Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903

Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay.

Legation of the United States,
Bogotá, August 15, 1903.

No. 105.]

Sir: I have the honor to report that the most intensely critical period for the canal treaty seems to have passed, and that now there is some hope for a satisfactory conclusion. Since the rejection of the treaty on the 12th instant there has been an almost hysterical condition of alarm and uncertainty in Bogotá as to the future action of the United States. Yesterday there was a widely circulated report that United States troops had landed on the Isthmus. When, finally, large posters were put up all over the city, announcing that because of a desire to maintain the most cordial relations with the United States, a joint committee would be appointed by Congress to confer as to the way and means of an agreement for the construction of a canal, I am certain that there was a genuine feeling of relief.

When the report of the special committee of the Senate was prepared, and I had positive information that twenty of the twenty-seven votes in the Senate had been secured to pass it, I knew at once that such action would be fatal; and there being no cable communication to permit of instructions from you, I determined upon a course of energetic action which, while it might seriously lessen my popularity here, and seem undiplomatic unless viewed in the light of the exigency and the circumstances, resulted in my two notes of the 5th instant and one of the 8th instant to the minister for foreign affairs. These notes were as strong and incisive as I could make them, with no attempt to disguise in suave phrases the fact that there was no probability that the United States Senate would accept the amendments proposed by the committee. Whether or not I was justified in writing such strong notes is best judged in the light of events, for they accomplished what I deemed to be necessary, and no other course could have prevented the adoption of the report of the committee.

Some of the newspapers and members of Congress are expressing dissatisfaction with what they term my dictatorial attitude, but I do not consider this important, provided a satisfactory treaty is finally ratified, which now seems probable.

When action was taken on the 12th instant no one in authority believed that it was final. Aside from the tone of the public debate, which would indicate this to the public, the Senators had come to an agreement some days before as to the policy to be pursued. Because of the apparent fatality of the amendments proposed, it seems to have been thought best by those in charge (and I was so informed about the 10th instant), in view of the present state of public opinion, to reject the treaty in the first debate, and then, believing that there would be a reaction of this public opinion, to resort to some coup to get the treaty again before Congress and pass it.

Apparently the manner of getting at this has not been definitely determined, for there are various ideas of ways and means.

General Ospina, the chairman of the new committee, stated to a friend of mine yesterday that the main objections to the treaty rested upon lawful or constitutional grounds. That the treaty was not unconstitutional, but contrary to law 2 of 1886 and law 153 of 1887. That the committee could recommend an annulment of these laws, which, if done, would permit the ratification of the treaty, with some trivial amendment intended to soothe the apparent inconsistency of the two votes. That the action of the 12th instant was taken on the minority report of the committee, and the majority report could still be called up and a reconsideration had.

General Valencia, a senator and lawyer of reputation, says that the treaty is not unconstitutional, except with reference to the appointment of United States tribunals on the isthmus, which is not highly important; that it is not necessary to annul laws, because the treaty itself would become a superseding law if passed; that the only thing to look to was to get enough votes to pass the treaty when it again came before the Senate.

The feasible scheme, however, and the one most generally talked of as being likely to be adopted, is to frame a law authorizing the executive to continue and finish the negotiations for a canal without further recourse to Congress.

Whatever may be the means determined upon, it is altogether probable that the report of the joint committee will be passed when presented.

There is a seeming of good intentions in this movement, and yet I can not forget that there has never been a favorable word said for the treaty in the Senate, nor in fact has it been discussed at all, and there is little evidence of a desire to treat the matter with open good faith to the United States.

The first weeks of the session were devoted to the discussion of the question as to whether the vice-president must sign the treaty before it was considered by the Senate. In other words, an attempt of the vice president’s political enemies to place the responsibility for the negotiations upon him, which he declined to assume. When this point was settled to the satisfaction of the Government and the burden was apparently placed upon Congress, came the appointment of the special committee of one member from each of the nine departments of the Republic, who consumed nearly three weeks in their deliberations, and then reported recommending the nine amendments, which I immediately cabled to you.

The first (and only) debate upon the committee’s report occurred on the 12th instant, and that you may understand how the matter has been treated I will give a summary of that day’s proceedings:

Senator Marroquin (son of the vice-president) moved that the debate be preceded by the reading of the correspondence which had passed between the United States minister and the minister for foreign affairs on the canal negotiations.

Senator Caro gave notice of a law he would move, containing two clauses, viz:

(1) To reject the Hay-Herran treaty.

(2) That the United States Government be informed that the Congress of Colombia meant no manifestation of hostility by this act, nor any antagonism to the construction of a canal by the United States.

The correspondence above referred to was then read.

My memorandum and notes, in which I pointed out that the Colombian Government did not apparently realize the gravity of the situation, and that if Colombia should now reject the treaty or unduly delay its ratification the friendly understanding between the two countries would be so seriously compromised that action might be taken by our Congress next winter which every friend of Colombia would regret, was received with loud murmurs of disapproval by the densely packed gallery. The minister for foreign affairs’ replies, read mostly by himself, were, on the other hand, greeted with applause.

Besides the above, the tenor of my notes was (a) that any modifications would be fatal; (b) that any modifications affecting the arrangements with the Panama Canal and Railway companies would not be accepted. The minister’s replies were to the effect that the Government was bound to submit the treaty to the Congress, and that in the event of its not passing that body he understood that the United States would proceed to the negotiation with Nicaragua; but that he did not see that the refusal to ratify the treaty could in any way alter the friendly relations existing between Colombia and the United States.

Senator Caro vehemently attacked the Government for its attitude in the conducting of the negotiations. He taunted the minister for foreign affairs for his action in having the correspondence between the United States minister and himself read as an attempt to elude the responsibility resting on the Government, and to cover it by courting the applause of the gallery as the champion of the rights of the Colombian Senate; rights which, he said, had never been called in question by the United States minister.

This same attitude was taken by Senator Arango, in a short speech.

The minister for foreign affairs then went through the whole history of the negotiations, beginning with the project of an interoceanic canal first made. He gave a detailed résumé of the whole De Lesseps scheme, and its subsequent failure, and deduced the following conclusion: That the present situation, as shown by the history of antecedent schemes and negotiations, was that Colombia must choose one of two things—either the whole scheme of a Panama Canal must be abandoned, or Colombia must hand the undertaking over to the United States. Feelers had been thrown out which had proved that no other power or entity would under any circumstances take the project in hand. The concession, therefore, if given to anybody, must be given to the United States Government. But this fact must not be lost sight of, that the United States Government would not even consider the cutting of a canal which should not be its own canal. The minister than made reference to the notes which had passed between him and the legation of the United States. The result of that correspondence was that the Colombian Congress found itself in the dilemma of either accepting the treaty as it stands or losing all hope of seeing the great work cut through Colombian territory. He concluded by expressing the hope that, in discussing this matter, the Senate would strictly limit itself to the points at issue. The Government had clone what it could in the matter. The negotiations had been initiated by the ablest of their statesmen, Dr. Martinez Silva, and the treaty, even as it now stood, bore the impress of that initiatory work. The Government had, moreover, left the decision of the issue to the free judgment of the country, and had exerted no influence whatever upon public opinion, when it could have passed the measure through by the use of dictatorial measures. (This evoke marked disapprobatory murmurs from the gallery.)

Senator Marroquin then made a short speech to the effect that the question turned on the acceptance or nonacceptance of the treaty, and not on questions of government policy, brought in by honorable senators, and which were foreign to the discussion.

A speech by Gen. Pedro Nel Ospina then followed, in which he blamed the minister for foreign affairs for having in a note given the United States minister the opportunity of raising the question as to whether or not his Government would accept any modifications. He said the minister’s position reminded him of the man who, on being told by an alcalde that he must furnish three horses for the use of the Government, turned, as he was leaving the room, and inquired: “Must I furnish saddles, also?” To which the alcalde replied: “Certainly!” He also said that, outside of the question as to whether he did or did not favor the canal treaty as it stood, he could not, in view of the existing laws of the country, give his vote for its ratification. That the Congress should, in his opinion, first so amend the laws of the country as to enable the Colombian Government to come to an agreement with that of the United States in a manner honorable to both countries.

Senator Rodriguez spoke in the same sense, expressing his advocacy of the construction of a canal and his friendly disposition toward the Government of the United States. He should, however, as privately agreed upon, give a negative vote on this occasion.

And thus ended the only debate ever had in the Colombian Senate on the canal treaty.

A vote was taken at 6.30 p.m., and every senator present was recorded as voting against the ratification of the treaty.

As I have on many occasions informed you, ratification has seemed almost hopeless from the beginning without the active influence of the Government, and this it has never used. The Nationalists, under the lead of Senator Caro, have been too deeply concerned in their efforts to belittle the Government to consider the merits of the treaty at all. The Liberals, while not represented in Congress, are the most active factors in creating public opinion, and have taken an almost identical position. The coffee planters and exporters, who think their business would be ruined by low foreign exchange, have been unpatriotic enough to place personal interests above national good, and have been against the treaty because the $10,000,000 once paid Colombia would send exchange so low that coffee could not be exported from the interior. Even the Panama representatives have lately become so thoroughly imbued with the idea of an independent republic that they have been more or less indifferent to the fate of the treaty.

As a matter of fact the treaty, as such, has had no active friends or or supporters, and if it is ratified at all it will be because of the strong attitude taken by the United States and the earnest repetition of the statement that the friendly understanding between the two countries depended upon it.

It has been a difficult and trying situation from the first, rendered more so by the interruption of cable communication, and one in which a strong, rather than a velvet hand, was imperative.

I await the consummation with some hope and much distrust.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

A. M. Beaupré.