Ambassador Griscom to the Secretary of State.

No. 19.]

Sir: I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of a paper on “Brazil, the United States and Monroeism,” rumored to have been written by Baron Rio Branco, Brazilian minister for foreign affairs, under the nom de plume of J. Penn.

A translation by the secretary of this embassy is also inclosed.

I have, etc.,

Lloyd Griscom.

brazil, the united states and monroeism.

The manifestations of reciprocal appreciation and friendship between the Governments of Rio de Janeiro and Washington have been censured during the last years, sometimes with a good deal of injustice and passion by some rare Brazilian newspapers who believe themselves to be the real interpreters and propagandists of the political thoughts of imperial statesmen.

These censors have considered bad the greater drawing together which Presidents Rodrigues Alves and Theodore Roosevelt have promoted between Brazil and the United States. They have shown themselves on various occasions ungratefully disdainful of the Monroe doctrine and consider impracticable the resolution taken simultaneously by both Governments to raise the grade of their respective diplomatic representatives.

The documents which we are now going to produce or to summarize will show that President Rodrigues Alves was right to say in his last message to Congress:

“I see with great satisfaction that the relations of cordial friendship between Brazil and the United States of America are becoming more and more close. In concurring to that end I have done more than follow the policy selected since 1822 by the founders of our independence and invariably followed by all the governments which Brazil has had.”


The manifesto of the Prince Regent of Brazil to friendly governments and nations bears the date of August 6, 1822. That document as is known was drafted by José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, then minister of the Brazilian Empire and for foreign affairs.

From the last part we detach this extract:

“My firm resolution and that of the people I govern are legitimately promulgated. I therefore hope that the wise and impartial men of the whole world and [Page 117] governments and nations friendly to Brazil will see the justice of such true and wise sentiments. I invite them to continue with the Empire of Brazil the same relations of material interest and friendship. I shall be ready to receive their ministers and diplomatic agents and send them mine, as long as may last the captivity of the King, my august father.* * *”

Six days later, on the 12th of August, the Prince Regent, D. Pedro, signed the decree appointing a chargé d’affaires of the Kingdom of Brazil in the United States of America and on the following day left for São Paulo, where on the 7th of September he proclaimed the independence of Brazil.

This decree, countersigned by José Bonifacio is, nevertheless, prior to the date of the independence and the proclamation of the empire, which was only effected on the 12th of October of the same year.

The decree in full reads as follows:

“As it is indispensable in the actual political circumstances to appoint a person who in my royal name may treat directly with the United States of America concerning affairs which may occur between both countries, and taking into consideration the recognized ability, patriotism, and zeal of Luis Moutinho Lima, clerk of the department of state for foreign affairs, I have seen fit to appoint him to exercise the position of my chargé d’affaires near the same United States of America, with the annual salary of Rs. 2,400,000.

“José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, of my council of state and of the council of His Most Faithful Majesty, minister and secretary of state for the kingdom and for foreign affairs, will so understand it and in consequence will cause the necessary documents to be issued.

“Palace of Rio de Janeiro, August 12, 1822 (with the seal of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent), José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva.”

This was the first diplomatic appointment signed by the Prince Regent, D. Pedro, on the advice of José Bonifacio. Later on the same day the decrees appointing the other two chargés d’affaires were signed: For London and Paris. Before these only one other appointment had been made: For consul at Buenos Aires on May 24.

On January 15, 1823, Antonio Congalvez da Cruz, who had been prominent in the Pernambuco revolution of 1819, was appointed consul-general in the United States of America. The form of the decree is different from the preceding ones.

“José Bonifacio, etc.

“Palace of Rio de Janeiro, January 15, 1823, second of the independence and of the empire.”

Louiz Moutinho was not able to leave in 1822 for the United States as he was detained by extraordinary work in the department of foreign affairs, where shortly afterwards he was promoted to be chief clerk of director-general.

By decree of January 21, 1824, José Silvestre Rebello was appointed chargé d’affaires of Brazil in the United States of America and he was the first diplomatic representative that we have effectively had in that country.

On the 28th of March he landed at Baltimore and on April 3 arrived at Washington. The President was James Monroe, who, in his last message read to Congress on December 3 of the previous year had affirmed the purpose of the American Government to oppose European conquests on our continent. John Quincy Adams, his successor as President, one year later on March 4, 1825, held the position of Secretary of State or Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On April 5, 1824, Rebello wrote to Adams requesting an audience to present his letters of credence, signed by the illustrious Bahian José da Carvalho e Mello, later Vicount of Bachbeira, then minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs of Brazil. The interviews and conferences between both then began. On April 20 Rebello handed to Adams a memorandum with this heading: “Succinct and true exposition of the facts that lead the Prince, now Emperor, and the Brazilian people to declare Brazil a free and independent nation.”

On the 26th of the same year, Rebello was presented to President Monroe by Adams and was thus accredited as chargé d’affaires of Brazil.

On the following day the “Daily National Intelligence,” of Washington, No. 5454, mentioned the event as follows:

“Mr. José Silvestre Rebello was yesterday presented by Mr. Adams, Secretary of State (to whom he had already presented his letter of credence), to the President of the United States as chargé d’affaires of the Emperor of Brazil and was received and recognized in that capacity by the President.”

[Page 118]

By a dispatch of May 26, Rebello informed Carvahho e Mello of this event, ending his communication with these words:

“The Empire of Brazil was therefore recognized by this Government on the 59th day after I landed at Baltimore. I present my compliments to Your Excellency.”

And in another, of May 3, he said:

“I hope that these dispatches will have arrived, at any rate, to take advantage once more of the occasion, I inform Your Excellency that this Government recognized the independence and the Empire of Brazil on the 26th instant, when I was presented to the President as chargé d’affaires of His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil with the same formalities as are received the representatives of other sovereigns. I therefore present my compliments to Your Excellency and beg Your Excellency to salute His Majesty the Emperor for such a happy occurrence.”

The illustrious author of the well-known book “Illusão Americana” was therefore badly informed, when in 1893 he wrote these lines:

“On the occasion of the independence of Brazil, we did not receive a single proof of good will from the Americans, and only after other countries had recognized the emancipation of Brazil, did the United States recognize our autonomy.”

The Government of the United States of America was the first Government to recognize the independence and Empire of Brazil, and the only one which did so before Portugal did so by the treaty concluded in Rio de Janeiro on August 29, 1824.

Pereiro Pinto has already said in his book (1865):

“The American Union was the first power to recognize the independence of Brazil. While Great Britain was leaning on one side, in favor of our emancipation by its commercial needs, by its liberal system of government, and by its tenacious aspiration to abolish the slave traffic, it wavered on the other hand in this duty by the deferences which it was obliged to show to its old and always faithful ally, Portugal; as to Austria, bound by very narrow ties to the founder of the Empire, it was even more bound to the compromises of the holy alliance, which looked with threatening glances on the independence of American countries. The United States, in consequence of the enlightened policy which they had adopted with reference to all the people who in America had separated from the mother country and has established themselves in a regular manner, stretched out a brotherly hand to us and invited us to take a seat in the great congress of the nations of the globe. We offered up, therefore, at that moment a prayer of gratitude to that people, the most powerful nation of the New World.


Which was the country on our continent which first recognized the already-mentioned Monroe doctrine?

We can answer without hesitation—the Government of Brazil.

The last message of President James Monroe, as we have already mentioned, bears the date of December 3, 1823. Fifty-nine days later, on January 31, 1824, our minister for foreign affairs, Carvalho e Mello, signed the instructions of the Imperial Government for the chargé d’affaires of Brazil.

In paragraph 6 of this interesting document we read the following:

“Now, if the United States of America, by nature of private reasons, should recognize the independence of the Empire of Brazil, as is probable, much more should be expected of that great nation when it is taken into consideration that its very interest are in accord with the known principles of its government and its policy.

* * * * * * *

“Such, then, are the principles of the policy of those states which by themselves would be enough to hasten our recognition. These principles have now in the message of the President of both houses, in December last, a more special application for all the states of this continent, as in that message the necessity of uniting and fighting for the defense of our rights and our territories.”

And in paragraph 15:

“You will sound the feelings of that Government as to an offensive and defensive alliance with this Empire as a part of the American continent, on the condition that such alliance does not have as a base any concession from either side, other than those which result from the general principle of mutual convenience resulting from such an alliance.”

[Page 119]

Thus Brazil, from the first days of the revolution which separated it from its mother country, considered it a particular duty to politically approach the United States of America, then adhered to the Monroe doctrine, and was almost able to conclude, on the basis of that doctrine, an offensive and defensive alliance with the “great nation of the north,” as even then the leaders of Brazilian independence called it.


The Imperial Government continued to work for the policy of closer relations and for the establishment of an alliance between the two countries. It also commenced to desire as early as 1824, and to find convenient and important for them, to give a higher character to their mutual diplomatic representatives.

In a dispatch of September 15, 1824, Carvalho e Mello said to our representative in Washington:

“Certainly the nations of that hemisphere (those of Europe) will not cease trying to prevent and to cry down a union and alliance which we may make with the Government of the United States, thus forming a totally American policy, which will make them beware of the results which may spring therefrom. On account of this His Imperial Majesty desires your honor to suggest to that Government to give a grade of minister plenipotentiary, with the resulting powers, to Mr. Condy Raguet, who is already here, or to any other person, a measure which will help to confirm the recognition. His Imperial Majesty also charges your honor to propose an alliance for the purpose of conserving and strengthening the liberty of American powers. Your honor will for the present limit yourself to learn the conditions under which those States may desire to take an active part in such an alliance and give an account as soon as possible by the adopted channels of what in that respect may be said to you. In this respect I refer you to the instructions which were given you, recalling the speech of the President of the United States there mentioned (the Monroe message of 1823) in which the same President clearly states that those States will not permit the mother countries to make efforts to regain their ex-colonies and in addition, will not permit the intervention of other powers, a principle which has been admitted by the British Government * * *.”

On the 28th of January of 1825 the same minister wrote:

“I have received the order from His Majesty, the Emperor, to recommend to your honor to make all possible efforts to persuade that Government of the necessity of making an offensive and defensive alliance with the Brazilian Government as soon as possible. Your honor will always bear in mind what was instructed you in this respect, as much in your instructions as principally in my dispatch of September 15 last. You honor must nevertheless understand that in the negotiations nothing must be definitely decided, leaving everything ad referendum, so that the Imperial Government may never be obliged, neither by civility nor condescension, but may deliberate with perfect liberty, what it considers just.”

And he added on the 14th of May of the same year 1825:

“I have received and have brought to the presence of His Majesty, the Emperor, the dispatch No. 14, which your honor sent me under date of January 26 of the current year, and the same gentleman saw what you had accomplished to have a diplomat named at this court, and as much through what your honor states as by the reading of an American newspaper which appeared here at a date previous to that of your dispatch, it is seen that Condy Raguet was in fact appointed with the grade of chargé d’affaires; the reason therefore was because your honor holds the same rank. Nevertheless your honor will insist with polite and solid reasons that a minister plenipotentiary be appointed not only out of a consideration for the dignity of the Empire, but also because there have already been American ministers of that class here. Your honor should not cease to insinuate that it is for that Government to first appoint a person of that category, as it has recognized the Empire and that is a consequence of such recognition. Your honor will also assure that Government that His Majesty, the Emperor, will in that case immediately appoint a person of the same rank.”

“As to the prospects of a treaty of alliance, you should proceed in conformity with your instructions and former dispatches, and it is my duty, in view of the action of your honor in that respect, to tell you that it did not please His Majesty, the Emperor, that your honor proposed the idea to include the other States which were formed from Spanish colonies, about which nothing has been [Page 120] mentioned to you in the above-named instructions, nor was it convenient to involve us generally with those same States, without their having special relations with us.”


On the 28th of January, 1825, Rebello proposed in writing the desired alliance to Adams, the latter having said to him on the 22d:

“What you have just told me will be brought to the knowledge of the President, but, in order that it may be done conveniently you must send me all this in a note, on the receipt of which the President will decide what the Government will consider best.” (Dispatch of January 26, 1825, No. 14, from the legation of Brazil at Washington.)

Here are the essential paragraphs of the note which on the 28th of January, 1825, Bebello directed to the Secretary of State Adams, and which began by a reference to the Monroe message of 1823:

“The Government of Brazil being convinced that the declaration made by the President of the United States in the message of His Excellency the President on the first session of the Eighteenth Congress was true, in which message it was said that relative to those countries in America which had declared their independence and maintained it and which independence this Government had recognized, founded on profound reasoning and principles of justice, this Government could not impartially see any interference with the purpose of oppressing or diminishing, in whatever way it be, the destinies of the same by whatever European power, but as a declaration of hostile sentiments to the United States; and therefore, it is to be hoped that the above European powers, enlightened by the true ideas which all Governments should entertain about the justice and principles on which Brazil based its independence, will not interfere in the questions which it has with Portugal; nevertheless as men are accustomed to do wrong and those governments are made up of men, and, as it is possible that some of the same powers might wish to help exhausted Portugal to recolonize Brazil, for which it so greatly strives; and as in such circumstances the Government of the United States must put into practice the principles of the policy set forth in the above-mentioned message, giving proofs of the generosity and feeling with which it is animated, which can not be done without the sacrifice of men and capital; and it not being in conformity with reason, justice, and law that the Government of Brazil should gratuitously receive such sacrifices, it (Brazil) is ready to enter with the Government of the United States into a convention which has for an object the uplifting of the Brazilian independence in the event of any power helping Portugal in its vain and useless projects for the recolonization of Brazil.

* * * * * * *

“The same reason which moved the Government of Brazil to hope that the Government of the United States may propose the terms of the convention above offered influences directly for it to hear from the Government of the United States the conditions under which it may wish to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Government of Brazil * * *.”

The answer to this note was given after James Monroe had passed the Presidency over to his successor, John Quincy Adams.

The new Secretary of State, Henry Clay, in the note of April 16, 1825, expressed himself as follows:

* * * * * *

“The President of the United States adheres to the principles of his predecessor exactly as they are formulated in his message of December 2 to the American Congress. But, not being in conformity with your first question, as there does not seem to be any probability at present of Portugal trying to obtain the help of other powers to recolonize Brazil, there does not appear to be any need for a convention founded on that improbable contingency. On the contrary, the President sees with pleasure the clear signs of an early peace between Portugal and Brazil, based on Brazilian independence, which the Government of the United States was the first to recognize. Declining, therefore, to enter into arrangements for the proposed convention, I have, nevertheless, the pleasure to say that you may assure your Government that the desires of the President are not the result of any weakness in the interest which the United States have constantly shown for the establishment of the independence of Brazil, but are only the result of the absence of circumstances which would be necessary to justify the signing of such a convention. If, in the course of [Page 121] events, it be noticed that the European allies might renew demonstrations of attacks on the independence of the American States, the President will give to this new situation of things all the consideration which its importance may demand.

“Relative to your second proposition for an offensive and defensive treaty of alliance to repel any invasion of Brazilian territory by forces of Portugal, I shall say that this also is unnecessary, since there are reasons for hoping for an approaching peace. Also, such a treaty would be contrary to the policy which the United States has up to now followed. According to this policy, the United States remains neutral, extending its friendship and showing justice to both parties as long as the war limits itself to a struggle between the mother country and its former colonies. From this line of conduct this Goevrnment did not deviate during the whole long period in which Spain fought with the different states which arose on the former Spanish territories of America. If an exception were made now for the first time, the sentiments of justice of your sovereign would cause him easily to admit that the other new governments would have some cause for complaint against the United States.

“Regretting that these considerations of a political order—which the United States feel themselves obliged to respect—do not permit this Government to now enter upon the negotiation of the two treaties now suggested, I have, nevertheless, great satisfaction in agreeing with you in the convenience of permanently uniting our two nations in the bonds of friendship, peace, and commerce. With this intent, I am authorized to tell you that the United States are willing to conclude with Brazil a treaty of peace, amity, navigation, and commerce and wish to adopt, as a basis for the mutual regulations of commerce and navigation between the two countries, principles of equity and perfect reciprocity. If you have the necessary powers to negotiate such a treaty, I shall have great pleasure in entering with you upon the examination and discussion of its clauses on whatever date may be convenient to both of us * * *.”

The treaty of amity, navigation, and commerce between the two powers was signed in the city of Rio de Janeiro on December 12, 1828, by the two plenipotentiaries of Brazil, Counselor Marquis of Aracaty, minister for foreign affairs, and Miguel de Souza Mello e Alvm, minister of marine, and by the plenipotentiary of the United States, William Tudor.


We shall add to the already transcribed documents the following extract, very significant, from a dispatch of the Marquis of Aracaty, minister for foreign affairs, sent on April 6, 1827, to our representative in Washington.

“And in this respect, while your honor is in conference with the respective minister, you will endeavor to make him believe that His Majesty, the Emperor of Brazil, in his high-minded and well-calculated policy, knows very well what that nation is and what it is worth, and how much it is to the interest of both countries for their respective Governments to especially tighten their political relations and to mutually shake their hands.”


After treating of the recognition of our independence by the Government of Washington, Pereira Pinto says:

“Since the relations of good friendship between Brazil and the United States have been thus cemented, they have always continued on a basis of perfect cordiality, as several slight incidents or conflicts occurring at different times have not altered it in any form. * * *”

The author refers to discreditable incidents caused by the diplomatic representatives of the United States in Brazil—Condy Raguet in 1827, Wise in 1846, and Webb after 1863—as well as the offense made our sovereignty by Commander Collins, of the cruiser Wachusetts by the capture of the corsair Florida in 1864, in the waters of Bahia. The American Government in the three first cases disapproved the conduct of their agents and substituted them by others who by their contrast with them, knew how to cause to be forgotten the faults and the insolence of their immediate predecessors; in the case of the Wachusetts it gave us promptly an honorable satisfaction.

We cite further Pereira Pinto to show what always was among us the dominant thought at the time of the Empire: “Making an ardent prayer for the consolidation of our alliance with the United States by means of a sincere and [Page 122] enlightened policy, may the reader consent that we transcribe in these papers some impressions which in this regard we wrote in the Correio Mercantil of April 7 of this year.

* * * * * * *

“No reason can be suggested to make us quarrel with the United States. Our interests in America are similar; they consume to a great extent our great product; they therefore ought to be our natural ally; and in fact they have those relations with us.

“The facts prove it.

* * * * * * *

“* * * when European mediation was spoken of to put a stop to the struggle in that country, its rulers said that the traditional policy of Monroe excluded that intervention, and that if they should come to a position to desire intervention, they would prefer that of Brazil.

“All these precedents reveal on the part of the United States the best and pronounced desire to form a more intimate alliance with Brazil, and such an alliance would have prevented (who knows?) the unjustified interference of Spain and France in the affairs of Mexico and Perú and the affronts which the powerful nations of Europe have inflicted on the weak people of the New World. Perhaps our form of government is opposed to that intimacy? We believe not. The institutions of the Empire are also democratic and the monarchial element which was added to them give brilliancy and fortify the system in force in Brazil. It is certain that in spite of that difference the liberal precepts among us are more frank and tolerant. We have no exclusions and all are able to intervene in public affairs if they possess talent and good qualities.* * *”


Tovares Bastos wrote in March, 1862 (Cartas do Solitario): “I am a mad enthusiast of England, but I only well understand the greatness of that people when I look upon that of the republic which it founded in North America. It is not enough to study England; it is necessary to know the United States. And it is from this latter country that we can obtain more practical experience as regards our agriculture and our economic situation, which have the greatest similarity with those of the Americans.

“In my opinion Brazil is more nearly approaching its moral and economic regeneration when it copies that of England, Germany, and the United States. In my cosmopolitism therefore there centers a great part of real interest for the country, the only real patriotism which I recognize.

“Do we wish to copy Europe? Let us copy the United States. The curved line is the nearest road.

“I also am a monarchist and consider that form of government as necessary to Brazil, as the republic is perfectly adapted to the social constitution, the ideas, and the tradition of North America.”

In the session of the 8th of July of the same year, 1862, in the Chamber of Deputies, Tovares Bastos expressed himself as follows:

“The ex-minister for foreign affairs has said that the relations of Brazil with the United States continue to be good and that they prosper. I am convinced that, even from the political point of view, the relations with the United States of North America are those which are most convenient to Brazil. We must cultivate them and develop them, especially because after the present struggle—a glorious struggle—because it is that of liberty against servitude, of progress against barbarity—there is reserved for the glorious Republic of Washington an incalculable part in the destinies of the world. It is not necessary to point out the reasons which unite the commerce of the two countries and the affinities between the procèsses of their agriculture, between their means of communication, and between the moral and material constitution of their population.”


Looking over the “Annals of the Brazilian Parliament” and in books, magazines, and newspapers published during the two reigns of the imperial epoch, we could multiply extracts as we have already done as a proof of the perfect understanding which, at that time, statesmen, writers, and, in general, all the men of the dominating classes in Brazil had of the advantages for us of a cordial intelligence with the United States of America.

[Page 123]

Those who in intimacy talked with the Emperor D. Pedro II know in what respect he held the same sentiments as those inspired in his father by José Bonifacio, Carvalho e Mello, and others, who in the same way as later the Viscounts de Sepetiba and of Uruguay arranged or consolidated the basis of our foreign policy. These sentiments of the second Emperor were proved by the voyage he undertook to the United States in 1876, during which, even on board ship, he took pleasure in translating the popular hymn, “Stars and Stripes,” and the haste and satisfaction with which he appointed Brazilian delegates to the first pan-American conference of 1889, at Washington.

On the other hand, to review the proofs of friendship to Brazil, of interest for its progress and prestige, and of appreciation for its Government given by the United States from 1824 till to-day, it would be necessary to lengthen far too much the extension of this article, which is principally a compilation of texts. It is enough to remember that if the French military occupation of 1836 in Amapa ceased in 1840, to this concurred the representation of the Government of the United States, backing up in Paris those of Brazil and England; that if in 1895 a second military occupation, planned by M. Lebon, minister for the colonies, did not take place, it was because M. Hanotaux, minister for foreign affairs, better advised than his colleague, knew that this was opposed to the Monroe doctrine and the interests of England; that, on the wish of the United States, Brazil appointed an arbiter, Viscount of Itajuba, to the Geneva tribunal, which settled in 1872 the American claim against England in the affair of the Alabama; that by suggestion of the Government of the United States a Brazilian, Viscount de Arinos, presided over the Franco-American arbitration tribunal which was held in Washington from 1880 to 1884; and that to the offer of good offices insinuated by some of the great European powers in a critical moment of the civil wai? of the United States President Lincoln answered that as it was an American question the respect for the Monroe doctrine did not permit him to accept any European intervention, adding that if—which was not probable—it should become necessary for the mediation of a friendly nation the interventor or arbiter naturally indicated to both sides would be the Government of Brazil.

We shall not deprive ourselves of the pleasure to reproduce here, taken from the newspapers of the time, the following translation of the essential paragraphs of the speech which an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United Staes, Richard Kidder Meade, read at the audience of December 5, 1857, in the palace of São Cristovaõ on presenting his credentials to the Emperor Dom Pedro II.

* * * * * * *

“In accrediting a minister near this Government, the United States have not only the purpose to fulfill a duty of courtesy to the greatest power of the South American Continent, but also to express its sincere desire to concur with the Imperial Government of Brazil in the maintenance of a policy which should unite forever the two countries by ties of peace and friendship, which shall give greater strength and vigor to an already growing and prosperous commerce, and which shall produce the permanent welfare, the prosperity, and the development of the power of the two countries on whose destinies depend the two great continents in which they are respectively situated.

“My Government is perfectly impressed by the points of similarity and the identity of interests which should render indissoluble the honds between the two countries and the aspirations of each of them. An equal expanse of territory of gigantic dimensions promises for the two nations a future preponderance above whatever apprehensions and should give to their position an importance due principally to their own strength.

“The similarity which in several respects exists between the constitutional organization of both is sufficient to foster political sympathies and associations promoting mutual benefits and future commercial progress; to the help which a policy common to both countries, stable and deeply rooted in their own soil (a policy which will have to combat many hostile movements abroad), will establish an alliance between both, and will insure, for mutual defense, a unity of action and feeling that will prove invincible in the future,* * *”

These feelings, manifested then and on many other occasions, are those which up to now have animated the two Governments of Washington and Rio de Janeiro, as are demonstrated by recent events, which are of public notoriety and which it would be useless to relate.

Washington has always been the principal center of intrigues and for demands for intervention against Brazil on the part of our neighbors, permanent [Page 124] rivals, or temporary adversaries. When the first diplomatic agent of Brazil arrived there in 1824 he met a South American mission which asked for the backing of the United States against us. In 1903 and 1904, during the bitterest period of our quarrels with Bolivia and Perú, they also tried to seek intervention there and made tempting offers. The ex-President Capriles, of Bolivia, confessed in a well-known paper what had been done on his order in that regard.

All the maneuvers organized against this country at Washington since 1823 till to-day have always met an invincible barrier in the old friendship which happily united Brazil and the United States and which it is the duty of the present generation to cultivate with the same strength and ardor as that with which our ancestors cultivated it.

J. Penn.