Office of the Historian

The Secretary of State to the French Chargé d’Affaires.

Department of State,
Washington, October 16, 1906.
No. 343.]

Sir: I have the pleasure to acknowledge your note of the 18th of August last, in which, at the instance of the chamber of commerce of Paris, attention is drawn to the perils to which vessels are exposed by the dormant mines scattered over the open seas of the Far East, and the suggestion is made that this subject be taken up by The Hague conference and an international agreement effected to prevent the liability of such dangers.

After-consultation with my colleague of the navy, I may say that this Government would incline to favor an international agreement whereby to restrict and regulate the employment by belligerents of dormant or other mines which are liable to drift away from the spot of their strategic employment and become a menace to legitimate navigation on the high seas or in neutral waters.

While the use of submarine mines in war is as legitimate as that of torpedoes and other dirigible explosive devices, the mutual rights of the belligerents and their obligations toward the whole neutral world forbid their employment except under conditions of reasonable control, both as to the area in which they are effective and the duration of their destructive character. Certainly the menace from drifting mines to all shipping navigating the Yellow Sea and adjacent waters [Page 305] since and during the Russo-Japanese war (and no one can foresee when this menace will cease nor how far afield it will extend with the lapse of time) constitutes a condition of affairs to which no neutral can reasonably be asked to submit, no matter how great the military value to the belligerent of the use of the mines from which this condition results. In view of the impossibility of fixing the responsibility in any particular case, it is no solution of the difficulty to argue that the belligerent is responsible for all damage to neutral shipping resulting from his use of mines, and where the damage to a neutral is accompanied by the sacrifice of innocent lives the question becomes still more complex.

While it may be premature to formulate the restrictions and regulations applicable to the case, it may be observed that in the case of unanchored mines the conditions should be similar to those in regard to torpedoes which are merely automobile modifications of the unanchored or floating type, and that as to both the area of destructive influence should not exceed that of the circle whose diameter equals that of the run of the ordinary standard torpedo. It would seem further that neutrals have a right to demand that belligerents who make use of contact mines, whether anchored or unanchored, shall use only such as shall become innocuous upon getting adrift and passing, uncontrolled, beyond the immediate range of belligerent activity. The point which seems proper to assert and emphasize by an international agreement is that a belligerent has no right to seek his own safety or to attack the enemy at the expense of probable injury to a neutral, against which no precaution on the part of the neutral can adequately provide. The belligerent’s remedy and duty is obviously to improve his contact mine and prevent its becoming a terrible uncontrollable peril to innocent mankind.

The Secretary of the Navy has furnished me with a memorandum in regard to derelict mines off the China coasts. I have the pleasure to inclose a copy of it for your further information.

Accept, sir, etc.,

Elihu Root.
[Inclosure.]

The Acting Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State.

Navy Department,
Washington, September 27, 1906.

Sir: Referring to your letter No. 282, September 1, 1906, inclosing translation of a note from the French chargé d’affaires, in which, calling attention to the danger to commerce from dormant mines scattered over the open seas of the Far East, he asks how a motion to effect, in accordance with the views of The Hague conference, an international agreement to prevent the recurrence of so serious a danger would be received by the United States, this department has the honor to reply as follows:

2.
In view of the extensive coast line of the United States, of the great value, actual and moral, of submarine mines in harbor defense, and of their small cost as compared to other means giving equal results, the Navy Department considers it highly impolitic for our Government to become a party to an international agreement entirely prohibiting the use of submarine mines in war.
3.
As between belligerents themselves, the use of mines in any form is no more subject to objection than is the use of torpedoes or submarines. As a rule all new weapons in their infancy are attacked on humanitarian or other grounds, but in the end are accepted, provided they are not perfidious and do [Page 306] not inflict suffering out of proportion to the ends to be obtained. Such was the case with the torpedo, which is now in general use, and the arguments pro and con in the case of that weapon apply with equal force to the submarine mine.
4.
There is a division of our artillery devoted to the defense of our seacoast harbors by mines. Lately large sums of money have been spent to perfect this system, and the entire scheme of mine defense is an important part of our coast-defense system. The mines are anchored mines that can be fired at will (observation mines), or by contact (electro-contact mines), and regulations have been drawn up and approved providing for the safety of neutrals and our own vessels. Upon executive order certain areas are proclaimed to be defensive areas, and all such vessels placed under charge of pilots while passing through these areas. We have a naval mine which is an anchored contact mine, to be used for the protection of flying or advanced bases. These mines would be dangerous under some conditions should they break adrift from their moorings; but it would not be difficult to so alter them as to bring them within the proposed rule.
5.
In Great Britain the system of mine defense, which has been in charge of the army, has been turned over to the navy. It has been publicly stated that the navy would defend the coast ports with submarines and that no mines would be used for this purpose. The number of submarines building in England gives some color of truth to this statement. At the same time it is known that their navy has frequent practice with anchored mines and countermines and that they are building vessels to be used for laying mines. The vessels with the naval mines are probably intended to defend an advanced or flying base.
6.
France apparently depends largely on submarines or submersibles to take the place of anchored mines.
7.
Germany is supposed to be prepared to use mines to a large extent in the protection of her coast, and has a number of mine-laying vessels.
8.
It is reported that Austria has a vessel prepared to place floating mines in the path of an enemy.
9.
It isobvious, however, that the unrestricted use of submarine mines involves not only the mutual rights of the belligerents concerned, but also the obligations of those belligerents to the whole neutral world. Certainly the menace from drifting mines to all shipping navigating the Yellow Sea and adjacent waters since, and during, the Russo-Japanese war (and no one can foresee when this menace will cease, nor how far afield it will extend with the lapse of time), constitutes a condition of affairs to which no neutral can reasonably be asked to submit, no matter how great the military value to the belligerent of the use of mines from which this condition results. (See memorandum.) In view of the impossibility of fixing the responsibility in any particular case, it is no solution of the difficulty to argue that the belligerent is responsible for all damage to neutral shipping resulting from his use of mines, and where the damage to a neutral is accompanied by the sacrifice of innocent lives, the question becomes still more complex.
10.
This condition points strongly to the necessity for an international convention restricting and regulating the use of mines in time of war.
11.
Proposed regulations followed by a full discussion of the question can be found on page 147 of the volume “International Law Topics and Discussions” issued by the Naval War College, 1905. The regulations are as follows:
(1)
Unanchored contact mines are prohibited, except those that by construction are rendered innocuous after a limited time, certainly before passing outside the area of immediate belligerent activities.
(2)
Anchored contact mines that do not become innocuous on getting adrift are prohibited.
(3)
If anchored contact mines be used within belligerent jurisdiction or within the area of immediate belligerent activities, due precaution shall be taken for the safety of neutrals.
The department approves the second and third of these regulations, but would change the first to read “Unanchored contact mines are prohibited.” If unanchored contact mines which become innocuous after a limited time and certainly so before passing outside the area of immediate belligerent activities were allowed to be used, then there is room for widely differing opinions as to what constitutes “a limited time “or “the area of immediate belligerent activities.” There can be little question that the time should not exceed that of the run of the standard automobile torpedo, and the area that of the circle whose diameter equals the torpedo’s range. Unless contact mines meeting the conditions above [Page 307] indicated can be constructed at smaller expense than the automobile torpedo, which is an open question, the automobile torpedo would seem to meet all the conditions under which it would be desirable to use unanchored contact mines.
12.
Contact mines that become innocuous on getting adrift certainly can be made, and neutrals have an undoubted right to insist that only such mines shall be used.
13.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the restrictions embodied in paragraph 12 above would prevent a vessel or fleet taking refuge in a harbor or bay from hastily mining the channel as a protection from a pursuing enemy. This view ignores the question of the advisability of a vessel, even in the greatest straits, planting contact mines under conditions which preclude her having an exact knowledge of their location, and further assumes that mines that can readily be planted and yet meet the conditions imposed by paragraph 12 can not be constructed, which is by no means certain. But granting all the above, it still appears that even in this case the right of the neutral prevails, and that the belligerent has no right to seek his own safety at the expense of probable injury to the neutral, against which no protection on the part of the latter can provide. The belligerent’s remedy is to improve his contact mine.

I have, etc.,

Truman H. Newberry,
Acting Secretary.
[Subinclosure.]

memorandum of derelict mines off china coast.

Previous to and after the capitulation of Port Arthur, some 3,000 to 5,000 mines were planted by the Russians and Japanese. These mines were anchored in and around the entrance to the harbor of Port Arthur and for some miles outside the harbor. These were mechanical mines with chemical fuses and were said to be anchored with chain moorings. These moorings, in time, either corroded through or were chafed through by the continuous movements of the water. This was particularly the case during the severe winter storms of that locality.

The submergence of the mines after going adrift depended upon the point of fracture of the chain; if close to the mine, the mine floated on the surface and in smooth weather could be sighted. If the fracture was near the bottom, the mine was drawn under by the weight of the chain, floated beneath the surface and could not be seen.

Of those sighted, about 100 to 150 were reported to the offices of the captains of the ports on the China coast, the latitude and longitude were seen being given, and all vessels were warned of their locality.

The above number was naturally but a small percentage of those adrift.

Few were seen to the southward of Shanghai and the majority of those reported were sighted between Newchwang and the Saddle Islands. Many mines floated ashore on the coasts of Japan, especially along the western and northwestern coast, and some were reported on the northeast coast.

Many coastwise merchant steamers and numerous Japanese vessels were sunk by these derelict mines.

In September, 1905, the vessels of our fleet steamed in squadron from Chefoo to Shanghai, passing some 5 miles from Shantung Promontory; an hour later on the same day a Batterfield and Swire steamer, pursuing the same course, struck a derelict mine and sunk in 10 minutes with a loss of 16 lives.

Following is a list of the ships known to have been destroyed by derelict mines off the China coast during the years 1904, 1905, and 1906:

Name. Nation. Year. Name. Nation. Year.
Nakonoura Maru Japan 1904 American 1905
Shintaiping Russia 1904 Marko Maru Japan 1905
China 1904 Hsieh-ho China 1905
Lucia British 1904 Leho British 1905
Kashing China 1904 Sanchin Maru Japan 1905
Laina Chiyoda Maru Japan 1904 Silvia Germany 1906
Tiberius Germany 1904 British 1906
China 1905 Toyotomic Maru Japan 1906
Sobralance British 1905 Nangpo China
Cheyetsu Japan 1905