763.72119/8987: Telegram
The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:45 a. m.]
14. For the President:
Five minutes before I entered into conference this afternoon of Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries and without previous notification General Pershing handed me a copy of the communication I quote herewith, the original thereof having already been sent to the Supreme War Council at Versailles and when George read this his comment was: “Political not military; some one put him up to it”. When Clemenceau read it his comment was: “theatrical and not in accordance with what he has said to Marshal Foch”. No Allied general has ever submitted a document of this character to the Supreme War Council without a previous request having been made by the civilian authorities. I have written the following letter to General Pershing: “In regard to the communication which you sent in to the Supreme War Council this afternoon will you not let me know whether your views are shared by any of the other Allied [Page 170] generals?” He sent me a verbal answer saying he had not gotten the views of the other Allied commanders on this question.
[“]Paris, October 30, 1918.
To the Allied Supreme War Council, Paris.
Gentlemen: In considering the question of whether or not Germany’s request for an armistice should be granted, the following expresses my opinion from the military point of view:
- 1.
- Judging from their excellent conduct during the three months, the British, French, Belgian and American armies appear capable of continuing the offensive indefinitely. Their morale is high and the prospects of certain victory should keep it so.
- 2.
- The American army is constantly increasing in strength and experience, and should be able to take an increasingly important part in the Allied offensive. Its growth, both in personnel and material, with such reserves as the Allies may furnish, not counting the Italian army, should be more than equal to the combined losses of the Allied armies.
- 3.
- German man power is constantly diminishing and her armies have lost over 300,000 prisoners and over 1,000 piece[s] of artillery during the last three months in their efforts to extricate themselves from a difficult situation and avoid disaster.
- 4.
- The estimated strength of the Allies on the western front, not counting Italy, and of Germany, in rifles is: Allies, 1,564,000; Germany, 1,134,000; an advantage in favor of the Allies of 37 percent. In guns: Allies, 22,413; Germany, 16,495; advantage of 35 percent in favor of the Allies. If Italy’s forces should be added to the western front we should have a still greater advantage.
- 5.
- Germany’s morale is undoubtedly low, her allies have deserted her one by one and she can no longer hope to win. Therefore we should take full advantage of the situation and continue the offensive until we compel her unconditional surrender.
- 6.
- An armistice would revivify the low spirits of the German army and enable it to organize and resist later on and would deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory by failing to press their present advantage to its complete military end.
- 7.
- As the apparent humility of German leaders in talking of peace may be feigned, the Allies should distrust their sincerity and their motives. The appeal for an armistice is undoubtedly to enable the withdrawal from a critical situation to one more advantageous.
- 8.
- On the other hand the internal political conditions of Germany, if correctly reported, are such that she is practically forced to ask for an armistice to save the overthrow of her present Government, a consummation which should be sought by the Allies as precedent to permanent peace.
- 9.
- A cessation of hostilities short of capitulation postpones, if it does not render impossible, the imposition of satisfactory peace terms, because it would allow Germany to withdraw her army with its present strength, ready to resume hostilities if terms were not satisfactory to her.
- 10.
- An armistice would lead the Allied armies to believe this the end of fighting and it would be difficult if not impossible to resume [Page 171] hostilities with our present advantage in morale in the event of failure to secure at a peace conference what we have fought for.
- 11.
- By agreeing to an armistice under the present favorable military situation of the Allies and accepting the principle of a negotiated peace rather than a dictated peace, the Allies would jeopardize the moral position they now hold and possibly lose the chance actually to secure world peace on terms that would insure its permanence.
- 12.
- It is the experience of history that victorious armies are prone to overestimate the enemy’s strength and too eagerly seek an opportunity for peace. This mistake is likely to be made now on account of the reputation Germany has gained through her victories of the last four years.
- 13.
- Finally, I believe that complete victory can only be obtained by continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from Germany; but if the Allied Governments decide to grant an armistice the terms should be so rigid that under no circumstances could Germany again take up arms.
Respectfully submitted. John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief American Expeditionary Forces.”