Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume II

763.72 Su/99

The Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 19, 1920 .

Sir: I have the honor to submit, herewith, my report on the Supreme War Council.

A duplicate copy has been handed to the Secretary of War.

Very respectfully,

Tasker H. Bliss

[Enclosure]

The Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 6, 1920 .

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the general operations of the Supreme War Council to which I was attached, by direction of the President, as the Permanent American Military Representative.

I.—American Mission of 1917 to Europe; Report of December 18, 1917; Forecast of the Military Situation for the Spring of 1918; Minimum Demands of the European Allies for American Effort in 1918; Recommendations for Absolute Unity of Command, Etc.

In the last days of October, 1917, I went to Europe as a member of the American Mission of which the purpose was to obtain as exact information as possible in regard to the existing conditions in the Allied Nations prosecuting the war against the Central Powers, and the bearing of those conditions on the most effective effort which the United States could make as an Associated Power in that war.

The Mission sailed from Halifax at 10:15 a. m. on October 30th, 1917, on two American warships,—the Huntington and the St Louis—escorted by the destroyer Balch. On November 4th the American destroyer Downs was picked up at the stationary tankship Arethusa and joined the escort. When off the south coast of Ireland, and nearing the British Channel, the destroyers Cushing, Davis, Wilkes and Sampson met us on November 6th and escorted the warships to the harbor of Devonport. Before reaching port, at 4 p. m. on November 7th, a British destroyer joined us and escorted our vessels through the minefields protecting the harbor of Devonport. We reached the dock after dark, at 6 p. m. of November 7th, and landed at 7:30 p. m. A special train was awaiting the Mission with high officials representing the British Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the War Office, who accompanied us to London, where we arrived about midnight of the same day.

It will thus be noted that our arrival in England was coincident with the creation, on the same day, of the Supreme War Council at the Conference of Rapallo.

The Government of the United States, on November 17, 1917, gave its adhesion to the Supreme War Council and Mr. House and myself were designated as the civilian and military representatives of the United States on it. In those capacities we attended the first meeting (after the Conference of Rapallo) of the Supreme War Council at Versailles on December 1st, 1917.

On arrival in London and, subsequently, in Paris, I devoted myself to obtaining all possible information in regard to the then military situation and condition of the Allies.

At that time I had formed certain views in regard to the composition and functions, as they were then generally understood to be, of the Supreme War Council, but which, not long afterwards, I found, as the result of experience, to be erroneous. But, guided at the time by these views, I requested Mr. House to obtain permission for us to return to the United States and submit our reports embodying the results of our Mission, before settling down to our work with the Supreme War Council. As a matter of fact, I then hoped (though I am now glad that my hope was not realized) that the President, as the result of our reports, would recommend to his European associates a change in the constitution and functions of the Supreme War Council.

Accordingly, we left Paris with the American Mission at 9:30 p. m., December 6th, 1917, arriving at Brest at 12:55 p. m., December 7th, 1917. On the same day we sailed from that port at 3:45 p. m. on the U. S. S. Mt. Vernon, convoyed by the U. S. S. San Diego and for two days by the destroyers Warrington, Monahan, Smith, Preston, Roe and Reid. We landed in New York in the afternoon of December 16th, 1917, and arrived in Washington at 12:05 a. m. on December 17th, 1917. On December 18th, 1917, I submitted the following report to The Honorable Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War:

“December 18, 1917.

“Memorandum for the Secretary of War:

“Subject: The Efficient Application of American Military Power in the War.

“1. When the American Mission headed by Mr. House left the United States it was understood that its object was to ascertain, in conference with representatives of our Allies,^* the most efficient way in which all the resources of our country,—military, naval, industrial, commercial, economic,—could and should be brought to bear, in behalf of ourselves and in aid of our Allies, in order to bring the present war to the promptest and most successful conclusion.

“The following statement represents the views of the military member of the Mission, in complete accord with those expressed by his colleagues of the Inter-Allied Conference (of which the American Mission was a component part) and on the Supreme War Council, by the Chiefs of Staff and members of the General Staffs of the Allied armies on the Western Front, and by the Commanders-in-Chief in the field. These views are supported by the independent opinions of the political representatives of the countries which thus far have borne the brunt of the struggle on this front and who must be supposed to know the spirit of morale of their civil populations.

“And it may be said in advance that these views are unanimous in the belief that military efficiency, under existing conditions, means promptness; that much delay, whether avoidable or not, may be disastrous in its consequences. Therefore, from our own point of view, it is the part of wisdom to get in without much delay, or—stay out altogether. The latter is unthinkable; and so, if any one, influenced by consideration of minor difficulties, of minor deficiencies, of the unalterableness of previous programmes of construction and equipment, and provision of transportation, says that to get in without much delay is impossible, the only reply is that we must do the impossible.

“2. By the time the Mission reached Europe a decided change had occurred in the Allied military situation. The collapse in Russia had become so complete that, in the opinion of both political and military men, she must be left out of consideration as even a passive agent working for the Allies. This was plainly stated in the remarks of Mr. Lloyd George at the conference of the American Mission with the British War Cabinet and Heads of Government at 10, Downing Street, November 20; at the conference of Mr. House and General Bliss with M. Clemenceau and General Petain at the French War Ministry, November 25; and at the session of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, December 1. And it was emphasized by all military men without exception.

“Moreover, the full extent of the disaster in Northern Italy was known only after our arrival in England. This, without their ability to put new troops into the field, had obliged the English and French to withdraw, each, six^† of their best divisions from Flanders and France for service on the Italian front with the almost certainty that they would not be able to get them back and that they would ultimately have to send more after them.

“These facts made it seem evident that the speedy arrival of American manpower would be the first question that would come up in the solution of the problem of the most efficient utilization of our military resources in the war.

“3. On reaching London it was found that General Sir William R. Robertson. Chief of the British General Staff, and other important officers were absent in Italy. But conferences with the Secretary of State for War (Lord Derby), the Deputy Chief of Staff (Major General Sir D. Whigham), the Master-General of the Ordnance (Major General Sir W. T. Furse), the Quartermaster General (Lieutenant General Sir J. S. Cowans), the Adjutant General (Lieutenant General Sir C. F. N. Macready), the Director General of Movements and Railways (Sir W. G. Granet), the Surveyor General of Supply (Andrew Weir, Esquire), the Director of Military Operations (Major General F. B. Maurice), the Director of Military Intelligence (Major General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh) and with other military men and high officials of the civil government, revealed an anxiety due to the backward state of our military equipment in various essentials and our slow rate of movement of troops.

“Before leaving Washington the suggestion had been rather strongly made that the movement of our troops to France be suspended and that the corresponding tonnage be utilized in carrying food and other supplies to nations in need of them. My original opinion as to the effect of this was confirmed by what I heard on all sides from military and civil officers. Of course I did not intimate that such a suggestion had been made. But no conversation on the subject of our participation in the war could go very far without bringing up the burning question of tonnage. Frequently in such conversations emphasis would be laid on the necessity for tonnage to transport food and other supplies. But whenever I asked what would be the effect if this necessity caused a cessation in our troop movements the invariable reply was that the moral effect, especially in France, would be disastrous.

“In view of the various suggestions that had been made to me as to further assistance that might be given by England and France in completing our initial equipment, it seemed clear that the problem would soon resolve itself into one of transportation. Brigadier General Williams, Chief of Ordnance in France, and Brigadier General Rogers, Chief Quartermaster, had been ordered to report to me in London. On their arrival I composed an informal board, consisting of themselves and Brigadier General Lassiter, who was then in London on temporary duty, together with myself, to study the whole question of equipment in the light of the information which I had brought from Washington and the question of tonnage. Assuming that a certain demand would be made for an American force by the end of the next spring the British Department of Movements was requested to make a new study, in the light of their own experience and of our actual operations to date, of the shipping data which had been prepared in the office of the Embarkation Service in Washington. As the assumption made by me in regard to the American force to be there by the month of May next makes demands upon shipping probably beyond the limit of possibility, no further reference is here made to the English study which, however, is attached hereto.¹ It need here be only stated that this English study seemed to conclusively show that certain additional tonnage would be necessary in order to maintain in France the troops estimated in Washington as being brought to that country by the month of May and to accumulate for them the necessary reserve.

“4. Meanwhile, the British Chief of Staff, General Robertson, had returned from Italy. Pending completion of data in respect to equipment and transportation I had had two interviews with him in which he had listened but had said very little. On the 14th of November he asked me to confer with him at his office to give him the exact data as to our preparation of equipment, and the transportation of troops.

“I explained to him in detail the military situation in the United States and, so far as we are concerned, in France. I gave him as exactly as possible the state of our equipment for each division as it would arrive in France from now to any time in the month of May next, including the troops now in France. I showed him the data as revised by the English shipping people, from which it appears that by the month of May next, including troops now in France, we could, with the facilities now at our disposal, transport not more than 525,000 men, including non-combatant forces; that without additional tonnage we could not supply even that number of men, much less accumulate the necessary reserve supplies of all kinds for a campaign.

“I showed him that if we could have the shipping for the above purpose we could have in France by the month of May twelve (12) divisions well equipped, with the assistance now being given by the French and English, with divisional, corps, and army artillery and necessary ammunition.^*

“He expressed grave apprehension at this statement. He told me that he doubted whether Italy could be held in the war during the coming winter; and that should she remain in, it would require the presence of considerable troops from the English and French forces on the Western front to be maintained in Italy for the remainder of the war.

“He said that the French man-power was going down and their divisions must be consolidated in order to maintain the remaining ones at proper strength because replacement troops cannot be found for this purpose; that for this reason and because of the withdrawal of French divisions to send to Italy their forces would soon be reduced by the number of ten (10) or twelve (12) divisions below the number now holding their line. He said that England likewise must send a certain number of divisions to Italy and she would have great difficulty in maintaining the remaining number on the Western front.

“He added that the Russian situation was such that the probability had to be faced at any moment of the withdrawal of a large part of the 130 divisions of Germany and Austria then on the Russian front and transferring them to the Western front. To offset all this there seemed from my statement nothing in sight except twelve (12) American divisions and that number at a critical time next spring and, even that number, contingent on securing additional shipping.

“He was of the opinion that the state of the French morale, both civil and military, required the prompt presence in France of a large American force, and the general impression left in my mind by his statement of the case was that a military crisis is to be apprehended if we cannot have in that country next year by about the end of the spring a very much larger combatant force than seemed possible to me at the time of our interview.

“General Robertson said that we must not count on a campaign of 1919 and of reserving our efforts for that year; that the surest way to make it impossible was to count on it; that to insure a campaign of 1919 every possible effort must be made early in 1918; that if it were good for America to wait it would be bad for Germany to let her wait; that events on the other fronts were so shaping themselves as to make it quite sure that Germany would concentrate a powerful additional force somewhere on the Western front for a decisive blow; that the man-power of England and France together could probably not be increased and that they must rely on us for additional strength; and that, for this purpose, we must make every effort to get not less than four Army Corps, or twenty-four (24) combatant divisions in France as early in the year as possible.

“I said that I assumed he meant not merely men, but properly equipped soldiers: that even with additional tonnage it would require till the beginning of next summer to bring over twelve such divisions reasonably equipped; that it would be late in the year, even without any fall-down in our scheduled deliveries, before we could equip the remaining divisions.

“He said that England and France could give us and doubtless would give us much greater assistance in the way of artillery equipment than they had promised, providing only that our troops were in Europe and not at home. He said that they could not take the chance of embarrassment resulting from formal agreements to help in the equipment of troops whose arrival was a matter of the indefinite future; but that if our divisions were in France,—if an emergency arose, if they saw our divisions ready to take their place in the line but prevented by lack of this or that, they would surely find means to equip us out of their reserve supply accumulated to meet just such an emergency. He stated further that even if not equipped with their artillery our divisions could be of the greatest service; that the personnel of French divisions was seriously depleted while their artillery remained at normal strength, and that we could fight in front of the French artillery; and, finally, that this depletion in personnel would probably require the consolidation of a number of divisions in the early part of the year, thus rendering a certain amount of artillery surplus which could be turned over to us.

“In short, he urged that our divisions be sent over as rapidly as possible after completion of their infantry equipment, it being assumed that this would still give them time for necessary disciplinary instruction and training.

“5. The British Chief of Staff having spoken thus freely and earnestly, the other principal officers of the War Office spoke with the same freedom and all to the same effect, viz: That America must make the greatest possible effort early in the year 1918.

“The views of the military men outlined above were confirmed and emphasized in the remarks of the Prime Minister at the Conference of the British War Cabinet and the American Mission, held at 10 Downing Street, November 20th. Among other things he said:

. . . . . . .

“‘. . . It is better that I should put the facts very frankly to you, because there is the chance that you might think you can work up your army at leisure, and that it does not matter whether your troops are there in 1918 or 1919. But I want you to understand that it might make the most vital difference.’

“In the above will be seen lurking the startling idea that even with our added man-power Mr. Lloyd George, optimist though he be, feared the possibility of being able only to resist a German attack without inflicting on them a decisive defeat.

“Finally he said:

“‘To summarize what I have said as to the most important spheres in which the United States can help in the war. The first is that you should help France and her Allies in the battle-line with as many men as you can possibly train and equip, at the earliest possible moment, so as to be able to sustain the brunt of any German attack in the course of next year . . .’

“It will be noted that Mr. Lloyd George referred to the necessity of our sending at the earliest possible date as many men as we could ‘train and equip’. He did not know that the various Ministers of Munitions were then considering a plan by which we would be enabled, if we accepted their plan, to complete our equipment in artillery by using material to be furnished by England and France and without waiting for the production of the manufactured articles at home.

“6. So the problem of American military participation in the war began to shape itself as follows:

First: Men, as many as possible and as soon as possible;

Second: Provision of artillery equipment and ammunition for these men as they arrive in France;

Third: Tonnage necessary to transport them.

“It may be assumed that with any possible tonnage that can be made available, the men will be ready to be moved. The problem, therefore, became one of shipping and equipment of artillery and ammunition. If the view of General Robertson, the British Chief of Staff, be accepted, lack of artillery equipment should not delay the movement of troops. Moreover, this question was to be taken up with the Ministers of Munitions and the American Munitions representatives, with good hope of a solution of the difficulty, but not until after arrival of the Mission in Paris.

“As to the subject of tonnage, after numerous conferences with the representatives of the shipping interests, it seemed evident that full consideration would not be given to this subject until there could be submitted to them the unanimous judgment of the responsible military men as to the minimum effort which the United States should make in the provision of man-power and supplies therefor, and the time within which this provision should be made, as a military measure of prime and vital importance.

“The views of English military men (except that of their Commander-in-Chief in the field) as well as of their important civilian officials, were known and were as stated in the foregoing. Unfortunately, representatives of the other Allies were not in London, and their views could not then be obtained.

“7. Prior to leaving England the following matters were considered and as satisfactory arrangements as possible made:

(a) The use was secured of already prepared British camp sites, as near as may be to Southampton, for all the troops that we can send through England, up to the personnel of a division. The use of these facilities to that extent may require us to establish our own ferry service from Southampton to Cherbourg and Havre and to provide convoy. Heavy freight could not be sent by this route, unless we could use Southampton as our port of arrival.

(b) Arrangements were completed for delivery by the British of enough 6” Newton Stokes Trench Mortars to equip 12 divisions by May 1st, with some but not enough ammunition. Fifty-two 8” howitzers and twelve 9.2 howitzers were obtained for delivery before May 1st, with ammunition. Two batteries of these howitzers (4 guns each) were ordered to be delivered at once from stock on hand in France, for instruction. The Master General of the Ordnance stated that they would consider (probably favorably), should we so desire, providing all the troops that we may send to France with the 3” and 6” trench mortars.

(c) I found that the question of an agreement for replacement by us of English steel used in filling orders for the equipment of our troops in France had become a serious one and there was danger of these orders being held up. In reply to my cable on this subject the Department advised me that while all possible assistance would be given in this matter, it would not be practicable to transport steel to England in the same manner as to France, that is, as part of cargo going to France.

“This led me to discuss with Admiral Benson the best use to be made of our deep-draft transport fleet now going to Brest. No cargo can be carried to that port. These vessels have had to go to Southampton for coal. Thus they have had to run through the ‘danger zone’ three times; whereas, if they went direct to Southampton they would pass through the ‘danger zone’ twice, would have the facilities of a good port for quick discharge and a quick turn-around, and could utilize their cargo space for steel billets to meet our obligations to England. Lord Derby told me that the arrangement would be so advantageous to them that there was no doubt as to our securing the use of Southampton for this fleet. At the time, this suggestion met the approval of Admiral Benson, but later, after an inspection of the port of Brest he concluded that it would be wise to continue the use of that port, believing that arrangements could be made that would obviate the necessity of going to Southampton to coal. This, however, still leaves us with the disadvantage of vessels having cargo carrying capacity going to a port to which they can carry no cargo.

“I think this matter is worthy of further consideration.

“8. The Mission arrived in Paris on the night of Thursday, November 22nd. The one essential thing that remained to be done there was to learn, First, what was the minimum demand that our Allies would unite in making on us for man-power and the approximate date when it must be available? and Second, what would be our state of equipment for this man-power?

“Only with an agreement as to these things could an intelligent demand be made for the necessary tonnage. And among those interested in this latter problem there seemed to be a general agreement that, when it should be known what the military situation demanded, not merely to win success but to avoid disaster, the necessary tonnage would be made available however difficult it might be.

“According to General Pershing’s Priority Schedule, the following five transportation phases are suggested, each consisting of one corps, its combatant army troops and service of the rear troops:

1st	Phase	220.000
2nd	“	267.000	or	487.000	total
3rd	“	246.000	“	733.000	“
4th	“	232.000	“	965.000	“ (24 divisions and service of the rear troops).
5th	“	226.000	“	1,191.000	“

“According to the estimates made by the experts in the office of the British Director of Movements we should be able with present tonnage to land one Corps in France with Auxiliaries complete, 220,000 men, by January 7 and two Corps complete, 487,000 men, by May 15. But, due to the fact that the animal-carrying capacity of the animal transports is not duly proportioned to the man-carrying capacity of the troop transports, we would not get the animals of the 1st Corps to France until March 15th, nor those of the 2nd Corps until September 11th. Moreover, the cargo ships as listed are not capable of supplying the daily needs and building up a 90 day reserve of supplies for a force arriving as fast as the troop ships can bring them.

“At first, it is true, cargo capacity is large in proportion to troop capacity and, on this account, a small reserve will exist for a time: but by the middle of March, 1918, the cargo capacity will only be just sufficient to maintain the troops that are then in the country (about 375,000 men) and so could neither supply daily needs of an increasing number of troops nor help build up a reserve.

“Thus, if no additional tonnage whatever can be supplied we must convert some of our troop transports into animal transports, so as to bring animals to France in proportion to men, and when the time comes that our cargo ships can only just maintain the troops in the country (which will then be about April 10th), we will have to stop the flow of troops until a reserve can be built up.

“Assuming, however, that we can get about 150,000 additional tonnage in operation by January 1st, that after April 10th we will add about 11,000 tons capacity per week, and that we make the conversion of troop into animal transports referred to above, then we should be able to get the 1st Corps with Auxiliaries complete to France by about January 10th, and the 2d Corps by June 15th. If then we continue to add cargo transport at the rate of 11,000 tons per week our 3d Corps should be in France by November 10th, and the 4th Corps by April, 1919.

“It was evident that, if the views of the other Allies as to the supreme military necessity of our man-power on an effective scale at an early date should be those held in England, the slight addition of tonnage mentioned above would not approach the actual requirements.

“9. November 23d and 24th brief interviews were had with the French Minister of War, the Assistant Chief of Staff and his immediate subordinates (the Chief of Staff, General Foch, being still absent in Italy), General Petain, who had come from his Great Headquarters at Compiègne to be present at the Inter-Allied Conference, and others.

“On Sunday afternoon, November 25th, a conference was held, at the written request of M. Clemenceau, in his office at the Ministry of War, at which, besides himself, there were present General Petain, Mr. House and myself.

He began by saying that he would get straight to business and discuss the subject of the conference, to wit, the effective strength of the French Army in its relation to the arrival of American troops. He then requested General Petain to make a statement of the case.

General Petain said that the French losses have been approximately 2,600,000 men, killed, died of wounds, permanently incapacitated, and prisoners; and that he now had at his disposition 108 divisions, including all troops both those on the front and in reserve. These are in addition to the men of all classes in the service of the rear. Eight of these divisions, he said, will have been transferred to Italy by the beginning of the year, leaving 100 for service in France.

“He stated that these divisions are not more than 11,000 strong, each, giving him a disposable force of not more than eleven hundred thousand men. The English, according to him, have in France and Flanders sixty divisions which, as their divisions approximate 20,000 men, each, gives them a force of approximately twelve hundred thousand men.

(Note: According to . . . information received in London the English have in France sixty-two Infantry Divisions kept hitherto at full strength of 18,825 men, and five Cavalry Divisions at 7,343 each. This makes a force of a trifle over 1,200,000 men.

The normal strength of a French Division is 15,000 men. Their total, therefore is 400,000 men below strength and they have no more that they can or are willing to call out.)

“He further stated that the English with this force are occupying a front of about 150 kilometers, while the French, with a less force were occupying about 500 kilometers.

(Note: It is to be noted the English front has been characterized by constant hard fighting while a considerable part of the French front has been quiescent since the early days of the war. Conflicting views come from English and French sources on this subject of the relative extent of fronts. At the War Office in London I was informed that only with the greatest difficulty could they prevail on the French to let them have additional front; at this interview M. Clemenceau said (to use his own words) ‘We have a devil of a time to get them to take more front.’ While in Paris I was informed that it had been agreed that the English should extend their front by some thirty kilometers further to the south. From information obtained after this interview, I learned that the front occupied by the British was 181 kilometers and that held by the French was 561 kilometers.)

“General Petain estimated that on the German front there was an equal number of troops but that there was no means of determining with accuracy how many disposable men the latter had in the rear.

(Note: The English estimate of relative strength on the Western front is more favorable to the Allies, not taking into account disposable forces that may be in the interior of the Central Powers nor reinforcements that may be brought from the Russian front. The 82 German divisions facing the 100 French divisions are equivalent to 1,066,000 Germans against 1,100,000 French or, as General Petain said, about man for man. But the 68 German divisions facing the 62 English Infantry divisions (excluding the 5 Cavalry divisions) are equivalent to 884,000 Germans against 1,167,150 or, a superiority in favor of the British of 283,150.)

“He thought that it was possible that the Germans might be able to transfer from the Russian front as many as 40 divisions if they were not held there by active operations on the part of the Russians and Roumanians, of which there was little hope.

(Note: As a matter of fact, the Russian situation will probably permit the transfer of a larger force. About the end of November, 78 German and 25 Austrian divisions were reported on the Eastern front. This amounts to a total of 1,3390,000 men. Moreover, there are some 1,500,000 prisoners in Russia who will be released by a treaty of peace. It will take several months to bring them home and many of them will be required to take up work now performed by Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria. But, if the War College estimate in its Strategic Summary of October 17th, 1917, is correct, there were at that time in the interior of Germany and Austria a total of 2,450,000 men under training. Thus, it would appear that if the Central Powers believe that the time is at hand for a supreme effort they can mass a formidable force against the point of attack.)

“In reply to the question as to how many American troops he desired to have available at a fixed date, General Petain replied that as many as possible should be there as early as possible, but that they should be soldiers and not merely men. It being explained to him how desirable it was that we should have an approximate definite number by a fixed date in order to make our negotiations with those who must provide the necessary tonnage, he stated that we must have a million men available for the early campaign of 1919, with another million ready to replace and reinforce them. Asked, how many we should have in France for a campaign in 1918, he said that this was answered by fixing the number for the campaign of 1919 since, in order to have this number for the latter campaign they would have to arrive at a fixed rate from this moment and extending throughout the year 1918; the number that would thus have arrived at any fixed date in the year 1918 was all that he could ask for that date. He explained that for the campaign of 1918 he would utilize the American troops in holding those parts of the line on which he would not make an offensive, thus relieving the French troops now there and making the latter available for an offensive elsewhere. In order to carry out this plan, he stated that we should move troops to France at the rate of two divisions complete per month with corresponding service of the rear troops, until about the 1st of May, when the rate should be increased to three divisions a month and continued thus through the year.

“During this interview General Petain spoke with an evident lack of readiness and positiveness. Subsequently, when I visited him at his headquarters at Compiègne, he said that he had been summoned to the conference without warning and not knowing what was to be discussed. When I told him of the views that had been expressed to me in England he said very earnestly that the sooner we could get our troops to France properly equipped the better. He confirmed General Robertson’s belief as to our getting more assistance in artillery equipment than we had anticipated if our troops were in France instead of at home. For this reason he urged that our artillery regiments precede^* the other troops of their respective corps.

“10. At this conference of November 25th there was some discussion of the Supreme War Council as proposed by Mr. Lloyd George, its organization and functions. When asked as to how far they accepted it, both M. Clemenceau and General Petain expressed non-concurrence in it. General Petain held strongly the view that to accomplish real results the Council must have executive power and the right to exercise this power promptly. He said this power did not exist nor could it be exercised in a Council formed as proposed by Mr. Lloyd George. Asked by Mr. House whether a workable Supreme War Council could be formed by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armies on the Western front, together with the Chiefs of Staff (or their representatives) of those armies, the latter constituting a Committee on Strategy, he replied that this could be done were it not for the fact that there would still be no one person to carry into execution the will of this Military Council. Being asked by General Bliss whether this executive official might not be the President of the Council, to be chosen by the members thereof and with the power only to carry into execution the will of the Council, he replied that this could be done and being done such an arrangement would have his approval. He stated, however, that while, in planning an offensive a considerable time beforehand, there would be time for careful consideration and expression of the will of the Council, there might be emergencies requiring such prompt action that this executive officer could not be expected to do more than quickly consult the other members and then give very prompt orders.^†

“He gave me the general impression that he could see unity of control only in unity of command.

“Being asked whether M. Clemenceau and General Petain gave their approval of this general plan with the distinct understanding that it eliminated the Prime Ministers and other political representatives of the various Allied countries, they both stated that it was so understood by them.

“11. General Foch, the French Chief of Staff, having returned from Italy, informal conferences continued until November 29th. On this day, during the meeting of the Inter-Allied Conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Robertson, General Foch, General Pershing and myself withdrew to an adjacent room. I gave them a summary of the views that had been expressed to me by English and French military and political men with practical unanimity, as to the urgent, even vital, necessity of promptly bringing the military power of the United States into action with the minimum delay. I reminded General Robertson that he had told me in his office in London that I could, if 1 desired, quote him in a despatch to our Secretary of War as saying that he considered this as a vital necessity. I told them that the time was now come for them to say, having in view the possibilities as they saw them for the year 1918, how many American troops they required by a given date; and in answering this question, to keep in mind the state of our probable equipment. I said that when they answered this, I proposed to present the case, as one of military necessity, to the Inter-Allied Committee on Maritime Transportation.

“After a brief exchange of views, in which there was no difference, they said that the minimum effort to be made by the United States should be to put 24 divisions in France, the last to arrive not later than the month of June, 1918; these to be maintained at full strength and additional troops to be determined by the conditions of the campaign.

“I then asked these gentlemen—Generals Robertson and Foch—to make a full statement for the information of our representatives of the Shipping Board, reviewing the entire military situation, explaining the probable approaching emergency which that situation revealed and making clear the necessity for additional tonnage to move American troops to meet the emergency. I felt this to be most important because the problem had not as yet at any time been placed before the shipping people in definite terms, as one of emergency, and demanding priority in consideration.

“A further conference was accordingly held that same day at my apartments and the case was presented first by General Robertson and then by General Foch.

“Meantime, the Allied Ministers of Munitions, with Mr. Perkins the munitions representative from the United States, had finished an exhaustive study of the situation as to ordnance equipment and ammunition. They recommended the adoption of a program by the respective governments which would completely equip all American divisions as they arrive in France during the year 1918.

“The resolutions of the Ministers of Munitions embodying the foregoing were contained in my despatch No. 10 from Paris to the War Department.

“Finally, a new study had been completed by the board appointed by General Pershing on the subject of the tonnage necessary to move 24 divisions of troops, including all auxiliary services, to France by the month of June, next. I think that the tonnage estimated by this board is insufficient for the purpose, even on the assumption of certain reductions in the numbers of men and animals and supplies to be transported. However, it was the last word which I had received on the subject and I was obliged to use it.

“12. The case was now ready to be submitted to the Committee on Tonnage appointed by the Inter-Allied Conference. Accordingly, on the same day as my last interview with the British and French Chiefs of Staff, noted above, I addressed a letter to that Committee setting forth the unanimous demands made by the Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied armies on the Western front as to the minimum effort which must be made by the United States early in 1918 to meet an apprehended emergency. I stated the minimum amount of tonnage that ought to be at once provided and requested the Committee to give the matter immediate and favorable consideration. A copy of this letter is attached.²

“This letter was presented to the Inter-Allied Committee by Mr. Colby, representing the United States Shipping Board and who was a member of the Committee.

“I learned that when my letter was read, the Committee was about to adjourn with a pro forma report to the Inter-Allied Conference. Realizing the importance of the subject, they took further action and recommended in their report to the Inter-Allied Conference the creation of an Inter-Allied organization for the purpose of coordinating the Allies’ action in the matter of tonnage and of ‘establishing a common program, constantly kept up to date, enabling them by the maximum utilization of their resources to restrict their importations with a view to liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible for the transportation of American troops’.

“This, for the first time, proposes the creation of a Commission, the sole purpose of which is to obtain tonnage to meet the military requirements of the United States. The general opinion among shipping men was that such a Commission, having for its object the solution of this one problem alone, would find a solution for it and would provide the tonnage.

“One thing is certain and it must not for a moment be lost from mind. If we are to take any part in the war, now, or at any time within reasonable future limits, the tonnage must be provided and provided now. Even if we are not to fight until 1919, it will require every available ton of shipping in operation from this moment in order to get a reasonable force of our troops, together with their supplies, in Europe by the end of the year 1918. If we wait until toward the end of that year before making an effort to get the tonnage our troops will not be available for a campaign until the year 1920. It is inconceivable that we can wait so long. The Allies demand our troops now; our acceptance of the proposition of the Ministers of Munitions in Paris will guarantee, as far as such a matter can be guaranteed, the proper equipment of these troops in artillery and ammunition; we know approximately the amount of tonnage that is necessary to move them within the time demanded; all shipping men are agreed that with a full understanding as to the existence of the military necessity the necessary tonnage can be provided. Every day of delay, so long as the submarines continue in action as now, reduces the amount of shipping available. There should be no further delay. We ought to be able to determine very promptly the last ton of shipping that can be made available from vessels controlled by the United States. The difference must be made up by our Allies. But, whether we are to make a strong effort in 1918 or a still stronger one in 1919, the shipping must be made available now.

“I recommend that our Government take up at once with the Government of Great Britain the question of the immediate organization of a Commission to obtain tonnage for the transportation of American troops, as recommended by the Inter-Allied Committee on Maritime Transportation, and approved by the Inter-Allied Conference.

“Summary

Conclusions.

[“]1. A military crisis is to be apprehended, culminating not later than the end of the next spring, in which, without great assistance from the United States, the advantage will probably lie with the Central Powers.

[“]2. This crisis is largely due to the collapse of Russia as a military factor and to the recent disaster in Italy. But it is also largely due to lack of military coordination, lack of unity of control on the part of the Allied forces in the field.

[“]3. The lack of unity of control results from military jealousy and suspicion as to ultimate national aims.

[“]4. Our Allies urge us to profit by their experience in three and a half years of war; to adopt the organization, the types of artillery, tanks, etc. that the test of war has proved to be satisfactory. We should go further. In making the great military effort now demanded of us we should demand as a prior condition that our Allies also profit by the experience of three and a half years of war in the matter of absolute unity of military control. National jealousies and suspicions and susceptibilities of national temperament must be put aside in favor of this unified control; even going if necessary (as I believe it is) to the limit of unified command. Otherwise, our dead and theirs may have died in vain.

[“]5. The securing of this unified control, even unified command in the last resort, is within the power of the President if it is in anyone’s power. The military men of the Allies admit its necessity and are ready for it. They object to Mr. Lloyd George’s plan of Rapallo (which, however, I would accept if nothing better can be done) for the reason that, on last analysis, it gives political and not military control. I asked Sir Douglas Haig and General Robertson what would happen if the military advisers of the Supreme War Council recommended and the Prime Ministers accepted a military plan which the British Commander-in-Chief in the field and the Chief of Staff did not approve. They said that it would be impossible to carry it into execution without their approval; that they would have to be relieved and the advisers of the Supreme War Council put in control. In the present temper of the English people such an issue could not be forced without the probable defeat of the Government. In general, they hold that the problem now is a military one and that in some way unity of control must be obtained through an unhampered military council.

“The difficulty will come with the political men. They have a feeling that military men, uncontrolled, may direct military movements counter to ultimate political interests. They do not fully realize that now the only problem is to beat the Central Powers. They are thinking too much of what they want to do after the Central Powers are beaten. They do not realize, as the Central Powers do, that national troops as a body can only be efficiently employed in the direction in which national interests lie,—with, in this war, the sole exception of our troops which will fight best where they get the best military results. There need be no political fear that great bodies of English or French troops will be ‘switched off’ to help the territorial aspirations of the Italians, nor vice versa. It is not merely a political necessity, it is also a military one which any commander-in-chief must recognize, that the English Army must fight with its back to the Channel, the French Army must fight with its back to Paris, the Italian Army must continue to fight Austria in the only direction by which it can reach her. This does not prevent troops of any of the four—English, French, Americans, Italians—being detached in accord with some coordinated plan from their main army where they are less needed to operate on another part of the front where they are more needed. The English failure to accomplish results at Cambrai in the last days of November was likely due to lack of reserves which might have been thus furnished.

“But, even as to the political men, I think they may now be ready to yield to intelligent pressure. Probably no English or French Premier could, of his own motion, propose what would look to the man on the street (the man who overturns governments) like a deliberate surrender of control of some national interest. But it is not unlikely that those same Premiers are looking to the President of the United States to help them do, with the acquiescence of their peoples, that which they know ought to be done.

“And it would seem that the Allies would take in good part the exercise of this pressure by the United States now when they are making this great demand upon our resources.^*

“6. To meet a probable military crisis we must meet the unanimous demand of our Allies to send to France the maximum number of troops that we can send as early in the year 1918 as possible. There may be no campaign of 1919 unless we do our best to make the campaign of 1918 the last.

“7. To properly equip these troops, so that we may face the enemy with soldiers and not merely men, we should accept every proffer of assistance from our Allies, continuing our own program of construction for later needs, but accepting everything from them which most quickly meets the immediate purposes of the war and which will most quickly enable us to play a decisive part in it. This should be the only test.

“8. To transport these troops before it is too late we should take every ton of shipping that can possibly be taken from trade. Especially should every ton be utilized that is now lying idle, engaged neither in trade nor in war. The Allies and the neutrals must tighten their belts and go without luxuries and many things which they think of as necessities must be cut to the limit. Every branch of construction which can be devoted to an extension of our shipbuilding program, and which is not vitally necessary for other purposes, should be so devoted in order to meet the rapidly growing demands for ships during 1918. The one all-absorbing necessity now is soldiers with which to beat the enemy in the field, and ships to carry them.

Recommendations:

“1. That our military program for the first half of 1918 be the despatch to France of 24 divisions, the last to arrive not later than the month of June; these to be accompanied or preceded by the proportionate number of service of the rear troops.

“2. That the artillery troops precede the other troops of the corps, to receive instruction with such artillery material as may be available in France.

“3. That every effort, be made to secure the additional tonnage indicated in paragraph 1 of my despatch No. 10 from Paris to the War Department.

“4. That the Government of the United States concur in the resolution adopted by the Inter-Allied Conference in Paris by which an Inter-Allied organization is created to handle the question of shipping ‘with a view to liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible for the transportation of American troops’, as quoted in paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 10 from Paris to the War Department.

That the very best man obtainable in the United States should represent us on that Commission.

“5. That an exact inventory be taken of the capacity of all vessels now in use by the War Department and that before sailing a certificate be required that they are loaded to full capacity.

“6. That every effort be made to speed up completion of facilities at ports of debarkation in France. This, together with using fullest capacity of vessels, will, in the opinion of shipping men who have inspected these ports, increase in effect our present tonnage as now operating by from thirty to fifty per cent.

“7. That the Leviathan (the former Vaterland) be used as a station ship at Brest, if we continue to use that port for our deep-draft transport fleet. All troops from the other vessels can be berthed on her pending evacuation from that port.^* This will greatly hasten the turn around of the rest of the fleet. It will avoid the danger of a terrible disaster resulting from the torpedoing of a vessel carrying 10,000 men.

“8. That a careful study be made of the relative advantages of Southampton as the port of debarkation of the deep-draft transport fleet. This fleet cannot carry cargo to Brest. To Southampton it could carry steel billets to meet our obligations to England for steel used by her in filling our orders. Our other transports can do the same for France.

“9. That a more satisfactory and efficient plan for port administration in France be devised. It would seem that General Atterbury, assisted by a high-grade terminal expert at each port, could have entire control of discharge of transports, troops and cargoes, until men and supplies are delivered at their destination.

“10. That the resolution of the Ministries of Munitions, as quoted in paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 10, in respect to our supply of artillery and ammunition for all our troops arriving in France during 1918, be at once accepted with reference to every item with which we can be supplied more quickly in this way than by following our own program. Everything should be subordinated to the quickest possible equipment of our troops with its artillery.

“11. That, if tonnage requirements make it necessary, approval be given to the plan worked out by a Board of Officers under General Pershing for a reduction in the strength of a division from 27,000 men to about 22,500; the elimination of the cavalry; the reduction of the reserve supply from 90 days to 45 days, and increasing the number of troops sent via England to 30,000 per month.

“12. That, unless the division be materially reduced or its complement of artillery be materially increased, our General Staff study out a new combat scheme by which the four combatant divisions of a corps right together on the line, with reduced front and extended depth. The front occupied by a division in combat is determined by its power in artillery. An American division from fifty to one hundred per cent stronger in personnel than an English or French division, but no stronger than they in artillery, cannot cover its full division front.

“13. That the aviation program worked out in Paris, and which I understand is now on its way to the United States, be approved.

“14. That the tank program communicated in my despatch No. 12 from Paris be approved and every effort made to hasten it. In this war of machines this weapon has become all-important. The prolonged artillery bombardment to destroy wire entanglements before an attack makes a surprise impossible. It becomes possible through the use of the tanks and saves costly expenditure of ammunition. In the attack on Cambrai late in November (which would have been successful with a few more light tanks and reserves to follow the attack) it is estimated that the use of tanks to destroy obstacles saved 2,000,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, or more than the value of all the tanks engaged.

“15. That, having in view Conclusion No. 5, above, the Government of the United States represent to the other governments concerned the great interest which it has in securing absolute unity of military control even if this should demand unity of command; and that for this purpose the Supreme War Council be made a military council^* with the representation on it of the Commanders-in-Chief of the respective armies in the field, and their Chiefs of Staff or representatives.

Tasker H. Bliss,
General, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.”

The report is quoted in full because the problems to which it refers were the ones which, during the black days of 1918, engaged the most earnest attention of the Supreme War Council. And it is of passing interest to note the extent to which the forecast of the Military Situation of 1918 was actually realized:—the transfer of German divisions from the Russian front to the West; the spring drive; the culmination of the enemy’s efforts by the end of the spring; the crying need for American men—men—men, whether their training and equipment was completed or not; the demand for tonnage and the cordial willingness of the British authorities, when the crisis came, to provide the shipping for the transportation of American troops, etc., etc.

Two ideas in the report deserve more than a passing attention. The first one relates to the composition and functions of the Supreme War Council.

During my first visit to Europe I found an apparently invincible repugnance to the creation of an unified command. Military men, indeed, admitted its advantages—some, even, its necessity—but, practically, it was little more than an adhesion to the theoretical correctness of the principle. One and all believed that the peoples themselves would not consent to anything which would look (or could be made to appear) like the surrender, by one or another of them, of some national interest. Moreover, even with those who accepted the theoretical advantages, an impassable barrier was met when the question was asked, “Who, or what nation, shall exercise the supreme command?”

Those sentiments were, naturally, even stronger with the political leaders and would-be leaders.

But, those of us who believed that a spirit was at work, growing out of repeated disaster, which aimed at creating an organ for a sort of pseudo-unified control and command, thought at first that the Supreme War Council was intended to play this part. This was evident in all my interviews with military men during the months of November and December.

And it was only in that belief that in my first report I recommended in conformity with the general military opinion in Europe that the Supreme War Council be reconstituted and be composed of the military commanders-in-chief. This, to be sure, would not give unity of command because, as General Petain pointed out in our interview of November 25, there would be no one with unquestioned power to give orders to all the armies. But, it would be a long step towards unity of plans and coordination of movements, of which, theretofore, there had been a grave lack.

At that time few people realized—no one, apparently, except the much decried politicians themselves—that, in a great Alliance, back of all unity of command on the battlefield, back of every great strategical combination made by that unified command, there must be unity of national purposes, fully supported by each separate national will.

It was the general lack of this unity of national purpose and will in Alliances that caused Napoleon to say that he would rather fight two nations than one and, better still, three than two. And it was on this lack that the Germans for a long time, and justifiably so, placed their reliance.

It was the political leaders who first read aright the antecedent causes of the Italian disaster at Caporetto; who realized that it was unity of political control that might have warded off the Russian débâcle, might have prevented the Roumanian collapse and that would give its real value to unity of military control on the Western front.

Had the Supreme War Council attempted to work on any other theory it would have proved the final and fatal disaster of the war. But it did not do this. At no time did it attempt to make plans of campaign. It established a unified purpose, one on which the Allied and Associated Powers came to a common agreement, to be attained by a campaign waged by all the Powers, and left to the respective commanders-in-chief to prepare and execute the detailed plans for attaining the common purpose. It made no detailed plans for the opening campaign of 1918 but established a common policy which all the powers agreed upon as wise. This policy was expressed in detail and conveyed to the commanders-in-chief but it was never decided upon without full previous consultation with those commanders. There were some who thought that a failure to comply with one of these details of policy led to the initial disaster of March 21, 1918. The Supreme War Council in no way interfered with the plans of the local commander of the Army of the Orient at Salonika. It gave advice, based on a broader knowledge of the political and military situation in Europe; if the local plans called for additional Allied assistance it determined, after consultation with the military chiefs, whether such assistance could be given, or whether the local plans should, if necessary, be modified accordingly; it decided the approximate time when the general political and military situation warranted the final successful drive against Bulgaria.

Therefore, the great value of the Supreme War Council consisted in bringing together the political heads of the governments in constant and amicable discussion of the great problems of the war as seen from their point of view, and in causing each of them to consider these problems not only in the light of its own interest but in that of all the others,—that is, in the light of the common purpose of beating the enemy. It made this one unique in the history of alliances and enabled the Allied and Associated Powers, after many disasters that might have been avoided, after incalculable losses of men and money that might have been saved, to snatch victory from the very jaws of despair.

More than once, before the creation of the Supreme War Council one or another nation undertook a military project growing out of some national aim of its own. There might be unanimous objection on the part of the political and military leaders of the other nations; but they shrugged their shoulders and made no organized opposition because, perhaps, it might invite opposition when they wanted to make some such movement of their own. Could these political men have met and conferred, long before, as they began to do on December 1, 1917, it is not only conceivable but probable that they would have foreseen the approach and the causes of the great Russian collapse; that they would have devised a plan that would have relieved Russia of an unendurable strain before her people in despair broke all bounds, that would have retained a defensive Russian Army but one capable of a strong offensive unless the Germans maintained a large force on that front, that would have released millions of Russian peasants and artisans to produce the things of which the Allies had such need as well as to meet their own requirements and that would have relieved them from the intolerable burden which has sunk them in the gulf of Bolshevism. All this might have been done and still Russia could have played a more really effective part in the war than she did.

Such constant meetings of the Allied political and military minds would most certainly have stopped the Gallipoli adventure before it had passed the stage of a paper plan. It might have prevented the entry of Roumania into the war at the psychological moment to give Germany a great victory, with abundant supplies of which she stood in great need, reinforcing her own and depressing the Allies’ morale. Finally, it might have resulted in giving Cadorna the little that he needed to hold his advanced position rather than the larger forces they had to send in order to prevent the great disaster in Italy from becoming a fatal one, at a time when all their troops were needed on the western front to meet the approaching German drive.

It was for these reasons that, beginning with my actual service on the Supreme War Council, I modified the views as to its composition and functions which I had expressed in my report of December 18, 1917. If it was ever intended that the Council should work on the lines originally assumed by myself and many others, it was saved by its own conservative wisdom, by not interfering with the commanders in the field and by confining itself to matters of broad policy.

But I never changed my views as to the necessity of absolute unity of command.

The Supreme War Council, with its resultant unity of political control, partially opened the door leading to the unified command. The way was further paved by the discussions leading to the attempted creation of a general reserve to be controlled by Marshal (then General) Foch. Military men knew perfectly well that in the battle that was then approaching, success or failure depended upon the existence and the control of a general reserve. They knew that the commander of this reserve was to all intents and purposes an Allied commander-in-chief because, no separate commander could make a plan and execute it without knowing in advance what the commander of this reserve would do. Therefore, when these separate commanders-in-chief agreed to the creation of a general reserve they were surrendering in advance, perhaps without realizing it, their objections to an Inter-Allied commander-in-chief.

The processes of evolution which brought the Supreme War Council and the unified command into existence were long and difficult.

The war against the Central Powers was fought by a Coalition and, for purposes of war, coalitions are notoriously weak. No matter what, nor how vital, may be the common object which binds its members together, in the back of the minds of the political leaders there are other separate and national aims which they expect to attain from the common success. Often these aims are such that, prior to the war, insistence upon them would have separated the members of the subsequent coalition into hostile camps. And when the war comes and the coalition is formed and these separate—often selfish—national aims come more and more to the front there is a tendency to pull apart, an indisposition to coordinate efforts to a common end until, finally, one or another may see in a separate peace the better way to obtain its aims and the coalition is ruptured.

Napoleon was a great psychologist. He thoroughly understood the inherent weaknesses of national political human nature. His career, better than that of any other, illustrates the point now being emphasized. He himself, towards the end, fought coalitions with coalitions. In some of his campaigns he brought together under his single control a group of peoples, naturally hostile to each other, heterogeneous and dissimilar in national instincts and longings, but not so heterogeneous and dissimilar as the forces recently gathered from the ends of the earth—white, black, yellow and brown—to defeat the Central Powers. When he was successful in the management of such a coalition, his success was due to absolute unity of command and, as a consequence of this unity, coordination of effort. He had both political and military unity of control. He used the single undivided strength of his combinations to take instant advantage of whatever weakness may have been developed in the looser combination opposed to him. And when he failed, it was due to the same cause which held the Allied and Associated Powers together to the end, and which overcame any disposition of his opponents to pull apart and held them together to the bitter end—overwhelming and absolute fear. No nation any longer trusted him. They all feared him. They knew that it was their ruin or his. None could have the slightest hope that by a voluntary separate peace it could attain its own ends better than by adhering to the alliance. All knew that their sole hope was in the alliance.

So, the Allies held together without unity of command, with little effort at coordination, and with consequent waste of life and money. They held together through disaster after disaster greater than those which have dissolved former coalitions. They were fighting, literally, for their national lives. It was not until after many of these disasters had occurred that the step was taken that might have averted all of them. It was not until it seemed that the last dollar was extracted, the last available man put in the field, that it was seen that all resources must be pooled, which meant putting them under one control.

But it must not be assumed that unity of effort and control, in any real sense, was practicable before it actually came. It was not solely the wise and thinking men that had control in this matter. The political repugnance to it in all Allied countries had to be removed.

The presentation of facts made after the Conference of Rapallo, November 7, 1917, should have removed this repugnance, could anything have done so. Yet, notwithstanding all the facts of experience, the announcement of the creation of the Supreme War Council met with a storm of criticism which was only allayed, and then largely only on the surface, by the adhesion of the American government to that Council and its agreement to take official part in it. And among all the facts that stand out in the cold light of experience, two are of vital importance.

The first one is that, from the beginning of the war, all of the political and military combinations of the Entente were based on the assumption of a powerful Russia operating actively with the Allies. Had there been one common unified plan the defection of Russia would have instantly made evident the necessity of modifying the plan to meet this defection. Mr. Lloyd George, a consistent and insistent advocate of unity, said that a single commander-in-chief in the field would know what to do (and would do it instantly) who had made a plan based upon the arrival of an auxiliary army at a given date and place, but which failed to arrive at all. But the Allies did not have one common plan. Each had its own plan and these were attempted to be stitched together like the pieces of a patch-work quilt. But, as Mr. Lloyd George again said, stitching is not strategy, either political or military. Because there was not one plan but several; because there was no one to modify one or several plans to meet the radically changed conditions, the Allies continued through 1917 to follow the same lines with Russia out that they had followed with Russia in. As I have said before, could the heads of governments have frequently met about a table and discussed these problems, with assistants in constant session to work out details for them, there is no slight reason for believing that the disintegration of Russia might have been prevented; in any event, the new political conditions would have been at once recognized and steps taken to meet them.

But there is a still graver fact which experience had shown, and which confronted the Allies not only at the time of the creation of the Supreme War Council but from the earliest days of the war,—a fact which pointed to the necessity of unified control more clearly, perhaps, than any other. This fact was the Blockade.

It had been quickly realized by all the Allies in the very earliest days of the struggle that the blockade was the most effective, the most certain in its results, of all the agencies of war available to them. Could they prevent the Central Powers from winning a conclusive military success in the field and at the same time effectually cut off all supplies for them from the outside it would be only necessary to wait for the end. That end might, in the opinion of some, be more inglorious than a decisive victory won by force of arms in the open field, but it was more certain and, in the long run, less costly. When the time came to give the coup de grâce it would be found, as it was in fact found after the most heroic and costly sacrifices of mighty armies in the field, that the enemy resistance was no more than that of a fragile and empty egg-shell.

In these days of wars between nations in arms it is not possible for any of them, even one with the most varied and abundant resources, to store up in peace the supplies necessary for an enormous and continued demand in war. There is always something that must be obtained abroad. And the withdrawal of men from productive labor makes it more and more difficult for a nation to utilize its own resources. Science may do much to provide substitutes for lacking material, but in war there are time limits, even if no other, to the operations of science. And this was true, in this latest war, of the Allies as well as of the Central Powers. It was this which forced a more and more stringent blockade, regardless of previous rules or of national interpretations of them, much to the irritation of the United States and which continued until the United States learned that a ruthless blockade was to her own interest as well as to that of the European Allies.

And the character of this latest and, probably, of future wars justifies the extreme blockade. It will make, and it is to be hoped that it will make, future wars more difficult in their inception because, unless the whole world accepts this new rule, it will require a nation or an Alliance strong enough to defy the rest of the world, in order to block all avenues of commercial access to the nation with which it is at war. But it will do it if it can.

And the reason is not far to seek. With the modern nation in arms, every old woman who is able to knit a woolen sock for the soldier at the front, every child able to knit a mitten, every old man able to cultivate a bushel of potatoes or wheat beyond his own needs—each and all of them is a soldier; their work is commandeered and directed by the government for the purposes of the war. The non-combatant merchant deals in the goods that the government permits him; the farmer sows the crops that the government orders him. Every one is drafted for the war;—the labor of some at the front, the labor of others at the rear in order to enable the former to stay at the front. Horrible as we may think it all these have been treated in this war as soldiers and with little distinction, and it is to be feared that it will be as bad or worse in the next one, unless the good God gives us sense to at least try some plan by which another such war may be made impossible.

Until recently nations at war settled their differences by a sort of prize fight. They raised limited armies which marched and countermarched and fought battles, until one side or both had enough of it and they agreed to quit with a certain division of the purse. The non-combatant had so little to do with the war that he was regarded as really a non-combatant. He was really the body of the contestants and the rules of war, like the “gentlemen’s rules” of the prize ring, were made to protect him against unfair blows. The prize-fighter must not hit below the belt; the soldier must not use noxious gas. But suppose the prize fighter, after he has come to blows with his adversary and there is no escape, discovers that it is no longer a fight for a purse and half the gate money but a fight for life. From that moment neither contestant will regard the rules but will do whatever he finds necessary to save his life and destroy his adversary.

It is the unhappy fact that the rules made to govern the parties in one war result in large part from the violations of the rules made for a previous one waged under different conditions. When this war began the use of noxious gas was contrary to the rules. One side violated the rule and began to use it; then the other side used it; and now all the world contemplates its use in future war. And so the modern blockade which grew out of a gradual violation of rules made for guidance in wars of a different character has doubtless come to stay for future wars, so far as the circumstances of the moment will permit it to be applied.

From 1914 to the end of 1918 the principle of this blockade involved the shutting off of Germany and the other Central Powers from everything coming from the outside—food, clothing, fuel, material for munitions, everything. It was justified and necessary because the war in its actual effect was against the nations, against every man, woman and child in them, and not merely against the armies in the field.

Now, here was an agency which, more than any other, required in its application absolute unity of purpose and object and a common plan which no commander in the field, no minister in the Cabinet, should for a moment have lost from sight. Bad as it may be, lack of unity may lead to a defeat here or there without necessarily prejudicing the general success. But an extreme and successful blockade can permit no failure, anywhere, in its operation.

In the great siege to which the Central Powers were then being subjected there were times when it seemed that their peoples must be eating their last crop. The Allied navies had shut them off from all lands beyond the seas from which, in times of peace, they had drawn so much of their food and raw material. On land they were shut in on the east by Russia, and fear prevented the then neutral Roumania from giving them much assistance. On the west, in Belgium and France, they were blocked by the armies of three Allies while, in the southwest, Italy shut them in. There was little for them to gain in Serbia except the bare soil, while the Allied fleets prevented the smuggling to them through that territory of supplies from the outside world as they prevented it, to a large extent, through the neutral territories of Switzerland, Holland and Scandinavia.

When this circle was so nearly complete the signs began to appear of the black fates of death impending over Russia. She was like one of Homer’s demi-gods on the plains of Troy, leaning on her spear, faint and spent with the toils of combat, and bleeding from many wounds. She had mobilized—no one knows how many soldiers. Some say 20,000,000, and the least estimate is 12,000,000. Relatively a small part of this number—whatever it may be—engaged in the actual war; and then only to bring to her and her Allies disaster and to the enemy encouragement and hope. More than that, the Russian collapse would, in time, have opened to that enemy the great granary of Europe.

Meanwhile the Central Powers had thrown an overwhelming weight against Serbia, crushing her and at the same time unlocking the door to the East and giving access to abundant stores of grain, cotton, meat, and raw material for her war manufactures. More than that, it revived the exhausted Ottoman Empire resulting in the tying up of hundreds of thousands of the finest troops of the Allies.

The story of Roumania is but a repetition of the others. With the Allied promises of assistance unredeemed she was overrun in one campaign and her rich stores of food and raw material passed to the Central Powers to feed their armies and civil populations, and to provide their further military equipment.

During all this time the Allies were butting against an impregnable wall in the west—impregnable so long as the civil populations behind it were fed and clothed and warmed. Germany, trusting in this wall, had withdrawn the forces which she had used to crush the powers on her east and south. To be sure, her central position facilitated this rapid movement from one front to another. Nevertheless, the Allies could have relied for a time on a similar wall and have transferred forces that might have kept their weaker associates in safety and have made the blockade real and effective.

All of this might have been done had there been in the earlier days a Supreme Council the object of which was to sink national differences and aims and bring about international unity.

All of the foregoing facts together with the disaster of Caporetto had passed into history before the close of the year 1917. It would seem that then, if ever, national repugnance to an international unified control of the situation should have been turned into cordial acceptance of the Supreme War Council. Yet its creation was a contributing cause to the downfall of one Allied government and for a moment seemed likely to wreck another one. It was accepted coldly and had to win its way to popular approval. And to those who were privileged to take part in its work it was an inspiration to see the spirit with which the great political leaders of the Allied world approached and conducted their task. Matters of gravest importance to the safety of the world were settled with cordial unanimity in a few minutes which, did they have to be handled by diplomatic despatches, through the hands of jealous general staffs and of suspicious Cabinets—jealous and suspicious only because they could not get together and work together—would have taken precious days or weeks.

II.—Achievement of Unified Command

1. The Military Situation in November, 1917.

In the autumn of 1917 the Central Empires had been defeated on the Marne, had received a check so costly as to constitute a real reverse at Verdun, and had lost a small amount of the territory of France occupied by them in 1914–16; still the general situation was in their favor. Their definitely successful campaigns against Roumania and Serbia, and the Russian débâcle and revolution, culminating in the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, had practically realized the Pan-German dream of “Mittel Europa” and had placed within their control the petroleum of Roumania and enormous new sources of food supply, especially wheat lands. Moreover they held in France, Belgium and Italy large territories of enemy country, which deprived the Allies of much needed coal and iron deposits and gave the Germans useful bases for their submarine campaign and for a possible ultimate invasion of England, if the control of the sea should by any means be obtained. The Central Empires had only to hold on to what they had already won; the burden of the offensive had been definitely imposed upon the Allies, and with the promise of food and petroleum supplies from the Balkans and Russia—without which it had been possible to support the populations of Germany and Austria for nearly three years—there seemed good ground for believing that the defense could be maintained almost indefinitely.

The initial German successes at Verdun and the British campaign on the Somme had proved that an attack could be made almost inevitably successful if sufficiently organized and supported by heavy artillery; but that the cost in men was sure to be out of all proportion to the ground gained and that a rapid and well conducted retreat for a short distance would always secure a time of repose, since it would require the preparations for the attack and the organization of lines of communication and supply to be begun all over again.

The elimination of Russia, Roumania and Serbia from active operations deprived the Allies of the numerical superiority they had had in 1916 and 1917, and made it improbable that they would have sufficient man-power to take up the offensive effectively until the entry of the American army as a fighting force on the Western front. The strength of the American army and its efficiency were still problematical and could not be definitely appraised.

2. The Necessity for Unity of Command and of Policy.

The need for unity of command within any single theatre of operations had always been an axiom of the military art and had been recognized as a “sine qua non” to success by the military students of all time. The extension of the principle of unity of command to all theatres of operations along a very wide front, made possible by the invention of modern facilities for rapid communication, was one of the important lessons of our Civil War. It was evident to many observers that the World War was furnishing the Allies many examples confirming this principle and that the unfavorable position in which they found themselves in the autumn of 1917 was in great measure due to the fact that each of them had tried to fight his own war in his own chosen theatre of operations with very ineffective and occasional efforts at coordination, until some disaster to one imperatively required others to come to his assistance.^*

It was evident, even early in 1915, that the World War was to a great extent to be one of exhaustion, one in which all the material resources as well as the man-power of each nation engaged would have to be utilized to the fullest extent possible. As each nation necessarily had a surplus, or at least a preponderant proportion, of certain materials and facilities, and suffered from a deficiency in others, the fullest and most effective utilization of all the resources of all the Allied nations could only be attained through some agency cognizant of the requirements of all and the relative importance and urgency of the special requirements of each—a body capable of ensuring a unity of policy and the best utilization of the resources of each for the common good of all.^*

3. Opposition to Unity of Command.

However, as I have before stated,—this unity was not practicable in any real sense, before it actually came. There was a good deal of political repugnance to it which had to be overcome. This repugnance was unmistakably manifested at the time the Supreme War Council was formed. It was one of the elements which contributed to the downfall of one Allied government; another was probably saved from overthrow by the brilliant speech of the Prime Minister in which he was able to announce the adhesion of the United States to the Supreme War Council initiated at Rapallo.

Even after the Supreme War Council became a fact and had been in operation for some time, my colleagues at Versailles in discussing the question of having an Interallied Commander-in-Chief, while acknowledging as an academic fact that such a command was desirable, expressed the opinion that it would be impossible because of the deep-rooted opposition to it by both military and civilian officials supported by a powerful element of the public press. This opposition grew out, in large part at least, of one of the underlying causes of the weakness of all coalitions. During the early part of the war, when the British forces on the ground were relatively so insignificant, these forces had to follow the fortunes of the French armies. These armies were fighting to save Paris and thus prevent its possible neutralization for the further purposes of the war. During this time the Channel ports,—which were as much an object of solicitude for the safety of Great Britain as was the safety of Paris for France,—had been in great danger. Her people demanded that this danger should not be incurred again. Consequently, as the British forces in France increased in strength they became more and more tied to the Channel ports as a dependent base and their front of operations was necessarily determined with respect to that base.

Each country naturally feared for itself in case the other were rendered helpless. So, the British front came naturally to be marked out as one in Northern France and in Flanders, while the French front was equally naturally marked out as on the Northeast and East of Paris; and this latter position was further indicated in the minds of all Frenchmen by their determination to recover the Lost Provinces, even if they gained nothing else from the war.

The Belgian front and line of operations was determined for her by the fact of the German invasion and consequent occupation of all her territory except a small corner about Nieuport, where the remnants of her army stood at bay.

Italy entered the war with “Italia Irredenta” as her objective, and against her traditional enemy, the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

All were fighting the war for the common purpose of beating a common enemy, but also with the further object of securing certain national aims. And with these various war aims in view, the British army on the continent hammered away at the Flanders front; France dealt her blows north and east of Paris; while Italy pursued her war against Austria in the Julian Alps and about Valona.

In addition to all this, any threat against India, by propaganda or force of arms, aroused the greatest apprehension in all English minds. Moreover, British commercial interests could not keep their eyes off of the enormous domain represented by the German colonies. The trade of these colonies was the source of great potential wealth to whatever nation possessed them. For the same reason, these interests regarded with great dislike the possibility of the penetration of German commercial influence in the Ottoman Empire as well as its resultant danger to the security of trade routes with India.

And with it all, there was the possibility, even probability, that the adjustments made after the war would be based on the then status quo.

All these interests dominated in maintaining the fronts up to the end substantially as they were at the beginning; England fighting on the continent with her back to the Channel, in Asia Minor to maintain the safety of her route to India against possible encroachment by any country, and elsewhere to oust Germany from her colonial possessions; France fighting with her back to Paris; and Italy in the only direction in which she could reach her ancient enemy.

And, until a Supreme Interallied Council could show that it would operate with a general view to all of these interests and not to the advantage of one as against another, the fear was very natural that supreme and unified command vested in a general of one nation might sacrifice other national interests in order to secure those of his own. As time went on a strong group in England opposed the costly British offensive in Flanders; it favored a defensive attitude which would enable forces to be withdrawn to support the Italian advance toward Vienna. But in the minds of others there was a fear that this might favor Italian interests at the expense of those of the others; that the war might be ended on the basis of the status quo without either England or France gaining all their objects, thus leaving, possibly, France still without her lost provinces and England still in fear of seeing the Germans in occupation of the Channel ports and of the Belgian coast, with Antwerp as a “loaded pistol pointed at her”.

Nothing but disaster, so great as to imperil the whole Allied cause, could overcome the opposition to abandoning these natural and individual objects of each nation and to subordinating the operations of each national army to a general control by any Allied Council or by any one commander-in-chief. Disasters came fast enough. But it was only the one at Caporetto which was sufficiently illuminating to make the Supreme War Council—a political Supreme Council in which each of the principal Allied Powers was represented—acceptable to the majority; while the success of the German drive in March, 1918, was still necessary to make possible the acceptance of an Interallied High Command for the national armies operating on one continuous front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

4. Unity of Command and of Policy are Gradually Achieved.

So General Cadorna received no assistance, and his army suffered the almost decisive defeat of Caporetto. It was saved from annihilation only by French and British help gathered together after the disaster had been inflicted on Italy and sent hastily to the Piave. The British and French lines in France had to be thinned and the Prime Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, etc., met at Rapallo and adopted there the protocol creating the Supreme War Council.

As already stated this Rapallo agreement met with opposition. Many held that it showed an unpatriotic tendency to surrender the control of national armies. By tacit consent the future was left to show how useful or harmful the Supreme War Council would prove in practice; it was saved by its own conservative wisdom, by not interfering with the functions of the military commanders in the field, and by confining itself to questions of broad policy and of general utilization of resources and distribution of forces. The Supreme War Council was created to secure coordination, political and otherwise, on the Western front, but in practice it extended its functions to all the others. And it made possible unified command on the principal front when the terrible experience of March, 1918, came.

The first step toward unity of command was the decision to create a General Reserve under “an Executive^* composed of the Permanent Military Representatives of Great Britain, Italy, and the United States of America, with General Foch for France” as presiding officer; and which was to exercise its functions “after consultation with the commanders-in-chief” and with certain other limitations. This step met with opposition. Its principle was approved, but commanding generals objected to the “ear-marking” of certain of their divisions for use with a general reserve; and the matter had not yet been settled when the German avalanche fell on General Gough’s army on March 21st, 1918.

The American and Italian armies had, for the moment, no direct concern in this matter, and the measures to be taken to meet the emergency were a question for adjustment between the French and British authorities. Mr. Clemenceau for the former and Lord Milner for the latter met at Doullens on March 26th and signed the convention making General Foch nominally Commander-in-Chief. But he was limited to “advisory and co-ordinating” powers; and as he could issue no orders, he could not co-ordinate.

The inefficacy of this effort toward securing unity of command, without arousing the opposition of the narrow nationalistic elements in the armies and civilian populations, led to the conference at Beauvais, April 3d, which was attended by Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Clemenceau, Generals Foch, Sir Douglas Haig, Pershing, Petain, Sir Henry Wilson and myself. General Foch explained very dispassionately his difficulties and said that the false position he occupied made him little more than another element of delay and discord; that under these circumstances he considered it would be better for him to resign his position. This led to a new convention, signed within the hour, charging him “with the duty of co-ordinating the action of the Allied armies on the Western front; and with this object in view” conferring “upon him all the powers necessary for its effective accomplishment”; but it was still considered necessary to add the limitation that “each Commander-in-Chief shall have the right to appeal to his government if in his opinion his army finds itself placed in danger by any instructions received from General Foch”. The principle of separate national control of each army was dying hard. Nothing less than the good sense, kindly tact, personal magnetism and thorough professional qualifications of General Foch could have secured the degree of co-operation necessary to insure the successes, the prestige of which eventually made him indeed the Interallied Commander-in-Chief on the Western front.

In the course of the discussions of the Fifth Session of the Supreme War Council at Abbeville, May 1st and 2nd, the definition of the Western front as extending “from the North Sea to the Adriatic” raised the question of General Foch’s relations to the Italian army. The Italians, not fully realizing the extent of the powers conferred upon General Foch by the Conference of April 3d at Beauvais, had requested that these powers be extended to him with reference to their own front. When it was pointed out that this would give General Foch the power to remove troops from the Italian front in his discretion as well as the power to send troops to that front, the Italian Representative said that they could not consent to the exercise of such a power, but finally accepted the following agreement:

• “(a) General Foch is Commander-in-Chief of the Italian troops on the French front, just as he is of the other Allied troops.
• “(b) The powers of co-ordination conferred on General Foch by the agreement of Doullens are extended to the Italian front.
• “(c) Should circumstances bring about the presence on the Italian front of Allied armies fighting in the same conditions as in France, Signor Orlando would agree that there should be a General-in-Chief of the Allied armies on the Western front, and that this General-in-Chief should be General Foch.”

This, it will be seen, gave to General Foch over the Italian front only the advisory and ineffective co-ordinating powers that had been originally given to him on the Western front by the Conference of Doullens. It was only on the condition that independent Allied armies be sent to assist the Italian Army in Italy that General Foch could exercise the full powers of an Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The authority of General Foch as Commander-in-Chief of all Allied troops on the Western front was never accepted for the Belgian army; but this army actually did co-operate with him to the extent requested by him.^*

III.—Organization and Business Methods of the Supreme War Council

1. The Conference at Rapallo.

The Caporetto disaster threw the Italian army into confusion and, for a short time, made its escape doubtful. The British and French governments rushed troops to their assistance and General Foch the French Chief of Staff, visited the Italian General Head-quarters and arranged for a complete rehabilitation of the Italian army, including a system of schools for the training of officers.

The heads of the British, French and Italian governments, the ones who had participated in stemming the flood of invasion, met in conference at Rapallo and considered ways and means of insuring closer co-ordination and unity of action in waging the war. The formation of the Supreme War Council was decided upon, and the session of the Rapallo Conference on 7th November, 1917, became the first session of the new body.

The Supreme War Council came into being in accordance with the following joint resolution of the governments concerned:

“decisions of a conference of representatives of the british, french, and italian governments assembled at rapallo on november 7th, 1917

“I. The representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments assembled at Rapallo on the 7th November, 1917, have agreed on the scheme for the organization of a Supreme War Council with a Permanent Military Representative from each Power, contained in the following paragraph.

“scheme of organization of a supreme war council

“II. (1.) With a view to the better co-ordination of military action on the Western front a Supreme War Council is created, composed of the Prime Minister and a Member of the Government of each of the Great Powers whose armies are fighting on that front. The extension of the scope of the Council to other fronts is reserved for discussion with the other Great Powers.

(2) The Supreme War Council has for its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war. It prepares recommendations for the decision of the Governments, and keeps itself informed of their execution, and reports thereon to the respective Governments.

(3) The General Staffs and Military Commands of the armies of each Power charged with the conduct of military operations remain responsible to their respective Governments.

(4) The general war plans drawn up by the competent Military Authorities are submitted to the Supreme War Council, which, under the high authority of the Governments, insures their concordance, and submits, if need be, any necessary changes.

(5) Each Power delegates to the Supreme War Council one Permanent Military Representative whose exclusive function is to act as technical adviser to the Council.

(6) The Military Representatives receive from the Government and the competent Military Authorities of their country all the proposals, information, and documents relating to the conduct of the war.

(7) The Military Representatives watch day by day the situation of the forces, and of the means of all kinds of which the Allied armies and the enemy armies dispose.

(8) The Supreme War Council meets normally at Versailles, where the Permanent Military Representatives and their staffs are established. They may meet at other places as may be agreed upon, according to circumstances. The meetings of the Supreme War Council will take place at least once a month.

“III. The Permanent Military Representatives will be as follows:—

For France	General Foch
For Great Britain	General Wilson
For Italy	General Cadorna.

Rapallo, November 7, 1917.”

For the same reason that made it impracticable for the chiefs of staff of the other national armies to act as Permanent Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council, General Foch was relieved from his duty and General Weygand thereafter (until his appointment as chief-of-staff to General Foch after the Conference of Doullens, March 26, 1918) acted in this capacity. When General Sir Henry Wilson was appointed Chief of the British Imperial Staff he also was relieved and succeeded by General Rawlinson. The undersigned was designated as the American Permanent Military Representative on November 17, 1917. At the request of the British Government the United States Government gave its adhesion to the Supreme War Council on November 17, 1917, and from that date the political members of the Council were:

For Great Britain
 The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, M. P.
  Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury;

For France
 Mr. Georges Clemenceau,
  President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of War;

For Italy
 His Excellency V. E. Orlando,
  President of the Council of Ministers;

For the United States
 President Woodrow Wilson.

They were assisted, respectively, by the

 Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., Secretary of State for War (afterwards Secretary of State for the Colonies);

 Mr. S. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

 Baron S. Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and

 Mr. E. M. House, during the 2nd Session of the Supreme War Council of December 1, 1917, and the 8th (Armistice) Session.

The only resolution adopted by the Supreme War Council, at its session of November 7th, 1917, at Rapallo, was the following:

“terms of reference to the permanent military representatives

• “1. The Supreme War Council, assembled at Rapallo on the 7th November, 1917, directs its Permanent Military Representatives to report immediately on the present situation on the Italian front. In consultation with the Italian General Headquarters they should examine into the present state of affairs, and, on a general review of the military situation in all theatres, should advise as to the amount and nature of assistance to be given by the British and French Governments, and as to the manner in which it should be applied.
• “2. The Italian Government undertakes to instruct the Italian Supreme Command to give every facility to the Permanent Military Representatives both in regard to documentary information and movements in the zone of operations.

Rapallo, November 7, 1917.”

2. The Supreme War Coimcil.^*

It will be noted that, while chiefly concerned with watching over the “conduct of the war”, the Supreme War Council was nevertheless a political body. The decision to give it a political character was sound, in accord with the military principle that war is but a continuation of political policy in a new form, and affording reasonable assurance that it would not be an organization “which should either supersede or interfere with the unfettered activity and independent position vis-à-vis of the several governments and staffs, or again which would in any way derogate from the authority or ultimate responsibility of each of the Allied governments over its own forces and to its own people”^†. This political body had the wisdom not to attempt to direct military operations in the field, but to limit itself to reaching decisions as to:

• (a) Questions of policy affecting the military situations.
• (b) Distribution of the available man-power, equipment, supplies and shipping among the various theatres of operations.
• (c) The character that military operations should assume, in view of the forces available, in each theatre of operations.

It will be seen that these are all questions of a general character, which could have been decided only by the political heads of the governments. The Supreme War Council did not supersede the commanders-in-chief but gave them for their guidance an expression of the definite policy of the Allied Governments. It was not to act as a commander-in-chief, but as an agency for the adoption and maintenance of a general policy for the Allies in the prosecution of the war, consistent with the total resources available and the most effective distribution of their resources among the various theatres of operation.

While paragraph (1) of the resolution quoted above shows that the immediate problem was “co-ordination of military effort on the Western^* front”, paragraph (2) extends “its mission to watch over the general conduct of the war”, and it was found from the outset that the general military situation had to be considered in reaching a decision in any particular case. Indeed, at the first session it was agreed, as suggested by Mr. Lloyd George, that “the Supreme War Council should concern itself with all the fronts where the Allied armies were fighting in common”.

The original resolution of the Rapallo Conference provided that the new body should consist of “the Prime Minister and a member of the Government of each of the Great Powers, whose armies are fighting on that (the western) front”. The first session, being the one of the Rapallo Conference, was attended only by the representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy.

The formation of the Supreme War Council was announced by Mr. Lloyd George in a speech made at a diplomatic luncheon in Paris on 12th November, 1917. He was criticized by a section of the English press and in the House of Commons, on his return to London, for this speech and for his assent to imposing this interallied control upon the British forces; and, to aid in meeting this, he requested the adhesion of the United States to the plan of Rapallo in time for him to announce the fact in his speech defending his attitude to be made on the 19th of November in the House of Commons. Mr. House, then chief of a special American Mission in Europe, was notified on 17th November, 1917,³ that the President approved participation by the United States in the Supreme War Council and that he and the undersigned were designated as our political and military representatives. In those capacities we attended the second session at Versailles, France, on December 1, 1917. But at no time did the United States Government have a representative at any session of the Supreme War Council who could speak for that Government as the Prime Ministers of the Allied Governments could speak for theirs. The resolutions passed at the various sessions were, therefore, cabled to Washington by me, as the American Military Representative, immediately after their adoption by the prime ministers of the other powers, for acceptance or rejection by the President as the fourth member of the Supreme War Council.^*

Representation on the Supreme War Council was limited to the Great Powers because, if all the smaller Associated Powers were represented, it would be so large as to be unwieldy, with the necessary result that it could not reach a decision promptly. Moreover, the war was being financed by the Great Powers and, to a large extent, was being fought by them who in fact, found it necessary to assist the smaller Powers with men and matériel,—they being unable to wage even their small share of the war without such help. It was therefore not a practical injustice to limit them to participation in its deliberations when matters especially concerning them were under consideration, and provision was made for the presence and hearing of their representatives on all such occasions.

It was decided that the Supreme War Council should normally meet at Versailles, France, and here the Military Representatives and other permanent personnel were stationed. In reaching this decision the conferees were actuated by the desire to prevent any appearance of the Council’s being under the special influence of any one government, as might have been the case if its home were established in any one of the capitals, and at the same time to give it a central location, conveniently accessible to the Governments most concerned and to the Headquarters of the various armies on the most critical front. Nevertheless, when convenience required it, sessions were held at other places.

3. The Military Representatives.

A general officer with a suitable staff was designated by each of the Great Powers to take station permanently at Versailles and act as military adviser to the political representative of his government. The four Military Representatives constituted a permanent committee, constantly in session, informed at all times as to the military situation on all fronts and at home, and prepared to advise their own governments as to the attitude and interests of each other government in regard to any military or politico-military inter-allied question arising or that might arise. They were also the joint military advisers of the Supreme War Council, submitting their recommendations to the latter in the form of unanimously adopted joint notes. When there was a difference of opinion among them, or when advice on some particular subject was asked by one or another government or later (after the Armistice) by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the recommendations were put in the form of special reports. The Military Representatives were especially enjoined “to bear in mind that their function is to advise the Supreme War Council as a whole and not merely as the representatives of their respective nations on the Council.^*” They were required “to view the problems confronting them, not from a national standpoint, but from that of the Allies as a whole”^*. In short, the Military Representatives based their recommendations, as a rule and mainly, upon the military factors of the case, leaving to the Supreme War Council itself to determine the political practicability of carrying them into effect. In the very few cases where the recommendations of the Military Representatives failed to receive the definite approval of the Supreme War Council, this failure was due to the latter’s belief that the recommendations were politically impracticable.^†

The Supreme War Council did not usurp any of the powers of a commander-in-chief in the field, and it delegated to its Military Representatives no duty of execution; charging them however with the duty of following the execution by each country of the part allotted to it in any general operation or undertaking and keeping it informed as to the progress made in carrying out any such operation. Being preoccupied with none of the duties of command or of the detailed operations of a campaign, which necessarily demanded the continual attention of the commanding generals of the various national armies, and of the commanders-in-chief on the different fronts, the Military Representatives were able to study with more care and more general information than any others the progress of events on all the various fronts taken as a whole. They were thus able to advise the Supreme War Council as to the relative effort that should be made on each front regarded as a component part of the whole and as to the character—offensive or defensive—that military operations there should assume, and to suggest measures that would bring conflicting demands of different commanders into harmony. The Military Representatives as a body therefore occupied with relation to the Supreme War Council, a position somewhat similar to that of chiefs-of-staff to their own governments, but having nothing to do with the administration of the troops nor of the preparation or execution of detailed plans.

The Military Representatives met as often as necessary to consider the questions referred to them and to draft their recommendations. They took turns in presiding at their meetings, in the order of the entry of their respective countries into the war.^* Joint Notes and recommendations were signed by all of them.^† During the temporary absence of any one of them because of sickness or for any other reason, his chief of staff was authorized to attend the meeting and sign for him,^‡ but not to preside at a meeting, the chairmanship passing to the next Military Representative on the roster.

During the continuation of the Supreme War Council the following officers were, successively, Military Representatives:

• France.
  • General Foch
  • General Weygand
  • General Vidalon
  • General Belin
  • General Desticker
• Great Britain.
  • General Sir H. H. Wilson, K. C. B., K. C. M. G., D. S. O.
  • General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, G. C. V. O., K. C. B., K. M. G.
  • General the Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, C. M. G.
• Italy.
  • General Cadorna
  • General Giardino
  • General di Robilant
  • General Cavallero
• United States of America.
  • General T. H. Bliss

4. The Joint Secretariat.

Continuous record of the discussions and decisions of the Supreme War Council and of the Military Representatives was provided for by the formation of a Joint Secretariat in accordance with the following resolutions adopted at the Second Session of the Supreme War Council on December 1st, 1917, at Versailles:⁴

. . . . . . .

“3. In order to facilitate the reception and distribution of the information referred to above, each section of the Supreme War Council will comprise a permanent secretarial staff.

“4. The permanent secretarial staff of the respective countries will, in concert, organize a Joint Secretarial Bureau for the production and distribution of the notices, agenda, protocols, and procès-verbaux of the Supreme War Council, and for such other collective business as it may be found desirable to entrust to it.”

Each Military Representative designated one of his staff as secretary for his section. The four secretaries so named constituted the Joint Secretariat contemplated in the above resolution and organized a system of records and of preparing agenda for the Supreme War Council and all its immediately dependent agencies, which it may be of interest to outline, since it was found to be both practical and generally satisfactory and would be applicable to any interallied boards or commissions that may be constituted in the future. In fact, the methods adopted by the Supreme War Council were subsequently adhered to for the work of the Peace Conference.

Since each section necessarily had a considerable amount of correspondence with its own government and its own army headquarters which was of no interest to the other sections and in some cases of a character such that it could not properly be given to them, and since it was foreseen that upon the dissolution of the Supreme War Council each government would want a complete record of its operations, the idea of a single central room of archives or record files was from the very beginning considered inadvisable. Each section, therefore, kept its own records according to the methods in vogue in its own government service; joint records, such as minutes, joint notes, joint reports, etc., being made in quadruplicate and translations into the various languages compared by the four secretaries acting together. In this way there was an authenticated and identical copy of such joint records for file in each section.

The system adopted by the Joint Secretariat, either in compliance with instructions received in the form of resolutions of the Supreme War Council and of the Military Representatives, or as a result of the experience of the secretaries themselves gained in the performance of their duties, may be briefly outlined as follows:

• (a) The meetings of the Supreme War Council were presided over by the Prime Minister of the country in which the particular session was being held.
• (b) The meetings of the Military Representatives were presided over by the Military Representatives in turn, their names being arranged on a roster in the order of the entry of their country into the war.
• (c) In the absence of a Military Representative his Chief of Staff was authorized to replace him and to sign joint recommendations for him; but the Chief of Staff could not act as Chairman of a meeting and the chairmanship fell to the Military Representative present who was next on the roster. The presence of three Military Representatives was necessary to constitute a quorum.
• (d) The secretary whose chief was to preside at any meeting was responsible for the preparation in advance of the agenda for the coming meeting. In the case of the Supreme War Council inquiry was made of the governments as to the questions they wished to put on the agenda. In the case of the Military Representatives and other inter-allied committees, the agenda were made up on consultation with the Military or other technical Representatives; also by direction of one or another of the governments. The agenda were issued as long as possible before the meeting in order to permit each representative to prepare himself on the questions to be discussed. It was a general rule that the action which any representative proposed should be taken, was reduced to writing and circulated with the agenda for the information of his colleagues. Experience showed that it was almost imperative to have a written text to discuss in order to arrive at a conclusion within a reasonable time.
• (e) The resolutions passed and decisions reached were reduced to writing at the meeting, or by the Joint Secretariat immediately after the meeting, in order to prevent any subsequent discussion arising from a difference of opinion as to the precise sense of the meeting.
• (f) The minutes for each meeting were written up immediately thereafter by the secretary whose chief had acted as chairman and were circulated among the different sections, usually within 24 hours of the close of the meeting. This first draft of the minutes was subject to correction by the persons who participated in the meeting, provided the corrections were submitted within a reasonable length of time.
• (g) The Military Representatives signed their own joint notes and recommendations and the minutes of their meetings in quadruplicate. Members of other inter-allied committees signed only their joint notes or recommendations, one copy for each government.
• (h) Each secretary was charged with the duty of communicating such part of the record to the members or representatives of his government as concerned them.

5. Organization of the British Section.

The British Section was the first to be fully organized and in operation. It consisted, at the beginning, of 26 officers and 104 enlisted men and clerks. Being intended for what might be called war plans work rather than for the executive work necessary to coordinate the operations of a campaign, its organization differed from that usual in the staff of a commanding general and contained certain special features.

The officers were divided into a committee on the military affairs of Allied and Neutral countries, a committee on the military affairs of the Enemy and Neutral countries, a committee on Man Power and Matériel, a Political Branch, and a Secretariat and Administrative Branch.

(a) Allied and Neutral Branch.

It was the duty of this branch to study the military situation on all fronts, from the standpoint of an imaginary generalissimo. The situation was repeatedly summarized from this point of view and studies were made as to possible action that might be taken by the Allies and the best way to counter the possible moves by the enemy, as anticipated by the Committee on Enemy and Neutral affairs.

These reports were submitted whenever any marked change in the situation or other emergency made it seem advisable. Unless such an occasion arose these reports were regularly submitted weekly.

In view of the broad scope of the studies made, different officers of the committee specialized on the different fronts where operations were going on.

(b) Enemy and Neutral Branch.

This branch functioned in the same manner as the Allied and Neutral Committee except that the situation was viewed, as far as available information permitted, from the point of view of the Commander-in-chief of the enemy army. The work of these two committees was, therefore, complementary and their internal organization was the same. The positions of the Allied and Enemy armies in each theatre of operations were kept posted in a single common map room for the use of both committees. It may be stated that such studies in any of the Military Sections were cordially placed at the disposition of all the Sections.

(c) Man Power and Matériel Branch.

This committee was divided into three sub-committees: the first to deal with Allied and Enemy man power problems; the second, with the question of munitions and armament; and the third, with questions of supplies and transportation. It was the duty of this committee to keep the essential facts relating to its work constantly up to date and tabulated for ready use by the Military Representative and the other members of the Section.

This committee issued weekly Allied and Enemy Strength returns for all fronts, compiled from the information obtained from their own war office and General Headquarters, and from the other sections of the Supreme War Council. These estimates included combatant strength, auxiliary personnel, heavy guns, light guns, machine guns, airplanes, tanks, etc.

(d) Political Branch:

The duty of this branch was to study the political situation in all countries in so far as it might affect the Military Situation and render such assistance as might aid the other branches and Committees in their appreciations. A weekly appreciation was prepared both from the Allied and Enemy point of view.

(e) Secretariat and Administrative Branch:

The Secretariat’s duties have already been described under “Joint Secretariat”. A limited number of officers under the Secretary were necessary for the administrative work connected with the maintenance and records of the clerical force and enlisted men.

6. Organization of the French Section:

The French Section was divided into a Western Committee, an Eastern Committee, a Committee on Economic and Political Affairs, and a Secretariat and Administrative branch. It consisted of approximately half the number of officers and clerks and enlisted men in the British Section.

The Western Committee kept all information concerning affairs on the Western front and was supposed to be prepared at all times to make an estimate of probable developments on that front. The Eastern Committee had similar duties in regard to the Eastern fronts from Archangel to Egypt. The Economical and Political Committee was chiefly concerned with the collection and digestion of information relative to the state of public opinion and the financial conditions of the enemy countries and of the small powers. The duties of the Secretariat and Administrative Branch were the same as in the other sections.

7. Organization of the Italian Section:

The Italian Section, originally 7 officers, consisted at the Armistice of 10 officers and about the same number of enlisted men and clerks. Due to this relatively small number no special internal organization was ever adopted for it. After the coming to France of the Italian divisions this section undertook the duty of representing the Italian Government with the French Military authorities in regard to these troops.

8. Organization of the American Section:^*

The American Section consisted of 12 officers, 19 army field clerks, 16 enlisted men, and 2 civilian employees. It was the last section to arrive at Versailles and its internal organization, which is shown in the accompanying diagram (Appendix 1) [Appendix C], was modelled largely on that of the British Section, although the small number of officers and enlisted men available made it impossible to produce any extensive statistical statements, the information in regard to the other Allied armies being readily obtainable from the reports of the other sections and the information in regard to the American Army being formulated at the American General Head-quarters, and furnished, periodically, through the courtesy of General Pershing and his staff. It was thought that a large statistical branch would merely have produced a duplication of the work thus already being done in a more satisfactory manner.^†

9. General Remarks:

The interchange of information and opinions among the Military Representatives and their staffs was constant, free and frank; and the relations that existed between them throughout the period of the war and of the Peace Conference, whatever the difference of opinion on any questions under consideration, was always most cordial and friendly.

After the selection of General Foch as Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief for the Western Front, and at his request, each section had a liaison officer at his Headquarters, who kept the Military Representatives constantly informed as to the progress of events and who facilitated the free exchange of opinion between the Supreme War Council and the High Command as to the military situation.

IV.—Auxiliary Inter-Allied Committees and Councils

1. The Naval Liaison Committee.

In his criticism of the proposed Supreme War Council made in his speech in the House of Commons on the 19th of November, 1917, and which was a covert attack representing the extreme nationalistic as opposed to the rational inter-nationalistic view, Mr. Asquith called attention to the fact that, while a body of military advisers was provided for the Supreme War Council, naval interests, which were particularly important to Great Britain, were not represented. This objection was met by the formation in London of the Inter-Allied Naval Council, on which Admiral Sims represented the United States. Since the approval of the heads of the Allied Governments was necessary to insure the execution of any action recommended by this Council it frequently referred questions to the Supreme War Council, and its relations to the latter gradually became similar, as concerned naval affairs, to the relations of the Military Representatives, as concerned military affairs. In order to insure close and cordial cooperation between the Inter-Allied Naval Council in London and the Military Representatives a naval liaison committee was formed which periodically met at Versailles and facilitated the interchange of views.

2. The Inter-Allied Aviation Committee.

In Joint Note No. 7, (January 9th, 1918), adopted by the Supreme War Council at its Third Session, February 1st, 1918, the Military Representatives made the following recommendations:

“The Military Representatives consider that the question of placing Inter-Allied aviation on a definitely co-ordinated basis is a matter of great urgency. With this object they recommend that a small, strong Inter-Allied expert committee should be formed to report to the Supreme War Council. The Committee should meet at regular and frequent intervals at Versailles or wherever may be convenient. Each Section of the Supreme War Council should have upon its permanent staff an officer who should be an ex-officio member of that Committee. The Committee would, as a first step, draw up a statement of the existing state of affairs, the projects under way, the present state of, and future possibilities in construction, and would make definite recommendations as to their co-ordination on the most efficient lines. When the Supreme War Council had determined on their air Policy and Strategy of the future, the Committee would advise as to execution and report as to progress. Instances of the questions in need of most urgent consideration are:—

• “(i) the minimum necessities of the National Air Forces of each front;
• “(ii) the speedy creation of Inter-Allied strategic formations and their employment;
• “(iii) the systematic and scientific obliteration of areas in enemy territory vital to his munition supply;
• “(iv) the concentration of Air Force in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to break the various vulnerable links of Turkish communications.”

In the course of the three meetings of this committee views were exchanged on many subjects of technical and general interest with regard to the development of aviation. Special efforts were made to co-ordinate the programs of production of aviation matériel. In connection with the utilization of airplanes for counter-submarine work it was decided that this service could not be separated from the elements of the various navies charged with other anti-submarine activities.

In the spring of 1918 the question of obtaining ground for the airdromes of the various armies in France had become quite acute. This committee was able to effect a compromise in this matter satisfactory to all three armies and which would provide for the increasing needs of the American aviation as well as for the new airdromes that would be needed with any marked changes in the line occupied by the contending armies.

The Committee interested itself especially in the formation of an independent bombing force and in the designation of priority among various military objectives as targets for such a force. This discussion finally took form in Joint Note No. 35 of the Military Representatives August 3d, 1918, in which it was recommended

(a) That an independent bombing force should be created as soon as available matériel and personnel made it possible.

(b) That in anticipation of the constitution of such a force it would be expedient for the Supreme War Council to decide whether the enemy should not be called on to desist in his night attacks on defenseless towns and advised that the Allies would take retaliatory action if he did not.

(c) That this bombing force should be under the command of an officer designated by the Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief and subject to the latter’s immediate control.

(d) That the operations of this separate bombing force should be guided by some general plan previously conceived with regard to their effect on the rest of the campaign.

The complete organization of this bombing force was prevented by the exigencies of the campaign, then active on all fronts. But to a certain extent it was carried into execution and the French independent air force and British bombing squadrons were placed at the disposition of General Pershing in the great assembly of aviation in the St. Mihiel operation.

3. The Inter-Allied Transportation Council.

The captures of rolling stock made by the Germans in the early years of the war, the unusual wear and tear on the rolling stock remaining, and the small facilities that could be devoted to the repair of old and to the manufacture of new rolling stock had resulted in a very marked reduction in the railroad facilities of the Allied countries. Moreover, the movement of the French and English divisions to Italy in the autumn of 1917 had brought such a strain on the available matériel that it interfered with the regular transportation in other places. This alone would have justified a careful study of rolling stock and other matériel on hand with reference to its best utilization, and such a study was made absolutely necessary by the possibility of having again to reinforce the Italian front, or at some future date the army in the Balkans. These facts were brought to the attention of the Supreme War Council at its 2nd Session, December 1, 1917, resulting in the passage of the following resolution:

“The Supreme War Council decide that it is desirable that the whole question of Inter-Allied transport by sea and land shall be examined by a single expert, who shall report to it on the subject at the earliest possible date. It agreed that if the British Government can spare his services, Sir Eric Geddes should be designated to carry out this investigation, and that, in the first instance, he shall examine the transportation problem as affecting the Italian and Salonika situations.

“The representatives of the respective Governments undertake to give instructions to their technical experts and administrators to collaborate with Sir Eric Geddes, or, if his services cannot be made available, with such other expert as may be mutually agreed upon.”

As a permanent solution of the problem did not promptly result, the Military Representatives, in Joint Note No. 8 (January 9th, 1918), made the following recommendation to the Supreme War Council:

“The Military Representatives consider that the question of placing Inter-Allied Transportation on a definitely co-ordinated basis is a matter of great urgency. With this object they recommend that a small strong Inter-Allied Expert Committee should be formed to report to the Supreme War Council. The Committee should meet at regular and frequent intervals at Versailles or wherever may be most convenient. Each Section of the Supreme War Council should have upon its permanent staff an officer who should be an ex-officio member of that Committee. The Committee would, as a first step, draw up a statement of the existing position of affairs, the projects now under way, the present state of and future possibilities in construction, and would make definite recommendations as to their co-ordination on the most efficient lines.

“When the Supreme War Council had determined on the Transportation Policy and Strategy of the future, the Committee would advise as to execution and report as to progress.

“Instances of the questions in need of most urgent consideration, are:—

• “1. The co-ordination and improvement of railway communications behind the British, French and Italian fronts, and the machinery necessary for their employment as one system.
• “2. Rail and shipping facilities in Greece to serve possible alternative lines of defense to that at present being held.
• “3. Railway scheme to assist in the more rapid defeat of the Turkish forces in Palestine.
• “4. Suggestions as to points on the enemy systems of communications where the maximum effect could be obtained by aeroplane attack.”

This note was discussed by the Supreme War Council at its 4th Session in London, March 14th and 15th, 1918, in connection with a detailed report on the transportation situation which had been made by Major General Sir P. A. M. Nash and which included a recommendation for a similar council but with executive authority to act on its own responsibility in certain matters. The following action was taken:

“Resolution No. 6. Creation of an Inter-Allied Transportation Council.

“The Supreme War Council approve the recommendation of Major General Sir P. A. M. Nash for the creation of an Inter-Allied Transportation Council at Paris, under the Supreme War Council, consisting of a representative of each of the four Allied Governments, and charged with the functions set forth in section 3, Paragraph 11, of General Nash’s Report:—

“‘I recommend that an Inter-Allied Transportation Council should be created at Paris under the Supreme War Council, consisting of a representative of each of the four Allied Governments. This Council should be charged with fulfilling the following main functions:—

• “‘(i) (a) To advise the Supreme War Council at Versailles of the transportation aspect of all plans of campaign on the Western front.
• “‘(b) To negotiate with the Allied Governments concerned as to the provision of such additional railway facilities as are necessary to give effect to any accepted plan of campaign, or to relieve the general position, and to arrange for any extraneous assistance required in men or material.
• “‘(ii) (a) To prepare, when called upon to do so, schemes for the consideration of the Supreme War Council for all large movements of troops between one section of the front and another.
• “‘(b) To make, when instructed to do so, necessary preparation with the Inter-Allied Governments concerned for the carrying out of such movements, including when necessary a redistribution of mobile resources of railway matériel and personnel.
• “‘(iii) The study of the enemy positions regarding transportation facilities of every kind and advise the Supreme War Council as to the enemy’s capabilities of concentrating and maintaining their forces on any particular sector of their front, and as to the points at which and methods by which the enemy’s railway communications can be attacked from the air with greater effect.
• “‘(iv) To prepare schemes to develop continental railway lines of communication so as to relieve sea lines of communication, and to negotiate with the Governments concerned regarding the best utilization of the Allied railway resources to economize sea transport.
• “‘(v) To watch the performance of the different agencies operating the lines of communication on the Western front, bringing to the notice of the Governments or armies concerned cases in which the fullest use does not appear to be made of available resources and suggesting remedies.’”

The Inter-Allied Transportation Council so formed rendered extraordinarily valuable services to the Allied cause, the principal of which were:

(a) Co-ordination of the Military use of the railroads behind the entire Western front so as to ensure their most effective utilization with the rolling stock available.

(b) Ensuring the most effective utilization of the facilities already existing for making repairs^* and the increase of these facilities so as to bring back into service a large part of the cars which had remained idle for a considerable length of time.

(c) The location and construction of an emergency railroad line joining the communications of the British Army with the communications of the French Army, and thereby in some measure remedying the disadvantage in which the Allies found themselves in sending reserves and munitions from one part of their line to another ever since the German offensive of March had made the Paris-Amiens Railroad impracticable throughout its northern section.

(d) The solution of the problem of increasing the capacity of the railroads between France and Italy.

It is of interest to note that in this latter matter the solution suggested by the American members of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council was practically the one adopted. The work connected with this was provided for by Joint Note No. 33, July 5, 1918, of the Military Representatives, which read as follows:

“measures imperative to take in order to increase the capacity of the modane line with a view to possible strategic demands

“The Permanent Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council having considered Joint Note No. 19^† of the 5th of March, 1918, Joint Note No. 22^* of the 18th of April, 1918; and, after examining:—

(a) the report drawn up by the Inter-Allied Transportation Council relative to measures to be given effect to on the Modane Line with a view to increasing its carrying capacity, (Annexure ‘X’),⁵ and

(b) the explanatory memorandum hereto attached (Annexure ‘Y’);⁵

are of the opinion that:—

• “(1) Given the great and ever increasing strategic importance of the Modane Line and the necessity of increasing its carrying capacity as a counter-balance to the greater facilities of transport between the fronts which the enemy possesses to-day, it is urgent that all the measures proposed by the Inter-Allied Transportation Council be approved, put into execution and completed with the least possible delay.
• “(2) For reasons indicated in the Report of the said Council and the explanatory memorandum annexed, the work in question should be of a frankly Inter-Allied character, and should therefore be carried out by the joint contribution of means and labour by all the Allies acting as one.
• “(3) The proportion of this contribution as regards both means and labour should be studied by the Inter-Allied Transportation Council in consultation with the competent authorities and, subject to the recommendations of the Permanent Military Representatives, should be given final endorsement by the Governments concerned.
• “(4) The measures necessary to give effect to this important question should be regarded as very urgent and the sanction of the various Governments to this Note should be accorded at the earliest possible moment.”

The question of the payment for the materials used for the improvements made to these railroads between France and Italy arose after the Armistice and was the subject of Joint Note No. 47, 1st December, 1919, of the Military Representatives.

On the recommendation of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council the Military Representatives also submitted Joint Notes as follows: No. 23 (April 18th, 1918) for the utilization of valuable Belgian railroad resources, and No. 24 (April 18th, 1918) recommending the increase of shipments of railroad stock from the United States, adopted May 1st, 1918, by the Supreme War Council at its Fifth Session.

4. The Inter-Allied Committee on Tanks.

In their Joint Note No. 9 (January 9th, 1918) the Military Representatives recommended:

“The Military Representatives consider that the question of placing Inter-Allied Tanks on a definitely co-ordinated basis is a matter of great urgency. With this object they recommend that a small strong Inter-Allied Expert Committee should be formed to report to the Supreme War Council. The committee should meet at regular and frequent intervals at Versailles or wherever may be most convenient. Each Section of the Supreme War Council should have upon its permanent Staff an officer who should be an ex-officio member of that committee. The Committee would, as a first step, draw up a statement of the existing position of affairs, the projects now under way, the present state of and future possibilities in construction, and would make definite recommendations as to their co-ordination on the most efficient lines.

“When the Supreme War Council has determined on the Tanks Policy and Strategy of the future, the Committee would advise as to execution and report as to progress.

“Instances of the questions in need of most urgent consideration are:—

1. The minimum necessities of the National Tank forces at each front.

2. The speedy creation of Inter-Allied reserve formations and their employment.

3. Suggestions for the immediate creation of Allied anti-tank measures.”

This Joint Note was adopted by the Supreme War Council on 1st February, 1918, during the 3d Session.

This Committee was useful in securing the following:

(a) The adoption of types of tanks to be used by the different Allied Armies.

(b) The adoption of a doctrine and tactics for the employment of tanks, and the establishment of an Inter-Allied school for the training of tank personnel.

(Joint Note No. 30, 30th May, 1918, of the Military Representatives adopted by the Supreme War Council at their 6th Session, 3rd June, 1918.)

(c) The adoption of a policy for the distribution among the different armies of the tanks to be produced by the Inter-Allied factory at Chateauroux. The Armistice was signed before the products of this factory became available.

5. The Inter-Allied Anti-Aircraft Committee.

On the recommendation of the Chief of the Anti-Aircraft Service of the British Army meetings were arranged at Versailles for the chiefs of the same service in the other principal Allied Armies. While the Committee so formed had no official recognition from the Supreme War Council and while it made no recommendations requiring action by the chiefs of the governments, the exchange of views made at its conferences and the technical reports considered, undoubtedly assisted in co-ordinating the methods of training and the types of material adopted in the different armies for these new technical services, the chief of the service in each army being for the first time cognizant of exactly what was being done in other armies.

6. The Allied Maritime Transport Council.

In my original report to the Secretary of War, submitted December 18, 1917, after the return of the House Mission, I recommended “that the Government of the United States concur in the Resolution adopted by the Inter-Allied Conference^* in Paris by which an Inter-Allied organization is created to handle the question of shipping ‘with a view to liberating the greatest amount of tonnage possible, for the transportation of American troops’, as quoted in paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 10 from Paris to the War Department. That the very best man in the United States should represent us on that commission.”⁷

The adherence of the United States to the Allied policy referred to resulted in the formation of the Allied Maritime Transport Council which sat in London and was clothed with considerable executive power.

On March 6, 1918, I was advised by cablegram from the Acting Chief of Staff with regard to the question of requisitioning the Dutch shipping in ports of the United States and was instructed in this connection as follows:

“The political and military aspects of this problem as well as the shipping aspect should be considered with particular reference to the need for every available ton of shipping for War Zone use later in 1918 and the recommendation made by the highest Allied authorities in conference. Request that you lay matter before Supreme War Council and Inter-Allied Shipping Council and that you cable their recommendations as promptly as possible”.

The military aspects of the question were studied by the Military Representatives and their opinion was stated in Joint Note No. 17 which contained the following conclusion and recommendation:

“The Military Representatives are therefore of opinion that, owing to the urgent need of tonnage of all sorts for the transportation of matériel and personnel from the United States, the action recommended by the American War Trade Board to requisition the use of 400,000 tons of Dutch shipping now lying idle in American ports, is essentially desirable from a military point of view and the Military Representatives recommend that the matter be considered by the Supreme War Council for decision as to whether such action is otherwise consistent with the best interests of the Allies from the political, naval and economic points of view”.

The matter was considered on March 15th by the Supreme War Council at its 4th Session, held in London, with the following result:

“The Supreme War Council have carefully considered the memorandum of the Allied Naval Council, setting forth the disadvantages of drawing Holland into war, whether as an ally or as an enemy. They have also considered Joint Note No. 17 of the Permanent Military Representatives on the possible military consequences of such an eventuality. The Supreme War Council are of the opinion that the risk of Holland being drawn into the war in consequence of the requisition of Dutch shipping is a remote one, and that, in view of the urgent and immediate need of shipping as set forth in the Note of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, the risk is one that should be accepted. They therefore recommend that the policy of requisitioning Dutch shipping should be adhered to.”

The Allied Maritime Transport Council operated as an entirely independent body from the Supreme War Council; and it was only on occasions, when the military situation required that priority be given to certain demands for shipping, that the Military Representatives made any recommendations in regard to this subject.^*

V.—The Executive War Board

It was foreseen that the collapse of Russia and Roumania would liberate a large number of German divisions, which up to that time had been needed for the campaigns on the Eastern front. The number of divisions that would become available in this way for a German offensive on the Western front in the spring of 1918 was variously estimated at from forty to fifty. If thus utilized, they would transfer the numerical superiority on the Western front from the Allies to the Germans until such time as the American army in France could be sufficiently organized and trained, and in sufficient numbers, to reestablish the equilibrium or bring about Allied superiority. Since weather conditions would probably prevent active operations on the Italian front until late in the spring it also seemed probable that the German forces which had been engaged in the autumn in the drive against the Italian army would be withdrawn for further reinforcement of the German army in France early in the spring.^*

The Allied reserves had already been depleted in October, 1917, by 6 French and 5 English divisions, sent to reinforce the Italian army after the Caporetto disaster. It was evident that the maintenance of a separate reserve, for each national army of sufficient strength to make the position of that army perfectly safe, in case the great German offensive should happen to strike its line, would be impossible and that some plan for mutual support, as had already been necessary in the case of Italy, was imperatively demanded by the certainty that the German command would try to profit by their temporary numerical superiority to get a decision before the United States should have been able to develop her full military strength.

With these facts before them the Military Representatives recommended in paragraph 1 (i) of Joint Note No. 1 (December 13, 1917) “the use to the utmost of all possible mechanical means in order to provide the maximum mobile reserve”; and in Joint Note No. 14 (January 25, 1918) they made the following recommendation:

“The Military Representatives are of the opinion that the formation of a general reserve for the whole of the Allied forces on the Western front, both in France and Italy, is imperative.

“The Military Representatives recommend that in view of its urgency the creation of this reserve should be decided at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council and, so as to prepare for this decision, the governments should inform the Military Representatives as soon as possible of the views of their Chiefs of Staff and Commanders-in-Chief on this subject, in particular with regard to the number, situation and command of this reserve.”

The formation of such a general reserve was taken up at the Third Session of the Supreme War Council, held at Versailles January 30th to February 2nd. While the general principle met with almost immediate approval, considerable discussion arose as to what units should compose it and who should control or command it. It was evident that the divisions needed for the creation of such a force would have to be taken from the reserves then available behind the different national armies—in other words, would have to be taken away to some extent from the control of the various commanders-in-chief—and that the individual or body controlling this reserve and authorized to decide the time and place of its use would exercise most of the essential powers of a commander-in-chief. It was these facts which caused most of the difficulty in securing the approval of all the commanders-in-chief to the details of a plan which, in theory, they approved.

Only the Supreme War Council itself had, at that time, authority to do this and it might not be able to convene quickly enough to meet an emergency. Some new agency had to be created and the Allies were not yet prepared for the selection of a Commander-in-Chief. On February 1st it was agreed that each member of the Supreme War Council should discuss the subject with his own military advisers and present his views at the meeting on the next day. This decision was arrived at after much discussion and difference of opinion as to the agency for the control of the General Reserve. Had they been then ready to designate an Interallied Commander-in-Chief there would have been no difficulty; but for this they were not yet ready. The report made by the American Military Representative contained the following:

“1. I think that one single general principle should guide the Supreme War Council in determining the important question of the control and direction of the Interallied General Reserve. That general principle is unity of control and direction so far as it is possible to attain it.

“2. The Supreme War Council has already laid down the rule that the Allied Generals-in-Chief and their General Staffs must make their detailed plans in conformity to the general plans adopted by the Supreme War Council in representation of the Allied Governments. These plans must be submitted to the Supreme War Council in order that it may be assured that they are properly co-ordinated, and that all tend harmoniously to the successful accomplishment of a common object. The Supreme War Council cannot depart from this rule without abdicating its essential functions.

“3. It is not wise to waste effort by doing a thing which it is not necessary to do. It is, therefore, not wise to create an organization to do that which another organization has already been created to do. It is not wise to superimpose one agency upon another agency doing the same thing. The only possible result of such action will be to produce unnecessary confusion, friction, and delay, at a time when there should exist the utmost clearness of cool and unbiased vision, the utmost harmony, and the utmost rapidity of action.

“4. The Supreme War Council was created in order to secure unity of control, and unity of action. It was created, not to assume the functions of command and of execution which belong to Commanders-in-Chief and the General Staffs of the National Armies in the field, but it was created in order that a certain general control of the common allied military efforts might be transferred from the local theatres of war at the immediate front, where that control could not be exercised in the light of a general view of the entire situation, to a point further removed from that front and from which the situation on all fronts could be seen with equal clearness and each local situation be thus brought into its proper perspective.

“5. If the Supreme War Council, through its own military agency and in harmonious co-operation with the Commanders-in-Chief and with the General Staffs, is not able to undertake the solution of all questions relating to the Inter-Allied General Reserve, including its control and direction, I do not know of any organization which can undertake it. If the agency created to assist it under its immediate direction is not competent for the purpose, let the Supreme War Council change this agency to whatever extent it may find desirable; but, whatever be the final constitution of this agency, it is neither necessary nor wise to superimpose another agency on it. If the Supreme War Council cannot itself solve the problem of a general reserve, it will have failed in the principal function which, as I believe, it was created to perform, viz., the securing of unity of control and action; because, in the approaching campaign, the control and direction of a strong General Reserve is the only thing that will secure unity of purpose over three theatres of war which are now to be regarded as a single theatre.

“6. The Supreme War Council has already directed that the general attitude on the Western front shall, in general, be a defensive attitude. Therefore, the primary object in the creation of an Inter-Allied General Reserve must be the preservation of the integrity of a defensive line at the point or points most seriously threatened. It cannot be supposed that those who control and direct the reserve will use it to precipitate an offensive contrary to the accepted general plan. They can only direct it, in its entirety or in part, towards the threatened point where it immediately falls under the sole command of the Commander-in-Chief of that part of the front. If, when the enemy has been decisively repulsed, there should appear an opportunity for a decided offensive, it must be assumed that, if there then be any considerable force of the reserve still unengaged, those who control it will immediately send it to the Commander-in-Chief who is in a position to make the offensive.

“I, therefore, propose for consideration by the Supreme War Council the following—

Draft of a Resolution

“1. In order to secure unity of control and the maximum effort at the point or points of the Western front that may be most seriously attacked, the Supreme War Council directs the formation of an Interallied General Reserve.

“2. Its Military advisers, after full conference with the Commanders-in-Chief, their Chiefs of Staff, and the Chiefs of Staff of the respective Governments, shall advise the Supreme War Council as to the strength, composition, and point or points of initial concentration of the General Reserve. The Supreme War Council, if it approves, will then give the necessary directions to carry these recommendations into effect.

“3. The Military advisers shall constitute a committee for the sole purpose of deciding to which Commander-in-Chief or to which ones of them, and the time when, the General Reserve or part of it shall be assigned to assist in the defense; after which the control by this committee shall cease. After approval by a majority of its members, the orders of the committee for the movement of the General Reserve shall be given through that one of its members who shall be designated by the Supreme War Council for that purpose. The moment this movement of the General Reserve or any part of it shall have begun, it will come under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to whose assistance it is assigned. Until such movement begins, the General Reserve will for all purposes of discipline, instruction, and administration be under the orders of the respective Commanders-in-Chief, but no movement can be ordered except by the committee.

“4. On the advice of its Military Advisers and after approval, the Supreme War Council will give instructions to the Governments and Commanders-in-Chief concerned to prepare and have available at the designated places the means of transportation necessary for the most rapid movement of the General Reserve.

“5. At any time during the formation or existence of the General Reserve as an independent body, the Supreme War Council may, in its discretion, give any instructions relating to it.”

As a result of the discussion which ensued the Supreme War Council passed the following resolution^* relative to the formation of the General Reserve and its control, which it will be seen substantially followed the recommendations of the American Military Representative:

“Resolution No. 13.

“1. The Supreme War Council decides on the creation of a General Reserve for the whole of the Armies on the Western, Italian, and Balkan fronts.

“2. The Supreme War Council delegates to an Executive composed of the Military Representatives of Great Britain Italy, and the United States, with General Foch for France, the following powers to be exercised after consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armies concerned:—

(a) To determine the strength in all arms and composition of the General Reserve, and the contribution of each national army thereto.

(b) To select the localities in which the General Reserve is normally to be stationed.

(c) To make arrangements for the transportation and concentration of the General Reserve in the different areas.

(d) To decide and issue orders as to the time, place, and period of employment of the General Reserve; the orders of the Executive Committee for the movement of the General Reserve shall be transmitted in the manner and by the persons who shall be designated by the Supreme War Council for that purpose in each particular case.

(e) To determine the time, place, and strength of the enemy counter-offensive, and then to hand over to one or more of the Commanders-in-Chief the necessary troops for the operation. The moment this movement of the General Reserve, or of any part of it, shall have begun, it will come under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to whose assistance it is consigned.

(f) Until the movement of the General Reserve begins, it will, for all purposes of discipline, instruction, and administration be under the orders of the respective Commanders-in-Chief, but no movement can be ordered except by the Executive Committee.

3. In case of irreconcilable differences of opinion on a point of importance connected with the General Reserve, any Military Representative has the right to appeal to the Supreme War Council.

4. In order to facilitate its decisions, the Executive Committee has the right to visit any theatre of war.

5. The Supreme War Council will nominate the President of the Executive Committee from among the members of the committee.”

“Resolution No. 14.

“The Supreme War Council designate General Foch as President of the Executive Committee for the General Reserve.”

In compliance with these instructions the Executive War Board convened and took action as follows:

1st Meeting—3rd February, 1918

Inauguration of Board. Exchange of views on subjects requiring first consideration.

2nd Meeting—5th February, 1918

(1) It was agreed that a Joint Letter should be sent to each of the Commanders-in-Chief by the Executive Committee stating that it had been decided to form a General Reserve of so many Divisions, and that the contribution of each National Army should be of so many Divisions. It was agreed to fix the figures later.

(2) It was agreed that the distribution of the General Reserve should be considered and fixed at a later meeting.

3rd Meeting—6th February, 1918

(1) The text of a Joint Letter by the Executive War Board to the Commanders-in-Chief on the composition and the positions of the General Reserve was discussed and adopted.

(2) It was agreed that the use of the General Reserve should be discussed at another sitting.

4th Meeting—2nd March, 1918

(1) The replies of the French and Italian Commanders-in-Chief to the Board’s letter having been received, were read and considered.

(2) The fact that the British Commander-in-Chief had not yet replied was noted. The British Member of the Board, General Rawlinson, expected a reply by the next day. He did not think Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig would be able to make the contribution asked of him.

(3) Question of the 35th Italian Division was considered.

5th Meeting—4th March, 1918

(1) The reply of the British Commander-in-Chief to the Board’s letter was considered.^* It was noted that it substantially amounted to a statement that he could not make any contribution to the General Reserve as contemplated by the Supreme War Council.

(2) A report to the Supreme War Council, to the effect that the Executive War Board found itself unable to proceed with the formation of a General Reserve because of the refusal of the British Commander-in-Chief to contribute his quota to it, was adopted and signed with the proviso that it should be held 24 hours pending a conference which General Rawlinson expected to have with Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. As no change in the latter’s attitude resulted from this conference, the report was sent to the Members of the Supreme War Council.

(3) The return of a second British Division from Italy was considered.

6th Meeting—8th March, 1918

The Executive War Board took the following decisions:—

(1) “The Executive War Board has been unable to form a general Reserve on the basis of its letter of 6th February and has so reported to the several Governments, whose instructions it awaits.

(2) “If any member of the Board has a new proposal to make in respect to the formation of a General Reserve, he should submit it in the form of a Draft Joint Letter.

(3) “General Rawlinson having asked that the question of the withdrawal of the 7th Division (British) in Italy be examined by the Executive War Board, the Executive War Board decided that the question could not be treated apart from that of the General Reserve. If it was to be treated apart, the Supreme War Council ought to refer it specially to the Executive War Board.”

The attitude of the British Command as indicated in the foregoing paraphrase of the minutes of the 5th Meeting of the Executive War Board was probably influenced by the vague fear which still existed in the minds of some that the divisions “ear-marked” for the General Reserve might be entirely withdrawn from the particular national army to which they belonged and attached somewhere beyond the control of the Commander-in-Chief of that Army; although to explain that there was no intention of doing this was one of the objects of the conference between the British Military Representative and the British Command.^* That this was never intended by General Foch or the Executive War Board is shown by the maps giving their proposed distribution.^† It was intended to place the divisions of the General Reserve, taken from any national army, somewhere in rear of the sector occupied by that army where it seemed, in view of the general situation, that they would be most usefully employed in case of a German attack against that sector, but also where they could be moved with the greatest rapidity to reinforce the division of the General Reserve taken from another army in case the attack should develop against the sector occupied by that army. As stated below, the divisions of the British army proposed to be taken for the General Reserve would have been stationed at Amiens and its immediate vicinity, and the corresponding French divisions were to be at a point between Paris and Rheims. Could this disposition have been made, there would have been approximately a quarter of a million troops available and quickly ready to check the disastrous German drive of March 21st.

The British Command had arranged with the French Command for mutual assistance to be given, according as the attack should develop against the British or against the French. But, it had been pointed out at the Third Session of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, January 30–February 2, that the whole purpose in view was “that a certain general control of the common allied military efforts might be transferred from the local theatres of war at the immediate front, where that control could not be exercised in the light of a general view of the entire situation, to a point further removed from that front and from which the situation on all fronts could be seen with equal clearness and each local situation be thus brought into its proper perspective.” Nothing could accomplish this except absolute unity of control of the General Reserve. Very often it appeared that an attack proceeded for a considerable time before it became evident that it was the real main attack of the enemy. Subordinate attacks or deceptive preparations for such attacks were made at other points or other sectors. Each national commander naturally held on to his own troops to the last minute believing that the real attack would ultimately develop against him and that the one being made against his colleagues was merely a subordinate one. These commanders were necessarily tied up and influenced by an intense preoccupation with the situation on their own front. And, it was only the immediate and startling success of the Germans, beginning with March 21, which left no room for doubt where the main attack was being made. It was then only that French divisions were rushed in to fill the breach,—rushed so hastily that they arrived on the field without their artillery and reserve of ammunition. Had the recommendations of the Executive War Board been carried into effect, the General Reserve would have been ready at the locations best suited for their prompt use, and just where the whole Entente world would have liked to have them.

The statement of the British Command that arrangements had been made for mutual assistance by the French and British was an acknowledgment of the necessity of the General Reserve; but the arrangement which they made lost most of the advantages of a General Reserve. And the statement of that Command that the divisions of the General Reserve “could not be located in any particular areas prior to the delivery of the German offensive or the development of the enemy’s intentions” is shown to be in error by the fact that the proposed location of the divisions of that Reserve was one to meet all of the requirements of the situation.

At its 4th Session in London on March 14th and 15th, 1918, the Supreme War Council passed the following resolutions in regard to the Executive War Board:

“Resolution No. 1 (Allied General Reserve: transport of British and French Divisions from the Italian to the Western Front: employment of Italian troops on the Western Front.)

• “1. The creation of a General Reserve for the whole of the armies on the Western, Italian, and Balkan fronts, as decided at Versailles on the 2nd February, 1918, is maintained.
• “2. In view of the great enemy concentration on the Western front, and the likelihood of an early attack on the British section of the line, the proposals of the Executive War Board for the composition of the General Reserve require modification.
• “3. The British and French divisions now on the Italian front, together with the British division which has just left that front, and a quota of Italian divisions, to be determined by the Executive War Board, shall form the nucleus of the General Reserve.
• “4. The Executive War Board are at once to decide the following questions:—

  (a) The number of divisions to be allotted as the Italian quota of the General Reserve.

  (b) The desirability of an immediate transfer to the Western front of some of the British, French, and Italian divisions now on the Italian front.

• “5. To assist them in carrying out the above decision, the Executive War Board, or a Committee of General Officers nominated by them with the approval of their Governments, are at once to confer with the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army.
• “6. The decision of the Executive War Board on the above points will immediately be notified to the four Governments, so that, if political considerations are involved, the Governments may intervene.
• “7. In the event of the Executive War Board being unable to reach a unanimous decision on Resolution 4 (paragraph 4 above of this same resolution), the question will be decided by communications between the Governments or at a meeting of the Supreme War Council.
• “8. The nucleus of the General Reserve will be formed from such divisions as may be decided as provided above, and the General Reserve will thereafter be gradually expanded as the arrival of fresh divisions from the United States of America by relieving the pressure on the other armies, enables further divisions to be released.”

“Resolution No. 7 (Committee to proceed to Italy.)

“With reference to paragraph 5 of the Resolutions adopted by the Supreme War Council at the Second Meeting of the 4th Session in regard to the Allied General Reserve, the Supreme War Council approve the proposal that the following General officers should form a Committee, which should proceed at once to Italy in order to confer with the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army:

• General Maistre,
• General Rawlinson,
• General Bliss,
• General Giardino.”

“Resolution No. 8 (Functions of the Executive War Board: creation of an Allied General Reserve).

“The Supreme War Council took note of a statement made by General Foch with regard to the functions of the Executive War Board and the creation of an Allied General Reserve.”

In compliance with the above instructions the Executive War Board held meetings as follows:

“7th Meeting—21st March, 1918

“The Executive War Board assembled to decide the questions submitted to its decisions by the Supreme War Council at its meeting of Thursday, 14th March, 1918. (Resolution No. 4)

“After having considered the recommendations of the Meeting of General Officers which convened at Turin on the 20th of March, answers:—

“(a) ‘The number of divisions to be allotted as the Italian quota of the General Reserve’.

“General Giardino estimates that the number may be 4 Italian divisions on condition that only 2 French divisions are to be assigned to the General Reserve. General Diaz did, in fact, state that if—as the Governments indicated it in their Resolution No. 3—all the French and English divisions in Italy should be placed in the General Reserve, he will not be able to furnish any Italian divisions for this General Reserve.

“Generals Bliss, Rawlinson and Foch estimate that the number of divisions to be put in the General Reserve should be 4 Italian divisions and, for the present, 2 French and 1 English division.

• (b) ‘The desirability of an immediate transfer to the Western front of some of the British, French, and Italian divisions now on the Italian front’.

“General Giardino considers as opportune the immediate transfer of 2 Italian divisions and thereafter, of 2 French and 1 English division if the military situation permits it. General Bliss, General Rawlinson and General Foch consider it opportune that 2 Italian divisions, 2 French divisions and 1 British division be transferred. Since these divisions are part of the General Reserve, the Executive Committee will fix the order of the transfer of those units, having agreed that the transportation will begin with the 2 Italian divisions if the military situation permits.”

8th Meeting—23rd March, 1918

The Executive War Board took the following Resolutions:

“In view of the proportions reached by the battle now being fought^*, the Executive War Board decides that it is absolutely necessary to bring back at once from Italy:—

• 2 French divisions
• 4 brigades of British Field Artillery not in divisional cadres
• 1 British division.

“As any delay might have the most serious results, the Executive War Board direct the execution of this movement.”

Owing to its inability to obtain the participation of the British Commander-in-Chief in the formation of a General Reserve, the British Government failing to force his compliance with the scheme proposed by the Executive War Board acting under instructions of the Supreme War Council, the General Reserve had not been formed when the German offensive was launched on March 21st. Had it been formed early in February as the Executive War Board with its limited powers tried its best to do, the defeat of the British 5th Army on March 21st would most certainly have been promptly checked. The map of the Executive War Board shows that the location which it assigned to the minimum of 7 British Divisions in the proposed Reserve was at Amiens and the immediate vicinity while a minimum of 10 French Divisions were to be placed between Paris and Rheims;—both groups where they could be moved in any direction with the greatest promptness.

In Joint Note No. 12 the Military Representatives had given it as their opinion that “France will be safe during 1918 only under certain conditions”, two of which were:

“That every possible measure shall be taken for strengthening and co-ordinating the Allied system of defences, more particularly in the sectors most liable to a heavy attack.

“That the whole Allied front in France be treated as a single strategic field of action, and that the disposition of the reserves, the periodic rearrangement of the point of junction between the various Allied forces on the actual front, and all other arrangements should be dominated by this consideration”.

By adopting this joint note the Supreme War Council had made it the official statement of their policy for the conduct of the war in the spring and early summer of 1918. The rapid success of the German offensive in March developed the fact that a part of the British Army had not complied with the first of the above conditions; and it was the British Commander-in-Chief whose opposition had prevented the formation of the General Reserve, which if ready might have saved the Amiens-Paris railroad and have stopped the German advance before it ruptured the line at the junction of the French and English armies.

Under the Beauvais Agreement, April 3d, 1918, General Foch, as Allied Commander-in-Chief on the Western front, had taken over the duties with which the Executive War Board has been charged; and at its Fifth Session at Abbeville, May 1st and 2nd, 1918, the Supreme War Council agreed (Resolution No. 2):

“That, in view of the extended powers conferred on General Foch by the Doullens and Beauvais Agreements, the Executive War Board, set up at the meeting of the Supreme War Council held on the 2nd February, should be dissolved.

“The Executive War Board is therefore dissolved.”

VI.—The Supreme War Council and the Conduct of the War

1. General Remarks.

In the preceding pages a general idea has been given of the scope of the work which fell upon the Supreme War Council and the method pursued in performing it. In further illustration of this, a brief account of the relations of the Supreme War Council to the conduct of the war on the different fronts is given.

In a study presented to the Supreme War Council by the Military Representatives, at the request of that Council, it was held that France and Italy still remained the main theatres of the war. The decisive victory of the war—provided the enemy powers continued to hold together—was to be obtained by the decisive defeat of the Germans on the Western front, and this defeat at any point would necessarily entail the total collapse of enemy resistance on the remainder of that front and in all other theatres of war. It was, of course, always possible that a successful offensive on the Italian front or in the Balkans might cause the enemy coalition to crumble before a defeat could be inflicted on the French front; but in the general conditions which then existed there was nothing whatever to indicate this except as a remote possibility.

Nor was there anything at that time to make at all sure that the crushing of Austrian resistance on the Italian, or Turkish resistance on the Mesopotamian front would also crush Germany which was the real foundation of the hostile coalition. It was true that had the main effort, at one time, been diverted to the Italian front not only might Austria be thrown out of the coalition, but success there might afford an opportunity for a fatal thrust on the southern flank of Germany. But, with the disaster of Caporetto it seemed that this opportunity had been finally lost. It was, therefore, believed that the decisive defeat of the enemy coalition could only be achieved somewhere on the Western front between the North Sea and Switzerland; and that for this final struggle the Allies must concentrate their resources in man power and matériel on that front. Nothing should be allowed to absorb resources which were required by the armies of the Entente in France. It was assumed that the defeat of the Central Powers in any of the subsidiary theatres of war could only be a step on the road to the defeat of Germany; it could not bring about the final decision. Therefore, the part to be played by operations in the other theatres was assumed to be mainly that of contributing to the moral and material exhaustion of the enemy, thereby making his decisive defeat on the Western front the more easy. Until the time came for the final thrust on all fronts it was not realized how completely the military resistance of the enemy, after his exhaustion by the determined Allied offensive of the summer and early autumn of 1918, had become like that of an empty eggshell. It was, however, assumed that as soon as the time came for final offensive operations in France, the operations in Italy and in every other theatre of war must be characterized by the utmost vigor in order to take advantage of any specially favorable development in any of those theatres and also to prevent the German armies in France from obtaining any assistance from their allies elsewhere.

Agreement on a military policy for the beginning of the campaign of 1918 was first reached by the Allies when the Supreme War Council, on February 1st, 1918, accepted Joint Note No. 1 of the Military Representatives of December 13, 1917. It was based on a deliberate and express acceptance of the view that the arrival of American troops was necessary, first, to hold out against the anticipated German attack and, second, to be able thereafter to take a decisive offensive.^* In brief, this policy was:

1) To provide for a co-ordinated system of defense from the North Sea to the Adriatic.

(a) By reconsidering the existing lines of defense and constructing additional and successive defense lines to check an attack by the enemy.

(b) Providing the maximum mobile reserve and means to afford rest and opportunity of training for reserves.

2) To develop rail and sea communication between different sections of the front and make preparations for the movement of troops between these different sections, especially in respect to the Italian front. This defensive policy was not to preclude any minor forms of active defense that any Commander-in-Chief might think necessary to maintain the offensive spirit of his troops.

3) A defensive policy for the Balkan front.

The foregoing marked the beginning of a co-ordinated Allied policy. On the 31st of January, 1918, the Supreme War Council accepted Joint Note No. 12, January 21st, 1918, of the Military Representatives, which outlined the military policy for the beginning of 1918 and until the circumstances of the campaign should indicate a change. Again, in this note, a defensive policy for the Western front was advised and while it was not thought at that time that even with the maximum effort assumed as then possible for the United States in man power and matériel a complete victory over the Central Powers could be obtained in 1918, it was realized that unforeseen developments in that year might afford an opportunity for final success. Therefore, the Military Representatives advised that the Allied Armies on the Western front, far from being passive should, on the contrary, take advantage of every occasion to impose their will on the adversary. It was held that “the policy of a strong defensive not only does not preclude, but actually prepares for any offensive measures in any theatre of war that may be decided upon for 1918 when the present political situation in Russia, and the military situation in Italy, are more clearly defined”. In the note the Military Representatives, while advising energetic offensive action in Palestine and Mesopotamia, maintained that no troops, excepting possibly surplus mounted troops, could be with any degree of safety moved from the Western to the Eastern front. The principle of treating the Western front in France as a single strategic field of action, also agreed upon at the meeting of the Supreme War Council of January 21, 1918, now brought up the question of how the separate Allied Armies could operate successfully under three separate, independent commanders. The introduction to this report deals at length with this subject and shows how matters progressed and necessity finally forced the acceptance of a single commander for the Western front in France.

2. The Western Front.

In order that there may be no confusion as to the term “Western Front” it must be remembered that, prior to the German offensives of March and April, 1918, the term “Western Front” applied to the sector from the North Sea to Switzerland; but, during the remaining period of the war it applied to a sector which really included two theatres of operation, namely, the sector from the North Sea to the Adriatic. The term, therefore, required some qualification. As a result of the Abbeville Agreement of the Supreme War Council in its meeting at that place, May 2nd, 1918, the Western front became officially the sector from the North Sea to the Adriatic and subsequently in referring to the Western front the term was qualified by “in France” or “in Italy” when mentioning one of the divisions of what was considered one strategic field.

(a) Operations in France and Belgium.

The High Command having been established (nominally on March 26th, 1918, but actually on April 3d, 1918), the Supreme War Council now gave to the Commander-in-Chief a free hand in the conduct of operations in this theatre and every effort was made by the Military Representatives to assist the Commander-in-Chief in carrying out his policies. In addition to advising the Supreme War Council on all matters of policy pertaining to the general conduct of the war, the Military Representatives consulted freely with the High Command on any matter when it seemed possible that their advice or the studies of their respective sections might be useful.^*

(b) Operations in Italy.

The attitude of the Supreme War Council, with respect to operations on this front was to hold here only sufficient troops to maintain a safe defensive attitude. The question of reinforcements for the Italian front first came before the Military Representatives in December of 1917, when Italy made an urgent request for a sixth British division then on the Western front in France. The question being referred to the Military Representatives, they prepared Joint Note No. 3, which was accepted by the Supreme War Council February 1, 1918. This note advised against sending further reinforcements to the Italian front.

On December 1st, 1917, the Supreme War Council instructed the Military Representatives to examine the situation on the Italian front from an offensive as well as a defensive point of view and report upon it at an early date. As the result of this mandate the Military Representatives prepared Joint Note No. 6, which was accepted by the Supreme War Council at its session of February 1st, 1918. In this note the Military Representatives expressed the following opinion:

“1. The situation appears to be restored on the Italian front. During the last six weeks the Italian Army has shown very considerable powers of resistance which ought to be sufficient to hold, with the help of the Allied forces, the line Piave-Grappa-Altiplani.

“2. It does not at the present moment appear possible, or desirable, to take the offensive in Italy. The duty of the Allied forces is to maintain a defensive of the utmost tenacity with the object of preserving the line which they now occupy and which protects the port of Venice. With this object the line must be strengthened with every engineering device and with successive and mutually supporting lines behind it so that the ground can be defended inch by inch. As a measure of precaution, the works undertaken behind the Bachiglione and on the Mincio-Po line must be hurried on without delay.

“3. The Allied reinforcements are sufficient in the existing situation of the Italian front. In any event, the general situation at the present would not allow them to be increased.

“4. The re-organization and training of the Italian Army must be pushed forward with the utmost dispatch to meet any eventuality that may arise on the Italian front, as well as to facilitate the withdrawal of all or part of the Anglo-French in Italy at the earliest possible date.”

Nothing subsequently developed to cause the Supreme War Council to change its attitude with respect to the Italian front and, with the exception of a few American troops sent to the Italian front for the purpose of bettering the Italian morale by giving to the forces on this front a more completely Allied aspect, no further reinforcements were sent to Italy. On the contrary, a number of divisions, among which were four Italian divisions, were taken from the Italian front and sent to the front in France.

3. Operations in the Balkan Peninsula.

In Joint Note No. 1 of December 13, 1917, the Military Representatives advised a defensive attitude in the Balkans. The note stated that in the event of a serious attack by the enemy in this theatre, in which it might be impossible to adequately reinforce troops there available, it was necessary to consider the possibility of a systematic and pre-arranged retirement from part, at any rate, of the existing front.

In explanation of this general view, it must be kept in mind that the Germans had already begun the withdrawal on a large scale of their forces on the Russian front. Exactly what they were doing with them, or intended to do, was not known. From time to time a new German division was identified on the Western front in France. But whether these represented all the divisions that had been withdrawn from the East no one could tell. Others might at that moment be en route towards the Balkans or Italy or towards both. Their arrival would be known only when they suddenly appeared and, probably, only when they appeared in a drive actually begun. The means of detection of newly arrived enemy troops on either of those fronts were by no means as easy as on the Western front. Not in-frequently, reports came to us at Versailles of the arrival of fresh German divisions in Italy, which afterwards proved incorrect. Moreover, the movement from the East towards France might easily continue until the Germans had there obtained a formidable superiority and still leave divisions to throw against the Army of the Orient or against the Italian front. And there were some who believed, then and now, that this would have been a wiser move for the Germans to make, provided their transportation facilities permitted it. The morale on neither of the (for the time) subsidiary fronts was very good. Some believed that a few good German divisions thrown without warning against the front in Macedonia would break it. The political situation in Greece was such that this might throw her out of the war, make many fine harbors available as German submarine bases—all with a tremendous reflex action on the Allied morale. Similar action might break the Italian front with similar results. The Italians themselves believed this to be the real danger, which accounted for their unwillingness to send a large force to France and on the contrary caused them to demand reinforcements. Therefore, for the time, it seemed that the most that could be done on these two fronts was to strengthen the positions and hold on.

In Joint Note No. 4, of December 23, 1917, approved by the Supreme War Council on June 3, 1918, the Military Representatives recommended the holding of a line from Stavros to Monastir for which purpose they stated that they believed sufficient allied forces were on the ground to successfully withstand the enemy forces then present in that theatre. They advised, however, that since reinforcements for the Balkans were not available the possibility of a retirement must be faced. While recognizing the desirability of holding on to both Salonika and Valona they urged that the mainland of Greece be denied to the enemy. It was requested that the Commander-in-Chief at Salonika be asked for his plan and that he be advised that it must include arrangements for rebasing himself on Greece and not on Salonika alone.

As a result of the enemy pressure still being exerted in France, the Supreme War Council at its 5th Session agreed that a French and British general officer should be sent at once to Salonika, where, in association with the general officer commanding the Italian forces at Valona they should confer with General Guillaumat in order, if possible, to arrange for the immediate withdrawal of some Allied battalions from that theatre to the Western front. No withdrawals resulted, however, from the foregoing action.

The Supreme War Council at its 7th Session on the 2nd, 3d, and 4th of July, 1918, passed a resolution directing that:

• “1. The Military Representatives shall report as to the desirability of undertaking an offensive in the Balkans and a diplomatic representative shall be attached to the Military Representatives for this inquiry.
• “2. Pending the result of their inquiry no general offensive will take place.”

The report drawn up as a result of the foregoing resolution embodied the following recommendations:

• “(a) That it is desirable to make energetic preparations to enable the Allies to begin an offensive operation in the Balkans not later than October 1st, 1918, provided that these preparations do not entail the transfer of any men or material from the Western front, or the diversion of any tonnage which would otherwise be available for the continuous transport of men and material at the maximum rate indispensable for the realization of the plan of operation on the Western front, approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France.
• “(b) That it is necessary, in principle, to give the General Commanding in Chief of the Allied Armies of the East a free hand to carry this offensive into execution at the moment which he may consider most favorable, provided new and unforeseen circumstances do not compel the Supreme War Council itself to fix the date, or to abandon the operation altogether.”

In Joint Note No. 37 of September 10, 1918, on the subject of the military policy of the Allies for the autumn of 1918 and for the year 1919 (it being still held by the Allied High Command that preparations should be made for a possible campaign in the latter year), attention was invited to the preceding recommendations and the Military Representatives added, in substance, that it was not possible to foresee what the actual operations should be, on account of the uncertain political conditions in which some of the Allies’ enemies were then involved, and that, therefore, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Macedonia should not, in preparing his offensive operations, lose sight of the necessity which still existed of improving his lines of communications and of establishing new bases in Old Greece in accordance with the directions laid down by the Supreme War Council contained in Joint Note No. 4 of the Military Representatives.

An Allied offensive in the Balkans began on September 15th, 1918, and resulted, as is well known, in Bulgaria’s collapse.

4. Siberia and North Russia.

(a) Siberia:

At the close of the year 1917 and beginning of the year 1918 the Allies watched day by day the Germans withdrawing an increasing number of divisions from their Russian front and adding them to the forces which it was evident that they intended to employ in a tremendous effort early in the latter year. The situation was such as to cause the Allies the gravest apprehension. They were ready to clutch at every straw which seemed to afford the slightest chance of supporting their sinking weight.

In the month of February, 1918, the American Military Representative was informed that one of the Allies was strongly pressing the Government of the United States to participate in an Allied expedition to Siberia by way of Vladivostock. It was his first definite information that such a project was being considered, although for some time it had been a matter of more or less informal discussion among his colleagues. On receiving this information he brought the matter up for formal discussion with his colleagues and then learned that more or less elaborate, though unofficial, studies had been made on the subject.

It was represented that enormous stores of military supplies of all kinds had been brought to Vladivostock during the régime of the Czar and that the general collapse of the transportation system, both before and after the revolution, had prevented their being brought into European Russia. There was reason to believe that the new government might dispose of these stores to the advantage of Germany and to the detriment of the Allies. It was believed that great quantities of them were still to be found at Vladivostock and along the railway at least as far as Harbin.

This situation gave a valid reason for the military occupation of Vladivostock and the railway as far as Harbin, as a similar one gave a military reason for the subsequent project to occupy the ports of Murmansk and Archangel. But, as far as these situations alone were concerned, neither of them gave a reason for a further advance into the interior.

With reference to Siberia, the studies showed that no other Allied troops than those of Japan (except, possibly, in very small numbers) could be made available for this expedition. In fact, it was urged that one advantage of this movement would be to utilize Japanese troops relatively near to their home base but who could not be brought to any of the other fronts without a cost in money and tonnage, combined with difficulties of supply, that would be prohibitive.

At that time there was, in the mind of many, a misconception as to the extent of the revolutionary feeling in Russia, whether Bolshevik or otherwise, and the American Military Representative always held that the plans for intervention in that country and the ultimate objects were too largely based on that misconception. The others believed that the great mass of the people in European Russia and, especially, in Siberia wanted nothing but a leader and some support from the outside to overthrow a government whose local iniquities were then beginning to appall the world. Too little weight was given to the fact that the great mass of the 180,000,000 people living in Russia knew little of these iniquities and suffered little or nothing from them; while they attributed all of the evils from which they suffered to war in the abstract. People who believed that were not likely to rally to the support of anyone who proposed further war.

Whether the basic idea was incorrect or not, it was assumed that, after getting possession of the military stores at Vladivostock and Archangel, an Allied force of only a few divisions could work its way along the trans-Siberian railway as far as Cheliabinsk, occupying the important centers of population on or near that railway, and thus furnishing nuclei about which the orderly elements would rally and thence, by a process of peaceful penetration, their influence would be carried into European Russia. The occupation of the Siberian railway, it was believed, would first of all deprive the Germans of any possible hope of the grain supply of that great province. Furthermore, it was believed that the influence permeating the rest of the empire from the restoration of orderly government in Siberia would lead to a rehabilitation of a Russian Army to operate on the Eastern frontier of Germany. Could this be realized in time, it would prevent the further withdrawal of German divisions from that front and might possibly force the return of some that had already been withdrawn.

Thus, it will be seen that the original idea was not primarily to initiate a war against Bolshevism as such but was merely to bring about a renewal of a Russian thrust against Eastern Germany.

In the discussions which followed upon this subject, the American Military Representative held that the only certain or probable military advantage from the proposed movement would result from taking possession of the military supplies at Vladivostock and Harbin and prevent their sale to the Germans. He believed that, as conditions then were, the proposed movement along the entire line of the trans-Siberian railway was open to serious objections and might result in a situation quite the opposite to that which academic studies had made appear possible or probable. The Germans had at that moment just renewed the status of war with the Bolsheviks. The real object of the proposed movement was to consolidate all of the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia in favor of the Allies; but it was proposed that the movement should be conducted almost entirely by Japanese troops, the long-time enemies of the Russians and towards whom the latter entertained a very bitter feeling. It was, therefore, necessary to consider whether the Germans as the declared enemies of the Bolsheviks might not be as likely to consolidate in their own favor the anti-Bolshevik sentiment as the Japanese would be to consolidate it in favor of the Allies. Moreover, the proposed movement would demand an increasing number of troops, especially should the original assumption as to the friendly attitude of the Russian masses prove to be erroneous. This increasing demand would cause an increasing drain on tonnage which, even without the losses due to submarine warfare, was not sufficient for the proper conduct of the war on the Western front. He, personally, believed that the war would be decided in 1918 for or against the Allies. It would take a long time, even if all calculations and assumptions proved correct, to bring any real Allied pressure to bear on Germany through Russia. Long before the lapse of this time the war might be over and might be lost due to this diversion of Allied strength.

Nevertheless, he believed that the seizure of the military stores at Vladivostock and Harbin would be a distinct advantage to the Allies and as this could be accomplished by the use of a relatively small Japanese force which could not be employed to advantage elsewhere and which could be handled by Japanese tonnage he yielded his objections to the extent of agreeing to this occupation, with a further proviso that a strong civilian and military Allied Mission should accompany the expedition to Harbin, and which should report to the respective governments the facts which they might then have ascertained in regard to the real interior feeling of Russia, thus enabling those governments to decide whether the continuance of the movement would or would not be wise.

Consequently, on February 18, 1918, the Military Representatives adopted their Joint Note No. 16, as follows:—

• “1. That the occupation of the Siberian railway from Vladivostock to Harbin, together with both terminals, presents military advantages that outweigh any probable political disadvantages.
• “2. That they recommend this occupation by a Japanese force, after obtaining a suitable guarantee from Japan; together with a joint Allied Mission.
• “3. The question of the further occupation of the railway shall be determined by the Allied Governments concerned according as the circumstances develop.”

By this time, however, the subject had been taken up by the respective governments by diplomatic correspondence instead of being a matter to be determined by the Supreme War Council, and nothing further was done in the execution of Joint Note No. 16.

The views of the American Military Representative received the approval of his Government.

However, on April 9, 1918, at a full meeting of the Military Representatives, there was presented the draft of Joint Note No. 20 for discussion. The subject of this note was “The Situation in the Eastern Theatre”. It emphasized the necessity of an immediate Allied intervention in Russia as the only course that would insure any “serious military resistance to Germany” from that direction. Here, again, was an evidence of the frequent tendency to divert efforts from measures to attain a common end, for the purpose of guarding some threatened national interest. In Joint Note No. 20 appeared very clearly the British fear of influences that might seriously threaten India. To be sure, such a threat by the Central Powers might cause the diversion of British troops from the Western front in order to protect and guard the threatened India, and thereby decide the war in favor of the enemy. But, surely, this was an argument in favor of permitting no diversion of effort from the Western front but rather of concentrating every effort there for the purpose of effecting a quick decision.

I explained to my colleagues that the instructions which I had received from my Government were to the effect that the whole question of intervention in Siberia was the subject of diplomatic negotiation; that I, therefore, could not join them in signing the note but that, as it was a clear exposition of the situation from their point of view, I would transmit it, unsigned by me, for the information of my Government.

In any event, difficulties of finance practically prohibited intervention in Siberia on the scale which finally came to be demanded. Even if it were attempted by one of the Allies alone, that Ally would have to be compensated or financed; and this could only be done, either by granting concessions which were repugnant to the underlying idea with which the United States had entered the war, or by the United States assuming a financial burden which it could not then bear. It could only do this by largely ceasing its effort on the Western front.

(b) The Archangel and Murmansk Expeditions.

At a joint meeting of the Inter-Allied Naval Council and the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, March 23, 1918, the question of intervention at the northern Russian ports, Archangel and Murmansk, was first considered. The Joint Report prepared contained the following views:

“1. Intervention at Archangel.

“From the military point of view, under existing conditions no military resources whatever are found to be available for an expedition to Archangel.

“From the naval point of view, it would be extremely difficult to withdraw naval material, either transports or men-of-war, to devote to this expedition. The loss of this shipping, assigned to Archangel, would be heavily felt both in anti-submarine warfare and in transportation.

“The Council is conscious of the importance of preventing the stores accumulated at this point from falling into the hands of the enemy and is of opinion that all possible steps must be taken to insure the destruction of these stores.

“2. Intervention at Murmansk.

“The same considerations are equally applicable to Murmansk so far as a military expedition specially directed to this point is concerned.

“The Council is however of opinion, so far as this last place is concerned, that the naval steps actually being taken should be continued in order to retain this place in the possession of the Allies as long as possible.”

However, as time went on, the threat of a German advance on Petrograd and the ports of Murmansk and Archangel, assisted by Finnish troops (that country having aspirations in the latter direction) came to be more and more real. Therefore, on June 3, 1918, the Supreme War Council adopted the Military Representatives Joint Note No. 31, as follows:—

“At their joint Meeting on the 23d of March, 1918, the Inter-Allied Naval Council and the Permanent Military Representatives considered the possibility of sending an Inter-Allied Military Expedition to Murmansk and Archangel with the object of protecting the stocks of military material warehoused in those ports.

“While recognising the impossibility for the moment of such an operation, the Representatives in their Joint Report of 23d March, 1918, expressed the hope that the naval effort at Murmansk would be continued in order to maintain Allied possession of that port as long as possible.

“The Permanent Military Representatives are of opinion that since the 23d of March the general situation in Russia and especially in the Northern Ports has completely altered.

“(a) The German threat to Murmansk and Archangel has become more definite and more imminent, Finland has completely fallen under German domination and is now openly hostile to the Entente and makes no concealment of its claims to Carelia, the Kola Peninsula and the Murmansk railway. The Germans are preparing for an advance on Petrograd.

“(b) We are urged to occupy these ports not only by the Allied Representatives in Russia but also by the majority of the Russian parties. Such occupation is an indispensable corollary of Allied intervention in Siberia.

“(c) It is hoped that the available Serbian and Czech units will render the land defence of the maritime bases possible without the transport of any considerable expeditionary force.

“(d) The Serbian and Czech units gathered at those points cannot be conveyed immediately to France and, should the German-Finnish Armies advance rapidly, they run the risk of capture unless organized and supported without delay. Further, the following considerations must be noted:—

a) The lines of communication both by land and sea terminating at the ports of Murmansk and Archangel are the only routes the Allies have left by which to penetrate into the heart of Russia to keep in touch with the various nationalities and to combat German influence.

b) These ports are the only free economic outlets towards Western Europe that are left to Russia and Siberia.

c) The occupation by Germany of Murmansk alone and its conversion into a first rate submarine base would make the sea route to Archangel impracticable for the Entente.

d) On the other hand, the occupation of Murmansk and Archangel by the Entente would protect the flanks of the Allied Armies which may eventually operate in Siberia and facilitate and expedite liaison with them.

e) The agreement of the Czecho-Slovaks to the maintenance of a portion of their forces in those regions will be conditional on the moral and material support of a few Allied units on the spot to co-operate with them against the Germans.

“Hence the Military Representatives are of opinion:—

1) That a military effort be made by the Allies to retain in their possession, first in importance, the port of Murmansk; afterwards or even simultaneously if possible the port of Archangel.

2) In order to limit this effort to the minimum, that it would be desirable to obtain from the National Czecho-Slav Council approval of the principle of retaining in these regions during the necessary time some Czech units, it being understood that the number of these units would be reduced to the minimum necessary and that the remainder would be sent to France as previously agreed.

3) Provided that the assistance defined above is obtained, the effort to be made by the Allies can then be limited to the sending to the Russian Arctic ports:—

a) Of some English, French, American or Italian battalions, four to six in all;

b) Of officers and specialists from the Allies or Czechs in France, to complete the instruction and cadres of the Serbo-Czech troops and to provide for the general administration and supply of the garrisoning force;

c) Of the material and supplies which cannot be found there.

4) That the organization of the command can be effected in the following way:

• There will be a single commander who will be charged with the direction of both naval defense and land defense of the Russian Arctic ports, as well as of the important points on the railroad which terminates at each of these ports.
• This command will be exercised by a commander-in-chief designated by the British Government until such time as the Supreme War Council may otherwise direct.”

At this time, the attitude of the United States Government with regard to its participation in the occupation of the northern ports of Russia was perfectly clear. It recognized that, at the best, only a limited force was available. It was not contemplated by it nor (so far as was known to it) by any other government to conduct operations into the interior of the country,—certainly not except with the cordial consent of the Russian people. It agreed to the occupation of the ports for the purpose of getting possession of valuable military material and of preventing, as long as possible with the available force, access by the Germans to them and the establishment by them there of bases.

During all of the discussions leading to the preparation and adoption of Joint Note No. 31, it was assumed that there would be an approximate equal participation by the various governments in the proposed expedition. But, following the action of the Supreme War Council of June 3rd, a request was presented by the British to the President of the United States asking that there be dispatched to the ports of Murmansk and Archangel an American force consisting of three battalions of infantry and machine guns, two batteries of field artillery, three companies of engineers and the necessary administrative and medical service. This contribution was materially in excess of that which had been originally contemplated to be made by the United States. It led to requests from Washington for explanation and I accordingly, on June 22, 1918, sent a cable to Washington bearing on the general question of intervention at the Russian Arctic ports.

In this cable, besides giving an estimate of the situation with respect to the Russian Arctic ports, I expressed the opinion that the ports of Murmansk and Archangel could not be retained by the Allies without an unwise expenditure of military effort, unless the larger part of the forces required were drawn from Czech units then in Russia or from Russian sources; and further, that until definite assurance was had that such assistance would be obtained, Allied forces maintained at these ports should be sufficient only for defense against small enemy operations, or in the event of major enemy operations to insure removal or destruction of stores and destruction insofar as practicable, of all port material that would be of service to the enemy in the establishment of submarine bases; that before entering on a new and vague plan calling for a large increase in the originally proposed American force the plan must be studied out and the common agreement of the Allies reached.

It will be remembered that a considerable force of Czech troops, which had joined the Russian armies prior to the revolution and which, subsequently to the revolution, had developed an increasing repugnance to fighting for or against any of the then factions in Russia, was gradually working its way toward the east in the hope that on arrival at Vladivostock they might be transported by the Allies to the Western front. At about this time, a part of this force was in the vicinity of Omsk (and perhaps had passed beyond it on its way to Vladivostock) while another part of it was farther to the west. It was hoped that this latter force might be diverted to the northwest and finally reach Archangel where it would join the small force of Serbs and Czechs already there.

The discrepancy between the contribution proposed by Joint Note No. 31 and that which was actually requested by the British led to an inquiry for explanation from Washington.

Military intervention at the northern ports of Russia was the subject of long and earnest consideration at the session of the Supreme War Council at Versailles July 2–4, 1918. At that session the American Military Representative explained that, probably, one of the reasons for failure thus far to take action by the Government at Washington was due to this discrepancy between the figures originally proposed and those which were finally demanded. It then became evident that General Poole, commanding at Archangel, had telegraphed to the British Government for additional forces with a view to a more or less extended intervention. It was this which led to the British request of our Government for an apparently excessive contribution. After long consideration the three Prime Ministers drew up and sent a telegram to the President of the United States in regard to the intervention, without asking for study and recommendation by the Military Representatives.

In reply to requests for information I cabled on July 12, 1918, my views substantially as follows:

The Murmansk and Archangel plan was a compromise. Prior to July 2, when Sir Eric Geddes presented to the Supreme War Council the views of the British General Poole, commanding at Murmansk, my attitude toward this plan was as follows. My colleagues had steadily held to the view that sooner or later there would be intervention in Siberia. They believed that at any moment the attitude of Germany towards Russia might become such that the United States would approve of this intervention. I agreed with them to the extent that should such intervention come it would be desirable for the Allies to possess a point of support and access to Western Russia that would embarrass the Germans in their efforts to check intervention in Siberia and that would eventually permit military supplies to be carried into Russia directly from the west as well as from the east.

But I took no part in any plan based on the assumption of general intervention. The occupation of the northern Russian ports as part of a general plan of intervention would require a force large enough to move south and control or threaten railway communications between west and east.^* I did not believe that this force could be sent in from the outside and kept supplied, but would have to be raised from the country from friendly Russians. I and my colleagues therefore agreed upon a small force of at most 6 and possibly only 4 battalions distributed among the four Allies which, with the land and sea forces already there, we believed sufficient to hold the northern ports during that winter. This plan was strongly supported by General Foch and the Naval authorities.

Under that plan the United States would send one or, at most, two battalions—probably marines. With this small contribution, we would, first, get possession of the large amount of military stores still held at Archangel and which would be of great value to the Germans should it fall into their hands. Second, we would retain access to Russia by way of Murmansk which was an ice-free port. From a humanitarian point of view I thought that this was very important. All reports indicated the approach of a severe famine in northern Russia. It might be necessary to send food, medicines and Red Cross assistance generally. This might give opportunity for peaceful American intervention of the greatest value to the orderly elements in Russia and to the Allies. Third, there was an incidental military advantage that would result from holding the northern ports in case, for any reason, intervention should be agreed upon.^* It was assumed that this small force could hold the ports until after the opening of the campaign of the following year. By that time the question of general intervention would certainly have been decided. Should that intervention have come, it would have been a grave mistake to have surrendered the northern ports if we could possibly hold them.

The American Government had expressed sympathy with practical military efforts that could be made at and from Murmansk and Archangel, provided that they proceeded on the full sympathy of the Russian people and did not interfere with their political liberty. Murmansk was already in possession of the Allies and Archangel partially so. I assumed that no military movements from these places to the south could be made if the Russians were not sympathetic. I believed that the occupation of the Northern ports would be “practical military efforts,” which would justify the small expedition proposed and the risks involved. After further discussion of the subject I concluded my cable with the statement that “on the whole I think we should be represented but only by our fair part”.

On July 23rd a Washington cable to the American Section of the Supreme War Council stated that the President had decided to permit 3 battalions of infantry and 3 companies of engineers to participate in the Murmansk Expedition. The infantry was to come from General Pershing’s forces, provided General Foch could spare them, and likewise the engineers, if General Pershing himself could spare these. No artillery was authorized.

From time to time after the dispatch of the above force to Murmansk, and in one way or another, efforts were made to convince me that I should urge my government to further augment the forces in Northern Russia. The expressed purpose for the increase in force urged was offensive Allied action by the Northern Russian Expedition and I consistently held to the view that the Murmansk and Archangel Expeditions were intended for a specific defensive purpose, namely: the retention of those ports and for that purpose should not be augmented. Further I made it clear that the Government of the United States had definitely declined to take part in organized intervention in the interior of Russia in adequate force from Murmansk or Archangel.

5. Utilisation of American Troops.

From the time when the United States entered the war the Allied authorities urged that the American man power be utilized to maintain the Allied divisions at their maximum strength and in the number then organized, the American recruits receiving their finishing training in the schools already established and in operation for the allied armies. Opinion as to just how this should be done, ranged from the proposal to feed the American soldiers individually into European units to that of assigning smaller American units, such as companies or battalions, to the European divisions. It was recognized by the American authorities that any such procedure would be entirely impracticable and would not secure the best utilization of American man power. It was very evident to both General Pershing and myself that, in order for the American effort to reach its full efficiency, the American Army concentrated for a definite operation of its own on a well defined section of the front must be organized at the earliest possible opportunity. The Allies were very persistent in urging their proposition in some form or other, claiming that the shipping obtainable would not be sufficient to transport a well balanced army, with its complement of heavy artillery and auxiliary and supply troops, in time to participate in the 1918 campaign which it was foreseen would be the critical period of the war for the Allies. They showed that their man power reserves were exhausted and that the casualties, which must be foreseen as the result of the anticipated German offensive, would reduce their armies to such an extent that they could not hold throughout the year the front then occupied. Thus they were reasoning on two erroneous assumptions, to some extent justified by their own experience, namely:

a) That the American Army, if organized as separate body, could not be relied upon to hold defensively its own part of the line until after six to nine months training in Europe; and

b) That even after this period the commanders of the larger tactical units and their staffs would not have sufficient experience to permit the utilization of the army, so formed, as an offensive force without inviting disaster.

On the 29th and 30th of January, 1918, at an informal conference held^* by Mr. Lloyd George, Viscount Milner, Generals Haig, Robertson, Wilson, Pershing and myself, it was agreed, subject to approval by the American Government, that the British Government would furnish shipping for six American divisions to be trained with the British Army, in addition to the troops transported in accordance with the regular American schedule.

The case of the Allies was stated and discussed at the 3rd Session of the Supreme War Council, January 31st, 1918, at Versailles. At the conclusion of this discussion and in regard to the question which had been twice asked by Baron Sonnino as to whether the American Government would allow the minor units of each division to be amalgamated with British and French divisions, in order that they could most effectively perform their part in the emergency which was assumed to be approaching within the next few months, I made in substance the following statement:

“To ask the United States formally to declare now and in advance of the emergency that it will permit its units to be amalgamated with British and French divisions is to make unnecessarily difficult the solution of the problem which you are studying, i. e., the most effective utilization of American man-power under present conditions. Everything possible is now being done to prepare for this effective utilization of American man-power without the formal declaration by my Government which Baron Sonnino appears to desire. Yesterday the British Government agreed to bring over six American divisions, with the understanding that they would train the infantry battalions of these divisions on the British front. If the German attack finds these battalions on the British front they will fight to the extent of their capacity wherever the attack finds them. Also, General Pershing entered into an agreement with General Petain by which the organizations of his divisions will receive their final training on the French line. It goes without saying that neither can be withdrawn for the purpose of forming complete American divisions under their own officers while the German attack is being made or is being prepared. If the crisis should come the American troops will undoubtedly be used in whatever way their services will be most effective, either in defense or offence, with the British and French troops with whom they are at the time serving. It is to be clearly understood, however, that this training of American units with British and French divisions, whether behind the lines or in actual combat on the line, is only a stepping stone in the training of the American forces, and that whenever it is proper and practicable to do so these units will be formed into American divisions under their own officers. Such a thing as permanent amalgamation of our units with British and French units would be intolerable to American sentiment.”

The discussion ended there, and no further action was taken at this session.

The losses occasioned by the German offensive of March, 1918, amounted to approximately the combatant personnel of ten British divisions and exhausted their reserves of men. To make good these losses the Parliament passed a new conscription bill which drew into the army younger and older men; but these could not be trained and ready to take their share of the service until the latter part of July or the beginning of August. A message was received by me from the British Prime Minister in March, 1918, in which he stated the predicament in which the English Government found itself and especially urged that the American schedule of transportation be changed so as to increase the number of combatant men (especially infantrymen and machine-gunners) and correspondingly decrease the shipments of men of the other services and of material.

The nature of the shipping available was such that the greatest number of men could be transported in the least time by bringing over first infantrymen and machine-gunners in their regular organizations and leaving artillery personnel, guns, transportation and auxiliary troops until later. These infantry brigades, if placed in training with the British and French armies and concentrated in rear of their lines, would constitute a considerable reserve force which had already had many months training in the United States. It was found that, if this were agreed to by the American authorities, the British Government would feel itself justified by the emergency in utilizing for their transportation shipping which up to that time had been engaged in other very necessary traffic. The critical situation on the front and the fact that this offer of additional shipping from the British would actually expedite the getting of American troops to Europe, seemed to justify a departure from the priority list established for the American forces, and the Military Representatives therefore adopted Joint Note No. 18, March 27, 1918, which read as follows:

• “(1) In paragraph 4 of Joint Note No. 12 dated 12th [21st] January, 1918, the Military Representatives agreed as follows: ‘After the most careful and searching inquiry they were agreed on the point that the security of France could also be assured. But in view of the strength of the attack which the enemy is able to develop on this front, an attack which, in the opinion of the Military Representatives could reach a strength of 96 divisions (excluding reinforcements by “roulement”); they feel compelled to add that France will be safe during 1918 only under certain conditions, namely:

  (a) That the strength of the British and French troops in France are continuously kept up to their present total strength, and that they receive the expected reinforcements of not less than two American divisions per month.’

• “(2) The battle which is developing at the present moment in France and which can extend to the other theatres of operations may very quickly place the Allied Armies in a serious situation from the point of view of effectives, and the Military Representatives are from this moment of opinion that the above detailed condition (a) can no longer be maintained and they consider as a general proposition that the new situation requires a new decision.
• “The Military Representatives are of opinion that it is highly desirable that the American Government should assist the Allied Armies as soon as possible by permitting, in principle, the temporary service of American units in Allied Army Corps and Divisions, such reinforcements must however be obtained from other units than those American Divisions which are now operating with the French, and the units so temporarily employed must eventually be returned to the American Army.
• “(3) The Military Representatives are of opinion that, from the present time, in execution of the foregoing, and until otherwise directed by the Supreme War Council, only American infantry and machine gun units, organized as that Government may decide, be brought to France, and that all agreements or conventions hitherto made in conflict with this decision be modified accordingly.”

The Secretary of War was then in Paris and, after conference with General Pershing and myself, cabled to the President a qualified endorsement on this joint note, as follows:

“The purpose of the American Government is to render the fullest cooperation and aid, and therefore the recommendation of the Military Representatives with regard to the preferential transportation of American infantry and machine-gun units in the present emergency is approved. Such units, when transported, will be under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, and will be assigned for training and use by him in his discretion. He will use these and all other military forces of the United States under his command in such manner as to render the greatest military assistance, keeping in mind always the determination of this Government to have its various military forces collected, as speedily as their training and the military situation permits, into an independent American Army, acting in concert with the armies of Great Britain and France, and all arrangements made by him for their temporary training and service will be made with that end in view.”

Joint Note No. 18 was submitted and the whole matter was discussed in full at the 5th Session of the Supreme War Council May 1st and 2nd, 1918, at which General Pershing was given an opportunity to state to what extent he thought the wishes of the Allies could be met without jeopardizing the timely formation of the American army. In consequence of this discussion the following resolution was passed:

“It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion an American Army should be formed as early as possible under its own Commander and under its own flag.

In order to meet the present emergency it is agreed that American troops should be brought to France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit, and that, without losing sight of the necessity of building up an American Army, priority of transport be given to infantry and machine-gun units for training and service^* with French and British Armies; on the understanding that such infantry and machine-gun units are to be withdrawn and united with their own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the discretion of the American Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France.

“It is also agreed that during the month of May preference shall be given to the transportation of infantry and machine-gun units of six divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over such other troops as may be determined by the American Commander-in-Chief.

“It is further agreed that this programme shall be continued during the month of June upon condition that the British Government shall furnish transportation for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 men in June, with the understanding that the first six divisions of infantry shall go to the British for training and service, and that troops sent over in June shall be allocated for training and service as the American Commander-in-Chief may determine.

“It is also further agreed that if the British Government should transport any number in excess of 150,000 in June that such excess should be infantry and machine-gun units, and that early in June there should be a new review of the situation to determine further action.”

At the 6th Session of the Supreme War Council, June 2, 1918, the following resolution was passed:

“The Supreme War Council approves the following telegram to be sent to the President of the United States in the name of the Prime Ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain:—

“‘We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for the remarkable promptness with which American aid, in excess of what at one time seemed practicable, has been rendered to the Allies during the past month to meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues. General Foch has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which, points out that the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 Allied divisions are now opposed to 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions (on the contrary, they are put to extreme straits to keep them up), there is a great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied. He therefore urges with the utmost insistence that the maximum number of infantry and machine-gunners, in which respects the shortage of men on the side of the Allies is most marked, should continue to be shipped from America in the months of June and July to avert the immediate danger of an Allied defeat in the present campaign owing to the Allied reserves being exhausted before those of the enemy. In addition to this, and looking to the future, he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory in the war unless America is able to provide such an Army as will enable the Allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. He placed the total American force required for this at no less than 100 divisions, and urges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total American force of 100 divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done.’

“We are satisfied that General Foch, who is conducting the present campaign with consummate ability, and on whose military judgment we continue to place the most absolute reliance, is not overestimating the needs of the case; and we feel confident that the Government of the United States will do everything that can be done, both to meet the needs of the immediate situation, and to proceed with the continuous raising of fresh levies, calculated to provide, as soon as possible, the numerical superiority which the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies regards as essential to ultimate victory.”

The subsequent steps in regard to the shipment of American troops were taken by General Pershing with the French and English authorities without further intervention on the part of the Military Representatives and are fully described in his report.

VII.—The Armistice

1. Preparation and Approval of the Armistice Terms.

Under date of October 14, 1918, the United States Government sent its reply to the communications received by it from the German Government of the 8th [6th] and 12th of October, 1918.⁸ In this reply it was stated:

“It must be clearly understood that the processes of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and the advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments. And the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the Armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment of the Allied Governments”.

Under date of the 20th of October, 1918, another communication was received from the German Government⁹ to which a reply was returned under date of October 23d¹⁰ and in which the following appears:

“He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible.

“The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and insure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.”

It is well to note the terms of these communications because of the unwarranted opinion, which has been expressed by some, to the effect that the Government of the United States forced the unwilling acceptance of an armistice on the governments with which it was associated in the war. The President’s letter of October 23, 1918, plainly leaves the whole matter in the hands of the Allied Governments. It was only on the condition that “those governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated” that the question of an armistice at that time would be considered at all. The American representatives who participated in the drafting of the armistice terms were guided by the spirit of this communication. They had no more to do with the formulation of the terms of the armistice than the representatives of any of the other participating powers, and more than once they yielded their own view to a different but unanimous view of their colleagues.

There is always a tendency for us to judge preceding events in the light of our subsequent knowledge. When the total collapse of Germany became evident there were many who had advocated the armistice as it was actually made but who then expressed wonder that more drastic terms of surrender had hot been exacted. Twice there had been presented to the authorities formulating the Armistice terms the condition of absolute and complete disarmament and demobilization of all land and naval forces of the enemy. It had been rejected;—why? To those who were in daily association with the political and military leaders then assembled in Paris the reason was obvious.

In the early days of November, 1918, the extent to which the German people was beaten was not known to the outside world. Those people were wearing paper shoes, paper clothing, eating substitutes for food that an American farmer would not feed to his cattle or pigs. Yet, at that very time, legislators and economists of the Allied world were talking of anti-dumping laws as being necessary to protect their peoples against the commercial flood of manufactured fabrics and articles of all kinds with which they believed German ware-houses to be filled,—manufactured and stored during the war!

As for the German army, it was apparently being beaten. But, before, there was a time when it was apparently being beaten. For more than two years, up to the early days of 1917 it had held a fortified line in France. It suffered much in holding it, but it also inflicted tremendous losses on the Allies who tried to drive it back. Then came the withdrawal to the “Hindenburg line”. As the one side withdrew, the other pushed eagerly on. Our newspapers and the Allied newspapers were filled day by day with accounts—perfectly true accounts—of the capture of thousands of prisoners here and there, of many hundreds of pieces of artillery, and of great quantities of stores and ammunition. If one were to consult a file of newspapers of those days he would find the rapidly growing conviction that the Germans were hopelessly beaten. Editorial comment and countless cartoons scouted and ridiculed the idea that the Germans were making an orderly and successful withdrawal to a new position where they were again to hold the Allies at bay for many months and fill the graveyards of that fair land with another million of Allied dead.

When armies of the huge size of this war confront each other on a line hundreds of miles in length, with the advanced trenches along this line within pistol shot of each other, neither side can get up and withdraw in the course of a night and be at day-break beyond the reach of its enemy. The new position must first be fortified by weeks or months of labor; new artillery positions must be prepared with concrete platforms for the heavy guns; hundreds of miles of road must be repaired and others constructed. New stores of supplies and dumps of ammunition must be accumulated on the new position. Between the old and the new positions—a distance of many miles—every point from which the advance of the enemy can be checked must be fortified and held by its garrison till death or capture. On this depends the safety of its main army. Every town and village from which roads radiate must be held to the last; because, in these days of tractor-drawn artillery, of motor ammunition and supply trains and motor transportation for rapidly moving bodies of troops, the roads are more than ever of vital importance. Large parts of the stored supplies and of the ammunition dumps must be abandoned to the enemy, if they cannot be destroyed in time. Transportation is not available for them and reliance must be placed on new stores in the new position. An ammunition dump may cover many square miles. For miles the ground along the main roads leading to a position and the lateral roads in rear of it are dotted with piles of projectiles of every kind, covered with earth to protect them from air-plane attack and from which the shells are dug out as a farmer digs out roots for his cattle. Other piles are hidden far from the roads, in clumps of trees and in forests where they are invisible to the eager searcher in the air. Neither time nor means permit the removal of much of such material or its destruction, and it swells the list of the enemy’s booty of war.

It is all this which accounts for the Allies’ captures during the successful German withdrawal of 1917.

Until the end comes such a movement is apparently quite consistent with the belief either that an orderly but limited withdrawal is being made or that the enemy has met with his final defeat and is retreating to his own frontier and as much further as he may be driven before his surrender. But we know well enough what has happened when, suddenly, we read that our armies, which have been advancing at the rate of fifteen or twenty or more kilometers a day, and day after day, capturing many thousands of prisoners, hundreds or thousands of guns and great quantities of stores,—have suddenly come to a standstill, are gaining (if they gain at all) a few yards here or there after days of savage fighting and terrible losses and with, after a whole year of one prolonged battle, a gain of perhaps the width of the District of Columbia at some one point on a line 450 miles in length.

All of this happened in 1917. Was it to be repeated, even only partially, in 1918? Whatever we may think now, in the light of subsequent knowledge, it was not sure then. The Germans were making a well executed retreat. They were losing heavily, but they had lost heavily in the previous retreat of 1917. That they were beaten, so far as concerned their war aims, there was no doubt. But there is a wide difference between a beaten enemy and one that is “down and out”. The German army was “down and out” on the signing of the armistice but not before. In the rapid retreat and rapid advance the Allies had necessarily left behind heavy artillery and other material necessary to break the German resistance if the latter’s army of between three and four million men should be able to reach a prepared position, or one naturally suitable for defense, in German territory; while at the same time the Germans had this material, except such as was abandoned (as they had done in 1917), with them. The advance was costly for the Allies and they had reached a point where they were unable to make good the losses and keep up their fighting units.

The campaigning season was approaching its end. If the Allies should find themselves confronted by a position on which the Germans had “dug-in” it would be necessary to promptly break this resistance or face the certainty of another winter under arms. To break it required the long process of preparing positions, bringing up the heavy guns, the ammunition and stores of all kinds,—and for this precious time was lacking.

All of this brought the political leaders of the Allies face to face with the grave problem of the morale of their civil populations. Would their peoples accept even the possibility of another year of war when they knew that the enemy had agreed to peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points which had been approved and accepted by the common people everywhere? There may have been then a few enthusiasts who believed that the enemy was finally “on the run” and who did not admit even a chance in his favor. But these were not found among the Allies and the great majority viewed the possibilities of the problem about as has been outlined above.

Thus, the Allied political leaders had, on the one hand, the chance of the enemy’s complete annihilation; they had, on the other hand, the chance of meeting a check for the winter, with its consequent effect on their own peoples. On the one hand, they had their armies which, whatever we may think now, would have been in a serious condition were they to meet with the appalling losses of another desperate battle. Already, battles or campaigns had been stopped by popular demand resulting from such losses. On the other hand, they had behind them peoples hungry, cold, every household in mourning, dazed and stupefied by the incredible losses already incurred. Excluding the United States, the Allies of Europe and Japan had mobilized 35,404,864 men; of these 4,705,665 were killed and 10,870,025 wounded; while 4,941,870 had been captured or were reported missing, a large part of which number were dead at the time of the armistice. It is not necessary to repeat here the money cost of the war up to the armistice and the accumulated burden of debt under which the Allied world would stagger for generations unborn.

It was to peoples who had made these sacrifices and were to bear the resulting burden, and all to attain the objects set forth in the Fourteen Points, that the political leaders had to say whether they would discuss a peace proposed by the enemy on the basis of those Fourteen Points. Could there be any doubt as to their decision? What had they to gain, except revenge, by going to Berlin with a loss of another million men and a further burden of debt of an unknown number of billions of dollars? We might have secured at that cost a more complete military impotency on the part of Germany. But that might have been attained in the Armistice itself. It was my belief then, as it is now, that had the demand for disarmament and demobilization been made, as the one condition for an armistice, immediately after October 23, it would have been accepted. If declined, it would have given the only justification for continuing the war. It was not made because the Allied Nations had a lurking fear of the possibility that it might be declined while they believed that their war aims could be attained without taking this chance. They may have been right,—who can now tell? Those things will now lie forever “on the knees of the gods”, a fruitful theme of speculation and controversy.

One thing is certain that, had the demand for disarmament and demobilization as the one essential armistice term been made and accepted; or, had the Peace Conference acted as promptly as it might have done^*, Germany would long ago have been disarmed and without an army other than necessary for her admitted internal needs. Had this been done there would now be no biassed contention in the United States that this government forced an armistice on the unwilling Allies.

Meanwhile, a meeting of the three prime ministers had been hastily summoned in Paris (not at Versailles) on October 5th, 1918. At this conference they did not sit as the Supreme War Council but as a Council of the Prime Ministers. The purpose of this conference was not made public, and, up to its final development, the only speculation that I heard was that the meeting was called for the purpose of arriving at an agreement about the situation existing at that moment in the Balkans. For a long time, in anticipation of the inevitable end, this had been the subject of anxious thought among the Military Representatives. They believed that it would be a great misfortune if the war, which began with an overt act resulting from the Balkan situation, should end with a sudden collapse of all resistance in that quarter and still find no general principles of adjustment agreed upon among the European Powers. But, up to the end, the demands of the war elsewhere absorbed all attention. It may be, too, that the underlying possibilities for controversy were so dangerous as to make the Allies indisposed to attempt the settlement of this burning question until forced to do so; this attitude being due, perhaps, to a desire not to bring on the consideration of any question having in it the seeds of dissension before the Alliance had attained the principal object of beating the common enemy.

Nevertheless, there were some who believed that, whatever might have been the ostensible purpose of the meeting which so hastily assembled the Prime Ministers in Paris, there was also another object in view, and, perhaps, the more important of the two. Rumors of appeals from the German Government to that of the United States, made or to be made, were rife. The moment was provocative of suspicion. There were some who did not see how such an appeal could be made or entertained without the possibility of a separate peace or, at least, of such action as would reduce the Allies to playing second part in the making of a general peace.

I was, therefore, not very much surprised when, at 9:00 p. m., Sunday night October 7th, 1918, I received the following communication from the Council of the Prime Ministers:

“The conference of Ministers at a meeting held on 7th October, 1918, agreed to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles, with whom shall be associated representatives of the American, British, French and Italian Navies, the consideration of the terms of an armistice with Germany and Austria, on the basis of the following principles, accepted on the previous day:—

“Paragraph 1	Total evacuation by the enemy of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Italy:
“Paragraph 2	The Germans to retire behind the Rhine into Germany:
“Paragraph 3	Alsace-Lorraine to be evacuated by German troops without occupation by the Allies:
“Paragraph 4	The same conditions to apply to the Trentino and Istria:
“Paragraph 5	Servia and Montenegro to be evacuated by the enemy:
“Paragraph 6	Evacuation of the Caucasus:
“Paragraph 7	Immediate steps to be taken for the evacuation of all territory belonging to Russia and Roumania before the war:
“Paragraph 8	Immediate cessation of submarine warfare. “Unnumbered Paragraph (It was also agreed that the Allied blockade should not be raised.)”

I recognized at once the importance and delicacy of the situation. I did not know whether this subject was or was not at that moment under consideration by the Government at Washington. When I received the above communication I was informed that a meeting of the Military Representatives would be held at 9:15 a. m. the following day for its consideration. I, therefore, at once cabled the document to Washington. I asked for immediate instructions, having stated that I should take no action whatever in this matter without formal instructions, but would keep my Government advised of whatever agreement was reached by my colleagues.

The document thus presented to the Military Representatives, was, of course, intended only as a basis for further study, and this accounts for certain oversights from the purely military point of view. Only one paragraph in it required immediate action by the enemy, and this action was only tentative. The other paragraphs fixed no time limit. One of them would permit the German Army, with its organization and armament intact, to retire to any strong position behind the Rhine which it might select. No guarantees were exacted of the enemy except the evacuation of certain territory which she was sure to lose anyway. The Military Representatives and their Naval associates met the following morning, October 8th, and drew up the following document, in reply to the request of the Prime Ministers, which is embodied in my cablegram to the War Department dated the same day:

“In compliance with resolution of the three Prime Ministers communicated to you in my number 242 the below quoted document was drawn up this morning. It was not drawn up by the Military Representatives in their official capacity as connected with the Supreme War Council but by them as individuals associated with representatives of the four navies. It is not in the form of a Joint Note but is entitled ‘A Joint Opinion’. I do not know whether the Prime Ministers intend to communicate it to the American government or not. The Americans have taken no official part in it nor is the American government committed to it in any way by any action here. I have informed the Prime Ministers in writing that I cannot sign it in the absence of instructions from my Government. The document follows:

“‘The Military Representatives and Naval Representatives meeting together on October 8th in accordance with the Resolution taken by the Conference of Ministers at their meeting held on 7th October, 1918, are of opinion that the first essential of an armistice is the disarmament of the enemy under the control of the Allies.

“‘This principle having been established, the conditions specified by the Ministers at their Meeting held on 7th October, require from a military point of view to be supplemented as follows:—

“‘Paragraph 1. Total and immediate evacuation by the enemy of France, Belgium, Luxemburg and Italy on the following conditions:—

“‘Subparagraph (a) Immediate re-occupation by Allied troops of the territories so evacuated:

“‘Subparagraph (b) Immediate repatriation of the civil population of these regions interned in enemy country:

“‘Subparagraph (c) No “Sabotage” loot or fresh requisitions by enemy forces.

“‘Subparagraph (d) Surrender of all arms and munitions of war and supplies between the present front and the left bank of the Rhine.

“‘Paragraph 2. Germans to retire behind the Rhine into Germany.

“‘Paragraph 3. Alsace-Lorraine to be evacuated by German troops without occupation by the Allies, with the exception stated in Clause 18 below.

“‘It is understood that the Allies will not evacuate the territory in their occupation.

“‘Paragraph 4. The same conditions apply to the territory included between the Italian frontier and a line passing through the Upper Adige, the Pusterthal as far as Toblach, the Carnic Alps, the Tarvis and the meridian from Monte Nero, cutting the sea near the mouth of the Voloska (see Map of the Italian Military Geographical Institute 1 over 500,000).

“‘Paragraph 5. Serbia, Montenegro and Albania to be evacuated by the enemy—under similar conditions to those stated in Clause 1.

“‘Paragraph 6. Evacuation of the Caucasus by the troops of Central Powers.

“‘Paragraph 7. Immediate steps to be taken for the evacuation of all territory belonging to Russia and Roumania before the war.

“‘Paragraph 8. Prisoners in enemy hands to be returned to Allied Armies without reciprocity in the shortest possible time. Prisoners taken from the Armies of the Central Powers to be employed for the reparation of the wilful damage done in the occupied areas by the enemy, and for the restoration of the areas.

“‘Paragraph 9. All enemy surface ships (including Monitors, River craft, etc.), to withdraw to Naval Bases specified by the Allies and to remain there during the Armistice.

“‘Paragraph 10. Submarine warfare to cease immediately on the signature of the Armistice. 60 submarines of types to be specified shall proceed at once to specified Allied Ports and stay there during the Armistice. Submarines operating in the North Sea and Atlantic shall not enter the Mediterranean.

“‘Paragraph 11. Enemy Naval air forces to be concentrated in bases specified by the Allies and there remain during the Armistice.

“‘Paragraph 12. Enemy to reveal position of all his mines outside territorial waters. Allies to have the right to sweep such mines at their own convenience.

“‘Paragraph 13. Enemy to evacuate Belgian and Italian coast immediately, leaving behind all Naval war stores and equipment.

“‘Paragraph 14. The Austro-Hungarian Navy to evacuate all ports in the Adriatic occupied by them outside national territory.

“‘Paragraph 15. The Black Sea Ports to be immediately evacuated and warships and material seized in them by the enemy delivered to the Allies.

“‘Paragraph 16. No material destruction to be permitted before evacuation.

“‘Paragraph 17. Present Blockade conditions to remain unchanged. All enemy merchant ships found at sea remain liable to capture.

“‘Paragraph 18. In stating their terms as above, the Allied Governments cannot lose sight of the fact that the Government of Germany is in a position peculiar among the nations of Europe in that its word cannot be believed, and that it denies any obligation of honor. It is necessary, therefore, to demand from Germany material guarantees on a scale which will serve the purpose aimed at by a signed agreement in cases among ordinary civilized nations. In those circumstances, the Allied Governments demand that within 48 hours:—

“‘1st. The fortresses of Metz, Thionville, Strassburg, Neu Breisach and the town and fortifications of Lille to be surrendered to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief.

“‘2nd. The surrender of Heligoland to the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief of the North Sea.

“‘Paragraph 19. All the above measures, with the exception of those specially mentioned in paragraph 18, to be executed in the shortest possible time, which it would appear should not exceed three to four weeks.’”

It will be noted that this document is an elaboration of the bases laid down by the Prime Ministers; also, that the projects in these terms relating to the disarmament were more effective than those which were finally adopted by the Armistice Convention.

After the foregoing terms were adopted, the draft of the document was brought to me with the request that I sign it. Before it was presented to the Prime Ministers I again stated my inability to do so and attached to it a note addressed to the Three Prime Ministers in which I stated that I could not sign in the absence of instructions from my Government.

What was finally done with this document after its submission to the Prime Ministers I do not know. It may be that one of its main objects was accomplished by the one fact that I had cabled it in its entirety to Washington.

Under date of October 21, 1918, I received a telegram from Washington directing me to submit a summary of views in regard to the armistice terms. In my reply, dated October 23d, I expressed the opinion that the armistice terms should be purely military in character and not embody terms intended to foreshadow the peace terms. It was my opinion that the armistice should be a cessation of all military operations, accompanied by the exaction of such guarantees as would make it hopeless for the Central Powers to attempt to resume the war and which would thus enable the civilian representatives of the respective governments to come together to consider and impose the terms of a wise peace. My general view, therefore, was that we should secure a complete military disarmament, so complete that there could be no hope on the part of the enemy of an attempt to resume hostilities, and then to proceed with the discussion and settlement of the terms of peace.

I met Mr. House on his arrival at Brest on the morning of Friday, October 25th, and handed to him a copy of my telegram to Washington of October 23d. At the same time, I informed him that the representatives of the Allies were then assembled in Paris to arrange the terms of an armistice. After our arrival in Paris, I had a conference on the morning of October 27th with Mr. House at his residence on the Rue de l’Université at which he discussed with me the views of the Commanders-in-Chief of the national armies and of the Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief in regard to the armistice. I then learned that none of them demanded what I believed to be necessary, viz.; a complete disarmament of the land and naval forces of Germany, leaving her, however, enough of her “home guard” troops to preserve internal order. The longest step, then under contemplation, toward attaining this took from Germany only a specified proportion of the equipment of her active army. I was of the opinion that it was dangerous to leave the German Army intact, with all of its organization perfected, with all its infantry rifles and ammunition, with at least half of its machine-guns, and with probably half its artillery,—to leave all of these with an army of between three and four millions of men to take up a selected position on the other side of the Rhine. I maintained that no one knew how many machine-guns and how many pieces of artillery might still be available in Germany for re-arming this intact army. On the other hand, if we could obtain disarmament and demobilization, we would be in a position to take any measures that common justice suggested and to obtain every one of our war aims.

In my opinion nothing but the complete disintegration of the German Army which immediately followed the armistice, saved us from a dangerous situation.

Mr. House then asked me to give him a memorandum expressing my views. I told him that my memorandum would express the same idea that was contained in my telegram to Washington of October 23d. I accordingly prepared and submitted my memorandum dated October 28th, 1918, as follows:

“Under ordinary circumstances the end of a war is indicated by two phases, viz:—

“a) An armistice, or a cessation of hostilities between the contending armies; and,

“b) A conference of the Powers concerned to determine and enforce the terms of peace. The extent to which the beaten party has effective participation in this conference depends ordinarily upon the extent to which he is beaten.

“But at the end of a great world-war like the present one, in which it may be assumed that one party is completely beaten and which will be followed by radical changes in world conditions the concluding phases are:—

“a) A complete surrender of the beaten party, under such conditions as will guarantee against any possible resumption of hostilities by it;

“b) A conference to determine and enforce the conditions of peace with the beaten party; and

“c) A conference (perhaps the same one as above) to determine and enforce such changes in world-conditions,—incidental to the war but not necessarily forming part of the terms of peace,—as are agreed upon as vital for the orderly progress of civilization and the continued peace of the world.

“Such I conceive to be the three phases that will mark the close of this war and which, if properly developed, will follow the war with an epoch-making peace.

“These phases should be kept separate and distinct. The conditions accompanying one should not and need not be confused with those of another.

“It is for the military men to recommend the military conditions under which hostilities may cease so that the political governments may begin to talk, without fear of interruption by a resumption of hostilities.

“What is the object to be kept in mind, in imposing military conditions to guarantee against resumption of hostilities?

“It is to ensure the ability of the powers associated in the war against the enemy to secure all of their just war-aims, for which they have prosecuted the war.

“It is conceivable that the enemy will accept one set of conditions that will ensure the attainment of these war aims, but will reject another set of conditions intended to ensure the same thing. In that case insistence on the latter will mean continued war with the attainment of the same aims at the end of it as might be obtained now, with the probability that the enemy may be less able then to meet some of the just demands.

“If it is considered possible that the enemy will accept certain so-called military conditions that have been proposed for his surrender, it is quite certain that he will accept others. In that case, the real question is ‘Will these two sets of conditions equally accomplish the essential object, to-wit, cessation of hostilities without power on the part of the enemy to resume them?’

“Apparently, all are agreed that there must be a complete military surrender on the part of the enemy as a preliminary to anything else. How shall this surrender be effected and made evident?

“It has been proposed, as one way to accomplish this, that there should be a partial disarmament by the enemy, accompanied by imposition of certain conditions which apparently foreshadow (and will be regarded by the enemy as foreshadowing) certain of the peace terms. This partial disarmament, apparently, leaves the enemy with the organization of his army intact, with his infantry armament intact, with an unknown amount of his artillery and half of his machine guns, and with apparently reserves of ammunition intact. If, during the subsequent period, this army can receive its missing armament, either from reserve stores of which there is no absolutely certain information, or from any other source, it is ready to receive it and then might again become a formidable object to deal with. If the enemy accepts such conditions, and is acting in perfectly good faith, it is even more certain that it will accept complete disarmament and demobilization without the imposition of conditions which, coming at the very first moment, may be very doubtful in their effect. If, on the other hand, the enemy accepts these conditions and is not acting in good faith, it will be because he thinks that these conditions are more favorable to his possible subsequent resumption of hostilities. If we secure partial disarmament accompanied by the other conditions proposed, and it does not prevent subsequent resumption of hostilities, then we will have failed in our purpose. If we secure complete disarmament and demobilization of the active land and naval forces no other guaranty against resumption of hostilities is needed and the powers concerned will be guaranteed the attainment of all their just war aims. If the enemy refuses complete disarmament and demobilization, it will be an evidence of his intent not to act in good faith.

“I, therefore, propose the following:—

“First, that the associated powers demand complete military disarmament and demobilization of the active land and naval forces of the enemy, leaving only such interior guards as the associated powers agree upon as necessary for the preservation of order in the home territory of the enemy. This, of itself, means the evacuation of all invaded territory, and its evacuation by disarmed and not by armed or partly armed men. The army thus disarmed cannot fight, and demobilized cannot be reassembled for the purposes of this war.

“Second, that the associated powers notify the enemy that there will be no relaxation in their war aims but that these will be subject to full and reasonable discussion between the nations associated in the war; and that even though the enemy himself may be heard on some of these matters he must submit to whatever the associated powers finally agree upon as being proper to demand for the present and for the future peace of the world.”

This memorandum was presented to Mr. House on October 28th, and two days later while I was waiting to see him at his apartment, 78 rue de l’Université, where a meeting of the Prime Ministers was being held, he came out from the council chamber and handed me my memorandum stating that the Council had decided against the proposition for absolute and complete disarmament and demobilization of the enemy forces. In doing this they equally declined to accept the opinion of the Military and Naval Representatives expressed in their “Joint Opinion” of October 8th, which was “that the first essential of an armistice is the disarmament of the enemy, under the control of the Allies”.

From the time of Mr. House’s arrival in Paris until October 31, 1918, the general conditions of the armistice had been the study of the Council of Ministers assisted by such other persons as, from time to time, they called upon for information and advice. In this way a rough draft of proposed armistice terms was drawn up and was first presented at the first meeting of the Eighth Session of the Supreme War Council held at the Trianon Palace (Hotel), Versailles, on Thursday, the 31st of October, 1918, at 3 p. m. This meeting of the Supreme War Council and the subsequent ones up to the final adoption of the armistice terms, was attended by varying representation of other powers not formally represented on the Supreme War Council. At the 4th and last meeting of the Eighth Session, at which the armistice terms were approved, the other powers represented were Japan, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Serbia and Czecho-Slovakia.

At the first meeting of this Session, on the proposal of Mr. Clemenceau, who presided, the rough draft was taken up for consideration and the discussion of it began paragraph by paragraph. The discussion was concluded and the final modified draft approved^* at the 4th meeting on the afternoon of Monday, November 4, 1918. In view of the possibility that Germany might refuse to accept the proposed terms of armistice and resume the war, at this same session there was approved the plan of further operations, prepared by direction of the Supreme War Council by Marshal Foch, General Wilson, General di Robilant, and General Bliss.

At the same meeting and after the same consideration, the terms of the armistice with Austria-Hungary were approved^† by the Supreme War Council. The resolution adopted in regard to the armistice with Germany was as follows:

“(a) To approve the attached terms of an armistice with Germany.

“(b) To communicate the terms of the armistice to President Wilson, inviting him to notify the German Government that the next step for them to take is to send a parlementaire to Marshal Foch, who will receive instructions to act on behalf of the Associated Governments.

“(c) To communicate to President Wilson the attached memorandum^* of observations by the Allied Governments on the correspondence which has passed between the President and the German Government, in order that they may be forwarded to Germany, together with the communication in regard to an armistice.

“(d) To invite Mr. House to make the above communications on their behalf to President Wilson.

“(e) To authorize Marshal Foch to communicate the terms as finally approved to envoys properly accredited by the German Government.

“(f) To associate a British Admiral with Marshal Foch on the naval aspects of the armistice.

“(g) To leave discretion to Marshal Foch and the British Admiral with regard to minor technical points in the armistice.”

The conclusions in regard to the Armistice with Austria-Hungary were as follows:

“(a) To approve the attached terms of an armistice with Austria-Hungary.

“(b) That General Diaz, on behalf of the Associated Governments, shall, on the arrival of accredited representatives of the Austrian Supreme Command, communicate to them the approved terms of an armistice.

“(c) That the Italian Government, on behalf of the Supreme War Council, shall be responsible for communicating this decision to General Diaz.

“(d) To invite Mr. House, on behalf of the Supreme War Council to communicate this decision to President Wilson.

“(e) That an Admiral shall be associated with General Diaz in these negotiations.”

2. Enforcement of the Armistice Terms.

Marshal Foch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western front was charged with the enforcement of the terms of the armistice with Germany. As to this armistice the Supreme War Council had agreed “To leave discretion to Marshal Foch and the British Admiral with regard to minor technical points in the armistice.”

As provided for in the closing paragraph of the Armistice signed on November 11th, 1918,¹¹ an agency known as the Permanent Inter-Allied Armistice Commission, with General Nudent (French), as President, was established with headquarters at Spa, Belgium, to supervise the execution of the Armistice, and to act as a channel of communication with the German authorities in regard to any questions arising in connection therewith.

3. Renewals of the Armistice.

The armistice was renewed on the 13th of December, 1918, the 16th of January, 1919, and on the 16th of February, 1919. The renewal of February 16th, 1919, provided that the Armistice be again prolonged for a short period of time, with no definite date of expiration, the Allied and Associated Powers reserving the right to terminate the same upon three days notice.

VIII.—The Supreme War Council After the Armistice

In the Supreme War Council the Allied and Associated Powers had an agency which could act with decision upon important international subjects, owing to the fact that it was composed of the political heads of the principal powers; and which had associated with it technical advisers on military, naval and shipping affairs. Moreover, the representatives of the different nations had now formed the habit of working together effectively on matters of international interest and an organization had been built up by which the necessary authoritative records were kept and the decisions reached were communicated to the officers of each government concerned in their execution.

But, it must here be kept clearly in mind that the Supreme War Council, as such, was no part of the Peace Conference. It so happened,—happened, because it might just as easily have been otherwise—that the heads of the four governments who composed that Council were also the most important of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference. The function of this conference was simply and solely to make peace with the Central Powers. But, many military and politico-military questions kept arising which for the most part had nothing to do with the making of peace terms but which grew out of the war which those peace terms were intended to end.

Were the heads of governments then sitting at that time in their respective capitals, these questions would have been considered either by exchange of diplomatic notes or would have been sent as before, to the Military Representatives at Versailles for their joint note of recommendations.

But, as they were actually sitting in Paris, it was natural and, indeed, quite necessary for them, as heads of governments, to refer these questions to themselves in their capacity as members of the Supreme War Council and to its military and other advisers. If the result of this reference concerned the terms then being formulated by the Peace Conference, it was brought to the latter’s attention; otherwise, action was taken in the usual course or procedure of the Supreme War Council.

Nevertheless, its general character, together with the scope of its work, ended with the Armistice. This was due to the fact that the questions arising no longer related to the conduct of the war against the Central Powers but were post-war and world-wide in their nature. This necessitated varying additions to the personnel, according to the problem under consideration, although the original personnel of the Council remained unchanged.

A summary of the reports of the Military Representatives made in conformity with these references by the Peace Conference will be found in appendix (I).¹² As these reports to a certain extent grew out of the work of the Peace Conference and in any event had nothing to do with the Supreme War Council as an agency for the effective prosecution of the war no further comment on them seems to be here necessary.

It is, however, desired to emphasize the fact that not only the Military Representatives and their staffs but the entire personnel of the Supreme War Council were imbued with the most earnest desire to aid as far as possible in bringing about the prompt and decisive defeat of the Central Empires; and, as a necessary outgrowth of this spirit they became at once a homogeneous and unified body able to decide upon united action. As enjoined by M. Clemenceau at the 2nd Session of the Supreme War Council on December 1st, 1917, they had been able to consider the good of the Allies as a whole and, when a difference of opinion arose, as it inevitably did from time to time, they were able to find a happy mean policy which secured effective action without one or another of them insisting upon some national aim inconsistent with the interests of any other one of the nations concerned. It was in the same spirit of “give and take” that the political members discussed and solved their special problems which were often of graver importance than the military ones. The Supreme War Council has proved that such an international body can work in unison and harmony; and it is in the belief that the members of any similar international council will in the future be inspired by the same spirit, that the hope of an ultimately successful League of Nations must rest.

[Appendix L]

The Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss) to the Executive Committee of the Supreme War Council

Versailles, March 9, 1918.

Subject: The Inter-Allied General Reserve

1. The American Permanent Military Representative, member of the Executive Committee, submits to his colleagues on the Executive Committee, the following views which he proposes for their consideration.

2. It is his view that the Supreme War Council in its Resolution of February 2¹³ decreed the creation of an Inter-Allied General Reserve and charged the Executive Committee with certain duties as to its composition and use. This decree and these instructions of the Supreme War Council are mandatory, and the Executive Committee cannot abdicate the duties and responsibilities with which it is charged, merely because a Commander-in-Chief has stated that he cannot agree with it as to one point, which point is a question of method and procedure rather than of general principle.

3. The letter of February 6¹⁴ was not final and conclusive, although it conveyed what was at that time the best judgment of the Executive Committee as to the formation of the Inter-Allied General Reserve. It was a basis of discussion with the Commanders-in-Chief, in which the Executive Committee formulated its ideas and submitted them in compliance with that part of the Resolution of the Supreme War Council which required that its “powers should be exercised after consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armies concerned.” This means that the Executive Committee must give careful consideration to the views of the Commanders-in-Chief; but these latter have no power, by a mere difference of opinion, to abrogate the will of the Supreme War Council nor to discharge the Executive Committee from the execution of the functions imposed upon it by that War Council. In case of an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the Executive Committee and the Commander-in-Chief, it is the duty of the former to exercise its best judgment, to organize the Inter-Allied General Reserve according to that best judgment, to report to the Supreme War Council that it has performed in full the duty which that War Council imposed upon it, and, therefore, to submit the organization which it thinks best for the Inter-Allied General Reserve, leaving the Supreme War Council to modify this organization at its pleasure.

The Committee created by the Supreme War Council is an executive one and not an advisory one; and it is the duty of an executive committee to carry something into execution. This particular Executive Committee is charged with the duty of carrying into execution the mandatory will of the Supreme War Council when it decreed the creation of an Inter-Allied General Reserve. The Supreme War Council is composed solely of the heads of the four great Governments which constitute the Alliance for the prosecution of the war,—that is to say, it is composed of these four Governments. The Executive Committee is, therefore, the agent for carrying into effect the expressed will of the Entente Alliance. This Alliance has not placed it in the power of any Commander-in-Chief to veto its will; nor has it given to the Executive Committee any authority to listen to or to be guided by any such attempted veto.

It has been suggested that, perhaps, if one Commander-in-Chief says that he is unable to contribute any troops to the Inter-Allied General Reserve, the other Commanders-in-Chief will do the same. Who is to decide this? Manifestly, it is neither the Commanders-in-Chief nor the Executive Committee, but solely the Entente Alliance itself. How can the Alliance determine whether a particular Commander-in-Chief can or cannot contribute troops to the Inter-Allied General Reserve? Primarily, it can do this only after consideration of the best judgment of its Executive Committee as expressed in the final organization prepared by the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee cannot, because it has no power to do so, be guided by the views of any Commander-in-Chief, who, in effect, opposes himself to the expressed will of the Entente Alliance. The Executive Committee must be guided by those views of Commanders-in-Chief which are helpful to it in its execution of the mandate of the Alliance as represented by the Supreme War Council. If those views are not helpful to it, the Executive Committee must use its best judgment in the formulation of an Inter-Allied General Reserve and allow the Commander-in-Chief to make his protest to the Supreme War Council.

4. The letter of February 6, which was the basis of discussion with the Commanders-in-Chief, having been submitted to them, certain written and verbal consultations with the French and Italian Commanders-in-Chief which followed resulted in an agreement with them which was a modification of the original scheme. The consultation with the British Commander-in-Chief has resulted in a statement by him to the effect that he has made plans to assist, if necessary, any other part of the Franco-British Front with a force which is substantially the same as that which was asked of him by the Executive Committee in the letter of February 6. But he declines to set this force apart in any particular area, for the reasons given by him in, his letter to the Executive Committee. His views are not at all inconsistent with the performance of his share in the creation of the Inter-Allied General Reserve. His letter concedes in principle all that has been asked of him. It is not absolutely necessary that his Inter-Allied Reserve divisions should be stationed in any particular area or areas. It is sufficient for our purpose that they exist somewhere in his zone of operations. In case of difference of opinion on such a point it is better that the Executive Committee should subordinate its judgment to that of the local Commander-in-Chief.

It is true that the British Commander-in-Chief contemplates the use of his Reserve solely for the assistance of the French front, and that the French Commander-in-Chief contemplates the use of his Reserve solely for the assistance of the British Front. This is not a point in regard to which the Executive Committee need, at this time, urge any objection. The chances are very great that the British part of the Inter-Allied Reserve will eventually be used either on its own front or on the French Front; and there are the same chances that the French part of this General Reserve will eventually be used only on its front or on the British front. If the development of the campaign should ever make it necessary to consider the question of sending any of these forces to the Italian Front, the situation at the time would undoubtedly be such that this step would be taken only by the common consent of all. It is quite certain that if there were any reasonable doubt at the time, the Executive Committee, which must act unanimously, would not take such action. At any rate, this is a bridge which we need not attempt to cross until we come to it.

5. The Executive Committee has, therefore, succeeded in the execution of the task assigned to it by the Supreme War Council, to the extent of forming an Inter-Allied General Reserve consisting of a certain number of Italian, French, and British Divisions, subject to certain conditions desired to be imposed by the respective Commanders-in-Chief and which conditions are not inconsistent with the general principle of the Inter-Allied Reserve. These divisions are as follows:

a) Italian Front: Six Italian Divisions, plus four French Divisions (or as many as may not be withdrawn from Italy) now serving on the Italian Front;

b) French Front: Eight French Divisions, being the maximum number which the French Commander-in-Chief has agreed, when necessary and possible, to send to the assistance of the English Front;

c) British Front: Eight British Divisions, being the maximum number which the British Commander-in-Chief has agreed, when necessary and possible, to send to the French Front.

It seems reasonable to assume that if any British Divisions are returned to that front from the Italian Front, they will be available to increase that part of the General Reserve on that front.

Thus, the Inter-Allied General Reserve, subject to certain conditions which are not incompatible with the principle of a General Reserve, would consist of twenty-six divisions, having an approximately total strength of 316,000 men exclusive of Army Artillery and Aviation.

6. The American Permanent Military Representative, in his capacity as member of the Executive Committee, proposes that the Executive Committee report to the Supreme War Council that, in compliance with the latter’s instructions—

a) It has constituted an Inter-Allied General Reserve consisting of twenty-six divisions, of which for the present ten are to remain in the Italian theatre of war; eight in the French theatre of war, and eight in the British theatre;

b) That all of the correspondence, or a résumé of it, between the Executive Committee and the respective Commanders-in-Chief, on the subject of the Inter-Allied General Reserve, be submitted to the Supreme Council in order that it, acting for the Entente Alliance, may pass upon the validity of any protest made against the proposed composition of the General Reserve.

Tasker H. Bliss

1. The word “Allies” was hastily and carelessly used to indicate the powers associated with the United States in the war. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State.]
2. These were the numbers as given to me in London, in the month of November, 1917. In his final dispatch of April 8, 1919, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig gives the number as five. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State.]
1. No copy of this document accompanied General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State.
2. This statement was based on official data prepared in the various bureaus of the War Department for my use on the Mission. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State.]
3. In order to receive whatever artillery equipment could be made available for them and proceed at once with their field training. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State.]
4. It will be noted that these views were in line with those then generally held and before the Supreme War Council had demonstrated what its real functions were to be when in actual operation. They were based on the belief that the Council was to decide upon plans instead of as was really the fact, upon policies. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State.]
2. No copy of this letter accompanied General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State.
3. Everything contemplated by this paragraph (5) was accomplished by the creation of the Inter-Allied High Command which, perhaps, might never have come—or have come too late—were it not for the prior existence of the Supreme War Council. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State.]
4. This was before the establishment of facilities for caring for large numbers of troops on shore at Brest. A crying need at that time was a quicker “turnaround” for our transports. Railway facilities from the port, which had never done commercial business on a scale, were poor. There was a tendency to hold transports till rail transportation for the troops could be provided. It was thought that if the latter could be at once transferred to a floating barrack they would be away from the port before the arrival of a new convoy, even with a quicker “turn-around”. Improvements in port and rail facilities made this unnecessary. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State.]
5. See note on page 22. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State. Reference is to p. 209.]

6. Von Kluck’s army escaped and the battle of the Marne was prevented from being a full and definite success by Marshal French’s failure to attack energetically on September 5th, 1914, as requested by Marshal Joffre,—requested because he could not order.

   The costly and unfortunate Gallipoli campaign would probably not have been considered twice had the general situation been under unified control.

   And it is equally true that with such control the elimination of Russia, the annihilation of Serbia and Roumania might have been in a large measure avoided. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

7. The need for such an agency had been recognized in 1915 by Lord Kitchener. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
8. Thereafter designated in American and British records as the Executive War Board. See p. 86, et seq. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original. Reference is to pp. 251 et seq.]
9. General Foch’s authority as Commander-in-Chief was never extended beyond the Western front, and even there it was limited as concerned the Belgian army and the Italian army in Italy. A French general, General Sarrail (afterwards succeeded by General Guillaumat, and he in turn by General Franchet d’Esperey) had already in 1916 been appointed Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Orient, which included all Allied troops in the Balkan Peninsula except the Italian division stationed at Valona and in its vicinity. General Allenby (British) was recognized in the latter part of 1918 as Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief of all troops in the region extending from Egypt in the South to the Black Sea in the North. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
10. See Appendix A. [Footnote in the original. Appendix A is not printed; it is a summary of action of the Supreme War Council.]
11. Speech of Mr. Asquith before the House of Commons 19th November, 1917. [Footnote in the original.]
12. Defined by resolution passed 2nd May, 1918, at the Fifth Session of the S. W. C. at Abbeville as extending “from the North Sea to the Adriatic”, but not such prior to that resolution. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report.]
3. See Foreign Relations, 1917, supp. 2, vol. i, p. 308.
4. By common acceptance, and in fact as the necessary consequence of the basic idea that the recommendations of the Military Representatives and the Resolutions of the Supreme War Council should represent a common purpose, all such action was required to be unanimous. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
5. Speech of Mr. Clemenceau at the second session, December 1, 1917. [Footnote in the original.]
6. Speech of Mr. Clemenceau at the second session, December 1, 1917. [Footnote in the original.]
7. See Appendix B. [Footnote in the original. Appendix B is not printed; it is a summary of the operations of the Military Representatives.]
8. Resolution of the Military Representatives at their Third Meeting, December 12, 1917. [Footnote in the original.]
9. Resolution of the Military Representatives at their 31st Meeting, May 19, 1918. [Footnote in the original.]
10. Generals Desticker and Cavallero were designated as Military Representatives after the signing of the Armistice. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
4. The following omission indicated in General Bliss’ report.
5. See Appendix C. [Footnote in the original. Appendix C. is not printed; it is a diagram of the organization of the American Section.]
6. The commissioned staff of the American Military Representative comprised the following officers:

   Brig. General P. D. Lochridge,	National Army
   Colonel B. H. Wells,	Infantry, N. A.
   (On request of General Pershing, Colonel B. H. Wells left the American Section on July 26, 1918, to become Chief of Staff of the 6th Corps.)
   Colonel S. D. Embick,	Signal Corps (temporary commission)
   Colonel U. S. Grant, 3d,	Eng., N. A., General Staff
   Colonel W. S. Browning,	Field Artillery, N. A., General Staff
   Colonel J. M. Coward,	C. A. C, N. A., General Staff
   Colonel W. B. Wallace,	Infantry (temporary commission), General Staff
   Lt. Colonel Arthur Poillon,	Cavalry
   Major C. M. Exley,	Q. M. C., N. A.
   Capt. B. A. G. Fuller,	Infantry, R. C.
   1st Lieut. P. A. Bedard,	O. D., R. C.

   The reputation which I think I am justified in saying that the American Section enjoyed for tact in dealing with its colleagues, for soundness of judgment, for—in short—general “level-headedness”, is due to the professional accomplishments, the loyal devotion to their work and the untiring zeal of these officers. More than one of them sacrificed uncomplainingly the promotion that I am sure would have come to them in field service. They sacrificed these chances in order to put all their energy into the work which the American Section was doing in furthering the great object for which the Supreme War Council was created,—to bring about harmony and cordiality in the relations and purposes of the Allies.

   The American Military Representative owes everything to their patient, loyal and intelligent assistance. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]

7. As a result of co-ordinated use of facilities a great deal of thitherto unserviceable rolling stock was repaired and put into commission prior to the armistice. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
8. Joint Notes No. 19 (March 27, 1918) and No. 22 (April 18, 1918) referred to the above recommendations as to the measures that should be taken for the support of the Italian Army in case of an enemy offensive on that front and for the maintenance of the coal supply for Italy; both of which emphasized the necessity for improving the Trans-Alpine Railroad service. T. H. B. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report.]
9. See footnote on previous page 80. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report. Reference is to the preceding footnote.]
5. Not printed.
5. Not printed.
6. Session beginning November 29, 1917. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report to the Secretary of State.]
7. Ante, p. 213, last paragraph.
8. Among these occasions may be mentioned: The repatriation of Czechoslovak troops from Russia (Joint Note No. 25, April 27, 1918, of the Military Representatives, and Resolution No. 4 of the Supreme War Council at its 5th Session, May 1, 1918); and the loan of British shipping for the transportation of American troops. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
9. Actually, 47 German divisions from the Eastern and Italian fronts participated in the German offensives of March, April and May. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
10. February 2, 1918. [Footnote in the original.]
11. Extract of letter 2nd March, 1918:

    . . . . . . .

    “An enemy offensive appears to be imminent on both the English and French fronts. To meet this attack I have already disposed of all the troops at present under my command, and if I were to earmark six or seven divisions from these troops, the whole of my plans and dispositions would have to be re-modelled. This is clearly impossible, and I therefore regret that I am unable to comply with the suggestion conveyed in the Joint Note.

    “I would also point out that I foresee a wider employment, etc. of Allied Reserves than that foreshadowed in the Joint Note.

    “In the event of the enemy making a sustained attack in great force on any of the Allied Armies on the Western front, it might be necessary to despatch a considerable force to the assistance of the Army attacked, and to maintain that force by a rotation of divisions. But this force could not be earmarked or located in any particular areas prior to the delivery of the German offensive or the development of the enemy’s intentions, for the situation might well demand the ultimate employment of the whole of the resources of any one army.

    “For such a purpose or to meet any emergency on the Franco-British front, I have arranged as a preliminary measure with the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies for all preparations to be made for the rapid despatch of a force of from six to eight British divisions with a proportionate amount of artillery and subsidiary services to his assistance.

    “General Petain has made similar arrangements for relief or intervention of French troops on the British front. These arrangements, both French and British, are now being completed, and zones of concentration opposite those fronts which are most vulnerable and likely to be attacked are being provided.”

    . . . . . . .

    T. H. B.

    [Footnote in the original.]

12. See Appendix L. [Footnote in the original.]
13. See map in Appendix D. [Footnote in the original; Appendix D is not printed.]
14. It was the third day of the great German drive. T. H. B. [Footnote in the orginal.]
15. See remarks at the conference held at 10 Downing St., London, November 20, 1917, pp. 5 and [ante, p. 204]. See also the declaration in Joint Note 12 to the effect that France could be made safe during 1918 only under certain specified conditions, the first of which was that the French and British forces in French should “receive the expected reinforcement of not less than two American divisions a month”; And many other subsequent declarations. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
16. As illustrations of this see appendix E and F [not printed], the subjects of which were presented to the Inter-Allied Command on April 25, 1918, and June 6, 1918, respectively. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
17. As a matter of fact, a force sufficient for this purpose was never sent to North Russia and for this reason, among others, the expedition failed. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
18. It must be kept in mind that at this time there was no certainty that intervention on a considerable scale would not be finally agreed upon. T. H. B. [Footnote in the original.]
19. In the Supreme War Council Building at Versailles. T. H. R. [Footnote in the original.]
20. The word “service” meant service only during the period of training. [Footnote in General Bliss’ report.]
8. For the communications from the German Government, see Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, pp. 338 and 357, respectively; for the reply, see ibid., p. 358.
9. Ibid., p. 380.
10. Ibid., p. 381.
11. On February 12, 1919, the Supreme War Council adopted a resolution in which the following appears:

    . . . . . . .

    “2. The armistice with Germany shall be renewed for a short period terminable by the Allied and Associated Powers at three day’s notice.

    “3. Detailed and final naval, military, and air conditions of the preliminaries of peace shall be drawn up at once by a Committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch and submitted for the approval of the Supreme War Council; these, when approved, will be presented for signature to the Germans, and the Germans shall be at once informed that this is the policy of the Associated Governments.”

    These terms were not presented to the Germans except with the final treaty of peace on June 28, 1919; and of course, no attempt could be made to enforce their execution until the long delayed ratification by the necessary number of the Allies and the exchange of these ratifications in this year of 1920. [Footnote in the original.]

12. See Appendix G. [Footnote in the original; the terms of this draft are printed in Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, pp. 463–468.]
13. See Appendix H. [Footnote in the original; the terms of the armistice are printed in Foreign Relations, 1918, supp 1, vol I. pp. 433–435.]

14. Letter to President Wilson.

    “The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President’s Address to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the Freedom of the Seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.

    “Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored, as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage caused to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany, by land, by sea, and from the air.”

    [Footnote in General Bliss’ report; for President Wilson’s address of Jan. 8, 1918, see Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i. p. 12.]

11. See Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, p. 494.
12. Not printed.
13. Ante, p. 255.
14. See pp. 256–258.