Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume II

861.00/2602½

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Washington, August 18, 1918 .

My Dear Mr. President: On Friday, the 16th, I asked the Japanese Ambassador to come and see me in regard to a report that Japanese troops were being sent to Manchu-li on the Manchurian border not far from Chita, the western junction of the Eastern Manchurian and Amur River railways. He evidently anticipated the purpose of the visit for he brought with him a telegram from his Government. The substance of the telegram he sent to me last night, and I enclose it to you. He also said that the Japanese Government were sending between 3,000 and 5,000 troops to Manchu-li and that these troops were part of forces stationed in Manchurian garrisons further south.

I am also enclosing a letter from the French Ambassador on the Siberian situation which is in substance a repetition of statements made to me on Saturday morning.

To complete the documents in the case I am appending a telegram from Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy, under date of the 15th, and also a report by General Dietrichs in command of the Czechs at Vladivostok, forwarded by Consul Caldwell on the 15th.⁵⁹

A careful consideration of the facts as disclosed by these communications convinces me that the situation is developing in a way which differs considerably from the plan originally determined upon and compels a consideration of the policy which should be adopted in reference to the new conditions presented.

I believe that the evidence points to an intention on the part of the Japanese to send a larger number of troops to Vladivostok than the 13,500 already sent, while I feel sure that they will increase the force operating at Manchu-li in the event that the pro-German troops should be superior. Of course they assert that the Manchurian force will not go beyond Chinese territory, but in view of the importance of the Chita junction I am not sure that that is not their objective.

We are informed that on July 7 Irkutsk was captured by the Czecho-Slovaks, that between that city or between Lake Baikal and the Chinese border there are about 25,000 of the opposing forces largely composed of armed German and Austrian prisoners, and that that section of the railroad is entirely in their hands.

We are also informed that Czech troops, estimated variously at from 2,000 to 6,000, have reached Harbin from Vladivostok, which is apparently an utterly inadequate force to push westward to Irkutsk in the face of the largely superior numbers near Manchu-li.

In addition to this the Germans and Austrians and the Red Guard are in strong force (estimated 80,000) north of Vladivostok along the Amur, so that it will require all the Czechs remaining in the city together with the allied forces landed to resist an attack on that port.

The question seems to be, therefore, what course should be taken to open a way to relieve the Czecho-Slovaks in Western Siberia. Under present conditions a military advance westward seems practically impossible. I do not see how we can permit a deadlock to continue, because to do so would destroy the whole value of the enterprise and seriously imperil the lives of all the Czechs west of Irkutsk, who will if captured be treated as traitors.

Frankly I think that the situation is getting beyond our control and that unless we revise or modify our policy to meet these new conditions we will be placed in a very embarrassing situation, especially so if any disaster should occur to the Czechs in the west.

I think, too, that whatever is to be done to relieve the Czechoslovaks must be done speedily since winter will set in within eight or ten weeks and the rigorous climate will cause great suffering unless we can reach them with supplies, of which, we are informed, they are so sorely in need.

I am not prepared to offer advice in the matter but I do feel that we must assume that Japan, with the pressure of the present situation together with the undoubted approval of the Allied Governments, will assert that military conditions require her to send a much larger force both to Vladivostok and to the western border of Manchuria.

If the Japanese Government indicate their purpose to take such action, what ought we to say?

If we reach the conclusion that Japan will follow this course in any event, would we or would we not be in a better position to control the situation in the future by asserting that present conditions require Japan to send sufficient troops to open the railroad to Irkutsk and to keep it open so that we can send supplies to the Czechs?

I raise these questions for consideration only and not as an expression of opinion. My only suggestion is that the situation calls for prompt consideration.

Faithfully yours,

Robert Lansing

[Enclosure 1]

The Japanese Ambassador (Ishii) to the Secretary of State

Washington, August 17, 1918 .

Dear Mr. Secretary: As I promised you yesterday I beg to send you herewith enclosed a short sketch of what I explained to you verbally about the situation in the border town of Manchuli.

Yours sincerely,

K. Ishii

[Subenclosure]

The Japanese Foreign Office to the Japanese Ambassador (Ishii)

The forces of the Soviet, virtually under command of the armed German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners, have recently pressed back the Semenoff’s troops to the borders of China. Part of the town of Manchuli has been bombarded by them and the Japanese residents numbering some two hundred fifty have been compelled to take flight to the town of Hailar. The Chinese troops stationed at Manchuli were powerless to cope with the Soviet forces and only succeeded by means of a compromise to check their invasion into the town.

It is further reported that part of the Soviet forces seem to have penetrated into the Chinese territory, proceeding eastward around the north of Manchuli.

[Enclosure 2]

The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State ⁶⁰

Washington, August 17, 1918 .

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Referring to our conversation of this morning I beg to confirm that my Government has received somewhat serious news as to the situation of the eastern section of the Tcheck army in Siberia.

Part of this section (2,000 men we are told) moving west in order to join the western branch of the army has reached Kharbine. Their objective is now Tchita which is apparently the key to the situation, is an important railroad junction and is a strong position where the germano-bolshevik resistance is powerfully organised.

General Dietrichs, General Paris (who is French) and the Japanese staff have exchanged views and come to the conclusion that the contemplated advance is not possible unless the Tchecks are immediately reinforced by Japanese divisions.

My Government cables, that great as is their desire to abide without change by the views of President Wilson and not to trouble him with new proposals, it seems impossible to them not to place the facts before him, and ask whether he does not think that something should be tried.

It is certainly necessary to leave troops in Vladivostok so as to defend the rear of the Tcheck army, and destroy the threat resulting from the enemy’s being strongly established north of Khabarovsk, where it holds the line of the Amur. The Allied contingent will suffice for this task.

At Kharbine the Tcheck troops are at a stand still, owing to the very serious risk of being worsted by an enemy stronger than themselves and established in a region easy to defend.

That something should be done is rendered more evident, in our eyes, by the advanced season and the danger of the disorganisation and destruction of the several Tcheck groups scattered along the railroad.

It does not seem possible, under present circumstances to take Tchita and to progress towards the Baikal and Irkoutsk, that is to realize the very objective of the action agreed upon, without immediate and powerful reinforcements. These should amount, as we take it, to 3 or 4 Japanese divisions. Would the President agree to such an increase?

I commend this problem, my dear Mr. Secretary, to your immediate attention and I should be much obliged if you were so good as to let me know as soon as possible what are the views thereon of the President.

Believe me [etc.]

Jusserand

[Enclosure 3—Telegram—Paraphrase]

Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)⁶¹

U. S. S. “Brooklyn,” August 15, 1918—2:16 p. m.

It is requested that the assistance to Czechs by American and other forces to be extended to Manchuria front and Baikhar region instead of being confined to Ussuri front. This is in reference to Communication from General Dieterichs and Czechs-Slovak forwarded by Consul to the State Department this date. Unable to learn where impression originated that assistance proposed is to be limited to any one area but in some way this impression has become widespread and appears to be generally accepted. It is even believed that American Forces are to remain at Vladivostok. It is possible that Japanese Officials know something not known to myself, and have communicated it confidentially to others.

The Czech General has asked for information and stated that all his plans depended upon the knowledge of cooperation to be expected. In replying to same, I informed him that I did not have any information beyond that given in the United States Government proclamation.

59. For the latter, see Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. ii, p. 346.
60. Filed separately under file No. 861.00/2600½.
61. Filed separately under file No. 861.00/2597½. Admiral Austin M. Knight was commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet.