861.00/1894½
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: I have had another séance with Lord Reading on the question of intervention in Russia, during which he read to me the enclosed memoranda.49 These I agreed to submit to you.
In a previous interview I pointed out to him that the proposed intervention in Russia had become divided into two problems, the Siberian and the Murmansk, and that they seemed to me to require separate treatment; that the question of intervention in Siberia depended upon the certainty of military benefit which as yet was not evident; and that intervention by way of Murmansk was different since it was a question of ability to land a sufficient military force.
The British Ambassador, acting under instructions from his Government, persists in seeking to have us unite with Great Britain and France in the endeavor to obtain from Trotsky a request that we intervene on the condition that we obtain from Japan a declaration that the territory occupied would be restored to Russia without conditions after the war.
I pointed out to Reading that this confusion of the two problems was unfortunate, that I did not perceive how the conditional entry into Siberia by a Japanese force had anything to do with the occupation of Murmansk and the railway south, and that while intervention through the port of Murmansk might be desirable, intervention through Vladivostok or Harbin was very questionable in view of [Page 361] the inexpediency, if not the impossibility, of a Japanese force advancing farther west than Irkutsk.
Lord Reading said that he had already advised his Government as to my statement that the two problems were distinct and should be treated separately, but that he had not had a reply.
I told him that I could see no objection to securing a request from Trotsky that we should intervene via Murmansk, but that I was not at all sure we would gain anything by a request as to a conditional Japanese intervention in Siberia since to act upon such a request would array us against Semenoff and the elements antagonistic to the Soviets. I said that if we took hold of either one or the other horns of the dilemma we probably would find ourselves in hot water.
In view of the present situation do you think it wise to advise Francis to unite through unofficial channels in obtaining from Trotsky a request for us to intervene by way of Murmansk? I do not feel that we should go further than this at the present time and I am not sure that this is expedient in view of the uncertainty of Trotsky’s power. To bring Japan into the question seems to me to be unwise at the present time.
Will you please give me your opinion as to the course which should be taken?
Since writing the foregoing I have received the enclosed telegram from Ambassador Sharp.50 Probably you have also received a copy.
Faithfully yours,