Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903
Mr. Thompson to Mr. Hay.
Petropolis, April 16, 1903.
Sir: Believing that it may be of interest to the Department, I inclose herewith a copy and translation of an editorial appearing in the principal opposition newspaper of Rio, which criticises the action of the Argentine Government in regard to the Monroe doctrine, and elaborates views as to the attitude which ought to be taken by South America toward that doctrine, which are very generally held among certain classes of Brazilians.
I have, etc.,
Editorial from the Correio da Martha, of Rio de Janeiro, of March 30, 1903.
the monroe doctrine.
The note directed by the Argentine chancellery to the United States of America seems to us a very good illustration of the extent to which, in this grave period of our international life, some of the statesmen of Latin America are being misled. It is certain that that error gives us the measure of the way in which, perhaps in all the South American countries, public opinion studies events and judges anomalous situations which in many parts of the continent the mistakes and wrongdoings of the governments are creating. The case of Venezuela, the most recent and of the most positive eloquence as a notice to the nations of South America, caused a kind of chorus of clamoring or of protests to explode that had been lying dormant in certain Americans who, with respect to the great power at the North, live forever midway between fear of the expansionist policy of Washington and the plaintive desire and request for Yankee tutelage.
Unquestionably there has fallen upon the Argentine Republic a great responsibility from now on into the future. The responsibility in diplomatic history for the movement which is operating, or at least for the manifestations which are going on in almost all the Republics of Iberic origin in relation to the United States of America, will devolve upon Argentine statesmen. It is not only now, on the occasion of the original and very deplorable note to the North American Government, that the Argentine Republic has shown itself to be impatient to give proofs that it was not satisfied with any role but that of being among the first in the international relations of the continent. When a short time ago England and Germany did not hesitate to use force against the Caracas Government, the Argentine Republic even then, judging from the dispatches from Buenos Aires in the press of the whole world, showed certain veiled desires to intervene in the alarming conflict; upon seeing that the United States crossed their arms before the insolent aggression, the Argentine Government did not hesitate to direct itself to Venezuela, offering it generously resources that would rehabilitate it and cure promptly the evils and afflictions of that terrible emergency. There is evident in that beautiful stroke the insinuation of indirect [Page 25] censure of the attitude of the United States, in other respects very correct and perhaps more than ingenious, because they greatly served the Government of Caracas. Not satisfied with the insignificant result obtained, the Argentine Republic now has stirred itself up to provoke the North American Government to a more positive and formal declaration of the Monroe doctrine.
In the first place, the Buenos Aires chancellery commits an infraction of international etiquette in taking the responsibility of such an important initiative without the knowledge of any of the other South American Republics. Nor can the right of the Argentine Republic be recognized to thus present itself to the Washington Government, speaking in the name of collective interests, when it is certain that those interests are not understood by us all as they are being interpreted by the Argentines.
But what really surprises us, because it exceeds everything which might have been expected of the high pretensions which the Plata Republic is revealing is the informality, the audacity with which it did not hesitate to make one more play in the open road of Monroeism. The note directed to the Washington Government suggests or proposes that the colossus of the north shall take the responsibility of affirming definitely the Monroe doctrine and (what is unbelievable as an expression of boldness in the diplomatic field) proceeds to the extent of indicating one of the points which the Argentines would like to see clearly stated and settled—namely, that foreign intervention in South America as a means, or as a coercive measure, for collecting debts should be declared illegitimate and not allowable. It is really astonishing, this courage of the Argentine Government. And what is even more astonishing is that for that very fall from grace it finds applause in two or three capitals of the continent. How is it that one of the noblest of American nations could thus suddenly put aside the traditions of manliness with which its history is full? How can that eclipse of the conscience be explained in a people which has always had a clean record and which has always known how to be dignified and to defend heroically its independence as a sovereign nation? How can we believe, without sharp disillusionment, that the Argentines, like all Americans, so sensitive always on points of national honor; that the Argentines, one of the people who are found to be in the vanguard of American civilization, how are we to believe it was that people who bestirred themselves thus to making a request which was troublesome to the Government addressed and humilitating for all Latin Americans?
We do not believe we are exaggerating the gravity of this thoughtless act. But we admit the Argentine Republic obeyed impulses which are justifiable in view of the not very tranquil disposition that some European governments are revealing. Yes, because it is undeniable that in the minds of Americans, principally those of the South, there is working almost an alarm against the way some of the great powers of the Old World have of interpreting international law. And above all the alarm has grown since the recent events in Venezuela. The Argentine Government should, however, have taken a different road. Its noble action would then, perhaps, have been more effective.
We are not of the number of those who deceive themselves with regard to the great advantages of the often planned alliance of South American nations as a means of resistance to the invasions which would be owed to imperialism. It is easy to understand how, in other respects, such an alliance would give us the means of strengthening the ties of sympathy and moral solidity which already exist between us. As a means, however, of guaranteeing our integrity and common defense that alliance would accomplish nothing, and it is probable would never pass beyond simple Utopia. Only those could believe in such a dream (already destroyed at Tecubaya, and in an hour very different from the present) who misunderstand the situation of the nations of the continent. That which simple good sense counsels us is to hope nothing from artificial and illusory agreements. Peoples, like individuals, are judged and do justice to other peoples according to the discreetness with which they conduct themselves; according to the prudence, firmness, and wisdom of the men who lead them; in proportion to the economic progress which gives them strength and independence, and above all as they possess that great virtue born of the sentiment of duty and the consciousness of destiny, worth more perhaps than riches—that heroic moral courage of being dignified on all occasions. There is nothing like being right and being honest. Because, as a matter of fact, whenever we speak of European pretentions we tend to exaggerate and see everything through a false prism. What Europe wants is to open markets. The great problem for her is the economic question, the source of all the pains which afflict that ancient, dying society. Except in Africa, conquests to-day are difficult; and how many European nations are there who would not congratulate themselves on the fortunate day on which they could relieve themselves of some of their possessions, retaining only their commercial advantages. That is to say, what we should do above all is study the most natural means of exchanging interests with Europe. As long as we limit this to obtaining loans in [Page 26] London and to buying in Hamburg we will not cease to occupy that relationship to her which always exists between debtors and creditors.
Another truth which we also forget is the spirit of patience, at times amounting to forbearance, of the European creditor. This is the natural spirit of all sensible creditors. They understand that their interests are bound up with those of their debtors. We might cite many examples of the good will with which European capitalists accede to all the reasonable demands of our governments. Why should we then be always so suspicious toward these men of affairs? Is it not true that they would have the right to say to us, “Why did you then ask of us our money?”
There is nothing like having right on our side. Instead of hatred toward the capitalist after we have got possession of the borrowed money we should have the good judgment either not to borrow at all or scrupulously fulfill our obligations and not give the slighest pretext for disputes and coercive measures by stronger governments. This would be worth much more to us than all the fictitious coalitions we may have planned. If we had only taken home to ourselves the thought that to be in the right is the best thing—better even than possessing cannons—Brazil, for example, would not be to-day in the very complicated position in which she finds herself, due in great measure to the irregularities which exhausted the country, principally, after the Republic. Besides being already burdened with tremendous debts, the twenty former provinces, converted into independent governments with the name of states, were handed over to incapable and selfish men who are devoting themselves to the only certainly profitable business that survived the deluge—borrowing. The instant they hear the European banker jingling the sovereigns they shut their eyes and accept any conditions. When the obligations have to be met, they either make new loans, which each time become, more burdensome to the poor country, or they appeal to the federal coffers. And the federal coffers, when once they are opened how are they to be closed? And on the day when they have to be closed, after they are drained to the last cent, what is to be done with the European creditor? And, finally, to complete all this, we will have a “Sorocabana” case, another “Oeste de Minas” case, and yet other cases, each one a more eloquent witness than the last to our sins. But we ask, Would continental alliances perchance possess the miraculous power of remedying the evils that naturally flow from such aberrations and vices?
On the whole, although it is true that false conclusions do not advance the solution of the problem of our defense, nevertheless we can not doubt that some profit would be derived from measures of another kind, founded upon a general understanding among Americans. For example, instead of invoking the Monroe doctrine (clearly a mere fiction in international law), we might establish, by a collective note to the powers of Europe that no case arising out of the rights of subjects of foreign nations shall be discussed diplomatically before being submitted to the courts of the country where it arose. This is possible, as the legal principle involved is a perfectly acceptable one, although Europe has almost forgotten it, partly because she abuses her strength, but also because she has been encouraged by our own negligence. Such an agreement would be of much greater value to us than alliances full of expressions of platonic friendship but devoid of positive significance, or at least without the positive advantages which such an agreement would, tend to assure to us.
To appeal, however, to the North American Government, as the Argentine has just done, in the hope that the former will reiterate and accentuate in the form of a definite promise and reduce to a formula of international law a fragment of a note given out eighty years ago by the Washington Government, and up to the present time regarded as a pure eccentricity of the kind for which America has become the classic source, really proves that the Government so doing has no notion of the juridical rules obtaining among modern peoples, that it is not acquainted with the actual conditions surrounding the nations of the world, and, finally, that it has a very superficial view of the nature of the relations that can be maintained between nations without peril to their sovereignty and without injury to their honor or even to their simple national dignity.
The Monroe doctrine as such has no value whatever. At best it is simply another document for the benefit of those who would determine the characteristic psychology of the North American. Such a doctrine passes not only for a work very original and very Yankee, but also as being without substance as a whole. The Government of the United States can invoke it and put it into force when it is to its advantage to do so and whenever it is able to give to the formula the unanswerable validity and strength of cannons. And even for this purpose it might well be dispensed with. Without the support of Monroeism the great powers of Europe exercise the same “rights” (those of force) whenever they can and on all the seas of the world.
Further, it can not help being detrimental to the peoples of South America to invoke that doctrine, even outside the cases which the Argentine chancellery wished to see specified—those with regard to the collection of debts. Such a principle [Page 27] becomes for us South Americans somewhat paternal, and for that very reason incompatible with the sovereignty of each of us, whenever it does not express an explicit agreement, validated by all the countries in whose favor it pretends to operate. By no means does it possess the breadth which it claims nor has it the force of a rule of this continent, since a government, by itself, can not arrogate to itself the right of assuming obligations in relation to foreign peoples whose existence, destiny, and interests, as a consequence of their sovereignty, does not depend upon any other power. The Government of the United States, consequently, is not competent to impose bases of international policy, and much less to institute principles of law capable of coming into force in all America without the accord of all the nations interested. What value then in the diplomatic world can a phrase known by the name of President Monroe have?
If the United States, as the strongest nation on the continent, believe, as a matter of fact, that it would be to the interests of all the American peoples to effectively prevent the intrusions of Europe; if the Government of the United States is sincere, as we believe it is, then let it do with all the American republics what one government may do with another; let it celebrate with us any treaties which it considers would be useful, with the idea of preserving forever interests which it recognizes as peculiar to the nations of America. Thus, if the protest of Monroe were reduced to a diplomatic formula, and consequently to a form having the character of reciprocity, the conceit or protest of Monroe would be that of us all, it would be in its fullness a regulating principle of our common action in given emergencies, and this notwithstanding it would not be incorporated in the law ruling our international relations with the old world; that is to say, to the extent that the great powers of Europe would not recognize it.
But as a North American doctrine, created and interpreted exclusively by the Government at Washington, and by that Government—through its sovereign criterion— exclusively applied, what we, nations of South America, should do is not admit any such doctrine and treat it, moreover, as if it did not exist, as the statesmen of the Plata, as a matter of fact, and others principally wish. We ought not to talk any more about that doctrine. Our feelings of delicacy as a nation, our juridic conscience, our perception of our sovereignty repel that doctrine thus disfigured and converted into an easy means for complications; that doctrine in whose circle in this part of the world live so many leaders and so many Chauvinistic patriots.