General Reyes to Mr. Hay.
Washington, December 23, 1903.
Most Excellent Sir: The Government and people of Colombia consider themselves aggrieved by that of the United States in that they are convinced that the course followed by its administration, in relation to the events that have developed and recently been accomplished at Panama, have worked deep injury to their interests.
If the matter were one of little importance, even though right were wholly on its side, my Government would not hesitate in yielding some of its advantages out of regard for the friendly relations which have happily existed without interruption between the two countries. But as the facts that have taken place affect not only valuable and valued interests, but also the independence and sovereignty of Colombia, my Government deems it its duty to remind that of the United States of the stipulation contained in section 5 of article 35 of the treaty of 1846, in force between the two countries, which reads word for word as follows:
If, unfortunately, any of the articles contained in this treaty should be violated or infringed in any way whatever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the two contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other in complaints of injuries or damages, until the said party considering itself offended shall have laid before the other a statement of such injuries or damages, verified by competent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, and the same shall have been denied, in violation of the laws and of international right.
On formulating the statement of “injuries and damages,” referred to in the quoted abstract, there is nothing as natural or just as to recall to mind that in the treaty concluded on the 22d of January of this year between your excellency and the chargé d’affaires of Colombia, Señor Doctor Tomás Herrera, there appears the following stipulation:
The convention when signed by the contracting parties shall be ratified in conformity with the laws of the respective countries, etc.
This condition, which rests at once on a correct conception of the doctrine accepted in such matters by nearly all the constitutional countries in the world, could not be foregone by Mr. Herran, since under our constitution and laws it is for the Congress to approve or disapprove the treaties signed by the Government, so that the said treaties are not valid unless the requirement has been observed, and as it likewise [Page 285] happens that under the law of nations covenants entered into with any authority that may not be competent are null, it is evident that no Colombian representative in the absence of a preexisting law conferring such authority could have signed the said convention without the above-quoted reservation. Furthermore, this formality was at the outset admitted by the American Government in the course of the negotiations that preceded the Hay-Herran convention, as shown in articles 25, 26, and 28 of the “Draft of convention” submitted by the American Administration and dated November 28, 1902. Article 25 says, textually, that the convention will be exchanged “after approval by the legislative bodies of both countries.”
The Hay-Herran convention did not take in Washington a course different from that it took at Bogotá. The parliamentary debate that took place in the Senate was so full and earnest that it was not approved until the following extraordinary sessions. And if it had been rejected the disapproval would have involved no grievance for Colombia, for if the mere entering upon negotiations for a convention implied the obligatory approval of the legislative body it would be superfluous to submit it to its decision. Among the precedents of international usage that could be mentioned in this respect there may be cited the case that occurred between the same United States of America and Her Britannic Majesty, when, after the signing of the treaty intended to abrogate the convention known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, England, as I understand it, declined to accept the amendment introduced by the Senate, and her refusal delayed for some time the approval and ratification of the treaty.
It follows that the Congress of Colombia, which is vested, according to our laws, with the faculty or power to approve or disapprove the treaties concluded by the Government, exercised a perfect right when it disapproved the Hay-Herran convention. This course did not disqualify the Government for the conclusion of another treaty with the Government of your excellency; and it indeed resolved to make a proposition to that effect, and Mr. Herran, whom our minister for foreign affairs intrusted with that duty by cable, had the honor of bringing this purpose to your excellency’s knowledge. Neither did that course imply any slight toward the Government of the United States, and, on the contrary, the Senate, observant of the existing friendly relations, relied on the sentiments of American fraternity, by which it is animated, for the introduction in the new agreement that was to be made of stipulations more consonant with the notion of sovereignty entertained by the people of Colombia.
It is proper to observe that under our constitution the Congress is the principal guardian, defender, and interpreter of our laws. And it can not be denied by anyone, I take it, that the Hay-Herran convention provides for the execution of public works on a vast scale and for the occupancy in perpetuity of a portion of the territory of Colombia, the occupant being not a juridical person whose acts were to be governed by the civil law and the Colombian code, but rather a sovereign political entity, all of which would have given occasion for frequent conflicts, since there would have been a coexistence in Panama of two public powers, the one national, the other foreign.
Hence the earnest efforts evinced by the Senate in ascertaining whether the American Government would agree to accept certain amendments tending especially to avoid as far as practicable any [Page 286] restriction in the treaty of the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory. There is abundant evidence of the efforts of the Senate in that direction, and I firmly believe that it would have approved the convention with amendments that would probably have been acceptable to the United States had not the American minister at Bogotá repeatedly declared in the most positive manner that his Government would reject any amendment that might be offered.
In a note dated April 24 last he made the following statement to the minister of foreign relations:
With reference to the interview I had with your excellency at which were discussed the negotiations for the annulment of the present concessions of the Panama Canal and railroad companies and other matters I have the honor to inform your excellency that I have received instructions from my Government in that respect.
I am directed to inform your excellency, if the point should be raised, that every thing relative to this matter is included in the convention recently signed between Colombia and the United States on the 22d of January last, and that, furthermore, any modification would be violative of the Spooner Act, and therefore inadmissible.
The memorandum handed by the same minister to the minister of foreign relations on the 13th of June of this year reads as follows:
I have received instructions from my Government by cable in the sense that the Government of Colombia to all appearances does not appreciate the gravity of the situation. The Panama Canal negotiations were initiated by Colombia and were earnestly solicited of my Government for several years. The propositions presented by Colombia with slight alterations were finally accepted by us. By virtue of this agreement our Congress reconsidered its previous decision and decided in favor of the Panama route. If Colombia now rejects the treaty or unduly delays its ratification the friendly relations between the two countries would be so seriously compromised that our Congress might next winter take steps that every friend of Colombia would regret with sorrow.
In his note of the 5th of August of this year he says this, among other things:
It seems to me that the commission (referring to the Senate commission) has not been sufficiently informed of the contents of my notes of April 24 and June 10, [sic] 1903, or that it has not given them the importance they merit, as being the final expression of the opinion or intentions of my Government. They clearly show that the amendment the commission proposes to introduce in article 1 is, by itself, equivalent to an absolute rejection of the treaty. I deem it my duty to repeat the opinion I already expressed to your excellency that my Government will not consider or discuss such an amendment in any way. There is another important amendment that the commission believes should be introduced in article 3, consisting in the suppression of the tribunals therein dealt with. I consider it my duty again to state my opinion that this will also in no wise be accepted by my Government.
And further, in the same note, he adds:
I avail myself of this opportunity respectfully to repeat that which I already stated to your excellency, that if Colombia truly desires to maintain the friendly relations that at present exist between two countries, and at the same time secure for herself the extraordinary advantages that are to be produced for her by the construction of the canal in her territory, in case of its being backed by so intimate an alliance of national interests as that which would supervene with the United States, the present treaty will have to be ratified exactly in its present form without amendment whatsoever I say this because I am profoundly convinced that my Government will not in any case accept amendments.
The Congress being unable to accept in its actual wording at least one of the stipulations contained in the treaty, because inhibited from doing so by the constitution, no one will wonder that under the pressure of threats so serious and irritating and in presence of a formal [Page 287] notification from the party which had authority to serve it that no amendment would be accepted, preference was given to disapproval.
The integrity of any nation [said Mr. William H. Seward] is lost, and its fate becomes doubtful, whenever strange hands, and instruments unknown to the constitution, are employed to perform the proper functions of the people, established by the organic law of the state.a
Before dismissing this point, it is proper to observe, in accordance with article 4 of the Spooner Act:
Sec. 4. That should the President be unable to obtain for the United States a satisfactory title to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and the control of the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia and the rights mentioned in sections 1 and 2 of this act, within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, then the President, having first obtained for the United States perpetual control by treaty of the necessary territory from Costa Rica and Nicaragua, upon terms which he may consider reasonable, for the construction, perpetual maintenance, operation, and protection of a canal connecting the Caribbean Sea with the Pacific Ocean by what is commonly known as the Nicaragua route, shall, through the said Isthmian Canal Commission, cause to be excavated and constructed a ship canal and waterway from a point on the shore of the Caribbean Sea, near Greytown, by way of Lake Nicaragua, to a point near Brito, on the Pacific Ocean.
This act, on account of its having served as the basis of the treaty draft on the part of the United States, as stated in the preamble, which adds that it is accompanied by a copy of the act, had for Colombia exceptional importance. For it is so imperative that it seems to leave no faculty other than that of selecting one of the two routes, Panama or Nicaragua, and therefore it was to be presumed that the action of the American Government could not overstep the limits therein fixed. Whence it follows that the sole evil that could befall Colombia if her Congress should disapprove the treaty was that the route eventually selected would be that of Nicaragua. It may be that we fell in error when we entertained that belief, but it was sincere, and we were led into it by the profound respect with which the American laws inspire us.
All governments being, as is well known, bound to respect the rights born of the independence and sovereignty of nations, the premature recognition by the United States of the province of Panama, rising in arms to detach itself from the country of which it is a part, while it is a matter of public knowledge that the mother country commands sufficient forces to subdue it, constitutes, according to the most ancient and modern authorities on international law, not only a grave offense to Colombia, but also a formal attack upon her wealth.
For, as the territory forms the most important part of the national wealth, its dismemberment impairs the revenues applied to the discharge of corporate obligations, among which are foreign debts and those enterprises entailed on the insurgent province, from which Colombia derives a considerable income.
If there be an end and eternal and immutable principles in right, that right of Colombia has been injured by the United States by an incredible transgression of the limits set by equity and justice.
Before the coup de main which proclaimed the independence of the Isthmus took place at Panama, there were in this very city agents of the authors of that coup in conference with high personages clothed with official character, as is asserted by reputable American newspapers. I have received information to the effect that a bank in New [Page 288] York opened a considerable credit in their favor, with a knowledge of the general use for which it was intended, even though unaware that it was to be applied in part to the bribery of a large part of the garrison at Panama.
Intercourse of any kind [said Mr. Seward] with the so-called “commissioners” is liable to be construed as a recognition of the authority which appointed them. Such intercourse would be none the less hurtful to us for being called unofficial, and it might be even more injurious, because we should have no means of knowing what points might be resolved by it. Moreover, unofficial intercourse is useless and meaningless if it is not expected to ripen into official intercourse and direct recognition.a
It will be well to say that before the news was divulged that a revolution was about to break out on the Isthmus, American cruisers which reached their destination precisely on the eve of the movement were plowing the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Cablegrams that are given public circulation in an official document show that two days before the movement the Secretary of the Navy issued orders to those cruisers not to permit the landing of troops of the Government of Colombia on Panama’s territory.
A military officer of the Government of the United States stopped the railway from carrying to Panama, as it was under obligations to do, a battalion that had just arrived at Colon from Bogotá at the very time when its arrival in that city would have impeded or suppressed any revolutionary attempt. A few days thereafter, when my Government intrusted me with the duty of leading the army that was to embark at Puerto Colombia to go and restore order on the Isthmus, being unacquainted except in an imperfect manner with the attitude assumed by the American war ships, I had the honor to address a note on the subject to Vice-Admiral Coghlan, and in his repby, which was not delayed, he tells me that—
his present orders are to prevent the landing of soldiers with hostile intent within the boundary of the State of Panama.
The Republic of Colombia, with a population of 5,000,000 souls, is divided into nine departments, of which Panama is one of the least populous, as the number of its inhabitants does not exceed 250,000, while there are others in each of which they number over 900,000. The Colombian army at the time consisted of 10,000 men, a force more than sufficient to suppress the Panaman revolution if Your Excellency’s Government had not prevented the landing of the troops under my command that were to embark at Puerto Colombia under Generals Ospina, Holguín, and Calballero, who soon thereafter accompanied me to that city, and at Buenaventura, on the Pacific, under Generals Velazco, Dominguez, and others. It is known that there is no overland way to reach Panama with troops from the interior of Colombia.
The gravity of the facts contained in this recital increases as they draw closer to the end.
In the midst of profound peace between the two countries, the United States prevented by force the landing of troops where they were necessary to reestablish order, in a few hours, in the insurgent province. Because of this circumstance, and as a coup de main, certain citizens of Panama, without taking into account the consent of the other towns of the department, proclaimed the independence of the [Page 289] Isthmus and organized a government. Two days after effecting that movement they were recognized by the American Government as a sovereign and independent republic, and fourteen days later the American Government signed a treaty with the Republic of Panama which not only recognized and guaranteed its independence, but agreed to open a canal for the purpose of uniting the waters of the Atlantic with those of the Pacific.
It is well known that the contract which Colombia made with the French company, in the exercise of its perfect right, for the construction of this canal, is in force and will remain in full force and vigor, legally at least, so long as Colombia does not give her consent for its transfer to a foreign government; since in the aforesaid contract it is expressly stipulated that a transfer to any foreign government, or any attempt whatever to make a transfer, would be cause for absolute nullification.
The same is true with regard to the Panama Railroad Company; so that, without the express consent of Colombia, no transfer can have legal effect, because it can not cancel the legal bonds which exist between the Republic of Colombia and those companies—bonds growing out of perfect contracts, which, according to the precepts of universal jurisprudence, can not be disregarded because one of the parties may consider that the strip of land in which the enterprise radicated has been conquered by a foreign country. The lapse of many years is necessary in order that the facts may establish the right, and even wdthout the need of such time elapsing the Colombians feel sure that the justice and equity which control the acts of Your Excellency’s Government in its relations with all nations are a sure pledge that our complaints and claims will be heeded.
Nor is it just to expect anything else in view of the constant practice which the United States has established in similar cases. Among many others, are set forth in its diplomatic annals the antecedent history relative to the independence of South American States, proclaimed in 1810; that of the new State of Hungary, in the middle of the last century; and that of Ireland, later, in 1866; not to make mention of the practice systematically observed by the powers, of which their procedure when the Netherlands proclaimed independence in the time of the Philips of Spain is an example. In this relation the precedent of Texas, when the United States Senate disapproved the treaty signed by the Washington Cabinet with the secessionists of that Mexican province, has an especial significance.
In the note of Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, to Mr. Adams, United States minister, in 1861, this doctrine is found:
We freely admit that a nation may, and even ought, to recognize a new State which has absolutely and beyond question effected its independence, and permanently established its sovereignty; and that a recognition in such a case affords no just cause of offense to the government of the country from which the new State has so detached itself. On the other hand, we insist that a nation that recognizes a revolutionary State, with a view to aid its effecting its sovereignty and independence, commits a great wrong against the nation whose integrity is thus invaded, and makes itself responsible for a just and ample redress. (Foreign Relations, 1861, pp. 76–77.)
At another point, in the same note, the Secretary says to the minister:
To recognize the independence of a new State, and so favor, possibly determine, its admission into the family of nations, is the highest possible exercise of sovereign [Page 290] power, because it affects in any case the welfare of two nations, and often the peace of the world. In the European system this power is now seldom attempted to be exercised without invoking a consultation or congress of nations. That system has not been extended to this continent. But there is even a greater necessity for prudence in such cases in regard to American States than in regard to the nations of Europe. (Foreign Relations, 1861, p. 79, Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, No. 2, April 10, 1861.)
Referring to the consideration which nations should mutually observe, he adds:
Seen in the light of this principle, the several nations of the earth constitute one great federal republic. When one of them casts its suffrages for the admission of a new member into that republic, it ought to act under a profound sense of moral obligation, and be governed by considerations as pure, disinterested, and elevated, as the general interest of society and the advancement of human nature. (Foreign Relations, 1861, p. 79, Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, No. 2, April 10, 1861.)
It would seem that nothing could be added to the benevolence of these noble and humanitarian doctrines, written by the great man, who, unhappily for his country and for Colombia, is not living to-day.
If the sovereignty of a nation gives to it especially the power to govern itself; if the right to look after its own interests is an attribute of sovereignty; if, upon such right, rests the stability and security of international relations, respect for such sovereignty should be the more heeded by one who is obligated, as is the United States, not only by international precepts, but also by an existing public treaty from which it has derived indisputable advantages. The pertinent part of the thirty-fifth article of the treaty in force between the United States and Colombia reads as follows:
And, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an especial compensation for the said advantages and for the favors they have acquired by the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of this treaty, the United States guarantees, positively and efficaciously, to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United States also guarantees, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory.
It may be said that the power of the United States is for the time being limitless, not only by reason of its laws and its resources of every kind, but also on account of the respect with which its greatness inspires the world. But in order to deal justly with a weak country this circumstance should be taken into account—that, in stipulating to guarantee “the perfect neutrality and property of the Isthmus,” it could not be supposed that the words “neutrality” and “property” could be given any other interpretation than the technical one they have. If, by a coup de main, the revolutionists have snatched from Colombia the property of the Isthmus, it seems natural that the United States, in view of the aforesaid stipulation, should return the property to its legitimate owner. It does not seem right to give the word “neutrality” the interpretation that, by its application, the acts of the revolutionists shall be left free, because, among other reasons, the stipulation contained in the thirty-fifth article above quoted excepts no case; nor did it foresee, as it could not have foreseen, that the United States would prevent Colombia from landing her forces in Panama territory in case of secession.
If Colombia had not sufficient force to compel Panama to remain a [Page 291] part of the national unit, it would, without doubt, have asked the mediation of some friendly country in order to reach an understanding with the de facto government which has been established there.
But for it to have been able to subdue it by force it was necessary that Your Excellency’s Government should remain neutral in the dispute; in not having done so, your Government itself violated the rights of sovereignty and the property which Colombia has and possesses over the said territory,” not complying, consequently, with the obligation it contracted to guarantee those rights as set forth in the above-cited part of the thirty-fifth article of the treaty. And it may be observed that the United States continues deriving the advantages granted under the treaty, while we lose those which we gave in order to obtain such guaranties.
The true character of the new State of Panama is revealed in the fact that it came into existence by a coup de main, effected by the winning over of troops, valorous without doubt, but who have fought against no one, assaulted no intrenchment, captured no fort—contenting themselves with putting in prison the constituted authorities.
If conserving our national integrity, with a few years of peace we could recover the powers we have lost through unfortunate civil wars and could hope, by reason of the moral and physical capacity of our race, to take a distinguished position in the American Continent; but if the Government of the United States, by preventing the military action of Colombia to subject the rebels to royal obedience, should, in a way, make itself the ally of the Panama revolutionists, that Government will be responsible for any new secession movement that may occur, and also, before history at least, for any anarchy, license, and dissolution which a further dismemberment might occasion. Sad indeed is the fate of my country, condemned at times to suffer calamities from its own revolutions and at others to witness the unexpected attacks of a powerful but friendly state, which for the first time breaks its honored traditions of respect for right—especially the right of the weak—to deliver us pitilessly to the unhappy hazards of fortune.
There shall be a perfect, firm, and inviolable peace [says the first article of the aforesaid treaty] and sincere friendship between the United States of America and the Republic of New Granada (now Colombia) in all the extent of their possessions and territories, and between their citizens, respectively, without distinction of persons or places.
If the United States repels by force the action of our armies in Panama, is not this a clear violation of this article, since peace in one of the Colombian territorial possessions is broken?
The Panama revolutionists, counseled by speculators from several countries, who had assumed the direction of affairs, did not consult the opinion of the inhabitants of their own territory, for there are good reasons for the belief that there are in that territory thousands of persons who, respecting order and authority, have condemned the separatist movement with a determined will and in most energetic and severe terms.
Colombia, in its internal law, has never recognized the principle of secession, because, among other reasons, the obligations contracted with foreign nations by treaty, or with private parties by contract, rest upon the mass of the assets which the State possessed at the moment when the common authority contracted such obligations.
[Page 292]If the people of Panama, animated by the noble sentiments which induced men of action to seek quicker and more rapid progress, had proclaimed their independence and, without foreign aid, been victorious in battle waged against the armies of the mother country, had organized a government, drawn up laws, and proved to the world that it could govern itself by itself and be responsible to other nations for its conduct, without doubt it would have become entitled to recognition by all the powers.
But none of these things having occurred, and judging by the practice which in similar cases has guided the conduct of the American Government, the belief is warrantable that /the recognition that has been given would probably not have been made if there had not existed in Panama the best route for the isthmian canal.
In the former case Colombia would have had no right to complain of the failure to fulfill the existing treaty, nor would it have shunned any legitimate means for seeking an arrangement that should dissolve the civil bonds which unite it with those enterprises radicated on Panama territory by contracts made in the exercise of a perfect right.
But Panama has become independent, has organized a Government, has induced a few powers prematurely to recognize her sovereignty, has usurped rights which do not belong to her in any case, and has ignored the debts which weigh upon Colombia (debts contracted, many of them, to reestablish order which her sons have often disturbed), because the Government of the United States has desired it; because, with its incomparably superior force, the United States has prevented the landing of Colombian troops destined to reestablish order after our having exhausted every possible means of friendly understanding; because the United States, even before the separatist movement was known in Bogotá, had its powerful war vessels at the entrances of our ports, preventing the departure of our battalions; because, without regarding the precedents established by statesmen who have dealt with this matter, the United States has not respected our rights in that strip of land which Colombia considers as a divine bequest for the innocent use of the American family of States; and, finally, because the Government of the United States, invoking and putting into practice the right of might, has taken from us by bloodless conquest—but by conquest, nevertheless—the most important part of the national territory.
Every nation is responsible to other nations for its conduct, whence it follows that all have among themselves rights and obligations, but these rights and obligations are limited by the right of property. The owner of an estate can not oppose the passage through his land—for example, of a railroad which the community needs—but he may demand that he be indemnified for the damage done him. In the same manner a State should certainly not obstruct the passage through its territory of a canal which the progress of the age and the needs of humanity have made necessary, but it has the right to impose conditions which shall save its sovereignty and to demand indemnification for the use thereof. Reasons based on the needs of humanity are undoubtedly very powerful, but they do not convincingly prove that the legitimate owner shall be deprived of a large part of his territory to satisfy such needs. It might be said to me that exaggerated demands or obstacles which [Page 293] are intentionally raised are equivalent to a refusal. But this is not our case. Colombia has made divers treaties and contracts with foreign countries for the construction of a Panama Canal, and if they have not been carried into effect, as was the case with the treaty with the United States in 1870 and the contract with the French company later, it was not the fault of Colombia. Our demands have not been exaggerated, inasmuch as the terms of the treaty negotiated with the American representative were more advantageous than those stipulated with the French representative, and the conditions set forth in the Hay-Herran convention were much more disadvantageous than those made with the French company. The fact that the United States demands from us, in order to carry out the enterprise, a part of our sovereignty, which, under our laws, we can not legally concede so long as the constitution is not modified, because the powers that did it would be responsible before the judicial branch, does not mean that we have been opposed nor that we are opposed to the realization of the greatest undertaking of the kind which the past and future centuries have seen or will see.
Civil wars are a calamity from which no nation has ever been able to free itself. This being true, to hold responsible the Government which suffers revolutions because it can not prevent them or because it hastens to remedy them when danger menaces seems a notorious injustice, because, if the principle of foreign intervention in civil conflicts were accepted, there would be few cases that would not be converted in the end into international wars. To refrain from dealing or treating with a State for fear of civil wars might be deemed equivalent to refraining from “constructing ships for fear of shipwrecks or building houses for fear of fire.” Nor is it understood what power there would be that would assume the unhappy task imposing peace upon the rest, nor under what conditions it would do so, since to take away portions of their territory would be a punishment greater than the fault.
In this crisis of the life of my country, as unlooked for as it is terrible, Colombia rests its most comforting hopes in the sentiments of justice which animate the Government of your excellency, and confidently trusts that that Government, which has so many times surprised the world by its wisdom, will, on this occasion, astonish it by its example.
In any event, Colombia complies with the duty imposed upon her by the treaty of 1846 in that part of the 35th article which says:
* * * neither of the two contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other on complaints of injuries or damages, until the said party considering itself offended shall have laid before the other a statement of such injuries or damages, verified by competent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, and the same shall have been denied, in violation of the laws and of international right.
Since the aforesaid treaty is the law which governs between the two countries, and now that the weakness and ruin of my country, after three years of civil war scarcely at an end, and in which her bravest sons were lost by thousands, place her in the unhappy position of asking justice of the Government of your excellency, I propose that the claims which I make in the present note on account of the violation of the aforesaid treaty, and all other claims which may hereafter be made in connection with the events of Panama, be submitted to the Arbitration Tribunal of The Hague.
[Page 294]With sentiments of the most distinguished consideration and high esteem, I have the honor to subscribe myself.
Your excellency’s very obedient and faithful servant,
Hon. John Hay,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D.
C.
- See p. 109, F. R., 1861, Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.—Translator.↩
- Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, No. 10, May 21, 1861.—Translator.↩