Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix II, Affairs in Hawaii

Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham.

No. 31.]

Legation of the United States,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 19, 1894.

Sir: In recent dispatches I have sent letters between Hon. S. B. Dole, minister of foreign affairs, and myself in regard to my “attitude showing the intention to use force.”

I have the honor to transmit herewith the letters of Mr. Dole of January 11 and 18, 1894, and my reply of this and prior date, which will, on my part, end correspondence on the subject.

Very respectfully,

Albert S. Willis.

Inclosures.

1. Letter of Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis.

2. Letter of Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole.

3. Letter of Mr. Willis to Mr. Dole, January 15, 1894.

4. Letter of Mr. Dole to Mr. Willis, January 18, 1894.

[Inclosure 1, in No. 31.]

Department of Foreign Affairs,
Honolulu, January 11, 1894.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication dated January 1 instant, in which you refer to my communication to you dated December 27 as “containing statements which I am fully prepared to show are not warranted by the facts, seriously affecting the President of the United States and the representatives of the United States, in this country, and that these charges and statements, if accepted as the official views of your Government, demand prompt answer and equally prompt action on the part of the Government of the United States to the end that the condition of affairs therein described should be removed by the removal of the alleged causes.”

You also refer to the intervening correspondence between us, stating that my above-mentioned communication, “being for the first time the official information that the warlike preparations described by you were caused by and intended for the diplomatic and military representatives of the United States.”

You further state that, believing that upon further consideration I would realize the great injustice of my statements, you, on the 29th ultimo, wrote, suggesting the withdrawal of my communication of the 27th ultimo and your reply, and that no copies be given to the public or made a record by either Government; and on the 31st stated to Mr. Damon that your note to me “was prompted by no improper or unfriendly spirit, but was intended to continue the amicable relations heretofore existing.”

You further state that, in my letter of December 29, there is no “withdrawal or modification of the statements complained of, but, on the contrary, an expression of readiness, implying ability, to furnish the specifications requested.”

You also acknowledge the receipt of my note to you, dated January 1, stating that it was not my intention to withdraw any of my letters, which note you state is unsigned by me. The omission of the signature was unintentional.

You conclude by stating that “I have now to ask that you furnish me, at your earliest convenience, with the desired specifications, as I wish to make immediate answer.”

I will comply with your request. Before doing so, however, I desire to say, in reply to your communication of the 1st instant, that I have made no “charges” against the President of the United States or its representatives. On the contrary, in order that there might be no misapprehension concerning the matter, I specifically stated, in my communication to you of the 27th ultimo, that I do not claim or intimate that this unfortunate situation has been intentionally created by you or by the Government which you represent. I still disclaim any intention of charging you or your Government with intent to produce the results and conditions described in my communication of December 27.

The object of my communication to you was to formally bring to your attention certain facts and conditions existing in this country; what, in my opinion, were the causes of the same, and: to obtain from you such information and assurances as would tend to allay the prevailing excitement and apprehension.

Concerning your statement above referred to, that my communication of December 27 contains statements which you are fully prepared to show are not warranted by the facts, I would say that it would give me great pleasure to become convinced that the alleged conditions and facts referred to by me did not in truth exist. The matters hereinafter stated constitute in part the basis for my belief in the existence of the conditions referred to and the causes producing the same; but I shall be glad to receive from you any evidence tending to remove from my mind the belief that they or any of them did exist, and assuring you that upon becoming convinced that I am under misapprehension concerning any of such alleged facts, the allegations concerning the same will be immediately withdrawn.

Concerning your statement that my letter of December 29 contains “no withdrawal or modifications of the statements complained of,” you will pardon me if I say that I was not aware that any complaint had been made concerning any statement made by me, your reply having been primarily directed to eliciting more specific information concerning certain points.

Referring to the suggestion contained in your note of the 29th and your interview with Mr. Damon, that I withdraw my communication of December 27, I would say that to do so would have been in the nature of an admission that the statements therein contained were incorrect, which, unfortunately, in the absence of the information which you say you are prepared to present and with certain other evidence before me, it was impossible for me to do so.

Allow me to assure you that it is with deep gratification that I received your assurance that your communication to me of the 29th December was prompted by no improper motive or unfriendly spirit, but was intended to continue the amicable relations heretofore existing, and to further assure you that this and all other communications from this Government are written in the same spirit, and I trust that no statement presenting the claims and views of this Government concerning any matter of law or fact may by reason of its directness and distinctness be construed as otherwise than of a similar character.

In compliance with your request for certain specifications concerning my letter of December 27, I reply thereto as follows:

First. You inquire as to the meaning of the word “attitude” as used in my letter.

I reply that the word was used by me in its ordinarily accepted sense, meaning the bearing, the posture as indicating purpose, of those referred to.

You further say: “Will you point out where and when and how the representatives of the United States assumed any attitude toward the supporters of the Provisional Government, or that Government itself, other than one essentially and designedly expressive of peace?”

In reply I would say that the attitude of a person is to be ascertained only by inferences drawn from the known words and acts of such person, and the conditions and circumstances under which they take place.

Some of the words and actions of the United States and its representatives in this connection and the conditions and circumstances attendant thereupon, from which its intentions and attitude toward the Provisional Government must be inferred, are as follows:

(1) A treaty of annexation had been negotiated between the Provisional Government and the United States Government and presented to the Senate for ratification. This treaty was withdrawn by President Cleveland immediately upon his entering office without prior notice to this Government or its representatives of his intention so to do, or of his reasons for such action.

(2) Immediately thereafter the President appointed Hon. James H. Blount a special commissioner to Hawaii to investigate the condition of affairs at Hawaii.

The knowledge of such appointment was withheld from the representatives of this Government at Washington. The press having announced the appointment, the Hawaiian representatives applied to the State Department for information concerning the same. The Secretary of State refused to state the objects of the mission or even to admit that a commissioner had been appointed.

(3) On the 19th day of June, 1893, Mr. Thurston, Hawaiian minister at Washington, addressed a communication to Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, in which the following language is used, viz:

“I am directed by my Government to represent to you that, while the Hawaiian Government has full confidence in the good faith of the United States towards Hawaii in and concerning its treatment of the relations between the two countries, it seems proper that it should be informed as to the effect the present uncertainty as to the ultimate course to be pursued has upon the situation in Hawaii.

“The long-continued delay and uncertainty keeps the entire community in a feverish state of mind, by reason of which business is seriously affected; capital is rendered timid, thereby hampering all enterprises which are conducting their business on credit; the Government credit and ability to borrow is prejudiced; the expenses of the Government are largely increased by the necessity of maintaining a considerable armed force for the protection of public order, and the enemies of the Government are encouraged to conspire against law and order, all of which is highly prejudicial and injurious not only to the Hawaiians, but to the very large amount of American capital invested in Hawaii and the mutual trade now being conducted between the two countries.

“It is important for the Hawaiian Government to know the intention of the United States Government concerning annexation at as early a date as possible, as if annexation is not to take place the methods of treating local conditions in Hawaii must be radically different from those to be pursued if annexation is to take place.

“It is also important that whatever the intentions of the United States Government may be concerning the subject-matter, the Hawaiian Government be informed what such intentions are before the same are made public, in order that it may consider the situation with full knowledge of all its aspects and decide upon such course of action as may be necessary to preserve order and protect the interests of the people of Hawaii.

“For the reasons above stated I respectfully request that a decision may be arrived at and communicated as speedily as is consistent with the interests of the United States.”

No reply has ever been made to such communication.

(4) Upon the arrival of Mr. Blount in this country he did not communicate nor in any matter intimate to the Hawaiian Government that his investigations were to be directed toward the right of existence of the Government to whom he was accredited. All of his investigations and examinations were private, and such persons only were examined as he chose to call.

(5) An examination of his report, since published, shows that there are statements made by approximately 60 Royalists and 20 supporters of the Provisional Government.

That he has obtained no statements from the 4 members of the cabinet voted out three days before the revolutionary attempt of the Queen, although he has obtained exhaustive statements from their Royalist successors.

That he has examined only 2 of the 13 members of the committee of safety; one of the original 4 members of the executive council of the Provisional Government; 3 of the original 14 members of the advisory council; 2 of the 8 speakers who addressed the mass meeting called by the committee of safety on the day prior to the establishment of the Provisional Government, and but 1 of the 8 field and staff officers, and none of the 17 line officers in command of the forces of the Provisional Government and none of the 5 commissioners sent to Washington, although all of such men omitted to be examined were eye witnesses and active participants in the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the Provisional Government, and are men of character and standing in the community, while a number of those examined on the Royalist side are irresponsible characters.

(6) Upon the 15th day of May, 1893, Mr. Blount, without first communicating to this Government what his instructions were, or his intention so to do, published his official instructions in a Honolulu newspaper in the form of an address “To the people of the Hawaiian Islands,” and concluded with the following words:

“While I shall refrain from interference between conflicting forces of whatever nationality for supremacy, I will protect American citizens not participating in such conflict.”

(7) Although Mr. Blount’s report is official in character, vitally affects this Government, and is distinctly hostile to it in tone and conclusions, no request to this Government for explanation of the charges therein made was received nor opportunity to reply thereto or notice of its contents given prior to its publication. The first information concerning the contents of such report was obtained by this Government through published extracts in the American papers dated November 20, last, no official copy thereof being furnished, the Hawaiian minister at Washington until November 25, and none received by this Government at Honolulu until December 22, last, such copies having been furnished only after several applications therefor at the State Department.

(8) On November 7 you, having arrived in Honolulu, presented your credentials to this Government as American minister, with the usual declarations of friendship and regard and were duly received and acknowledged. Simultaneously therewith, Admiral Skerrett was suddenly and unexpectedly removed and Rear-Admiral Irwin appointed to the command of the American naval forces in Honolulu. Such change was almost universally interpreted by the press of the United States as having a bearing upon the contemplated execution of the announced policy of the President concerning Hawaii. The extract hereinafter Contained from the New York Herald is a sample of the interpretation placed thereon by the press of your own country favorable to such policy.

I do not claim or intimate that the personnel of the commanding officer of the United States forces is of any concern to this Government, nor suggest that the interpretation placed thereon by the American press is correct, nor that your Government is responsible for such interpretation. This incident is mentioned simply as a part of the res gestœ of the case which this Government had before it, and as one of the many things which it was obliged to consider in drawing its inferences as to what the intentions of your Government were.

(9) Upon the 8th of November last the Now York Herald published a statement from its Washington correspondent from which I make the following extracts:

“A diplomatic bombshell will burst within the next few days and the report will be heard throughout the entire world.

“The bomb will be thrown by an accredited representative of the United States Government, and he will hurl it against the badly conceived and worse managed Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

“If Minister Willis and Rear-Admiral Irwin arrived in Honolulu on schedule there would be even livelier times in the capital city of the Hawaiian Islands to-day than there is in the metropolis of the United States.* * * Briefly stated, the present administration will do all in its power to restore the condition of affairs which existed in Hawaii at the time Minister Stevens * * * brought about the overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani * * *

“The same force, that of the United States Government, which made the Provisional Government possible has sustained them in power to this day. They could not have made the revolution of which they were the head center a success but for the support given them by the administration in Washington, and there is every reason to believe * * * that the Provisional Government would have gone down long ago but for this same support. * * *

“The fact that a new minister has been sent to Honolulu to succeed Minister Stevens and that Rear-Admiral Irwin has been sent to relieve Commander Skerrett has been accepted in many instances as an inkling of the administration’s policy towards Hawaii. * * *

“This means that the Queen will be restored to her throne and the Provisional Government, representing only a small part of the people of Hawaii, will soon be a thing of the past.”

I do not intimate that the U. S. Government is responsible for the utterances of the Herald, but cite the above as one of several instances in which information of intended acts on the part of your Government, vital to this Government, has been denied to this Government and first made known to it through the public press.

(10) On November 11 the papers of the United States published a letter from the Secretary of State to the President, dated October 18, 1893.

No previous notice had been given to this Government of the contents of such letter or of the intention to make it public.

In that letter the Secretary, referring to the initiation of this Government, says:

“They relied on no military force of their own, for they had none worthy of the name. The Provisional Government was established by the action of the American minister and the presence of the troops landed from the Boston, and its continued existence is due to the belief of the Hawaiians that if they made an effort to overthrow it they would encounter the armed forces of the United States.

“The earnest appeals to the American minister for military protection by the officers of the Provisional Government after it had been recognized show the utter absurdity of the claim that it was established by a successful revolution of the people of the islands.

“These appeals were a confession by the men who made them of their weakness and timidity. Courageous men, conscious of their strength and the justice of their cause, do not act thus. * * *

“Should not the great wrong done to a feeble but independent State by an abuse of the authority of the United States be undone by restoring the legitimate Government? Anything short of that will not, I respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of justice. * * * Our Government was the first to recognize the independence of the islands, and it should be the last to acquire sovereignty over them by force and fraud.”

You have intimated in your communication dated December 2 that the foregoing letter, “being a domestic affair, the transaction is not the subject of diplomatic representation,” which statement you have reiterated in your communication of January 1.

I must submit, however, that an official communication from the chief of the Department of State to the President, in which he charges this Government and its officers with conspiracy, weakness, timidity, and fraud, and recommends its subversion, which letter is officially furnished to and published by the public press without any information concerning the same being afforded to this Government, is not a “domestic transaction,” and is preeminently a proper subject for, inquiry on the part of this Government as to the intentions of your Government concerning the subject-matter.

(11) On November 14 Mr. Thurston, Hawaiian minister at Washington, called upon the Secretary of State and inquired if the above letter was authentic, and was assured by Mr. Gresham that it was.

Mr. Thurston then said: “I wish, then, to further ask whether it is the intention of the U. S. Government to carry out the policy therein indicated by force; or, in other words, whether if the Provisional Government declines to accede to the request of the U. S. Government to vacate in favor of the Queen, U. S. troops will be used to enforce the request.”

To which Mr. Gresham replied: “I am not at liberty at present to answer that question. It is a matter concerning which I will speak to the President and talk with you more fully this afternoon.”

In the afternoon of the same day Mr. Gresham further said to Mr. Thurston:

“I have already answered your first question, to the effect that the letter published (Secretary Gresham to the President) was authentic and a correct statement of the policy of the United States. As to your second question, as to whether force is to be used by the United States to restore the Queen, all that I am at liberty to state is that Mr. Willis has no instructions to do anything which will cause injury to life or property of anyone at the islands. Further than this I am not at liberty to state what his instructions are. You can draw your own inferences from my statement and allay any apprehension which may have been caused by what has been published.”

Mr. Thurston further said to Mr. Gresham:

“Your answer does not convey the information which I requested. What I desire is to obtain information which will guide my Government in their action. If they know that force is to be used by you their course of action will necessarily be different from what it otherwise would be. The definite information from me that you intend to use force may be the means of preventing them from using force and causing bloodshed.”

To which Mr. Gresham replied:

“Our relations in the past have been pleasant and I want them to continue to be so in the future, and to be perfectly courteous to you, but I can not at present answer you more fully than I have.”

(12) On the 16th of last November there was published in the Honolulu Star an interview with you, with the accompanying statement that the proofs had been revised by you.

The following are extracts therefrom, purporting to be statements made by you:

“You are authorized to say from me that ho change in the present situation will take place for several weeks. I brought with me certain instructions. * * * Since my arrival here contingencies have arisen about which neither the United States Government nor myself were aware when I left Washington. * * * I forwarded my dispatches to Washington by to-day’s steamer, and until I receive an answer to them no change will take place in the present situation, nor will any be allowed.

“What do you mean by the expression ‘nor will any be allowed?’”

“I mean just this; that until the time comes for me to carry out my instructions, the peace and good order of this community will be kept undisturbed in the interests of humanity. That any attempt made by any person or persons to make trouble will be promptly checked and punished. You may put the matter more plainly and say that even if the Provisional Government discharged the whole of its troops to-day, no lawlessness would be allowed for one moment under the present situation of affairs.* * * The whole Hawaiian question is now in abeyance and nothing the newspapers can say or do, will alter the situation one iota; * * * There is not the slightest necessity for any one to stay out of bed nights for fear of trouble of any kind, for none will be permitted.”

In the Honolulu Bulletin of November 17, last, there is published what purports to be a letter signed by yourself, in which you state concerning the above-mentioned interview:

“The interview in the Star was submitted to me but I did not scrutinize it carefully. It contains several expressions which are misleading; due, I am sure, not to any intention on the part of the writer.”

There is no specification of what the “misleading” portions are, although you have since verbally informed me in substance that you did not intend to use such words and had no intention of exercising authority inconsistent with that of the Government.

(13) On November 29, last, the Hawaiian Star published a statement purporting to be a report of remarks made by you to a delegation of the American League, in which the following words are stated to have been used by you:

“I have my instructions which I can not divulge, * * * But this much I can say; The policy of the United States is already formulated regarding these islands, and that nothing which can be said or done either here or there can avail anything now. I do not come here as did Mr. Blount. I come here as the executive officer. I come to act. When the proper time comes, I shall act. * * * I wish to state, positively, that any outside interference will not be tolerated by the United States.”

I am not aware that you have ever disavowed the correctness of this report.

(14) On November 29 last, having that day for the first time received information through the Hawaiian minister at Washington of the contents of Mr. Gresham’s letter to the President, and of his statements concerning the same and his refusal to state whether it was the intention of your Government to carry out its policy by force, I called upon you in company with the Attorney-General, stated to you the substance of my information, and asked you what the intentions of your Government were in relation to Mr. Gresham’s recommendations. You replied that you were not at liberty to tell us, but would do so as soon as you could.

(15) Immediately thereafter, I addressed a communication to you, revoking the general permission theretofore granted to the United States forces to land for drill, and a further communication formally stating to you the information received by me concerning said letter of Mr. Gresham and asking you the following question:

“I desire to inquire of you whether the published reports of such letter of Secretary Gresham are substantially correct? If they are, I feel that it is due this Government that it should be informed of the intention of your Government in relation to the suggestions contained in the said letter of Mr. Gresham.”

On December 2, you replied to such letter stating that “as to the letter of Mr. Gresham I have the honor to call your attention to the fact, as shown by you, that it is a communication from a member of the cabinet to the President of the United States, and being a domestic transaction is not the subject of diplomatic representation. Answering your note further, I must express my sincere regret that it is not in my power at present to inform you of the views or intentions of the United States.”

(16) On December 4th last President Cleveland transmitted his annual message to Congress, in which the following language was used concerning Hawaii.

Referring to Mr. Blount’s report he said:

“Upon the facts developed it seemed to me the only honorable course for our Government to pursue was to undo the wrong that had been done by those representing us, and to restore, as far as practicable, the status existing at the time of our forcible intervention. With a view of accomplishing this result within the constitutional limits of executive power our present minister at Honolulu has received appropriate instructions to that end.”

(17) On December 14 last the U. S. dispatch-boat Corwin arrived in Honolulu from San Francisco bringing dispatches to yourself. No mail was allowed to be brought by her, but the press of Honolulu obtained from persons on board of her and published the above extract from the President’s message. But for such accidental information no information concerning the same would have been obtained by this Government until the arrival of the Alameda on December 22.

Up to the time of the arrival of the Corwin the U. S. naval officers in port were in the habit of coming ashore in citizen’s dress, the crews received the usual liberty on shore, and no unusual warlike preparations were visible on board.

Immediately after the arrival of the Corwin the liberty of the crews was stopped, as was that of most of the officers. Those who came on shore were in service uniform. Rifles were stacked, cartridge belts were filled with ball cartridges, and knapsacks packed for immediate use were conspicuous on the decks of the ships, and were seen there by visiting citizens, who in reply to inquiry as to the meaning of such preparations were informed by the officers that they were ready to land at a moment’s notice. When asked if the landing would be to protect or fight us the reply of the officers of the Philadelphia was that no one on board knew what orders would be received.

(18) It was known at the time that several of the wives of the U. S. naval officers temporarily in Honolulu were packing up their baggage preparatory for immediate removal in view of possible hostilities.

(19) It was also known that you were in frequent communication with the ex-Queen, and leading royalists were constantly reiterating that you were going to immediately restore the Queen by force.

As a sample of the innumerable assertions of this character is the following, made by Mr. J. O. Carter, the ex-Queen’s most trusted counselor and confidant, a gentleman who was then known to be in consultation with you and the ex-Queen and who appears as the attesting witness, to the exclusion of the former members of her cabinet, to her proposition of amnesty, hereunder referred to.

Mr. Carter warned his nephew, Mr. C. L. Carter, a supporter of the Provisional Government, that restoration was certain; that force would be used by the United States for that purpose, and that he ought to consider the rights of his family and not risk his life in opposing the inevitable.

This information was from one of the sources from which numerous prophecies of future action on the part of the United States had emanated, with almost invariable correctness.

(20) It was the almost Well-nigh universal belief in the city that you were about to attempt to land the naval forces of the United States to enforce the execution of the President’s policy.

In anticipation thereof for a number of days the wharves were lined with crowds of people, among them prominent Royalists, waiting to see the United States troops land to restore the Queen.

(21) On December 18, Mr. H. F. Glade, consul for Germany, called upon you and, in substance, asked if you could not speak out and relieve the public from the state of extreme tension they were in, which was becoming unbearable; to which you replied, in substance, that you were aware of the conditions and were making every effort to bring the matter to a speedy determination and would act within forty-eight hours.

(22) On December 16, it being reported that the Corwin was at an early date to return to San Francisco, the attorney-general called upon you stating that there would be no regular mail for nearly three weeks and asked permission to forward Hawaiian Government dispatches by her, which permission you refused, stating that your instructions would not permit it.

(23) On December 18, Maj. Wodehouse, the British minister, and Mr. Fujii, the Japanese diplomatic representative, both asked permission to land troops from their respective warships for the purpose of protecting their respective legations, which permission was granted by this Government.

(24) In view of the existing conditions, Mr. Fujii, the diplomatic representative, sent word to a number of prominent American supporters of the Provisional Government offering the use of the Japanese legation as a, refuge for their families in case of hostilities.

(25) On December 18 last, I addressed to you a communication containing the following words:

“I am informed that you are in communication with Liliuokalani; the ex-Queen, with a view of reestablishing the monarchy in the Hawaiian Islands, and of supporting her pretensions to the sovereignty. Will you inform me if this report is true, or if you are acting in any way hostile to this Government. * * * You will pardon me for pressing you for an immediate answer.”

(26) On December 19 you called upon and made a verbal address to me furnishing me with a manuscript copy of your remarks from which I make the following extracts:

“The President regrets, as I do, that any secrecy should have surrounded the interchange of views between our two Governments. I may say this, however, that the secrecy thus far observed has been in the interest and for the safety of all your people. * * *

“Upon the facts embodied in Mr. Blount’s reports the President has arrived at certain conclusions and determined upon a certain course of action with which it becomes my duty to acquaint you.

“The Provisional Government was not established by the Hawaiian people or with their consent or acquiescence, nor has it since existed with their consent. * * * (Other reasons are set forth for the conclusions reached.)

“In view of these conclusions I was instructed by the President to take advantage of an early opportunity to inform the Queen of this determination, and of his views as to the responsibility of our Government. * * * I was instructed at the same time to inform the Queen that, when reinstated, that the President expected that she would pursue a magnanimous course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement against her. * * *

“In obedience to the commands of the President, I have secured the Queen’s agreement to this course. * * * It becomes my duty further to advise you, sir, the Executive of the Provisional Government and your ministers, of the President’s determination of the question which your action and that of the Queen devolved upon ‘him, and that you are expected to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority. And now Mr. President and gentlemen of the Provisional Government, with a deep and solemn sense of the gravity of the situation * * * in the name and by the authority of the United States of America I submit to you the question ‘Are you willing to abide by the decision of the President.’”

(27) Upon the 23d of December, I replied to the foregoing communication in the negative.

Up to the time of sending you my communication of December 27, no further communication had been received by me from you and no assurance had been received that force was not to he used nor what your further intentions were concerning this Government.

(28) During your nearly two months’ residence in this city you and your family have declined the customary social courtesies usually extended to those occupying your official position, on the specified ground that it was not deemed best under existing circumstances to accept such civilities.

I do not for a moment intimate that such a course is improper or that it is a subject for criticism. It is simply referred to by me as an existing fact bearing upon your relations to this Government and germane in considering the question of your attitude thereto. It would not have been referred to by me except in response to your inquiry.

In the absence of specific definite information as to the intentions of your Government, the foregoing are some of the facts from which this Government has been obliged to infer what such intentions were, and which, considered as a whole, constitute the “attitude” toward this Government.

It may be that the proper logical deduction and inference from the foregoing facts is that the attitude of the United States and its representative toward the Provisional Government is and has been “one essentially and designedly expressive of peace.” It will give us the greatest pleasure to receive assurances to” that effect, but I submit that under the circumstances and in the absence of such assurances, they are capable of another construction, to a sufficient extent at least, to warrant the question which I have asked you in my communication of December 27.

Your second request for information is as follows:

“You assert that at the time of my arrival in this country the forces of this Government were organized and amply sufficient to suppress any internal disorder. Will you inform me what connection this statement has or is designed to have with the Government of the United States or with the future action of its representative?”

I reply that there are two reasons for the said statement. First, that already stated in my letter of December, that “in consequence of your attitude, the enemies of the Government, believing in your intentions to restore the monarchy by force, have become emboldened,” etc.; and, second, that by reason of my inability to ascertain whether your Government proposed to use force in support of its policy of restoration, I was obliged to act as though it did so intend; as a result of which this Government has been obliged to increase its forces, and has been, and now is, subjected to the necessity of increased watchfulness and large additional expense, which, but for such attitude, would have been unnecessary.

The effect which I had hoped this communication might have upon the future action of the representative of the United States was that he might give such assurances that such additional watchfulness and expense might be avoided.

Your third request is for the time, place, and subject-matter of the “language” used by yourself in public and in communication to this Government. The answer to this is covered by my reply to your first inquiry.

Your fourth inquiry is as to what particular words in the published letter from Secretary Gresham and in the President’s message, and which message of the President I referred to. I reply that certain of the words of the Secretary and the President which I deem pertinent to the subject-matter have already been quoted in my reply to your first inquiry, although there are other obviously bearing on the same subject.

I have already replied to you that I referred to the President’s first message in my letter dated the 27th, having actually been written on the 26th of December, and forwarded to you before I had knowledge of the contents of the second message.

Your fifth inquiry is as to the time and contents of your communications which were “ambiguous.”

I have enumerated them in my reply to your first inquiry.

The ambiguity consists in the reiterated statement that you proposed to do some act and carry out certain instructions which all the surrounding circumstances indicated were inimical to this Government, without stating what that act nor what those instructions were; and, while presenting and speaking assurances of friendship and amity, without the consent of this Government negotiating with its enemies for its subversion and declining to state what your intentions were.

Such utterances and actions were so inconsistent, one with the other, with international rules of comity, and the past relations and international policy of the wo governments, as to be not only ambiguous but incomprehensible to this Government.

Your sixth inquiry is as to when, where, and to whom you declared that you intended to do some act when the proper time arrived. The reply to your first inquiry covers this also.

Your seventh inquiry is as to the time and manner when the Government has sought the assurance that force would not be used. The answer is contained in my reply to your first inquiry.

You finally ask my “careful consideration” of the following statement contained in my letter:

“Your action has unfortunately aroused the passions of all parties and made it probable that disturbances may be created at any moment,” and say that you “refuse to believe that upon reexamination you (I) will feel at liberty to affix your (my) official signature to such an extraordinary declaration.”

In reply I beg to state that I have resided in this country for nearly fifty years and had intimate personal knowledge of the conditions prevailing during the riot of 1874 and the revolutions of 1887, 1889, and 1893, and with all deliberation I state of my own knowledge that during such period there has never been a time when this country has been subjected to such strain and excitement as during the eight days following the arrival of the Corwin. The business of the entire community was practically suspended and its time and energy devoted to an excited and absorbing consideration of the political situation and to military preparations to meet unknown contingencies; which state of things has since been fortunately allayed by advices from America furnishing, in reports of the President’s special Hawaiian message to Congress and his instructions to your excellency, information which made a satisfactory and favorable response to the inquiry of my letter to you of December 27.

I also state with equal deliberation that such condition was produced and maintained by reason of your actions and declarations and the actions and declarations of your Government and the circumstances and uncertainties attendant thereupon, as detailed in my letter of December 27, and herein.

I make this statement in no spirit of unfriendliness to you or your Government but as an historical fact which, if not already known to you, should, in the interests of both countries, be made known to you.

In conclusion, I beg to refer to the statement in your communication of January 1, wherein you state that it is a source of “sincere and profound regret” that my letter “brings, for the first time, the official information that the war-like preparations described by you were caused by and intended for the diplomatic and military representatives of the United States.”

In reply, I would say that such regret on your part at receiving such information can not exceed the sincerity and profoundness of my own regret that such a condition should exist.

Such regret on my part is only equaled by inability to understand how it has come about that a Government and a community which is to-day more closely connected with the United States by ties of commerce, friendship, and blood, than any other lying beyond its borders, which values your friendship above that of all other nations, which fully admits and appreciates the many and deep obligations which it is under to your Government and people, which has done you and your country no wrong, has been forced into a position where, in defense of their very right to exist, they have been obliged to take up arms to meet the possible hostility of that country whose flag they revere and whose principles of liberty they love.

I cannot but believe that it has arisen through a misunderstanding of facts on the part of your Government and a mutual misapprehension of motives and intentions which may, I sincerely hope, at an early day, be cleared away.

Allow me, in closing, to thank you, Mr. Minister, for your frequent expressions of personal regard, and for the evident sincerity of purpose displayed by you under recent trying circumstances, and to assure you of my deep appreciation thereof.

I have the honor to assure you, that, with highest consideration,

I am, your excellency’s obedient servant,

Sanford B. Dole,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His excellency, Albert S. Willis,
U. S. Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Legation of the United States,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, ——— ——, 1894.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 11th instant, which was in reply to mine of the 1st.

The only question of practical importance arising out of the present correspondence was whether the United States war vessels were at the time your letter was written objectionable to your Government. Certain language which seemed to convey that idea was, in a subsequent note of January 18, withdrawn, thus, as lam pleased to know, leaving their peaceful and friendly purpose without question.

In addition to the above there were statements which were, as I thought, unjust, in that the sole responsibility for the recent disturbed condition of this community was attributed to me, the diplomatic agent of the United States.

In your last communication you expressly disclaim any intention of charging me or my Government “with intent to produce the results or conditions described in the communication of December 27.” Your first letter contains a similar assurance, coupled with the statement that your “Government is reluctant to believe that this condition of affairs was contemplated or expected by yourself or by the Presiident of the United States.”

In view of the above, a reply to your last communication may not be necessary, nor would one be made except from the desire of my Government to have the good will and friendship of the people for whom you speak, which result will, in my opinion, be advanced by an explanation of several matters therein referred to.

I am the more encouraged to this course because of your assurance that upon becoming convinced that you are “under misapprehension concerning any such alleged facts the allegations concerning the same will be immediately withdrawn.”

With the hope that I may be able to convince you of such misapprehension, I will now briefly consider the “specifications” furnished by you which refer to my “attitude,” “language” and “public communications” since arriving here, and which in your judgment show that I “intended to use force.”

Your last communication embraces many topics that are not only irrelevant to the above inquiry, but are not proper for me to discuss. Among these are (1) the withdrawal of the treaty of annexation; (2) the appointment of Mr. Blount; (4) his official conduct while here; (5) the class of witnesses whom he examined; (6) the publication in a “Honolulu newspaper,” of his official instructions “without your previous knowledge,” and (7) the publication of his reports to the State Department without an opportunity on the part of your Government to “reply thereto.”

The above paragraphs, referring to matters occurring before my arrival, I do not feel at liberty to discuss further than to say that they were not at the time given the unfriendly construction now imputed to them, nor do they, except in a very remote degree, bear upon your statements as to my “purpose to use force.”

The following five paragraphs, embracing matters occurring in the United States, some of them now for the first time brought to my knowledge and with none of which had I any connection, have so slight a reference to my “attitude “showing an “intention to use force” that I will, with due respect to you, confine myself to a brief epitome of their contents.

Paragraph 3 recites a communication of the 19th of last June from Hon. L. A. Thurston, Hawaiian minister at Washington, to Secretary Gresham, to which no answer was received.

Paragraph 8 refers to the appointment of Admiral Irwin as successor to Admiral Skerrett.

Paragraph 9 is an extract from a letter of November 8, sent to the New York Herald by its Washington correspondent, giving his interpretation of the above change.

Paragraph 10 gives copious extracts from Secretary Gresham’s letter published in the press of the United States on November 11, outlining the views of the State Department, which letter reached here on November 24.

Paragraph 11 contains extracts from a dispatch of Hon. L. A. Thurston to your Government which, as appears from your note of the 18th instant, was received here Friday, November 24, simultaneously with the letter of Mr. Gresham referred to in your paragraph 10.

This dispatch shows that three days after the publication of Mr. Gresham’s letter Mr. Thurston called upon him and inquired as to its authenticity and as to the “intention of the United States Government to carry out the policy therein indicated by force.”

After speaking to the President on the subject, Mr. Gresham replied as follows:

“I have already answered your first question to the effect that the letter published [Secretary Gresham to the President] was authentic and a correct statement of the policy of the United States. As to your second question, as to whether force is to be used by the United States to restore the Queen, all that I am at liberty to state is that Mr. Willis has no instructions to do anything which will cause injury to life or property of anyone at the islands. * * * You can draw your own inferences from my statement, and allay any apprehension which may have been caused by what has been published.”

Waiving for the present, for reasons stated, any further consideration of the eleven foregoing paragraphs, I come now to number 12, which quotes certain expressions from an interview in a local paper of the 16th of last November. As this does involve my “attitude,” I have this to say:

The subject-matter of that interview and the circumstances out of which it arose were known to you at the time.

In the forenoon of Wednesday, November 15, Hon. S. M. Damon, minister of finance, notified me in person that there were rumors of an attack that night, or the ensuing night, upon the Executive building, The Government did not credit these rumors, hut there were many people who had apprehensions upon the subject, in consequence of which, as he informed me, the regular guard had been increased and one of the volunteer companies would be ordered under arms for the night. I asked him, “Who constitute the volunteer companies?” His reply was, “They consist mainly of the citizens, many of them being the young men employed in the banks and business houses of the city.”

I then said: “It seems hard to have these young men called from their homes under such circumstances, as their families will necessarily be under great anxiety during their absence.” I further remarked: “The Japanese consul-general, the English minister, and. other foreign representatives have already called to say that their people are apprehensive of mob violence, and had asked me as the only representative whose Government has war vessels now in port to protect their people. The friends of the Queen, also, are apprehensive as to her safety. I do not wish to interfere in any way with your domestic affairs, except with your approval. If you do not object, however, I will publicly announce that the United States will cooperate to prevent mob violence. I will also state that there will be no communication to your Government from the President of the United States for several weeks.”

Mr. Damon replied, thanking me for the offer, and saying that he could see no objection to it whatever, that such an announcement would go very far toward allaying excitement and relieving general anxiety.

In reply to the question whether the order calling out the volunteer troops could not be rescinded he said that he would go immediately to the executive building, but was afraid it was too late to make any change for that night.

The following evening I met Mr. Damon at a dinner given by Capt. Barker on board the U. S. flagship Philadelphia, when he expressed his hearty appreciation of my action, and said that the effect of the interview, which you quote, had been to greatly relieve the apprehensions of the community as to mob violence.

On the following morning you called at this legation, and being informed of the preceding facts and that, as stated in your letter, I “had no intention of exercising authority inconsistent with that of your Government,” you expressed your satisfaction and approval of what had occurred. The representatives of the foreign governments and many prominent citizens expressed themselves to the same effect.

The action taken was meant and understood at the time as in the interest of peace, humanity, and good order, and will, after this explanation, no longer, I hope, be considered an evidence of hostility.

Paragraph (13) contains extracts from remarks published in a local paper of the 17th of last November, purporting to have been made by me to a “delegation of the American League,” and which you accept as correct.

In the same issue of that paper, its editor, commenting upon these “remarks,” says: “They contained two statements which must give encouragement to those to whom the future of Hawaii as a civilized state is a cherished and Christian object. We group these declarations together so that they may stand out with the prominence which is their due.

“I am an ardent American. I would like to see the Stars and Stripes waving, under proper conditions, not only over the Pacific islands, but over any other territory which would be beneficial to the United States, and this—‘knowing the policy of the United States, I could not have accepted the position of an executive officer had it been in conflict with the principles I hold.’”

“Surely,” continues this editor, “the time can not be far off when the American flag shall wave over these Pacific islands and do so under proper conditions.”

By a singular coincidence the “two statements” above cited were the only portions of the alleged “address” that are omitted in your quotation. I respectfully submit that as an entirety the “address” admits only of the friendly construction given by this editor.

Without reference, however, to such construction or to the question of the correctness of the published “address,” I state now that nothing was said on that occasion which was intended or which could be construed into an unfriendly sentiment towards you or your Government.

Paragraphs (14) and (15) refer to your personal call at the legation in company with the attorney-general on Friday, November 24, and inquiry as to “what the intentions of my Government were” and to your letter of November 29, asking “whether the published reports of the letter of Secretary Gresham are substantially correct;” and stating “if they are, I feel that it is due this Government that it should be informed of the intention of your Government.”

My duty, as I understood it, did not permit me to discuss with you, the letter of Mr. Gresham to the President, nor could I, under the state of facts, be questioned as to the existence or nature of the “intentions” of my Government, As a matter of fact, it was, at that time, doubtful whether my Government had any “intentions,” hostile or otherwise, towards your Government.

This inability to comply with your requests should not have been construed as an evidence of “hostile, intent” for the further reason that the information upon both points submitted to me, had already on Nov ember 14, been given to your minister at Washington and through him, on November 24, to your Government.

If there was nothing in the subject of your inquiries to warrant the belief that the United States “intended to use force,” was there anything unfriendly in my manner of receiving or responding thereto?

As to the written communication, the language used will answer for itself. The oral interview is reported to the United Press by its correspondent here, whose accuracy you will attest. In a letter from Honolulu of December 5 he says:

“On the 24th ultimo the Warrimoo brought from Victoria our earliest knowledge of Secretary Gresham’s letter. * * * Immediately after the news by the Warrimoo was received President Dole and Attorney-General Smith waited upon Minister Willis. They asked to know his instructions. He courteously declined to communicate them, but renewed to them, a previous assurance that he would take absolutely no action until the return of the Alameda on December 21. He further assured them that they would be the first to know of any course of action decided upon by him. He evinced a genuine sympathy for the Government if not for their cause. Minister Willis then listened appreciatively to a representation by the attorney-general to the effect that their struggles for a good and constitutional government had been protracted for fifteen years.”

You further, in paragraph (15), refer to your communication of November 29, “revoking the general permission theretofore granted to the U. S. forces to land for drill.” You assigned no reason for such action, and I know of none. You were, however, promptly notified that such privilege would not thereafter be exercised, and to this day no armed soldier of our Government has been landed here for that or any other purpose.

Indeed, as appears from a letter of Admiral Irwin of November 29, acknowledging the receipt of a copy of your letter above referred to, he had “already given orders that our troops were not to be landed for drill or any other purpose,” as in his opinion the landing of troops for drill would have a tendency to increase the disquiet already existing.

Your paragraph (16) is a brief extract from the message of President Cleveland of December 4, which was received here on the Corwin December 14.

Under our Constitution, as you are well aware, Congress alone has the “power to declare war.” As the President distinctly announced that he would only act “within the constitutional limits of Executive power,” he precluded the idea of using force and reaffirmed his declaration of November 14, delivered through Secretary Gresham, not “to do anything which would cause injury to life or property of anyone at the islands.”

Paragraph (17) describes, upon the authority of certain “visiting citizens,” the preparations on board our war vessels after the arrival of the Corwin, which seemed to imply that our forces “were ready to land at a moment’s notice.” “Rifles were stacked, cartridge belts were filled with ball cartridges, and knapsacks packed for immediate use.” “The liberty of the crews was stopped as was that of most of the officers. Those who came on shore were in service uniform,” etc.

If those “visiting citizens” had made inquiry of the officers in command their apprehensions would have been promptly allayed by the information that what they saw on that Friday they could have seen on any third Friday in the month, it being the usual “squadron routine drill,” viz: “Boat drill, fire party, arm and away,” requiring the “packing of knapsacks” and other preparations which you detail.

I append two letters of Rear-Admiral Irwin of the 13th and 15th instant, giving “notes from entry in log book U. S. Flagship Philadelphia” and “extract from Squadron Routine Drills,” showing the above facts, and further that, in his own words:

(1) “No different preparations for landing have ever been made since I assumed command of this squadron than those made by my predecessor, Rear-Admiral Skerrett, * * * which were intended to suppress riot and to protect the lives and property of ‘American and English residents.’”

(2) As to the stoppage of shore leave he explains: “I did, as a matter of precaution, suspend liberty to the crews until I could ascertain whether it would be prudent to permit them to land without danger of collision. After coming ashore and having satisfied myself on that point, which I did in less than an hour, the order was revoked by telephone.”

(3) “On the 18th of December, as the excitement on shore was very great, and as quite a mob had gathered at our usual landing, I gave orders for our officers to wear their uniforms on shore, which is the usual precaution taken in foreign countries in times of great public excitement. It is proper to add that I had been informed by Capt. Rooke, of the British cruiser Champion, that he had given a similar order.”

(4) “The great guns of the Philadelphia and Adams have never been loaded since their last target practice at sea. The usual harbor drills have been kept up, as required by regulations, the exception being that our men have not been landed for the purpose of drill since my assumption of command.”

(5) “The reply quoted as made by the officers of the Philadelphia ‘that no one on board knew what orders would be received,’ should convince any reasonable person that no order had been given.”

The admiral says in conclusion: “As you are aware, I have studiously avoided doing anything that would have a tendency to increase the excitement prevailing in Honolulu, and I now distinctly state that the naval force under my command is in no way responsible for the feeling now existing.”

Your letter referring to the preceding facts makes this frank and just admission:

“Up to the time of the arrival of the Corwin * * * no unusual warlike preparations were visible on board.” The only warlike preparations seem, therefore, to have been confined to one day—December 15—and these as just shown by Admiral Irwin were not subject to an unfriendly construction.

In this connection it may not be improper to mention the conduct of our naval forces during the trying circumstances succeeding the 24th of last November. The many rumors as to their purpose of landing and attacking your people, the feelings of resentment naturally resulting from the honest belief by a large part of the community that such was their intention, the opprobrious epithets that were freely employed, brought such a dangerous and critical condition that for a time, as Admiral Irwin states, it became necessary for all our officers going ashore to wear their service uniform as a protection against insult and attack. During the whole of this unfortunate and regretable situation the demeanor of both officers and men was one of forbearance and self-control.

Your paragraph (18) sets forth that “it was known at this time that several of the wives of the U. S. naval officers, temporarily in Honolulu, were packing up their baggage preparatory for immediate removal in view of possible hostilities.”

It is true that on the day of the Corwin’s arrival, December 14, three ladies, wives of naval officers, in the absence of their husbands on board ship, made preparations to leave. Within a few hours their apprehensions were allayed and they decided to remain where they were. If, however, these ladies had left the city upon the 24th of last November it would not, even at that early date, have been an evidence of any hostile purpose nor “in view of possible hostilities toward your Government,” but an act of ordinary prudence and protection against the contingency of mob violence. Their fears, under the circumstances, were, it must be admitted, not unreasonable.

The wives of the officers to whom you refer and others, with their children, numbering nearly a score, having no anticipation of danger, had selected as their residence a most central and exposed location, within a few hundred yards of the executive building, and of easy access from every direction. Their husbands were daily absent on shipboard and if danger threatened, were compelled to be absent. Their diplomatic representative could not exercise the usual privilege of landing troops for their protection, because that act, in the unfortunate condition of affairs, would, he feared, have been construed as a hostile invasion, of which the lawless element might have taken advantage.

Paragraph (19) states: “It was also known that you were in frequent communication with the ex-Queen.” I desire to state that the only communications of a political character which I have had with the Queen were limited to three occasions. As to the first of these, on November 14, I have no reason to believe you were informed. The other two, on the 16th and 18th of December last, were the following day reported by me in person to your Government and their subject-matter fully explained. The sole purpose of these negotiations were, as you know, to secure proper guarantees from the Queen as to life and property of all connected with the overthrow of the monarchy. These having been secured, I then, under the instructions of the President of the United States, presented his decision, setting forth the reasons therefor and submitting it to your Government for its voluntary action.

With regard to Mr. J. O. Carter’s comments on the situation and conversation with his nephew, I have this to say. Mr. Carter was invited by me to the last interviews with the Queen, December 16 and 18. He knew nothing until then of the interview of November 14. As a native Hawaiian, of American parentage, whose character for integrity and intelligence was acknowledged in the community, I considered him a proper person to be present. His counsel to his nephew was, to use his own language, “based entirely upon Secretary Gresham’s published letter and current newspaper comments. * * * It was not a warning in the sense the letter of Minister Dole conveys.”

In paragraph (20) you state: “It was the almost well-nigh universal belief in the city that you were about to attempt to land the naval forces of the United States to enforce the execution of the President’s policy.”

My answer is that my Government, one month prior to the time referred to, had given you information negativing the idea, of using force and had authorized the publication of such information “to allay any such apprehension.” Furthermore, as frankly admitted by you in this correspondence, “your Government did not itself entertain this apprehension.”

As to the “crowds of people among them, many prominent Royalists” at the wharves “for several days,” you will recall the fact as set forth in your subsequent paragraph (23) that the British minister and the Japanese consul-general at this time, December 18, “asked permission to land troops.” As much publicity had been given, these facts in the daily press, I respectfully suggest that the crowed was most probably assembled out of harmless curiosity to witness the anticipated landing of the English and Japanese troops and not that of the United States “to enforce the execution of the President’s policy.”

Touching the statement in paragraph (22) that your Government was refused permission to forward “Hawaiian Government dispatches” by the dispatch boat Corwin it is only necessary to remind you that the naval officers of the United States and the public generally were denied such privilege and that no inference of unfriendly feeling should therefore have been drawn. Moreover, at the time your letter was written, you were aware of the fact that for the accommodation of your Government the Corwin had been delayed over half a week.

As to the requests referred to in paragraph (23) of the British minister and Japanese consul-general, for permission to land troops, they were, I am informed, precautionary measures against possible mob violence. This permission is still outstanding and is not now and was not then, in my judgment, proper evidence of a hostile purpose on the part of our Government.

In reply to paragraph (24) and also to a clause in your letter of the 27th, I have the honor to state upon the authority of a letter now in my possession from the diplomatic agent of Japan that it is a mistake in supposing that his offer of protection was confined to “prominent American supporters of the Provisional Government,” or was based upon the fear of “American invasion.” Mr. Fujii says in his letter: “Many of my neighbors were nervous and excited, being afraid of some sudden acts of lawless people, and I deemed it proper to say to them that in case of immediate need [his residence being in a somewhat distant part of the city] my consulate was always at their service as a good friend and neighbor.”

My answer to paragraph (25) is set forth in my reply to paragraph (19), which shows that all the Communications with the Queen were fully, and, I trust, satisfactorily explained to your Government.

In paragraph (26) you quote from my address of December 19, submitting the views of the President upon the Hawaiian question. I respectfully suggest that there is in this address no intimation as to the use of force and that even had there been no prior information to you upon the subject, there is enough in its tone and terms to show that, as stated in the opening words of the address itself, “the President’s action is now and has been from the beginning, absolutely free from resentment and entirely consistent with the long-established friendship and treaty ties which have so closely bound together our respective Governments.”

Your paragraph (27) states “Upon the 23d December I replied to the foregoing communication in the negative. Up to the time of sending you my communication of December 27 no further communication had been received by me from you, and no assurance had been received that force was not to be used, nor what your further instructions were concerning this Government.”

Let me call your attention to the fact that at the time your answer was delivered I notified you that I would forward it to Washington, and that nothing would be done by me until further instructed. To this your reply was: “That will be very satisfactory to our people.”

The Corwin, which, as hereinbefore stated, had been delayed for the purpose of receiving your answer, left at 4 a.m. Sunday, December 24. The next day being Christmas no communication could be sent to you, but on the following day, December 26, I acknowledged, in writing, the receipt of your answer to President Cleveland’s decision, notifying you that it had been sent to Washington. This communication was delivered at the executive building before 3 p.m. of date above named, December 26. On the following day, December 27, at 4 p.m., I received the letter out of which this correspondence has arisen.

Your paragraph (28) states: “During your nearly two months’ residence in this city you and your family have declined the customary social courtesies usually extended to those occupying your official position, on the specified ground that it was not deemed best, under existing circumstances, to accept such civilities.”

In reply permit me to say that the course of conduct referred to was prompted by the friendliest motive, had no official significance, was adopted, not toward the Provisional Government alone, and was intended to leave all persons, after the disclosure of the views of my Government, free and unembarrassed to determine for themselves the relations they desired to hold to me and to my family. The only official courtesy extended up to the date of your present communication was a concert by the Government band on the night of our arrival, which was accepted.

Thus, without unnecessary comment, I have considered and endeavored to explain those portions of your correspondence which bore upon the question of the “purpose to use force” and the responsibilities arising therefrom.

While duly respecting the doctrine of noninterference by the representative of another government with your domestic affairs, I shall rejoice to know that anything I have done or said, now or heretofore, has tended to a better understanding of recent events in your history and of motives and intentions as to which there may be, as you state, “mutual misapprehension.”

Thanking you for the courteous and appreciated terms which you have been pleased to express and which are cordially reciprocated, and trusting that there may be a speedy, honorable, and satisfactory adjustment of all pending questions, I have the honor, with renewed assurances of high consideration to be, sir,

Yours, most respectfully,

Albert S. Willis.

Hon. Sanford B. Dole,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Legation of the United States,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 15, 1894.

Sir: In the fourteenth paragraph of your communication of January 11, 1894, is the following statement:

“On November 29 last, having that day for the first time received information through the Hawaiian minister at Washington of the contents of Mr. Gresham’s letter to the President and of his statements concerning the same and his refusal to state whether it was the intention of your Government to carry out its policy by force, I called upon you, in company with the Attorney-General.”

I desire to inquire whether the date above mentioned is not a clerical mistake, as your call upon me was on the 24th, not the 29th, of November, and it was the 24th, as I am informed, that you received the information above referred to from your minister at Washington. Am I correct in this?

I wish also in this official way to call your attention to three extracts from your letters, of which the two first have already been mentioned to you.

In your letter of December 27 you say:

“The Government offices have been placed and still continue in a condition of defense and preparation for siege and the community has been put into a state of mind bordering on terrorism.”

In your letter of January 11, page 42, you say:

“As a result of which this Government has been, and now is, subjected to the necessity of increased watchfulness and large additional expense, which, but for such attitude, would have been unnecessary.”

In the same communication, toward the close, you say:

“I can not but believe that it—the necessity of ‘taking up arms to meet the possible hostility’ of the United States—has arisen through a misunderstanding of facts on the part of your Government, and a mutual misapprehension of motives and intentions, which may, I sincerely hope, at an early day be cleared away.”

Asking your attention to the above, I am, sir,

With sincere respect, very truly, yours,

Albert S. Willis,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,
United States of America.

Hon. S. B. Dole,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Department of Foreign Affairs,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, January 18, 1894.

Sir: A communication, dated January 15, 1894, received by me on the 16th, calls my attention to a probable mistake of dates in my letter to you of January 11, 1894, in connection with my allusion to a call made by the attorney-general and myself on you to ask for information concerning the intentions of the United States Government in relation to the recommendations of Mr. Gresham’s letter to the President. My letter stated that this call was made November 29, and that on that day I had received information of the contents of the Gresham letter. I now find, in accordance with your suggestion, that our call was made some days before November 29, probably on November 24, the former date being the day upon which I sent you a written communication on the same subject.

You further call my attention to an extract of the same letter, page 42, which you quote as follows:

“As a result of which this Government has been and now is subject to the necessity of increased watchfulness and large additional expense, which but for such attitude would have been unnecessary.” I find that you have left out a line belonging to this part of my letter, which should read as follows:

“As a result of which this Government has been obliged to increase its forces and has been and now is subjected to the necessity of increased watchfulness and large additional expense, which but for such attitude would have been unnecessary.” As I have already verbally assured your excellency, when you kindly called my attention informally to the words importing the present tense into this sentence, such a meaning was not intended and is inconsistent with other expressions of my letter. I then requested you to erase the words “and now is” and promised to make the same correction in my copy of the letter, which has been done.

You further call my attention to another extract from my letter of December 27, 1893, but you make no comment on these extracts. Being ignorant of your reasons for calling my attention to these passages, I am unable to consider them, and ask that you will at your convenience state such reasons.

I have the honor to be, sir, your excellency’s most obedient servant,

Sanford B. Dole,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency Albert S. Willis,
U. S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Honolulu.