763.72119/544a
The Secretary of State to President Wilson
My Dear Mr. President: This telegram from Mr. Penfield, No. 1757, March 13, 3 p. m.19 (I enclose another copy as you have probably burned yours) seems to me to possess a possibility that something may be accomplished along the line suggested by Count Czernin, namely a secret meeting between a representative of the Allies and a representative of Austria-Hungary. If these two representatives come together to discuss general terms of peace, they may gradually drift into a discussion of a separate peace; and, if Austria-Hungary once permits her representative to talk even on that subject, I believe that something will have been gained.
It is my belief that the rumors reported in the last sentence of the telegram have substantial foundation, and that the Austrian Government is almost as fearful of its powerful ally as it is of its enemies. It seems to be in the unenviable position that its interests will be at the disposal of others however the war ends, in one case Germany will dictate, in the other the Entente Powers. As a matter of expediency, therefore, the Austrian Government may think it wise to come to some arrangement with the enemy before the war is decided, and takes this way of entering upon the subject. That is what I hoped and still hope. The keen interest shown by Count Czernin further encourages this hope.
[Page 25]I think that the insistence of Count Czernin, that a secret conference such as he suggests could only discuss the terms of a general peace, ought not to be considered as discouraging, because that is precisely what he should be expected to do. He must of necessity maintain an appearance of perfect loyalty to Austria’s allies, not only to satisfy the Austrian sense of honor but also to avoid possible dangers from an enraged Germany in case the matter became public. That he is willing to engage in these secret conferences is, I think, very significant and ought to be encouraged. He must know that no single delegate of the Allies would discuss in any way terms of a general peace, especially with an enemy which could not control the other Central Powers. Knowing this these secret meetings must be proposed by Count Czernin for another purpose which, if it relates to peace, must have to do with terms affecting Austria-Hungary alone. A “separate peace” may be repudiated, but may be discussed nevertheless.
It seems to me that we ought to take the opening offered. We may accomplish nothing or we may accomplish more than we expect. If we fail, I do not see that anything has been lost. We will be no worse off than we are now.
We agreed, you will recall, to treat all communications from the Austro-Hungarian Government as strictly secret. The next step would seem to be to telegraph Penfield to ask Count Czernin if he would object to our making the suggestion of a meeting such as he proposed, to one of the Allied Governments, not as originating with Austria-Hungary but as originating here, explaining to him that, since the idea was his, we would not wish to appear to be violating our pledge of secrecy by even adopting the suggestion as our own unless he authorized us to do so. At the same time we should say that we cannot disclose our other correspondent as we are in that case also communicating in the strictest confidence.
Faithfully yours,