submitted to consideration by the other governments acting with it.
- 2nd.
- Freedom of action by this Government would be limited by the approval of the other governments.
- 3rd.
- It might possibly create a precedent for joint action which would embarrass the United States in the future.
- 4th.
- It would have the effect of substituting an international policy of Pan Americanism for the national policy of the Monroe Doctrine.
If the objections do not outweigh the advantages, and if the United States is compelled to employ force, would it not be well to approach at once the representatives of the A. B. C. powers with an informal inquiry as to whether a suggestion of joint action in Mexico would be favorably received by their governments?
They could be informed that all that would be required would be for their respective governments to send warships into Mexican waters to cooperate with the naval force of the United States, and that any military force employed would be furnished by the United States.
Unless the attitude of the South American Governments toward joint action is obtained now, I am afraid that it will be impossible [Page 531] later for this Government to avail itself of that means on account of the necessity of immediate action, when the time comes to act.
Faithfully yours,