Minister Dawson to the Secretary of State.
Santo Domingo , February 2, 1906 .
Sir: Continuing the subject of my No. 203, of January 16, political events in this Republic, I have the honor to report that after the surrender of the Independencia on the 13th and 14th, General Barba refused to lay down his arms and kept up a desultory resistance until the 27th. On that day I received the following telegram from the acting consular agent at Sanchez:
Sanchez, January 27, 1906.
Dawson, Santo Domingo:
Barba surrendered. Peace reestablished.
I inclose herewith a copy of Mr. Leroux’s very complete report to me of the events at Sanchez and copies and translations of the preliminary and final agreements made in regard to the surrender of the Independencia.
On receiving word through me that Catrain was authorized by the Government to receive the Independencia she was delivered to him, and shortly thereafter Catrain went in the Nashville to San Juan. The Nashville had brought Arias down from Monte Christi meanwhile and took him also to San Juan.
Perez, however, determined to throw his lot in again with the Horacistas and remained at Sanchez, offering his services to the Government as represented by General Cabrera. The cabinet here distrusted him and his application for a commission was refused. Thereupon he enlisted as a private and is now at La Vega practically exercising a command.
In Monte Christi Province all resistance seems to have ceased on the 15th, when Arias fled on board an American man-of-war. On the 16th Navarro and Gulito Pichardo laid down their arms and returned to their homes. About the same time Neney Cepin and his band at Copey accepted the Government’s terms.
In the Barahona district, where news of events in the rest of the Republic is hard to get, two guerrilla bands remained under arms until lately. The Government sent the Independencia on the 25th to Petit Trou, a little port 30 miles south of Barahona. The insurrectionary [Page 552] band there promptly dispersed. At the same time the band which had been threatening Barahona from the northwest was attacked and defeated. The rebels surrendered on the usual guaranties of life and property on the 31st.
Early in January a few Jimenistas took up arms at Comenclador and Banica, frontier towns in the very center of the island. A plot was also formed at San Juan, a large town in Azua Province some 50 miles northwest of Azua city. The governor went up there with 125 men and encountered no resistance.
About the 22d some twenty men, under the leadership of Pedro Mota and Peguero, appeared near Hato Mayor, a town in Seybo Province situated midway between Samana Bay and the south coast. Some of them, at least, had come from Monte Christi on the Independencia and crossed to Savana la Mar, with the idea of making a plundering expedition in virgin territory where the Government was expecting no trouble. A few local malcontents joined them, and after entering Hato Mayor they turned west, threatening Bayaguana, a town in this province 30 miles northeast of here, and then came into the sparsely settled savanas near the coast. When last reported they were about 15 or 20 miles east-northeast in a region where effective pursuit is difficult. Peguero has been wounded, and day before yesterday Mota asked for terms of surrender.
This body, so far as I know—and my means of information are good—is the only one remaining under arms in the whole Republic.
Barba’s operations at Sanchez had some importance because he had at the beginning 200 men. The other bands which I have been describing were insignificant in numbers and were composed of professional guerrillas, who regarded the insurrection as a convenient pretext for robbing henroosts and cattle pastures, with the hope of worrying the Government into paying them to surrender as cheaper than chasing them.
The fact that fewer of such plundering bands were organized than during any previous insurrection is a gratifying indication that everywhere, even in the disorderly provinces on the Haitian frontier, the revolutionary classes are discouraged. The political leaders, knowing or thinking that by violence they can not get control of the Central Government, that control of provincial governments would not be decisive under the present arrangement, and that they can not get their hands on custom-houses, do not excite the local “jefes” and professional fighters to take up arms.
I have, etc., etc.,