Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume II

763.72 Su/138½

The Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

Versailles, September 14, 1918 .

1. I have the honor to forward, herewith, copy of Joint Note No. 37 adopted by the Military Representatives at their meetings held at Versailles the 5th, 7th and 10th of September.

Tasker H. Bliss

[Enclosure]

Joint Note No. 37 on General Military Policy of the Allies for the Autumn of 1918 and for the Tear 1919

(Study submitted by the Permanent Military Representatives to the Supreme War Council, in accordance with a Resolution of the Supreme War Council, dated 4th July, 1918)

Part I.—Western Front

i. general considerations

France and Italy remain, as always, the main theatres of the war. A decisive victory can only be gained by the Allies by the decisive defeat of the German Army, and its defeat would necessarily entail the total collapse of enemy resistance on the remainder of the Western front and in all other theatres of war.

The Allies must, therefore, concentrate their resources both in man power and in material on the Western front for the decisive struggle.

The decisive defeat of the enemy coalition can only be achieved on the portion of the Western front between the North Sea and Switzerland. And, even though it might appear possible to crush the Austrian Army on the Italian front, and a portion of the German Army with it, the final defeat of Germany, the real foundation of the hostile coalition, can only be brought about in the theatre of operations where the main German Armies are to be found, that is to say, between the North Sea and Switzerland.

Operations in the other theatres of war must be made to play their part in the decision sought for on the Western front by contributing to the moral and material exhaustion of the enemy. But such operations must not be allowed to absorb resources which are required by the Armies of the Entente on the decisive front. The defeat of the Central Powers in any of the subsidiary theatres of war could only be a step on the road to the defeat of Germany: it could not bring about the final decision.

A. The front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

By the continued arrival of American troops in increasing numbers the Allies will have from the Autumn of 1918 onwards a numerical superiority which will be appreciable. But if, in spite of the reverses he has met with during the Summer and Autumn of 1918, the enemy’s fighting power still remains unbroken, it will only be in the Spring of 1919 that the Allied superiority in men, in tanks, in aeroplanes and in other material of war will justify the expectation of a great success, which would be capable of being exploited to the extent necessary to bring about a final decision.

Moreover, this superiority can only be obtained and developed:—

(a) If France, Great Britain and Italy maintain their present effort, and

(b) If American troops continue to arrive in such numbers as have been demanded by the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France.

If, however, it is evident that the fighting power of the enemy has diminished, it will be the duty of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France to consider if active operations can be successfully carried out before the Spring of next year.

B. Italian Front.

It is clear from the present situation of the opposing forces:—

(a) that, for the present, the Allies could contemplate no considerable withdrawal of troops from their Armies in Italy,

(b) that so long as the Austrians are not largely reinforced by German troops, the Allied forces in Italy appear to be able not only to hold their own but, if an opportunity should occur, to hasten the exhaustion and disorganization of the enemy by offensive action.

ii. general plan

A. Autumn and Winter, 1918, and the year 1919.

(a) Front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

From what has already been stated it follows that the Allies must, during the Autumn and Winter 1918–1919, first of all render their front secure against any hostile attack and, secondly, must make preparations, which are complete in all respects, for those offensive operations by which it is hoped to reach a final decision as soon as a sufficient superiority has been realised, and climatic conditions permit.

The Allied Front can only be made secure by a solid, vigorous and active attitude of defence, which must include such local offensives and counter-offensive actions, as may be required, to disturb the enemy’s preparations.

For the preparation of offensive operations it is necessary:—

(i) to ensure, to adjust, or to develop more fully, the programmes for munitions, for tanks, for aviation and other material so as to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France:

(ii) to put the troops through a systematic course of training for offensive operations:

(iii) to push forward the preparation of the theatre of operations as rapidly as possible, in accordance with the plans of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France:

(iv) to spare no effort to accumulate in the shortest possible time the greatest possible numerical superiority. For this purpose it is very important that American troops should continue to be sent to France, to the exclusion of other theatres of operations, and to be placed at the disposal of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France, until such time as the Supreme War Council may decide otherwise and with this object in view the necessary tonnage should be made available.

Finally, it is necessary to think out beforehand all such operations as are calculated to improve our chances, from a military and an economic point of view, for the final decisive operations; and as are calculated to keep the initiative in the hands of the Allies; or to prevent the enemy from reorganizing his forces; or to take full advantage of any mistakes he may make or any weakness he may show. It will be the duty of the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France to determine the scope of such preparatory operations, having regard to the relative conditions of the Allied forces and those of the enemy, while remembering that the final decisive operations must be executed with the greatest possible force.

(b) Italian Front.

Similar preparations should be made for the Italian front. If the conditions in Austria render it advantageous to support an active diplomacy by military action, offensive operations in Italy might be advisable. Such operations should be executed with a concentration of resources as great as the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France considers that the situation on the front between Switzerland and the North Sea will permit.

In order to facilitate a concentration of troops in Italy not only for offensive operations, as indicated above; but also in order to deal effectively with a possible attack by the Austro-Hungarian Army, reinforced for that purpose by a number of German Divisions, it is essential for the Allies to push forward as rapidly as possible such improvements to communications as will enable a sufficient force to be transferred from France to Italy before a hostile attack can achieve success.

B. Year 1919.

Although the Allied Forces will not be fully developed before the Summer of 1919, the offensive operations by which it is hoped to gain a final decision should be begun as soon as the weather permits. If this is not done the enemy might forestall the Allies and seize the initiative, thus compelling the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies in France to employ his troops in a manner other than that intended.

These operations will be carried out on the front between the North Sea and Switzerland with the maximum available resources.

As soon as offensive operations are begun in France the utmost vigour must characterize our operations on the front in Italy, and in every other theatre of war, so as to take advantage of any favourable developments and prevent the Germans from obtaining help from their Allies.

It must not be forgotten:

(i) that a considerable offensive operation by the Italian Armies, if carried out in conjunction with the general offensive in France, might contribute largely to the final decision by the defeat of the Austrian Army, which could not at such a time count on any help from Germany;

(ii) that the opportunity may arise for the Allied Armies to undertake in Italy in the Autumn and Winter of 1919 the offensive intended for the Autumn and Winter of 1918.

Part II.—Remaining Theatres of War

i. general considerations

The following are the broad principles which should guide the Entente in carrying out any operations in the subsidiary theatres of war:

(1) To retain at a distance from the Western front, those forces, which the Central Powers now maintain in the subsidiary theatres of war and, if possible, to attract additional forces:

(2) To attempt to break up the alliance of the Central Powers both by military and by diplomatic action:

(3) To prevent the Central Powers from exploiting the countries of which they are now in military occupation.

These objects demand a vigorous attitude by the Allied Armies in all the exterior theatres.

ii. macedonia

The operations on this front have formed the subject of a special study which was submitted to the Governments by the Military Representatives. The following conclusions were reached:

(a) that it is desirable to make energetic preparations to enable the Allies to begin an offensive operation in the Balkans not later than 1st October, 1918, provided that these preparations do not entail the transfer of any men or material from the Western front, or the diversion of any tonnage, which would otherwise be available for the continuous transport of men and material at the maximum rate, indispensable for the realisation of the Plan of Operations on the Western front, approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France:

(b) that it is necessary, in principle, to give the General Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies of the East a free hand to carry this offensive into execution at the moment which he may consider most favourable, provided new and unforeseen circumstances do not compel the Supreme War Council itself to fix the date, or to abandon the operation altogether.

Should this offensive be carried out in 1918, the operations to be undertaken in the Balkans in 1919 will depend on the results obtained in 1918 and on the general situation. It is not possible to foresee what these operations should be, on account of the uncertain political conditions in which some of our enemies are now involved.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Macedonia should not in preparing his offensive operations, lose sight of the necessity, which still exists, of improving his lines of communication and of establishing new bases in Old Greece, in accordance with the directions laid down by the Supreme War Council, (See Joint Note No. 4 of the Military Representatives).

iii. turkey in asia

A. Palestine.

The Turkish Armies in Palestine are relatively weak, they are of moderate value and are badly supplied, whilst the British Armies, in spite of reduction in number and the partial substitution of native for white troops, still possess a high military value.

If the relative position of the forces opposing one another be considered alone, the British Armies in this theatre would appear to be in a position to carry out offensive operations of considerable extent. But:

(1) as the armies progress the restricted means of communication would necessarily limit their advance:

(2) the eventual objectives, which might be assigned to these Armies, have lost much of their importance in consequence of the new lines of communication available for the Turkish Army to the Caucasus and Mesopotamia by the Black Sea, thus avoiding the Baghdad railway line.

Under these conditions it is neither possible nor opportune to fix distant objectives. But, operations of limited scope should be carried out in order to hold and attract enemy forces.

Operations of this nature would not justify a large numerical superiority of the British over the Turkish Armies. The possibility, therefore, of withdrawing troops during the winter should be considered in order to reinforce the Armies on other fronts.

B. Mesopotamia & Persia.

The British Army in Mesopotamia is very greatly superior in numbers to the Turkish troops actually opposed to it, or which are likely to be opposed to it. It might appear possible, therefore, to operate both in Mesopotamia and in Persia; but lack of communications and means of transport would probably prevent this. Consequently, the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia with the troops now at his disposal should spare no effort which would enable his forces to establish themselves firmly on the shores of the Caspian Sea and to render secure the Baghdad-Hamadan-Enzeli road.

A secure front, which included Baghdad and the Caspian Sea, would limit German activities in the East and would enable the Allies to stretch out a hand to such forces as could eventually penetrate into Russia from Vladivostock and the Arctic Ports. With the Allies established firmly on such a front, not only will the Germans be unable to supply themselves from the rich resources of Turkestan, on which they could otherwise draw by means of the Caspian Sea and the railways leading East and West from it; but all the healthy elements which still exist in Russia, as well as the anti-turc and Armenian elements in the Caucasus, would be encouraged to crystallise into effective fighting bodies, which would absorb considerable enemy forces and so relieve pressure on the Western front.

The Commander-in-Chief should be free to advance to Mosul if it should appear to be advantageous to do so, provided that the necessary operations did not entail any diminution of the effort towards the Caspian Sea.

iv. russia

Outside the Caucasus, which is directly connected with Mesopotamia and Persia, Russia contains two theatres of operations which are important to the Allies: Northern Russia and Eastern Siberia.

In both these theatres the Allies must aim at attaining the following objects:

(1) To prevent the Central Powers from exploiting such resources as may be available in Russia.

(2) To collect round nuclei of Allied forces all anti-German elements of resistance; to train these elements; to organize them, and so to make them into a force fit to fight against Germany.

(3) To bring assistance as soon as possible to the Czecho-Slovaks, who are in a critical position owing to Bolshevik propaganda; also owing to the military support given to the Bolshevik forces by the Germans and by enemy prisoners of war in increasing numbers, and whose organisation continues to expand.

(4) Finally, should circumstances permit, to build up again an Eastern front by continuing the various operations undertaken in the different regions of Russia, (Northern Russia, Siberia and the Caucasus.)

These objects having been defined, it is necessary to point out:—

(a) As regards Northern Russia:—

• that the man-power situation of the Western Powers of the Entente precludes the transfer of any appreciable forces from the Western front in addition to those being sent in accordance with the decision taken by the Supreme War Council on the 3rd July, 1918:
• that local resources being practically negligible in this region, the maintenance of the Allied contingents depends altogether on the despatch of supplies from Overseas. Communications between Western Europe and Northern Russia are, however, very precarious:
• that, under these conditions, the scope of any operations in Northern Russia, must be somewhat restricted until a junction with the Czecho-slovak contingents of Western Siberia can be assured.

(b) As regards Siberia:—

• that it is in this region that the effort of the Allies can give the greatest results on account of the presence of the Czechs; on account of the support to be obtained from Russian troops, favourable to the Allies; and also on account of the considerable resources in food and supplies of all sorts which the country affords:
• that, consequently, it is expedient to increase the efforts of the Allies in this theatre; but resources necessary for the Western front, which is the decisive front, must not be absorbed elsewhere.

v. eastern africa

The operations in East Africa should be prosecuted with the utmost vigour with a view to their being brought to a conclusion at a very early date.

Part III.—General Considerations Regarding War Material

Having weighed the considerations which should govern the conduct of the operations in the various theatres of war, the Military Representatives are of opinion that the investigations into the various Allied manufacturing programmes should be followed up by determining without delay the relative proportion of raw materials, of labour and tonnage which should be allotted to each kind of manufacture according to its importance for the prosecution of the war.

The manufacturing resources of the Allies appear already to be extended to their utmost capacity. It is, therefore, essential in order to obtain the best returns that the available resources be distributed strictly in accordance with the military requirements of the operations to be undertaken. And this distribution must be made in accordance with the views expressed by the Commanders-in-Chief in the various theatres of operations as to the relative amount of manufactured products they would like to receive in the form of guns, aeroplanes, heavy tanks, light tanks, gas, railway material, etc.

The Military Representatives wish in conclusion to draw the attention of the Supreme War, Council to the very great importance of ensuring that as early as possible the Allied Armies shall be made to reach their maximum strength, not only in man-power, but also in material. The Military Representatives consider that the culminating points in the development of mechanical contrivances of all kinds should coincide with the culminating point in the development of man-power.

If this coincidence of culminating points is attained, the Allies may look forward with all confidence to the operations of the year 1919, which will bring the fulfilment of their hopes, that is to say, peace through victory.

Gal. Belin

, Military Representative
French Section, Supreme War Council

C. Sackville West

, Maj. Gen., Military Representative
British Section, Supreme War Council
14.9.18

Robilant

, Military Representative
Italian Section, Supreme War Council

Tasker H. Bliss

, Military Representative
American Section, Supreme War Council

Given at Versailles on the 10th September 1918.