Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay.
Bogotá, September 11, 1903.
Sir: I have the honor to report that events of interest have taken place in connection with the appointment of Senator Obaldia to the post of governor of the department of Panama.
Senator Obaldia’s separatist tendencies are well known, and he is reported to have said that, should the canal treaty not pass, the department of Panama would declare its independence, and would be right in doing so. That these are his opinions there is, of course, no doubt, as I stated in my telegram to the Department of August 31, 1903.
At yesterday’s session of the Senate the feeling of opposition to Señor Obaldia’s appointment was given expression by a resolution proposed by Senator Perez y Soto, to the effect that—
The Senate of the Republic can not see with indifference the appointment which has been made for the post of governor of the department of Panama which it regards as a menace to the safety of the Republic.
This resolution was amended by omitting the reference to the governorship of Panama in particular, and made to include all administrative posts held under the Government.
In this form it passed with an almost unanimous vote.
The debate itself, though short, for it lasted under two hours, was one of the most important that has yet taken place in open session. As I telegraphed yesterday, it was nothing more or less than a direct vote of censure.
It was said that Obaldia’s appointment could have one, and only one, explanation: That he was “sent to the isthmus to make necessary preparations for the presidential election; and that other similar appointments had been made with the same end in view—such as that of insignares to the Department of Bolivar.
The speakers showed greater heat than I have yet known them to evince in this Congress. It seemed to be the general opinion that the Government was prostituting the general interests of the country for purposes of electioneering intrigue.
Gen. Pedro Nel Ospina, in a passionate and much applauded speech, warned the Government that should it persist in its present course, exhausted as the county was, a fresh revolution was not far distant.
The notable feature in the debate was the general spirit of hostility shown toward the Government, both by the Senators themselves and by the public assembled in the gallery and round the lobbies. With the exception of one Senator there was not a speaker who did not bitterly and uncompromisingly denounce the Government. When Senator Marroquin, the son of the President, rose to defend the action of the Government, he was greeted with hisses from all parts of the house, and hisses and jeers accompanied him throughout his speech. There was absolutely no sympathy for him nor for his position.
It is evident, I think, that a cross current was at work during the debate. It was initiated by an opponent of the canal and a believer in the integrity of Colombia against the appointment of a Panamaian who ardently supported the canal, and who, if forced to accept an alternative, would rather see the isthmus independent than lose the chance of seeing the canal built through his department, The opponent [Page 194] of the canal scheme carried the house with him, but he gained their support, not in virtue of his attitude on the canal question, but because his resolution opened the door to a general attack on the Government.
It really begins to appear that the majority of the senate care little about the canal, except in so far as that subject ministers to their own political ends.
During yesterday’s session the senators were presented with a document published by Senator Perez y Soto, protesting against the appointment of Senator Obaldia to Panama. The large portion of this publication consists of a copy of a letter addressed to the President on the subject. Treating of the canal in this letter, the following significant passage occurs:
When we (Perez y Soto and the President) again met, in December (1902), my first care was to entreat you to allow nothing to be signed—nothing at the time pending with the American Government—for by knowing how to wait we might be able to obtain greater advantages in the canal treaty. You answered me that the Government could very well allow the treaty to be signed, leaving it to Congress to make such modifications as it might see fit. I then observed to you that even that was a dangerous course to pursue, because with the Americans there was no playing. I said that you did not escape responsibility by making concessions ad referendum.
I have no reason to doubt the Senator’s veracity, and his statement brings vividly to mind the predictions I made in my No. 6 of April 15, 1903, to the effect that when the President ordered the treaty to be signed he anticipated amendments, and indulged in the hope of having them accepted by the United States.
In view of recent representations made to the department that the election for members of the Congress of 1904 would be so looked after that the canal treaty could be passed, it is well to remember that the present Congress was specially called to consider the treaty, and that the same methods were employed in electing this one as must be in electing the one of next year. Why, then, if that power is lodged in the Government, were not the present senators and deputies pledged to the ratification of the treaty?
If the Government intended to elect a minority strongly opposed to the treaty, and to give them full play in their attacks upon it with the view of obtaining better terms from the United States, it has reckoned without its host, for it has brought into existence a Congress, a large portion of which is not only against the treaty but intensely hostile to the Government itself. This is partly due to blunders on the part of some of the governors of departments, especially the one in Panama, but also to the rupture with General Fernandez. A considerable number of the senators and deputies elected were supporters of the latter, and were regarded as votes upon which the Government could count. After the break with Fernandez these votes joined the opposition, and to-day the Government finds itself confronted with a hostile majority instead of a noisy minority.
It was evidently plain to the Government some time ago that there is no hope for the ratification of the treaty; that the treaty would be rejected not on its own merits, but as a means of dealing a blow at the Government of President Marroquin. Seeing how the political game was being played the Government abandoned any intent it may have had to advocate the treaty, and turned its attention to averting from itself the current of opposition, or at any rate the responsibility for the rejection of the treaty. For this reason on a motion by Senator [Page 195] Marroquin, the President’s son, on the day which had been set apart by previous arrangement for the rejection of the treaty, the debate was preceded by the reading of the correspondence which had passed between the minister for foreign affairs and myself. The object of this move is clear. The Government desired to make it appear that the rejection of the treaty was not a blow aimed at the President and his ministers, but was a protest against what was asserted to be the dictatorial attitude assumed by the United States Government through its minister.
The first debate on the report of the joint congressional committee appointed to consider the canal matter has been postponed until the 14th instant, but nothing satisfactory is to be expected from this Congress.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,