861.00/1433½a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson 47

My Dear Mr. President: If the reports, which persist, that the military prisoners in Siberia are being organized under German officers and have succeeded in occupying Irkutsk are confirmed, we will have a new situation in Siberia which may cause a revision of our policy. It would seem to me, therefore, that we should consider the problem on the hypothesis that the reports are true and be prepared to act with promptness.

The occupation of important points in eastern Siberia by a German military force and the helpless state of the Russians to resist the extension of the German power place the situation on an entirely different basis from the one presented by the chaotic state caused by [Page 358] quarreling Russian factions. The presence of the Germans and the possibility of their control of Siberia becomes a real menace to the peace of the Far East. The situation of Irkutsk is such that the Germans, if masters of the place, might invade Manchuria and obtain control of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

In view of these facts I do not see how Japan could be expected to refrain from taking military measures to resist further extension of the German power, nor do I think that we could reasonably oppose their resistance to the German advance in that region. In fact I believe that in the circumstances Japan will act whether we approve or not. Would it then be the better policy to approve or to be in opposition to Japanese intervention?

With the actual control by the Germans of so important a place as Irkutsk the question of the moral effect upon the Russian people of an expedition against the Germans is a very different thing from the occupation of the Siberian Railway in order to keep order between contending Russian factions. It would seem to be a legitimate operation against the common enemy. I do not see how we could refuse to sanction such a military step.

The question presented, if intervention in Siberia seems advisable, is whether Japan alone or the Powers arrayed against Germany acting jointly should constitute the expeditionary force employed to overthrow the German power. I think that we must concede that in any event the burden of this task must fall upon Japan. No Power has forces available for this undertaking sufficiently strong to be a real factor in achieving the end desired. Furthermore Japan seems to be opposed to joint action. In the circumstances are not Japan’s sensibilities more important than the sensibilities of the Russian people?

If the reports turn out to be correct will we lose anything by making Japan the mandatory of the Powers, and giving approval to her sending an expeditionary force into Siberia to oust the Germans and to restore Russian authority in that region?

Ought we not to adopt this policy in the event that Irkutsk is actually controlled by the Germans?

I think that the situation requires careful consideration and a policy should be adopted in advance because no time ought to be lost to meet and offset the German activities in Siberia, if the reports prove to be correct.

Faithfully yours,

Robert Lansing
  1. This paper bears the notation: “This was returned to me 3/26/18 by the Prest who said that he quite agreed but did not think the situation yet warranted change of policy R L.”