763.72/2649½
Memorandum by The Secretary of State of a Conversation With the German Ambassador (Bernstorff), April 18, 1916
B My Government wants me to talk over with you once more the submarine question, and the instruction which I have received. I thought it would be better if I would give you confidentially a copy of the telegram.42 I had the telegram Friday but I had to put it in order. * * *43
L No, I noticed that the note did not suggest arbitration.
B It suggested a commission of inquiry. Have you anything to tell me today?
L Well hardly today. I think I will be able to tomorrow. The facts in the case appear to us to be conclusive.
B The facts of the Sussex case? I have had no information except what they told me.
L Of course there is one very disquieting thing that runs through the note that was sent. There are five cases presented. In two of these cases they do not seem to know whether the steamer torpedoed was the one torpedoed or not. They do not seem to know what steamers they have torpedoed, which seems to me a serious situation because they seem to be torpedoing anything, regardless of whether an armed vessel or an unarmed vessel, or neutral.
B A neutral vessel, according to instructions, is not supposed to be attacked.
L We have received reports from various capitals of neutral countries, of vessels attacked.
B Without warning?
[Page 553]L Without any warning at all. Some they say were probably destroyed by hitting a mine, some they state were torpedoed. Of course we have not all the details.
B It was because of advocating this general attack that von Tirpitz was compelled to resign. The instructions are very plain that the naval authorities have given that neutral vessels must not be attacked.
L It seems to me very strange they cannot control their commanders. They torpedoed one neutral ship when it was not even going to an English port. That is a report from Madrid; and furthermore it appears that about half the people on board the Sussex were neutrals.
B Of course they constantly report from London that such and such a ship was torpedoed without warning.
L I am not referring to the London reports but to those of neutrals.
B I don’t understand it.
L They seem to torpedo a vessel and find out her nationality afterward, which is a dangerous proceeding.
B It certainly is.
L That is what makes the situation serious. It is a menace to the safety of Americans when they torpedo a vessel without Americans on board, if Americans had a right to travel on them.
B (This concerned the real intention of his Government in regard to submarine blockade as to routes of safety and neutral vessels, and closes—“but everything else is regarded as blockaded and any ships that do not regard the blockade will be sunk.”)
L I cannot understand the actions of the submarine commanders unless the Government has no control over them. Of course some of our reports are very full as to certain vessels, and the evidence comes in slowly on others. We made a special effort on the Sussex case because that was one of the most harrowing, so we made a special effort to collect our evidence as rapidly as we could and the evidence which we have is perfectly conclusive as to the facts. We shall make out a full statement of the facts as established by the evidence and it will be found, I think, that everything substantially in the note of April 10th from your Government44 corroborates the facts, except as to the sketch.
B And that you have sent?
L No we have not, but it will be sent.
B (Asks if there is anything he can do)
L I do not think there is at present. I think I will be able to communicate with you more definitely tomorrow.
[Page 554]B I would like to help because I have been worried. We could manage it better here. You know I have used every effort to preserve friendly relations.
L I appreciate your efforts.
B I do not want trouble and I am absolutely certain that my Government does not want trouble though I say this without instructions. They have to meet public opinion over there which is very strong for submarine war.
L I think I appreciate the position. I understand and appreciate the difficulties all Governments have in dealing with public opinion.
B Certainly my Government does not want trouble.
L We shall have to wait until tomorrow. I can then talk more freely.
B Will you be good enough to let me know?
L Yes, good bye.
- Infra.↩
- This form of punctuation appears in the original.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1916, supp., p. 227.↩