Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume I

763.72/3353½

The President of the American Peace Society (George W. Kirchwey) to the Secretary of State

New York, February 12, 1917.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I take pleasure in complying with your request to submit to you a statement of my connection with recent unofficial efforts to bring about such modifications of the German submarine warfare as might lead to a restoration of friendly relations between our government and that of Germany.

Believing that the action of the German Government in promulgating the new submarine policy was due, in some measure at least, to its failure to understand the attitude and policy of our government and people, and fearing that the action of the President in severing diplomatic relations would be interpreted by the German Government and people in the usual sense, as a mere preliminary to an act or declaration of war on our part, or as indicating that we, as a people, had gone over to the “war party,” it seemed to me that it might be useful to remove such misconceptions if they existed.

I had no thought of playing any part in the situation when I arrived in Washington, Sunday morning, Feb. 4, but circumstances quickly placed me in a position where, as it appeared to me, I could not refuse to accept the responsibility of taking action along the lines above indicated.

A German newspaper correspondent, Dr. George Barthelme,² representing the Cologne Gazette, who had called on me for the purpose of securing an interview with Mr. William J. Bryan, was induced to abandon that purpose and to prepare in its stead a dispatch which might have the effect of enlightening the German people and Government as to the attitude and purpose of the American Government and people. He gladly accepted the task and later in the day submitted the matter to me for criticism and correction. I rewrote it in large part, the matter marked in the enclosed copy of the dispatch having been written by my hand,³ and all the rest, with the exception of the opening and closing paragraphs, having been suggested by me.

As the wireless via Sayville was no longer open to Dr. Barthelme, I undertook to see Secretary Daniels with a view to having the embargo lifted, and accordingly did so on the following day (Tuesday morning, Feb. 6). The Secretary heard me with apparent interest and read the dispatch with care, after which he called Admiral Benson into conference with us and submitted the dispatch to him. Both officials expressed their satisfaction with the tone and substance of the paper but suggested a few changes in phraseology and the elimination of some matter which Dr. Barthelme had quoted from Mr. Bryan’s published “Statement to the American People” (Feb. 4.). The changes suggested seemed to me wise and on the same evening the corrected dispatch was submitted to Admiral Benson. The enclosed copy (marked No. 1) represents this final form of the dispatch as it was submitted by Dr. Barthelme for transmission to his newspaper. I learned subsequently from Admiral Benson that before passing it he made a further change in the first sentence. (Probably deleting the two words “almost implored”, to which I had previously taken exception).

It may be proper for me to add that I took the action above outlined without consultation with anyone except as stated, and in particular that Mr. William J. Bryan had no part in nor any knowledge of the affair. It is true I obtained from him a formal note of introduction to Secretary Daniels, but without giving him any information as to my purpose except that I desired to see the Secretary in order to ascertain whether the wireless service via Sayville was still available for the transmission of regular newspaper dispatches to Germany.

In the meantime I had sought and obtained, Sunday afternoon, February 4th, an interview with Count von Bernstorff, in order to secure as trustworthy information as possible as to the probable effect of the severance of diplomatic relations between the German and American Governments on the question of peace or war between the two countries. As President of the American Peace Society it seemed to me of the utmost importance to secure such information in order that the Society might be in a position to act promptly and intelligently in an effort to secure united, prudent and patriotic action by the numerous and influential peace organizations of the country in the crisis confronting the nation, and especially to forestall any unwise, precipitate action by any pacifist groups that we might be able to influence.

As I feared would be the case, Count von Bernstorff took the view that the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries made war inevitable. He was of the opinion that the German Government and people could put no other construction on the President’s act. I urged the contrary view, that unless the Imperial Government was bent on war with the United States (which, he assured me, was not the case) it might still be possible to avert that calamity by inducing the German Government, even at the last moment, to modify its program of submarine warfare in such a way as to make it acceptable to our government. Finally the Count accepted my view of the situation and referred me to Dr. Paul Ritter, the Swiss Minister, to whom the interests of Germany had been committed.

I was unable to secure an interview with Dr. Ritter until Tuesday morning, Feb. 6, when the opportunity was afforded me of laying the matter before him. I found that Count von Bernstorff had already enlisted his interest in the cause and that Dr. Ritter was quite willing, in the interest of his own government and people, who were, as he pointed out, vitally concerned in the avoidance of war between the two great powers, as well as in the general interests of peace and good will, to make an effort to secure the good offices of his government to that end.

At his suggestion I drafted a note embodying my views, as they had been expressed to him and previously to Count von Bernstorff, as to the attitude of the Government and people of the United States and as to the steps that might be taken by the Imperial German Government to avoid war between the two countries.

This note, a copy of which I enclose (marked No. 2) I submitted to Dr. Ritter, and it was, as I am informed, made the subject of a conference on the same day (Tuesday, February 6) by Dr. Ritter, Count von Bernstorff and Dr. Barthelme, and approved by them. I am also informed that it was somewhat condensed and, possibly, otherwise altered for transmission, but that its substance and effect were carefully preserved, and that it was then transmitted to the Swiss Government on the evening of that day.

I desire to add that in this, as in the matter of the newspaper dispatch, I acted solely on my own initiative and without consultation with anyone, save that I reported from time to time to Mr. Arthur Deerin Call, the Secretary of the American Peace Society. In particular I wish to state that Mr. William J. Bryan had no cognizance of my plans or proceedings and to my personal knowledge had no communication, direct or indirect, with Count von Bernstorff or Dr. Ritter.

Meanwhile, Tuesday afternoon, I had made several efforts to see you, but the Cabinet meeting and subsequent conferences in which you were engaged made it impossible for me to do so. However, in the evening I saw Secretary Baker at the War Department and gave him a full account of my activities as well as of the motives that had inspired them—of all of which, I am happy to say, he expressed complete approval. The following morning (February 7) I had the pleasure of seeing you and of submitting a resume of the matter.

I know that you do not need any assurance from me that in all the proceedings above recounted I have had no aim but to serve the highest interests of our country—its honor and dignity as well as its peace—and to further, as far as it might lie in my power to do so, the aims and policy of the President and of your high office.

With sincere appreciation of the opportunity you have afforded me of submitting this detailed statement of my efforts in this crisis of our national life, I have [etc.]

George W. Kirchwey

[Enclosure 1—Telegram]

Mr. George Barthelme to the “Kölnische Zeitung”

February 5, 1917.

From high sources whose identity I cannot disclose I am urged, (almost implored), to convey to the German people and government the idea that the message^3a must not be construed as indicating any desire on the part of the government or people for war with Germany. Strongest attention is called to the following passage:

“I refuse to believe that it is the intention to do in fact, what they warned us they will feel at liberty to do. Only an overt act can make me believe it even now.”

Further the following sentence:

“If this inveterate confidence should unhappily prove unfounded, I shall take the liberty of coming again before Congress to ask authority to use any means necessary for the protection of our seamen and people.”

These passages widely construed, first, as expression of confidence that some way out might be found; second, as not containing any war threat, notwithstanding language used. General opinion is that the President could do nothing else but sever relations to make good his former note. It is now up to Germany to provide an opening.

First thing necessary, avoid everything which makes maintenance friendly relations impossible, particularly refrain from destruction American ships; then make clear misunderstood terms of German note, that no unrestricted submarine warfare contemplated but only a blockade confined within narrowest limits compatible with necessary military aims; even within those limits greatest care taken not to interfere with innocent American commerce and every precaution taken to limit destruction of neutral ships carrying contraband and of enemy vessels to ship and cargo, safeguarding wherever possible lives of passengers and crews, as was the recent practice. Then propose joint commission for negotiation of code governing blockade and submarine warfare generally, such offer inducing delay and made as a special token of ancient friendship of the two countries. Then consider possibilities provided in Hensley resolution⁴ for calling conference of the powers, which possibilities would be closed by hasty action. Furnish some explanation about sailing of only four especially marked American ships. This would remove extremely bitter impression created by this wholly incomprehensible proviso hurting national pride as nothing else.

My informants assure me in the most emphatic manner that the country is not for war; will be for war only when forced into it by an overt act on part of Germany, only certain very small circle are clamoring for hostilities, but huge majority praying for peace with honor.

I feel it my solemn duty to inform you about these sentiments and opinions entertained by men of the highest standing, noblest character, responsible position, loftiest ideals and thoroughly good will. Should you deem it advisable to exert influence of our great paper, do so to find way out of situation not yet unavoidably pregnant with gravest possibilities. I honestly believe country just anxiously waiting for one more good word.

George Barthelme

[Enclosure 2—Telegram]

Draft Message From the Swiss Minister (Ritter) to the Swiss Federal Political Department

February 6, 1917.

With the approval of Count Bernstorff, I urgently recommend immediate transmittal of following to Imperial German Government.

American public opinion strongly supports President in his actions and sentiments but strongly averse to war, which however will inevitably result from serious overt act. Tension will relax as time elapses without such act. Such forbearance coupled with reasonable modifications of announced blockade would afford American Government welcome opportunity to restore friendly relations. Slight modifications already announced have produced good effect. New announcement should make clear that no unrestricted submarine warfare contemplated but only blockade confined within narrowest limits compatible with necessary military aims and even within those limits greatest care taken not to interfere with innocent American commerce and every precaution taken to limit destruction of neutral ships carrying contraband and enemy vessels to ship and cargo, safeguarding wherever possible lives of passengers and crews. Not impossible that constructive proposals allowing time to elapse and demonstrating sincerity and reasonableness of Imperial Government might prove acceptable—as that the two governments institute a joint commission, perhaps in conference with other neutral powers affected, for negotiation of a code governing blockade and submarine warfare generally, or suggestion for a conference of powers authorized in Naval Appropriation bill (1916).

Extreme gravity of situation would seem to warrant earnest representations to above effect to Imperial German Government.

2. Washington correspondent of the Kölnische Zeitung.
3. Enclosure 1, the paragraph beginning “First thing necessary,” p. 602.
4. i. e., President Wilson’s message to Congress, Feb. 3, 1917, Foreign Relations, 1917, supp. 1, p. 109.
4. See Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 53, p. 9143.