Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 6, 1904

Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay.

American Legation,
Peking, China, August 26, 1904.

No. 1692.]

Sir:

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I made the inquiry of the Chinese Government, as instructed, and warned them of the danger of any conflict at Shanghai, in a note, a copy of which I inclose, but to which I have not yet received reply. I also explained, in a personal interview with the Japanese minister, the location of the Standard Oil Company’s plant, adjacent to the dock where the Askold is lying, and the serious international complications which might arise from any conflict in the vicinity of the foreign settlements.

The Russians have consented to the Japanese demand that the two ships should be disarmed, and it is to be hoped the incident is closed, although it is rumored that, because the Russians have delayed so long, the Japanese have withdrawn the demand for disarming and will insist on the ships leaving the harbor. The Russian minister thinks this will bring on a conflict, but I do not believe the Japanese wall add another to the Chefoo mistake.

I inclose a copy of the Japanese explanation of the Chefoo incident, which has undoubtedly already been handed you by the Japanese minister in Washington.

When the Russian minister complained to the Chinese Government that the Russian consulate at Chefoo was liable to be attacked, he did not mention wireless-telegraph station, the Chinese replied that the Japanese said if they would remove the wireless-telegraph station there would be no occasion for an attack. Up to this time the Russians had persistently denied the existence of such station, but now, in order to sustain their theory of a threatened attack, they admit its existence, and attempt to justify their use of it, which, however, is rather incongruous, taken in connection with their own order to treat as spies persons using wireless telegraphy at sea.

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From recent confidential talks with the ministers of the Wai-Wu Pu I am satisfied that the Chinese Government, so far as its knowledge of international law and precedents and its ability to execute and enforce it are concerned, is doing its best to preserve a strict neutrality, and if it fails it will be on account of unauthorized acts of its provincial or military officials or of unjustifiable proceedings of one or both of the belligerents.

I have noted carefully your telegraphic instructions to Consul-General Goodnow about committing himself to any theory or scheme for international guaranty of, or to give effect to, Chinese neutrality, and had myself previously telegraphed him to take no action in this direction without instructions from the Department or the legation.

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I have, etc.,

E. H. Conger.

[Inclosure 1.]

Mr. Conger to Prince Ch’ing.

American Legation, Peking, August 23, 1904.

Your Imperial Highness:

I have the honor to call the attention of Your Imperial Highness to the fact that it is reported that the Russian cruiser Askold is in dock adjacent to the plant of the Standard Oil Company in Shanghai. This property would be greatly endangered by a conflict with said cruiser in its present location. In fact, very large foreign interests, particularly American, would be jeopardized by any conflict in proximity to the foreign settlements.

I am therefore directed by my Government to inquire what rules of neutrality China proposes to apply in this case.

Under all the circumstances it may be impracticable for the United States to actively safeguard American properties by coercing either belligerent, but it will reserve all rights as against any party responsible for all direct or resultant injuries.

Your immediate attention is called to the importance of this matter and an early reply is requested.

I avail, etc.,

E. H. Conger.

[Inclosure 2.]

Japanese official statement in Ryeshetelni incident.

[The Ryeshetelni incident—Official statement of the position of the Japanese Government regarding the incident.]

The status of China in the present struggle is wholly unique. Nearly all military operations are being carried on within her borders. She is no party to the conflict; nevertheless her territories are partly belligerent and partly neutral. Such a condition of things, in view of international law, is an anomaly and a contradiction in this case. It is a creation of a special understanding to which the belligerents have given their support. With a view to limiting the area of hostilities in the interests of international intercourse and the general tranquillity of China, the Japanese Government engaged to respect the neurtality of China outside the regions actually involved in the war, provided the Russians made a similar engagement and carried it out in good faith. The Japanese Government considered they were precluded by the engagement from occupying or making use of for warlike purposes any territory or ports of China outside the zone which was made the theater of war, because it seemed to them that any such occupation or the use of neutral Chinese territory or ports by the Russian forces would give effect to the proviso of the Japanese engagement and justify her considering the territory and the ports so occupied as belligerent.

In other words, the Japanese Government hold China’s neutrality imperfect, applicable only to places not occupied by the armed forces of either belligerent, and that the Russians can not escape the consequences of unsuccessful war by moving their army and navy into those portions of China which were made by the arrangement conditionally neutral.

The Ryeshetelni escaped from Port Arthur and sought in Chefoo asylum from attack which her home port had ceased to afford her. Taking that step, she is guilty of a breach of the neutrality of China, as established by the agreement of the belligerents, and Japan was fully justified in regarding the harbor of Chefoo as belligerent, so far as the incident in question was concerned. With the termination of the incident the neutrality of the port is revived. The action taken by Japan in Chefoo was the direct and natural consequence of Russia’s disregard of her engagements. But it is not alone in this matter, nor alone in Chefoo, that Russia has flagrantly violated the neutrality of China and ignored her own engagements. Shortly after the investment and isolation of Port Arthur began a system of wireless telegraphy was installed between the beleagured fortress and the Russian consulate at Chefoo. That system is still in operation, notwithstanding the repeated protest of the Japanese Government.

At Shanghai, at the beginning of the war, the Russian gunboat Mandjur, in defiance of the neutrality of China, remained in the port for several weeks after receiving notice to leave the port from the Chinese authorities. She finally, after long negotiations, consented to disarmament. Again, the Russian cruiser Askold and the destroyer Grosovoi have been now in Shanghai more than a week and refuse to leave or disarm. The Japanese Government has no intention of disregarding the neutrality of China so long as it is respected by Russia, but they can not consent that Russian warships, as the result of broken engagements and violated neutrality, shall unchallenged find in the harbors of China safe refuge from capture and destruction.

The statement of the commander of the Ryeshetelni that his ship disarmed upon arrival at Chefoo is untrue. The vessel was fully armed and manned when she was visited by Lieutenant Terashima early on the morning of the 12th. But in any event disarmament would not fulfill the requirements of the neutrality regulations of China, and it was for China, not the Russians, to decide whether the alternative of disarmament was acceptable.

It has been suggested in many quarters that the present case may be compared with the case of Florida, among others. But the Japanese Government draw a clear distinction between the two events. The neutrality of Brazil was perfect and unconditional; and the port of Bahia was a long distance from the seat of war; whereas the neutrality of China is imperfect and conditional, and the port of Chefoo is in close proximity to the zone of military operations.

The reports of the Japanese and Russian officers who took part in the Chefoo incident agree that the Ryeshetelni was the aggressor, being the first to commence hostilities which resulted in the capture. That fact would, the Japanese Government, believes, deprive Russia of any grounds for complaint which she might possess if the lawfulness of the capture were otherwise. In this respect the present case resembles the case of the American privateer General Armstrong and the British ship Anne. The case of the Ryeshetelni is in itself of trifling moment, but it involves a principle of paramount importance. Experience has shown that China takes inadequate steps to enforce her neutrality laws. If in these circumstances the Ryeshetelni could make Chefoo harbor a refuge, then great ships of Russia might do the same and nothing would prevent those ships issuing from their retreat to attack Japan. The necessity for guarding against such an eventuality is too commanding and too overwhelming to permit the Ryeshetelni to stand as a precedent. This incident in no way affects foreign commerce or disturbs the general situation of China. It merely serves as notice to Russia that she must keep her engagements in future.