In all frankness I should say that my personal inclination has been
against expanding our traditional policy in dealing with Latin America,
and that I have been concerned over certain actions of this Government
which seemed to be beyond the purposes of that policy. I approached the
subject with this prejudice against any radical departure from
established policy, but after taking into consideration the scope of the
Monroe Doctrine, the present problems in Latin America, and the motives
which to-day inspire our conduct in the international affairs of this
hemisphere, I have been compelled to change my views.
It seems to me that the logic of the situation is irresistible, and that
we must modify our present declared policy.
Whether this is to be done by a wider application of the Monroe Doctrine
so as to include new methods of obtaining political control by European
powers; or whether it is to be done by announcing a new doctrine, which
will include the present standard of international duty, are questions
which I am not prepared to answer without a more careful study of the
subject. But that something should be done I am convinced, if this
Government is to avoid the charge of insincerity and inconsistency in
its relations with Latin America, [Page 460] of which suggestions are already too frequent and
not without apparent justification.
When you have had opportunity to examine the annexed memorandum I would
like very much to discuss the subject with you.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Counselor for the Department of
State (Lansing)1
[Washington,]
June 11, 1914
.
Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe
Doctrine, and Its Need of Restatement
The Monroe Doctrine is in substance that the United States considers
an extension of political control by a European power over any
territory in this hemisphere, not already occupied by it, to be a
menace to the national safety of the United States.
In 1828, when the doctrine was enunciated, the dangers of the
extension of European political power on this continent lay in the
possible occupation of unsettled regions and in the conquest of the
territory of an independent American state.
Later, during the Polk Administration, another danger was recognized
in the possibility of a voluntary cession of territory by an
American state to a European power, and the Monroe Doctrine was
shown to be broad enough to include this means of acquiring
political dominion.
While the primary idea of the Monroe Doctrine is opposition by the
United States to any extension of European control over American
territory or institutions, the idea is subject to the modification
that the control must possess the element of permanency.
When the hostile occupation of the territory of an American state or
the coercion by force of its government by a European power is
intended to be temporary, and is employed solely as a means to
compel the government of the state to meet a particular
international obligation, which it has wilfully neglected or refused
to perform, the territorial occupation or coercion would not appear
to be in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless the
intention of temporary control must be beyond question, and any
indication of converting temporary control for a particular purpose
into permanent control for general purposes would bring the case
within the scope of the Doctrine and [Page 461] create a situation, in which the United States
might be compelled to intervene.
Just how far a European government should be permitted to exercise
control over American territory or over an American government as a
means of obtaining redress for an international wrong is a question
which must be decided in each case upon the facts. If it may be
reasonably presumed from the circumstances surrounding the
assumption of control or from the length of time it continues that
the intention is to make it permanent, denial of such intention by
the controlling power should in no way interfere with the assertion
by the United States of its established policy or with its
insistence that the European aggressor immediately withdraw from the
territory or surrender its control.
In dealing with the cases as they arise the two essential elements of
the Monroe Doctrine must be constantly borne in mind; first, that
the doctrine is exclusively a national
policy of the United States and relates to its national safety and
vital interests; and second, that the European control, against
which it is directed, must possess the element of permanency, or a reasonable possibility of
permanency.
While occupation and conquest, as means of obtaining political
control over American territory by a European power, are acts of
that power alone, voluntary cession, as a means, is the mutual act
of the two governments which are parties to the transfer. As a
consequence the inclusion of voluntary cession among the acts of
acquisition, against which the Monroe Doctrine is directed,
introduces the necessary corollary that it may be invoked against an
American government as well as against a European government. It is
manifest from this that the Monroe Doctrine is, as has been said, a
national policy of the United States and also that it is not a
Pan-American policy. The opposition to European control over
American territory is not primarily to preserve the integrity of any
American state—that may be a result but not a purpose of the
Doctrine. The essential idea is to prevent a condition which would
menace the national interests of the United States.
In case it should become necessary to enforce the Monroe Doctrine
against another American republic, which has ceded or apparently
intends to cede any of its territorial rights to a European power,
the preventive action of the United States would appear to be a
direct interference with the sovereign authority of the American
republic over its own territory. Logically such action, in case a
cession is made or intended, amounts to an assertion of the primacy
of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. The primacy of one
nation, though possessing the superior physical might to maintain
it, is out of harmony with the principle of the equality of [Page 462] nations which underlies
Pan-Americanism, however just or altruistic the primate may be.
While, therefore, the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism may come
into conflict, the Monroe Doctrine will in case of conflict prevail
so long as the United States maintains the Doctrine and is the
dominant power among the American nations. The equality of American
republics and, in a measure, their independence are legal rather
than actual, but it is necessary to acknowledge their legal
existence, if the theory of Pan-Americanism is accepted. The Monroe
Doctrine, on the contrary, is founded upon no assumptions of this
character but upon a fact, namely, the superior power of the United
States to compel submission to its will whenever a condition arises
involving European control over American territory, which, because
of the permanent nature of the control, is considered to be a menace
to the national safety of the United States.
The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, should not be confused with
Pan-Americanism. It is purely a national policy of the United
States, while Pan-Americanism is the joint policy of the American
group of nations. The Pan-American policy may support and may
probably be considered as invariably supporting the idea of the
Monroe Doctrine in opposing the extension of European political
control over any portion of this continent. The reason, however, for
such support will not be the national safety of the United States,
but the mutual protection of American nations from European attempts
upon their independence. In its advocacy of the Monroe Doctrine the
United States considers its own interests. The integrity of other
American nations is an incident, not an end. While this may seem
based on selfishness alone, the author of the Doctrine had no higher
or more generous motive in its declaration. To assert for it a
nobler purpose is to proclaim a new doctrine.
As stated, this traditional policy, as originally declared and
subsequently defined, relates to European acquisition of political
power in America by means of occupation, conquest or cession of
territory. There is, nevertheless, another method by which such
power may be acquired, a method, which to-day can be more easily and
more successfully employed than those to which the Monroe Doctrine
has been in the past applied. It is a mode of extending political
power, which, in my opinion, has caused much of the confusion and
uncertainty as to the scope of the Monroe Doctrine because of its
gradual development and the failure to recognize it as in practical
conflict with that policy.
Within the past quarter of a century the rapid increase of wealth in
the United States and the great nations of Europe has caused their
people, in constantly increasing numbers, to seek investments in [Page 463] foreign lands. No richer
field has been presented than the vast undeveloped resources of the
republics south of the United States. Hundreds of millions of
dollars have been expended in these lands by the capitalists of this
country, Great Britain, France, Germany, and other European nations
in the construction of railways, the establishment of steamship
lines, the development of mines, the cultivation of cotton, fruits,
and other agricultural products, and the operation of various
industrial enterprises.
In the opening up of these countries and the development of their
resources their governments require financial aid, or seize the
opportunity to replenish their treasuries. Eager investors,
appreciating the natural riches of these regions and the
possibilities of reward to those who obtain the right to exploit
them, lend their money readily in exchange for special privileges,
concessions and large rates of interest.
The governments of many of these republics, impoverished and
improvident and frequently in the hands of unscrupulous and greedy
men, careless of the future and heedless of their country’s welfare,
borrow beyond the limit of their capacity to repay, hypothecating
every possible source of national revenue for years to come. As a
result some of the smaller American republics, ruled by military
dictators or oligarchies, who have enriched themselves at the
expense of their countries, have become hopelessly bankrupt. In some
cases the United States, in others a European power, is the chief
creditor, to whose favor the insolvent nation must look for the
means to continue its political existence.
With the present industrial activity, the scramble for markets, and
the incessant search for new opportunities to produce wealth,
commercial expansion and success are closely interwoven with
political domination over the territory which is being
exploited.
The European power, whose subjects supply the capital to install and
operate the principal industries of a small American republic and
furnish the funds upon which its government is dependent, may, if it
so wishes, dominate the political action of the American government.
To state it in another way, a European power whose subjects own the
public debt of an American state and have invested there large
amounts of capital, may control the government of the state as
completely as if it had acquired sovereign rights over the territory
through occupation, conquest or cession.
The question, which is unavoidable, but which can only be answered
after mature thought for it is pregnant with difficulties and with
seeming departures from the time-honored policy of the United
States, is this—
[Page 464]
When by reason of commercial and financial domination a European
power becomes undoubted master of the political conduct of an
American republic, is a condition presented which may justify the
United States in applying to it the Monroe Doctrine with the same
vigor, with which it would have applied the Doctrine if the European
power had by force or treaty established a protectorate over the
American republic?
If the conditions are compared, it is evident that in both cases a
European nation has extended political control over American
territory; and in both cases the element of permanency is present.
They are to all intents identical in their results, though they
differ in the means by which the results were obtained.
The United States would certainly oppose the surrender by an American
republic of all or a portion of its sovereignty to one of the great
powers of Europe. It would be a voluntary and peaceable act of the
republic, but it would be manifestly contrary to the Monroe
Doctrine. If voluntarily and peaceably an American republic becomes
so financially dependent upon a European power that the latter
controls the government of the former, is not that also contrary to
the Monroe Doctrine? Is not one case as great a menace to the
national safety of the United States as the other? If there is a
practical distinction between the two cases, what is that
distinction? If there is no practical distinction, why should the
Monroe Doctrine not be applied to both?
These questions suggest the following:
Has the time arrived, as a result of modern economic conditions in
Central and South America, when the Monroe Doctrine, if it is to
continue effective, should be restated so as to include European
acquisition of political control through the agency of financial
supremacy over an American republic?
If a more radical change of policy than the one suggested by the
foregoing query seems necessary and advisable under present
conditions the question to be answered may be stated thus:
Should a new doctrine be formulated declaring that the United States
is opposed to the extension of European control over American
territory and institutions through financial as well as other means,
and having for its object, not only the national safety and
interests of this country, but also the establishment and
maintenance of republican constitutional government in all American
states, the free exercise by their people of their public and
private rights, the administration of impartial justice, and the
prevention of political authority from becoming the tool of personal
ambition and greed, the chief enemies of liberal institutions, of
economic development, and of domestic peace?
[Page 465]
Stated in a more general way the question is this:
Do not the modern ideals and aims of government in the United States
require us to abandon the purely selfish principle, which has so
long controlled our policies in dealing with other American nations,
and to adopt more altruistic and humanitarian principles, which will
be in harmony with the sense of fraternal responsibility, which is
increasingly dominant in all our international relations?
In the presentation of these questions there is no intention to
advocate a particular policy in dealing with the international
affairs of the Western Hemisphere. They are submitted solely for the
purpose of suggesting possible changes in the Monroe Doctrine,
either conservative or radical, which will be more in accord with
modern ideals and conditions. It appears to me to be necessary, in
order to avoid confusion and contradiction in the future conduct of
affairs of the Department, to determine definitely whether the
Monroe Doctrine should remain unchanged, should be restated, or
should be superseded. Uncertainty as to the policy, which this
Government intends to pursue, will undoubtedly cause embarrassment
when special cases are presented for action. The subject, in my
judgment, should receive prompt and careful consideration.
