710.11/206½
Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State 12
Dear Mr. Secretary: Sometime early in January of this year the President requested me to see the Ambassadors of the A. B. C. Powers and ascertain from them whether or not they would be willing to join the United States in a convention which would guarantee the political and territorial integrity of the North, Central and South American Republics under republican forms of government.
Also if they would be willing to agree that all manufacture of munitions of war should be owned by the governments of the respective countries.
[Page 487]The President wrote these two articles himself and I took them first to the Argentine Ambassador whom we thought would perhaps be most sympathetic. The Ambassador received the proposal cordially, after I had outlined to him just what the President had in mind. I called his attention to the fact that there was a military party in the United States just as there was in other countries, and after President Wilson relinquished office, there was a possibility of a military policy being adopted. I said if this happened it was quite probable that instead of following the path laid down by President Wilson there might be a sentiment for expansion. I told him there was sure to be a large part of the people who would want to try out the military and naval machine. If this should happen, no one could tell the final outcome.
I told him, too, that the President thought the time had come when this nation should cease to assume a guardianship over its sister republics and to ask them to come into partnership. I explained it was the President’s intention to approach the A. B. C. Powers first and later to approach the smaller republics, either directly or through the A. B. C.
The Ambassador was very much in favor of permitting the A. B. C. Powers [to] deal with the smaller republics, and it was tacitly agreed that this should be done. He spoke of writing to his government in regard to the proposal, to which I objected and asked him to cable it so we might hear in a few days.
He was filled with enthusiasm and declared that the proposal was almost epoch making, and that he was sure it would be cordially received by his people. He doubted, however, whether Chile would be agreeable because of her territorial aspirations. . . .
The Ambassador begged me to give him the original draft which the President had written, saying he believed it would be an historic document of enormous interest. I gave it to him and he wrote with his own hand a copy for me to use with the other Ambassadors.
I had a similar reception by the Brazilian Ambassador, and I gave him practically the same argument. The discussion followed largely along the lines I have mentioned with Naón.
The Chilian Ambassador was somewhat less receptive and showed a disposition to delay. He brought up at once the question of their boundary conflict with Peru—a subject about which I had informed myself in advance so as to be able to discuss the matter with intelligence.
I told him the President had in mind that there should be an article in the convention which would permit a reasonable time for the settlement of such disputes and a mode of procedure. This seemed to satisfy him.
[Page 488]All three ambassadors promised an answer within a few days. The one came first from Argentine and was entirely favorable. Then Brazil was heard from to the same effect. Chile, later gave an equivocal consent. This was a few days before my departure for Europe, and the President requested me to acquaint Mr. Bryan with what had been done and ask him to carry it to a conclusion.
Mr. Bryan was receptive, but suggested that his peace treaties should be also concluded between them. He wanted to know if there was any objection to this. The President said there was not.
I heard nothing from the matter while abroad until sometime in April when the President cabled me that the Chilian Ambassador had said he was under the impression that I had agreed in my conversation with him that the covenant should not be binding unless all of the A. B. C. Powers concurred. I cabled the President that there was no such understanding, and that probably the Ambassador had in mind the tacit consent that the smaller republics should be approached by the A. B. C. powers rather than by us directly.
This, Mr. Secretary, is a record of what occurred through me. I do not know what Mr. Bryan did.
Of course you understand that the President’s purpose is to broaden the Monroe Doctrine so that it may be upheld by all the American Republics instead of by the United States alone as now.
Sincerely yours,
- A notation attached to this paper reads: “This is for a record which you told me you desired. E. M. H. I shall hope to see you tomorrow.”↩