861.00/1165½b
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: I have had, this afternoon, interviews with the British and French Ambassadors in relation to Japan’s desire to occupy Siberia with a military force.
[Page 354]Lord Reading informed me that he had seen you and had given you a copy of a secret telegram which he had received from Mr. Balfour and of which I received a copy this morning and append to this letter.38
The French Ambassador gave me the substance of a telegram which he had received from his Foreign Office containing a summary of a telegram they had received from their Ambassador at Tokio. This latter is to me of especial interest in view of the avowal of Motono39 to declare publicly the disinterestedness of Japan and also the pledge to carry on military activities as far as the Ural mountains—that is, to the confines of Asia. This memorandum I also enclose.
I also would call your attention to the enclosed telegram from Stevens, at Yokohama, which may not have attracted your attention, but bears directly on the present subject.
In discussing the matter with the French Ambassador, who was my first caller, I told him that I fully appreciated the attitude of the Allied Governments in regard to Japan and that it would appear Japan intended to act in any event. If that was so it was merely a question as to whether it was better to make Japan the mandatory of the other powers or to permit her to act independently, as I doubted the advisability of protesting in case she sent a military force into Siberia.
The Ambassador asked me in case it was decided that Japan should act at the request of the other powers whether the United States would be a party.
I told him I thought there was serious difficulty in the way—chiefly that such an agreement as was proposed would amount to a treaty and that would have to be submitted to the Senate, where there were several strongly anti-Japanese Senators who would oppose it. I said further that in case action was taken by the Allied Governments I felt we should not be asked to take any part.
The Ambassador seemed disappointed at first but he said finally that he fully understood the difficulty and also the opinion which I urged that it was better for us and more in accord with our general policy to not join in such an agreement.
When Lord Reading called I told him substantially what I had told the French Ambassador. He seemed to feel that in view of the telegram which the French Ambassador had received a new phase was put upon the problem and that if Japan was willing to make public such a declaration it might be the best policy to make her the mandatory of the Allied Powers.
[Page 355]He said further that he fully agreed with my view as to the inadvisability of an agreement on our part which would compel Senatorial consent.
Since we talked over this matter yesterday I do not know as the conditions have materially changed, but certainly the French telegram has thrown a new light upon it and I think we should carefully consider whether or not we should urge the Allied Governments not to make Japan their mandatory.
My own belief is that Japan intends to go into Siberia anyway and that it might be a restraint upon her if she should make a declaration such as Motono proposed. So far as this government is concerned I think all that would be required would be a practical assurance that we would not make protest to Japan in taking this step.
As the whole matter is of vital importance and requires immediate action if any is to be taken I would be gratified if you would give me your views and guidance at the earliest possible moment.
Faithfully yours,