I would be glad to have the President see this letter. I mean to keep
Colonel House very fully informed of what goes on here, and there is
such seething just now that the sentiment may change almost from day to
day. Those with whom I come in contact are beginning to feel very
strongly that Italy should make an offensive and I should not be
surprised if General Diaz has to do so or give place to some one
else,—Should his military judgment, which I incline to think sincere, be
as strong as McClellan’s was when before Richmond and deter him from
taking an offensive himself.
The dash that Italy is making in Albania at present is intended to
off-set the inaction of General Diaz on the Piave front, but public
opinion here seems to be focusing on an offensive as soon as the Piave,
which is now in flood, falls sufficiently to admit of possible success.
People say that Diaz has won his laurels in his successful defeat of the
enemy on the Piave when he drove him back across the river and is afraid
to risk what he honestly believes will be a defeat. It is possible that
there is something in this view. There is also another strong influence
against an offensive: That of those who say that the Allies are winning
already and Italy has lost so much that she should not sacrifice more
from any political motive while the Allies are doing so well. I know
that some of the ecclesiastics are taking this view, and one can never
tell how strong the views of the Church may be with any particular
person here in Italy. Diaz is considered to be sustained by Signor
Nitti, who is more or less responsible for him.
It may, however, all be over long before this letter reaches you, and we
may be on the road to peace. If we are, please say to the President that
I know who won this war and made the road to peace. I do not venture to
say what I think about it all, but it’s enough.
[Enclosure]
The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to Colonel E. M.
House
[Rome,]
October 22, 1918
.
My Dear Colonel House: I am enclosing in a
letter to Frazier19 a personal letter inviting
you and Mrs. House on behalf of Mrs. Page and myself to come and be
our guests at the Embassy while you are in Rome. We can arrange also
for any members of your personal entourage, one or two with us and
others at an hotel nearby.
I am sending now, as you know, to Paris copies of all telegrams sent
by me relating to the situation here in Italy so that you may have
such information before you as I send to America. Information,
however, in letters and telegrams falls very far short of that which
one gets from being in the atmosphere himself, and no where does
that which we attempt to describe by that word indicate so truly the
realities of things as here in Italy. There is, in fact, no way in
which you could obtain a true comprehension of what Italy is and
stands for, and will probably stand for in the future, without
coming here where you will be able to meet and talk with and test
for yourself the men who not only represent Italy at present but
will very likely represent her in the negotiations which may take
place before a great while and in the period following the
conclusion of peace.
I deem it, therefore, of great importance, on this and on many other
accounts besides this, that you should come here and see and feel
for yourself the whole complex combination of sentiments, principles
and purposes which together make up the Italy which you will have to
deal with when the time comes for adjusting matters so as to [sic] a just and durable peace. It is not a
hard journey from Paris, everything will be made easy for you and I
can assure you of a very sincere welcome on the part not only of
ourselves at the Embassy but on the part of the Italian Government.
I have had two conversations with Baron Sonnino, and he informs me
that he has telegraphed Washington and also Paris and intends to
telegraph to England—or possibly has already done so—urging you to
come to Italy this time. And I will say come before you get your
impressions of Italy out of the French atmosphere. I suggest this
not only because Italy has felt very neglected in the past, and
there is always danger that such a feeling may deepen into an idea
that she is intentionally slighted, but because she has been
neglected and she does feel isolated and the consequences should she
think herself slighted would not cease with the close of this war,
but would continue and might have a disastrous effect hereafter on
our relations. The other reason why I am particularly urgent in this
matter is that there is a strong feeling
[Page 165]
here in Italy that France is cutting her off
from America for her own purposes and prevents her getting in touch
with those in America who if they came to know Italy really would
understand her and have a very different apprehension of what she
represents than at present exists among Americans. There is a strong
feeling in Italy anyhow against France and this has unquestionably
deepened in these last months, and it is no uncommon thing to hear
this feeling expressed in terms which represent real antagonism and
may, in the future, represent hostility sufficient to injure the
smooth working of what the President has in mind. The rivalry
between the Italian and the French forces on the other side of the
Adriatic, and the race which they are making to get possession each
before the other of towns and regions, is only an expression of the
feeling I mention, and the failure of Italy to place her army and
her fleet under the command of the French Commander in Chief and of
the French Admiral, commanding in the Mediterranean, is to some
extent also an expression of the same feeling. Nor is this feeling
confined to Italy and the Italians. It exists in an equal degree and
possibly in an even more exasperating form among the French toward
the Italians, and there is danger of the feeling becoming so general
that our enemies may be able to take advantage of it, if not at the
council table, which is also a possibility,—at least as soon as the
war is over.
There is in Italy a certain element composed of very diverse classes
which is perhaps more friendly even now to the Central Empires than
to France, and they are ready to avail themselves of every
opportunity to testify their preference. Italy says—I use this term
as representing not only the element above referred to but Italians
generally—that France is “squeezing” her and, lying across the
highways to England and America, absorbs substantially everything
that she can and allows Italy to have only what leaks through. And
she says further that not content with this, France is now
endeavoring to seize all she can to the east of her and cut her off
from any development in that direction.
You see there are many men in public life here in Italy that are
familiar with the whole progress of France’s relation to Italy from
the demand by her of Nice and Savoy down to the seizure of Tunisia
in the early eighties after France had threatened to bombard Genoa
should Italy take Tunisia. The Triple Alliance was the direct
outcome of this last move on the part of France, and Italy’s whole
foreign policy—speaking in general terms—for the last thirty or
thirty-five years has been directed with special reference to the
Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. The questions touching the
Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean are those which lie at the
very foundation of the war. Now, no one can understand the
[Page 166]
questions touching the
Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean without coming to Italy. He
may not do so even then, but without coming it is impossible. One
might as soon, or sooner, indeed, understand the Negro question in
America without going to the South. I cannot emphasize too much the
importance of this visit which I am urging on you.
The final success of Mr. Wilson’s plan which you have come over about
may hinge on your coming here and feeling out the situation for
yourself. The future of the Jugo-Slav and the Czech-Slovak States
may hang upon your doing so, as may the sound and equitable
adjustment of the questions relating to the Adriatic and the regions
beyond, on whose equitable and sound adjustment will depend the
possibility of a final, durable peace.
I will not add more to this letter at this time, but shall probably
send you another letter by the pouch which is due to leave here on
Friday. I will only add that the feeling between France and Italy,
which you will be able to judge of at least on the French side for
yourself before you have been in Paris long, disturbs me very much.
I do not undertake to say on which side the chief fault lies. Italy
has undoubtedly been “squeezed” as she says, and her people have
undergone privations and hardships incomparably greater than
anything that has occurred in France. She has lost more than a
million and a half men and no one could see the way in which her
people have endured what they have had to undergo without feeling
immeasurable sympathy with them.
I will not in this letter enter into the political reasons which I
think require our taking more account of Italy than we are doing.
This I will leave until next time. Some of them I have been setting
forth in my letters to the President which I rather suppose you have
seen, but those reasons are more cogent now than ever before, and I
feel that you will take them into consideration.
There is a rumor that Austria has made just now a separate peace
offer to Italy. The last story of this kind was in circulation about
ten days ago, or rather the story was that negotiations were going
on, and this Sonnino stamped as a “confounded lie.” There is a
better founded rumor that Italy is going to make an offensive very
soon. It was to have been made last week but the torrential rains
put the Piave in flood and prevented it. The public sentiment is so
much in favor of it that I believe General Diaz will have to start
an offensive even against his own judgment or else yield to someone
else.
You will hear much of the refusal of Italy to put her armies under
the Supreme Command of Marshal Foch. The reason for this lies in the
feeling which she has about France, to which I have already alluded,
and, I believe, in what also relates to that feeling, that is,
[Page 167]
the apprehension that the
Italian people who have been coaxed along, or inspired by the idea
that their generals are not inferior to those of France, might
resent their armies being placed under a French general to the point
of refusing to accept it.
Now I will close this letter that you may have an opportunity of
“digesting” it.
Always [etc.]
