It seems to me that in all the confusion of statement and conclusion
surrounding the Russian situation the following propositions are reasonably
clear:
First, that Germany hesitates to employ in Russia armed forces in
sufficient number to subjugate the land but desires—as clearly indicated
by a consistent course of conduct in Ukrainia, Finland and the Baltic
Provinces—to establish so-called governments of law and order which are
too weak to support themselves in the great class struggle but which may
be maintained and controlled by German force.
Second, that through such governments Germany hopes to control and
utilize Russian resources and, if possible, Russian man-power against
the Western Allies in this war, and to conclude the war with Russia
completely under the economic dominion of Germany.
Third, that forcible Allied intervention opposed by the Soviets would be
essentially analogous to what Germany is doing in the Ukraine, in
Finland and in the Baltic Provinces.
Fourth, that such intervention unless welcomed by the great mass of the
Russian people would be destructive in principle of the entire basis of
President Wilson’s democratic war policy.
Fifth, that forcible Allied intervention, if uninvited by the Soviet
power, will certainly be opposed and will result in civil war.
Sixth, that forcible Allied intervention can not be justified upon
grounds of military necessity, and will not prevent but will hasten and
make easy the consummation of Germany’s war aims in European Russia.
Seventh, that American economic co-operation with Russia will open the
way for effective Allied intervention with force and the creation of an
actual fighting front opposed to Germany in Russia.
The recommendations enclosed herewith are stated with as much brevity as
possible.58
[Enclosure]
Statement of Recommendations Concerning the Russian
Situation
American Economic Cooperation With Russia
i.—russia will welcome american assistance in
economic reconstruction
America’s democratic war aims are such as to make allied intervention by
force in Russia inconceivable unless desired by the great mass of the
Russian people. Thus far there has been no expression
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of any such desire, but there is now
presented in the invitation coming from the responsible head of the
Soviet Government for America’s coöperation in economic reconstruction,
the opportunity for taking a vitally important preliminary step toward
complete economic and military coöperation in the creation of an
effective Eastern front. This suggestion should be considered solely as
a war measure, uninfluenced by altruistic concern for the Russian
people.
The Russian people and their leaders are learning by bitter daily
experience the necessity of organizing resistance to German power. When
the peace written by Germany at Brest-Litovsk was signed the condition
of the old army was such that it was utterly incapable of resisting any
organized force. Demobilization was the first indispensable prerequisite
for the creation of an effective force with which German power could be
opposed. The next step is the reconstruction of the economic situation.
Modern armies cannot survive unsupported by economic and industrial
organization.
It was upon the plea of the necessity for economic reconstruction that
the peace, frankly described as shameful, was accepted. The leaders of
the Soviet Government realize that their social-economic revolution must
fail, and that Russia will inevitably fall under the complete domination
of autocratic Germany unless immediate and effective assistance in the
reconstruction of economic life can be obtained. Their faith in the
formulas of International Socialism naturally repels the suggestion of
friendly cooperation with so-called Imperialistic and Capitalistic
Governments, but the compelling realities and necessities of life have
led in this case, as in many others, to readjustment and compromise.
Hence the present suggestion coming from the responsible head of the
Soviet Government which is an earnest request for America’s cooperation
in the internal reconstruction of economic life.
It is my sincere conviction, if this suggestion is acted upon and such
economic reorganization is accomplished as is needed to equip and
support a revolutionary army, that such an army can and will be formed
and that in such event the assistance of armed forces of the Allies will
be gladly accepted by the Soviet Power. This Power can not be expected
to countenance Allied intervention until convinced that the intervening
force will not be used to destroy it.
ii.—general purposes of an economic commission
The aims of an Economic Commission sent to Russia to coöperate in the
problem of economic reconstruction will be—
- First. To so reconstruct commercial distribution as to assure
the consumption of Russian resources in Russia where they are
vitally
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needed, thus
preventing such resources from being used for the support of the
German people and the German armies.
- Second. To control the use and disposition of surplus
resources and through such control to prevent such use in the
service of Germany.
- Third. If possible to re-establish trade with Russia upon a
basis which, while facilitating economic reconstruction in
Russia, will at the same time furnish to the Allies for use in
England and France necessary products shipped from Russia via
Archangel, which otherwise would necessarily be brought to
England from more distant ports requiring longer voyages and
consequently a greater use of tonnage.
- Fourth. To convince the Russian people that the interests of
Russia and the Allies in overthrowing German autocracy are
identical, and that American assistance is given solely with a
view to hastening the day when Russia will be able to aid the
destruction of the German menace.
- Fifth. To encourage and assist in the organization of a
voluntary revolutionary army, creating behind such an army the
necessary organization for its economic support.
- Sixth. To convince the leaders of Revolutionary Russia,
whoever they may be, that the Allied Governments have no
imperialistic purposes in Russia and will gladly send forces to
assist the Russian people in opposing the aggression of German
force; and through coöperation with these leaders, to obtain
their consent to sending Allied troops which in coöperation with
Russian forces may be sufficient to reestablish the Russian
front.
- Seventh. To obtain an accurate understanding of the
fundamental social forces at work in Russia and to keep the
American and other allied governments advised of the actual
facts controlling the development of the Russian, social,
economic and political revolution.
iii.—the economic problem
Russia is not suffering so much from a lack of resources as from the
break-down of the ordinary processes of distribution. The Russian
peasant finds himself with a large quantity of grain and a large amount
of depreciated paper currency. If he takes his grain to the local center
of trade he finds none of the necessities of his life for sale, and can
not exchange his grain except for more depreciated paper money.
Consequently the grain is not brought to market. In several instances
where shipments of manufactured articles needed by the peasants have
been sent to villages, theretofore suffering from the lack of grain,
abundant supplies of grain have at once been brought from the
surrounding country by the peasants to be exchanged for the manufactured
articles.
While this is typical of the situation in many provinces, other
neighboring provinces are facing famine conditions because of crop
failures or other reasons, and have no grain with which to sow their
fields or to feed their people. In a district near Samara, the handling
of such a situation was attempted by the local peasant’s coöperative
society. Going to the peasants who lacked the seed wheat with which
[Page 369]
to sow their fields, this
organization proposed to procure the necessary seed-wheat, provided the
peasants would advance the price of the grain which the society promised
to deliver within a fixed period of time. Many of the peasants, ignorant
of all methods of business involving even the simplest form of credit,
refused this offer made solely in their own interest. A unit of the
American Friends Society, which has been doing excellent work in that
district, determined to bridge the gap; and sending a man to Omsk found
no difficulty in purchasing the necessary seed-wheat, and after
procuring the same transported and sold it to the peasants without loss
in a majority of cases.
Meanwhile, the factories in the industrial centers have in many cases
continued their operations and have produced manufactured articles that
are lacking in the country districts. In illustration: The J. M. Coates
Company, which produces 60 per cent of all the cotton thread produced in
Russia, and which has large factories in Petrograd, continued its
operations up to the end of February, 1918, and at that time had on hand
the largest stock of manufactured products its books had ever shown.
Owing to difficulties of communication, transport, and hauling, the
distributing branch of the business had not been functioning. That
efficient production is possible under Soviet rule has been demonstrated
by the experience of the International Harvester Company which has
largely increased its producing efficiency during the past six months
under Soviet rule. This experience was made possible through tactful
handling of a very difficult situation which resulted in effective
coöperation from the Soviet authorities who in order to get results were
willing when faced with the practical necessities of the situation, to
modify the rigid formulas of their economic theory. No doubt the
experience of this company is exceptional, but the tactful handling of
daily problems as they arise through a competent American Economic
Commission will be the most effective method of accomplishing similar
results in like cases.
iv.—government cooperation
Obviously nothing can be accomplished without the coöperation of
governmental power. The commission must, therefore, go if it goes at
all, willing to deal with the leaders of Revolutionary Russia actually
in power, without regard to their principles or formulas of economic,
social, or political life, so long as such leaders sincerely desire to
recreate forces in Russia which will be used in resisting the force of
German arms. Seeking such cooperation, the members of this commission
will be asked to advise regarding problems of a most practical and
controlling nature. They will be able to exert powerful influence to
prevent large commercial transactions with Germany. All of this
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work will from necessity be
done under Government control and protection. Their advice re-enforced
by the uncompromising facts of life will lead inevitably to the
modification, adjustment, and softening of the hard and impossible
formulas of radical socialism; and because of the necessity of finding
it, a practical basis for progress will be found. The Russian Revolution
has now reached the stage where it is to be controlled, not by theory,
but by the unyielding necessities of life. This fact is becoming each
day more clear to the radical socialistic group now in control of the
Soviet Government.
It is apparent from the informality of the suggestion inviting American
coöperation that formal recognition of the Soviet Government is not a
necessary prerequisite to coöperation. Acting upon this informal
invitation, a commission can proceed to Russia and be placed in direct
touch with the entire situation without further formality.
American coöperation will give the Allies effective and controlling
influence upon the internal situation. Such coöperation will be able to
direct the forces supporting the Soviet Power against Germany. If
effective, coöperation will ultimately compel the continued utilization
against the Russian people of tyrannical German force, thus preventing
German coöperation and increasing the bitter resentment against Germany
which is steadily gaining ground in Russia. If the economic life of
Russia can be sufficiently organized to make possible the support of an
effective army, this growing resentment will surely crystallize in the
organization of an army which will effectively oppose the German menace
in Russia.
v.—organization of commission
Through coöperation with the Government the work of such a Commission
will be concerned with:—
- (1)
- Railway control, management and operation;
- (2)
- Reorganization of credit and finance, governmental and
commercial;
- (3)
- Commercial distribution of grain and manufactured articles in
exchange for grain;
- (4)
- Food administration and control;
- (5)
- Shipping and foreign trade, with particular reference to
Allied war needs;
- (6)
- Industrial management and control in co-operation with
labor;
- (7)
- Reorganization of manufacturing and coal mining
industries;
- (8)
- Development of agriculture;
- (9)
- Prevention, or utilization, of speculative markets;
- (10)
- Education;
- (11)
- Propaganda.
[Page 371]
To accomplish substantial results the most competent organizing and
technical ability will be required. Members of the Commission must be
men of liberal views and sympathetic understanding, capable of meeting
fact conditions with practical ability to achieve results under
difficult and complex circumstances.
Under the control of the Commission it will be necessary to create an
extensive organization with representatives in all important centers of
Russian life. For this purpose the distributing and sales organizations
of large business concerns, both American and English, which have
heretofore been organized in Russia and which are now in danger of being
disorganized should be utilized and reorganized to meet the actual
demands of the situation. There are many such organizations in Russia
as, for instance, the New York Life Insurance Company, the J. M. Coates
Company, and the International Harvester Company.
The organization thus created by the Commission will co-operate in the
various local centers with various Russian agencies, including the local
Soviets, the Peasants’ Co-operative Societies and the local Zemstvos
where they are functioning. Thus the commercial and industrial needs
necessary for re-creation of commercial life may be effectively
ascertained. Through co-operation in railway management the opportunity
will be created of transporting manufactured goods from the place of
production to the place of consumption. The Commission will be able to
control the disposition of manufactured goods by the use of American
credit and upon transportation of such goods to the local centers will,
with them, be able to control the disposition of large food
products.
These products should of course be primarily used for consumption in
Russia and will be transported to the centers where food products are
lacking. Any surplus will be available for export.
If export trade with the Allies can be re-established upon such a basis
as to result in economic use of tonnage in bringing from Archangel
products required in England and France it should be possible in
exchange for these products to ship to Russia agricultural and other
tools and machinery and manufactured products. This trade should be in
the absolute control of the Commission, so that the distribution of the
goods sent to Russia will be, in so far as possible, under the control
of the Commission. With American credit and American goods the
Commission will be able to control the disposition of Russian resources,
vitally needed by Germany. In this connection it is encouraging to note
that there are authentic reports to the effect that Germany has been
endeavoring to make large purchases of American bank notes for the
purchase of grain from the Ukraine peasants. This fact indicates that
Germany has not at her
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disposal the goods required by the Ukrainian peasants for which they
would be willing to exchange their grain. Effective organization
combined with the use of American credit and the control of American
goods should effectively prevent the commercial exploitation of Russia
by Germany during the balance of the war.
The work of this Commission will be so extensive that the burden of
responsible supervision should not be placed upon any of the departments
of the Government already so greatly overburdened with work. In order to
meet this situation and at the same time to obtain proper co-ordination
it is suggested that a separate and independent department of the
Government be created under the Overman Act; that at the head of this
department there should be a man enjoying the absolute confidence of the
President, who shall be responsible only to the President; that there be
associated with him representatives of the various Government
departments having vital interests connected with the prosecution of the
war which may be related to the work of the Commission.
The Commission should be responsible only to this independent department
and, through it, responsible to the President. This department should be
granted an appropriation by Congress adequate to effectively carry on
its work. The very large amount of money which will be required is
indicated by the character of the work to be done.
Independent facilities of communication in cipher should be established
between the Commission and the department to which it is to be
responsible.
Time is of the utmost importance. The Commission should be organized as
quickly as possible and should proceed to Russia via Archangel so as to
reach the center of European Russia without unnecessary delay.
Raymond Robins
July 1, 1918.
