Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume I

841.857 Ar 1/89

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Washington, September 11, 1915.

My Dear Mr. President: I have been through the German note on the Arabic case⁵⁶ and also the affidavits which we have received from London and Liverpool given by survivors of the Arabic and of the Dunsley.^56a

I consider that the German note is most unsatisfactory; that in fact we are back where we were before Count von Bernstorff communicated to us the German admission of principle in submarine warfare.

From the evidence I think that the following facts are conclusively established:

(1) The Arabic was never nearer the Dunsley than two miles;

(2) The Arabic was pursuing a zig-zag course, which is a customary maneuver when the presence of a submarine is suspected.

This method of avoidance must have been known to the submarine commander so that the changes of course by the Arabic could not have been mistaken by the commander as an attempt to ram, though the Arabic might have been headed for him at one or more times during her approach to the Dunsley.

(3) The submarine, on observing the approach of the Arabic, submerged;

(4) The submarine was never seen by any person on board the Arabic. If it had been seen, the presumption would be that the Arabic, being at least a mile or more away, would have turned from and not toward the submarine, as the Arabic carried no armament.

(5) The torpedo was not seen by persons on board the Arabic until it was about two hundred yards away from the vessel. There was evidently no time to swing the vessel to any considerable extent after the torpedo was seen. Yet the torpedo appears to have struck the Arabic almost at right angles, not far from the vessel’s beam. Judging the location of the submarine by the direction from which the torpedo came, the submarine commander could not, at the time the torpedo was released, have had the slightest reason to suppose that the Arabic was attempting to ram his vessel.

(6) The unavoidable conclusion seems to be that the submarine commander did not believe the Arabic was attempting to attack him, but that he wantonly torpedoed the vessel without warning and with utter disregard for the lives of persons on board.

I would submit the following comments on the German note:

The statements as to what occurred do not purport to be by the commander of the submarine. Every allegation might easily be constructed from the press reports of the incident. The only fact alleged which appears to be solely within the knowledge of the officers of the submarine, is the alleged attack in the Irish sea on August 14th, five days before the Arabic was sunk, and this may have been reported to the German Admiralty before the Arabic incident occurred.

The question arises—Did the submarine commander make any report? If he did, why does the note fail to say so, and why does it not give the language of the report as to the facts?

Reference is made to the instructions issued to the Commander of the submarine. Why is not the language of the instructions given?

The failure to admit liability for indemnity for the lives of American citizens lost amounts to a justification of the commander. If the commander is justified in drawing such a conclusion, as it is alleged in the note the commander of the submarine did draw from the facts in this case, then the lives of persons on board merchant ships are in as great danger as they were before the instructions were issued.

The note proposes to submit the question of liability to The Hague for arbitration, expressly withholding the question of the legality of submarine warfare in general.

The whole tenor of the note is a cold and uncompromising declaration that the commanders of submarines have practically a free hand though bound, technically, by some general form of instructions, and that if they make mistakes, however unwarranted, their Government will support them. It seems to me that we must reach a conclusion that the Bernstorff statement of principle is valueless and cannot be relied upon as a protective measure.

If the foregoing analysis of the evidence as to the facts is true, and the comments on the German, note are justified, it would seem as if a course which this Government might pursue is to inform the Berlin Government that the note is highly unsatisfactory both in its declarations and in its tone, and a demand that the act of the submarine commander who torpedoed the Arabic, being deliberately unfriendly, be disavowed, that the officer be punished for his wanton and illegal conduct, and that a formal declaration be made that the sinking of the Arabic was contrary to the instructions issued to submarine commanders, of which instructions this Government was notified by the German Ambassador here.

If the foregoing course is not adopted, I see no alternative other than to announce that the German note is entirely unacceptable as an explanation of the conduct of the submarine commander, and that as the German Government supports the commander, this Government must consider that the German attitude is one of deliberate unfriendliness and, therefore, the United States must sever diplomatic relations with Germany.

I regret very much that the present situation has arisen which seems to preclude further negotiations, as continued discussion of this subject would, I believe, be contrary to the dignity of the United States and would invite general criticism from the American people. I further think that we should reach a decision promptly.

Faithfully yours,

Robert Lansing

56. Foreign Relations, 1915, supp., p. 539.
57. See telegram No. 2680, Aug. 23, 1915, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, ibid., p. 518; also telegram No. 2186, Sept. 14, 1915, to the Ambassador in Germany, ibid., p. 547.