Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume II
861.00/2900½
The President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council (Masaryk) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary: I beg to submit these Notes on the Memorandum of September 27th.71
I am [etc.]
Some Notes on the Memorandum of September 27th, 1918
After a careful perusal of the Memorandum, and after a comparison with the Statement of August 3rd,72 I come to the conclusion that the Memorandum gives only general direction, but that it radically changes the Statement of August 3rd; in this respect the question arises as to why is the Statement of August 3rd cancelled at a time when the whole situation, political and military, is changing so favorably.
I
The Memorandum very aptly emphasizes the difficulty of military activities west of the Urals, and expresses the view that our forces should retire to the eastern side of the Ural Mountains. Not long ago (Agreement with General Janin, September 21st) I myself viewed the possibility of retiring over the Urals, but only in case the Germans should conclude a military agreement with the Bolsheviks, and send their regular forces against us.
I need not say that I would not dare to decide such a strategical question here far from the scene of action; the military situation [Page 389] changes now almost every day, and new possibilities may arise while this is written. If, for instance, Bulgaria should leave the Austro-German Alliance, and, perhaps, even join the Entente, if Turkey should follow Bulgaria, and if Rumania should again declare war upon the Central Powers, (which she probably would do in case of Bulgarian and Turkish defection), the situation on the Volga would change radically. The Germans could hardly spare troops to send against us in such a case; and should Rumania move either against Hungary or in the Ukraina, our army, properly armed, could reach even Moscow. Of course, all this rests on many if’s—but such is the kaleidoscopic situation which does not allow me to make a definite decision in this, primarily a military matter.
Moreover, I should consider it necessary to hear the opinions of our Commander-in-chief, General Janin, who is now on his way to Vladivostok, and of the Allied Commanders, now acting in Siberia, before I could come to the definite conclusion that the territory west of the Ural Mountains should be abandoned. The Memorandum gives no date for this proposed retirement; I therefore understand that a definite decision on this point is left for the future.
I know too well the history of the ill-reputed Austrian Military Court-Council, deciding strategical problems from Vienna, to be tempted to follow such course and try to make decisions on strategical questions here in Washington, thousands of miles away from the battlefield. The question of retirement over the Urals is a strategical one; the responsible commanders must decide when and in what manner—whether at once or in étapes—the retirement is to take place; perhaps it may be advisable not to surrender the Urals to the enemy at once, but to retire from Samara say to Ufa, and keep the passage over the Urals. All these questions of strategical detail must be left to responsible commanders.
The same applies to the question as to where to retire in Western Siberia.
The Statement of August 3rd accepts the westward move of our troops, and the strategical aid of the Allies has been planned in accordance with it; the Memorandum changes this one all-important point, arguing that military activities west of the Urals are impossible. In my opinion they are not quite impossible, if our troops get in time the necessary arms and ammunition and help in general; such activities will be made more possible if the Allies send some larger military assistance. I understood from the Statement of August 3rd that the United States would not send larger contingents, but that does not exclude other troops in such moderate numbers as would work no injury to the Western front.
[Page 390]II
The Memorandum says that the Germans should not be allowed to get supplies from Western Siberia. That is a very sound contention; but it is for the very same reason that we are trying to keep Samara; the region of the Volga (Samara-Saratov) is the best in all Russia. That is a well known fact. I have no statistics of this year’s crop in that region, nevertheless I emphasize the great importance of Samara (being also a junction of the Turkestan Railroad).
III
At any rate, the suggested retirement of our troops, as I understand it, is not made a condition of the United States’ help. The Memorandum states that the supplies cannot be sent west of the Urals. If I am right, the supplies are now sent to Vladivostok (or via Fusan to Harbin?) and then by the railroad to the west; if the materials can be brought to e. g. Chelyabinsk it should be possible to bring them a little farther to Ufa. Anyhow, the problem remains: to hold the Siberian railroad, and by that Siberia in general.
IV
The particular question of Murmansk and Archangelsk I can omit, as it does not directly concern, our troops; I only would point to the fact that the Memorandum in this respect changes the Statement of August 3rd; but the question concerns the Allies.
V
From the Memorandum I infer that it has been drawn up without a consultation with the Allies; that puts me in a rather singular position. The Statement of August 3rd says that the action of the Allies will not be restricted by the United States and that they may use their own independent judgment in matters concerning Russia (Siberia): is that statement still valid?
VI
I hinted at the question of tactics: how will the Germans and Austrians take the voluntary retreat from Russia? And how will it be accepted by the Bolsheviks?
The recent reverses of the Germans in the West and the promising developments of things on the Eastern front needs must lower the Germano- and Austro-philism of the Bolsheviks: I would use this change and try to detach the Bolsheviks from the Germans and Austrians; I would try to get paid for the retirement, to put it [Page 391] bluntly. That of course is not an easy diplomatic job, but I would try anything to help our common cause. I explained clearly enough my views of the Bolsheviks; I do not agree with them and their tactics, but, if I may use one of President Wilson’s utterances . . . I would speak even with the devil. It is my conviction that the attitude of the Allies towards the Bolsheviks has been a wrong one from the beginning; it was and is not right to withdraw from Russia and leave her and the Bolsheviks entirely to the Germans and Austrians.
VII
I regret that the Memorandum proclaims the succor to the Russian people as impracticable; such a radical change from the stand of the Statement of August 3rd will have a very bad effect on the Russian people, if it becomes known, and will be used by the Central Powers against all of us. I am myself critical enough in the question of Russia’[s] ability soon to rally, but I am far from being as sceptical as the Memorandum appears to be. But here again I am touching at a sore point—the lack of a uniform and clear plan of the Allies and the United States concerning Russia.
The Statement of August 3rd provides for help to the Russian people on a large and generous scale; it makes three promises to Russia: a) support for organization of self-defense, b) support for restoring her self-government, and, c) a very elaborate plan of economic and administrative commission is put forward. The Memorandum cancels these economic and humanitarian plans; from the short wording of the Memorandum it can be inferred that the support for organizing self-defense even in Siberia is now denied,—I do not make such a radical deduction, but the enemies will be sure to make it. I approve of a critical attitude towards some phantastic promises to organize a great Russian Army in a short time; and yet I myself think that a considerable Russian force could be organized in a few months,—at any rate, an attempt must be made in that direction. As I understand it, such an attempt made at least in Siberia will not contradict the Memorandum.
I presume that this Memorandum will not be published; but, as I asked, it should be sent to General Janin. I am sending him these Notes, asking him to devote his whole attention to the suggested plan of retirement over the Urals. That, with the restriction of the Murmansk and Archangelsk operations, and the abandonment of Russia (proper) to herself, seem to me to be the salient points of the Memorandum.
- See Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. ii, p. 394, footnote 2.↩
- Ibid., p. 328.↩