867.00/804½a
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: I had yesterday two conversations in relation to Turkey which are worthy of consideration because any possibility of alienating an ally of Germany ought not to be ignored even if accomplishment is doubtful.
In the morning Mr. Elkus’19 private secretary (Mr. Alsberg, I believe) called to see me and I spent some time questioning him as to conditions in Turkey. He left Constantinople on April 6th and, therefore, brought the latest information.
He said that the food situation was as bad as it could possibly be, that he thought 200,000 people were starving in the city, and that in the interior the condition was even worse; that the people were most anxious for peace but without leadership could do nothing; and that all classes were bitter against the Germans who were being gradually removed as officers in the army.
He said that even the Government was becoming irritated at the arrogance of the Germans and feared German control after the war; that they did not want to become a vassal of Germany; that they saw in American capital the only hope of rebuilding their ruined fortunes and desired to remain on friendly terms but were compelled by the Germans to break off relations, which increased Turkish ill-feeling [Page 18] toward the German Government. Alsberg said that he believed the Turks would listen to terms of a separate peace if they dared.
I asked him what prevented them, and he replied the Goeben and Breslau, which were anchored before Constantinople with their guns trained on the city, and that to the Turks the preservation of Constantinople was the all-important thing, that he believed that they would give up Palestine, Syria and Armenia in order to hold Constantinople, even though it were under a practical protectorate like Egypt.
He believed that it was possible, on account of the attitude of Turkey toward the United States, for us to approach the Turkish Government with suggestions for a separate peace, and that it might be brought about if the German cruisers could in some way be destroyed by bombs or other means.
When he spoke of the Turkish Government he referred of course to the Triumvirs, Enver, Talaat and Djemel, who possess practically absolute power. He felt that these three were beginning to chafe under German control and to resent the insolent manner in which they were being treated, while the possibility of rebellion among the Turks was increasing as a result of the famine and suffering of the people.
I had been impressed with these statements, when Mr. Morgenthau20 came to see me in the afternoon and said that he had been thinking over the situation and believed that the time was ripe to make secret overtures to Turkey for he was sure that by this time the Turkish leaders were heartily sick of their German masters.
I asked him why they submitted and he said that the cruisers and some of the forts were in the hands of the Germans, which prevented the people from acting against the Government, and the Government from acting against the Germans. He said that he believed if the three Turkish leaders were properly approached (meaning undoubtedly by bribery or promises) he thought that they would allow some submarines to enter the Dardanelles and destroy the German vessels, and that if that was done and the Turks relieved of their fear of the Germans, they would be willing to make peace on very favorable terms for the Allies.
I asked him how he would get in touch with Enver, Talaat and Djemel. He replied that he believed that he could do it by going himself to Switzerland where two members of the former Turkish Cabinet were at the present time, men, whom he knew intimately, to whom he could talk freely, and who would act as intermediaries. He said that he did not court this service but was willing to under-take [Page 19] it if it seemed desirable. He suggested that we (he and I) confer with Mr. Balfour on the subject. I told him that I would think it over and if it seemed feasible would communicate with him later.
Of course it would be a tremendous blow to the Central Powers to have Turkey withdraw as no doubt Bulgaria would be forced to follow the same course. But has this plan the slightest prospect of success? It seems very doubtful, and yet, if the chance was one in fifty, I think it should be taken, but has it that chance? Of course we could well afford to spend a large sum to accomplish such a result. To make the attempt would cost very little. Is it worth trying? That is, is it worth while to send Morgenthau to Switzerland and let him make the attempt?
The other day I asked Mr. Balfour what chance he thought there was of making a separate peace with Turkey. He replied that he had nothing very definite on the subject, but that he had been advised that they were “nibbling” and that Bulgaria was also.
This may be the opportune time, but I am not at all sure that it is. The only thing is that I do not like to leave any stone unturned which will lessen the power of Germany, and I have therefore felt that I should submit the matter to you in detail for your consideration.
Faithfully yours,