My general impression of the document is that the tone is conciliatory
and that the presentation of the British case is adroit, though
transparently illogical in many particulars to one familiar with the
facts. It appears to be drafted with the purpose of allaying public
irritation in this country without giving any assurance that trade
conditions with neutral countries will be relieved.
It seems to me that in acknowledging the note Mr. Page, while expressing
gratification at its temperate tone, and stating that comment would be
withheld until the complete British reply had been received, should be
instructed to urge the delivery of such reply as soon as possible in
view of the existing doubt as to British action in the future and the
consequent demoralizing effect on American commerce.
I have submitted a copy of the enclosed to Secretary Bryan and I am
sending you a copy with his approval.
[Enclosure]
Notes by the Counselor for the Department of
State (Lansing) on
the Communication of January 7, 1915, From the British Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs (Grey)
[Washington,]
January 10, 1915.
Paragraph 2. The question is raised by the
statement, that these are “preliminary observations” and that a
detailed answer will be made, whether any answer should be made at
the present time to these “observations”?
Paragraph 3. Recognition of friendly tone of
United States note and desire expressed to reply in same spirit.
Paragraph 4. Concurrence in the principle
that necessity for national defense is measure of interference with
neutral trade and assertion that G. B. will endeavor to keep within
those limits and make redress for unintentional violation.
There seems to be a distinction made between “bona fide” trade and
“trade in contraband destined for the enemy’s country”. The term
“bona fide trade” appears to be novel and requires explanation.
Certainly trade in contraband is not mala
fides. No distinction is made in this assertion between
absolute and conditional contraband. Trade in conditional contraband
to an enemy’s country is not necessarily subject to
interference.
Paragraph 5. A ground for complaint is that
the danger of seizure or detention deters
shippers from sending goods, causes steamship lines to refuse to
take cargoes, and prevents shippers from obtaining insurance. The
uncertainty of freedom of trade is one of the chief, if not the chief, grounds of complaint.
Paragraph 6. These figures prove nothing, at
least not what they are intended to prove. No one denies the fact
that the export of certain commodities to neutral countries have
greatly increased, that is the normal result of closing the sources
of supply from belligerent countries. Those who deal in such
articles have unquestionably been benefited. On the other hand, the
trade in other commodities, which is viewed with suspicion by G. B.
and subject to interference, has fallen off to such an extent that
the industries are much depressed. Because the general volume of
trade to neutral countries has increased does not meet the argument
that certain of the great industries of the U. S. are suffering
severely by British action. The equilibrium of our industrial life
has been destroyed. We have no market for the surplus production of
certain industries, while we cannot produce enough of other
commodities to keep down their cost to our own people. Labor as well
as capital suffers from the deprivation of markets resulting from G.
B.’s closing the trade routes.
[Page 263]
Paragraph 7. The cotton situation is an
excellent example of the effect of the uncertainty and doubt which
prevails in this country, due in large measure to the vacillation
which has been shown by the British Government in the matter of
contraband. The change of policy in regard to resin and turpentine
is an example of this vacillation.
Paragraph 8. Invites statistics of trade.
Differentiates between results due to British action and the
existence of a state of war. This latter point requires
consideration as it appears to be well taken.
Paragraph 9. Elaborates the idea that it is
the state of war which is responsible for the disorganization of
American trade.
Paragraph 10. Calls particular attention to
the detention of copper and the trade in it to Italy.
Paragraph 11. Compares 1913 and 1914
statistics of copper exported to Italy. Fails to take into account
that Italy in time of peace imported manufactured copper from
Germany and therefore imported comparatively little raw copper from
the United States. Fails to consider that copper articles are not
exported from Germany. Fails to consider that the Italian demand for
copper has increased enormously in view of military preparations.
Fails to consider that Switzerland must obtain copper from Italy. In
spite of these reasons for increased copper import into Italy,
exports from the U. S. have only increased 20 million pounds. Of
this increase between 8 and 10 millions of pounds are lying at
Gibraltar.
Paragraph 12. Comment on paragraph 11 applies
to this paragraph dealing with copper shipped to other neutral
countries.
Paragraph 13. The presumption in view of the
facts which are not considered is not “very strong”, nor is the
necessity as imperative as alleged.
Paragraph 14. This Government would be better
satisfied if the “positive evidence” that copper consigned to Sweden
was bound for Germany were produced. It is said to be “in the
possession of His Majesty’s Government”. To withhold it is
inexcusable in view of the discussions which have taken place. One
of the serious grounds of complaint is not only the failure to
disclose evidence which is asserted to be sufficient to warrant
seizure, but the neglect to inform this Government of the charges
against the vessels seized. In view of the subscription to the
doctrine of “frankness” in Paragraph 3 this secretiveness appears to
be paradoxical.
Paragraph 15. The term “suspected cargoes”
attracts attention. What is the suspicion? What is the foundation of
it? On how strong evidence is it based? Is it based on any evidence
save the nature of the cargoes? The term requires explanation before
it can be accepted.
[Page 264]
So too the term “legitimate means” cannot be passed over without
comment. The U. S. does not question the employment of legitimate means by G. B., but what is
“legitimate”? Apparently the two Governments may differ as to that.
The U. S. would limit the word to its use as interpreted by
international law, but G. B. does not seem to be satisfied by such
limitation.
Paragraph 16. It is the way that the British
Government has applied the admitted rule as to food stuffs, of which
the United States complains. It is no excuse that the enemy of G. B.
may violate the accepted rules of
civilization. Specific instances of violation would be more in
point. I think that it can be shown that G. B. has not adhered to
the rule which she accepts.
Paragraph 17. Cargoes and vessels held for
prize court respectively 45 and 8. Hypothetical case of search of a
cotton cargo. Information alleged as to contraband hidden in cotton.
No evidence adduced that this has ever occurred. The argument seems
to be presented for the purpose of excusing future detention of cotton cargoes on reports based on
suspicion other than evidence. This paragraph causes distrust rather
than confidence in the policy which G. B. intends to follow in the
future.
Paragraph 18. The U. S. raised no question as
to the justice which would be rendered in the British prize courts.
It is the conduct of the British authorities prior to the prize court proceedings of which it
complains.
Paragraph 19. This seems to be a sound
argument in regard to the trade in crude rubber. There can little be
said in reply.
Paragraph 20. This statement is undoubtedly
true as to the danger of contiguous neutral nations becoming bases
for supplies for the enemies of G. B., but that is a matter between
the governments of those nations and G. B., with which the U. S. has
not and ought not to have anything to do. That the goods are
consigned to a neutral ought to insure them free passage unless it
is positively shown that they are destined to an enemy’s armed
forces or his government. If by arrangement with G. B. these
countries forbid exportation of these goods and the consignee
fraudulently attempts to evade the prohibition, the matter is one
for the British Government to take up with the government of the
consignee. Certainly the innocent American owner should not be made
to suffer. Yet this is the course which G. B. has adopted during the
past five months.
The phrase “bona fide” neutral as applied
to goods would appear to mean that other goods are enemy goods
falsely held in the name of
[Page 265]
a neutral. Can G. B. cite a single case of this sort? She has not
done so thus far in spite of the scores of vessels and cargoes
detained.
Paragraph 21. The United States should accept
the statement that G. B. had no ground to complain of the
abandonment of entirely unauthorized publication of manifests and
the adoption of a rule that they should not be given general
publicity by officials for thirty days. Attention might be called to
the fact that another custom was also abandoned, which was that a
full manifest did not have to be filed for four days after the
vessel sailed. In order to prevent the shipment of coal and supplies
to belligerent warships clearance was refused by order of the
Treasury Department until the full manifest was filed.
So far as knowledge of the contents of a manifest serves to remove a
danger of detention in a British port the claim is without
foundation. The vessels which are stopped on the high seas by
British warships have their manifests. These can be easily examined
at the time of visit. If they are without evidence of unneutral
trade, the vessels should be allowed to proceed. As to such visit
and detention on the high seas the United States has no ground for
complaint. But it does not appear that G. B. is satisfied with the
facts set forth in a manifest, actual search must verify them, and
this, acccording to British practice, takes place in port and not on
the high seas. How then does knowledge of the contents of a manifest
prevent detentions since the accuracy of the manifest is always
apparently doubted?
If a vessel was immune from interruption provided her manifest showed
no goods with enemy destination there might be some reason for
giving publicity to the manifest at the time of clearing, but, since
it does not, it in no way benefits American shippers to publish it,
while for trade reasons many seriously object to such
publication.
Paragraph 22. The experience of this
Government thus far has been that the reasons for many of the
detentions have not been promptly attainable. A change in this
particular, in accordance with the promise here made, would remove
some of the grounds for complaint which exist. The U. S. has sought
in vain in many cases for a statement of the reason for detention.
Such a situation cannot but cause irritation and arouse suspicion
that the vessel or cargo is held until arrangements have been made
with the government of the neutral country to the port of which it
is destined. If such a suspicion is justified the detention is
manifestly illegal and a proper ground for protest.
