No. 45.
Interview with Antone Rosa,
Honolulu, April 17, 1893.
Mr. Blount. I would like to have your opinion as to the various causes which culminated in the dethronement of the Queen.
Mr. Rosa. The only legitimate cause—if that can be construed into a cause—is this: The Queen signing the opium bill, which passed more than two thirds of the house and was favored by two members of the cabinet, and her signing the lottery bill, and the presumption on their part that the Queen was using her influence in an underhand way to oust the Wilcox cabinet. Those were the immediate causes.
Q. What were the remote causes?
A. The remote causes I should judge to be a dissatisfaction on their part in not being able to control the Government. I mean by that in not having their own men at the head of the Government. I do not think they cared much about the minor offices, but the cabinet and the principal offices of the Government they wanted to control, claiming that they are the substantial people of the country; and I can not see any more tangible cause than this. The Queen since her reign has not exercised any of the powers her late brother did.
Q. What do you mean by the powers he exercised?
A. Such as meddling with politics, demanding certain persons to be put in office, and undue expenditures of public money. She did not have as much right to enter into politics as her late brother, because during his reign whenever the ministry did not carry out his projects he would dismiss them without a vote of want of confidence.
Q. Without a vote of want of confidence?
A. Yes; prior to the constitution of 1887.
Q. After that did he dismiss the ministers without a vote of want of confidence?
A. No, he did not; he could not. He sometimes would obstruct some of the movements of the so-called Reform party. It went so far one time as to force the cabinet to require the King to make a pledge; I do not think he was made to sign it.
Q. What was the pledge?
A. That he should not in anyway obstruct the proceedings of the ministers, nor interfere in politics, but that he should accept every advice from them, as they were responsible for the King’s acts under the constitution. I do not think he exercised any rights against the cabinet except what he thought he had a right to; as, for instance, the right to veto. They contended that he did not have that right personal to himself, but that it was a right which he should exercise by and with the advice of his cabinet. That question was submitted to the supreme court and they decided in his favor.
Q. By unanimous vote?
A. I can not say; but I could refer to it. It was decided in favor of His Majesty’s contention that it was a personal prerogative.
Q. What was the cause of the revolution of Wilcox?
A. The revolution of Wilcox on July 20, 1889, was a public demonstration of the natives’ opposition to the constitution.
Q. How?
A. They contended that he was the undercurrent in the attempt to overthrow the Government, but he publicly denounced it in a letter, written at my instance and at the instance of another friend of his. [Page 940] He was then quartered at the boathouse. I personally thought he was a party to it.
Q. That Wilcox was?
A. No; that His Majesty was. I personally felt that way.
Q. How do you mean he was a party to it?
A. I cannot tell you from any direct evidence; but circumstances appeared to me as though he was a party to it.
Q. In what way; what was the scheme he was trying to effectuate?
A. It was the overthrow of the 1887 constitution, and to be replaced by another one which he framed. The fact of his having his Queen removed from the palace the night before the movement; the fact of his intimacy with certain revolutionary leaders, and other circumstances, which I can not call to mind, make me think so. I was very intimate with him then, but felt that his conduct through the whole matter was unjust.
Q. You think that he was secretly promoting the movement to undermine the Government with a view to giving him the powers he had prior to the constitution of 1887?
A. I believe so.
Q. Was that generally entertained?
A. I believe so—by the cabinet.
Q. Who was in the cabinet?
A. Thurston, minister of the interior; Damon, minister of finance; C. W. Ashford, attorney-general and Jonathan Austin, minister of foreign affairs. About 1 o’clock in the morning the King received a message that the movement was to dethrone him and put Liliuokalani in power.
Q. When he received this message where was he?
A. In the palace.
Q. Was that the day before the revolution broke out?
A. It was the same morning. It was supported by the fact that W. R. Castle and others had approached the present Queen and asked her if she would not take the throne. This may require corroboration. It is secret history. It is not denied that she had been approached on that subject. I do not know whether she favored it or not, but he distrusted it and somewhat intimated it to me personally.
Q. Now to pass on, how about the Wilcox cabinet? How did that happen to get out?
A. It was a very satisfactory cabinet. It did not seem so to the house. They were got out by means of some maneuvering. The Nationalists and Liberals joined to get them out.
Q. The Liberals came over to the Nationalists?
A. Yes. And which ever way they went they tumbled out the cabinet. I suppose the reason is that the natives feared they were an annexation cabinet. The natives were all afraid of them save myself. I did not believe it, because up to that time they were all anti-annexationists, and I knew Wilcox was against it at that time and prior to it. He has always been friendly to the aatives, always opposed to anything that might lead to annexation, and he is a good man, particularly friendly to the natives. But he has always said if it was done voluntarily by the natives he was willing to join in.
Q. The constitution of 1887 took from the King the power to appoint nobles?
A. Yes.
Q. It then provided for an election by electors having $3,000 worth of property unincumbered or an income of $600?
[Page 941]A. Yes.
Q. The elimination of everybody except persons having these qualifications left the relative strength of the foreign population in what proportion?
A. I should presume three-fifths of the voters were foreigners and two-fifths natives; perhaps less. The foreigners became much stronger.
Q. There was also coupled with that the permission on the part of foreigners who claimed their citizenship in other countries to vote?
A. Yes; by registering and taking oath. It was always a dangerous element to the native people, because a man for the sake of a few months’ occupation could vote.
Q. The power to appoint nobles was taken from the King and conferred practically upon what are sometimes termed foreigners?
A. Yes, that is true; there is no question about it.
Q. Was that or was it not a cause of discontent among the native population?
A. Yes; I suppose it was.
Q. Do the native population want the right to vote for nobles themselves or do they want the power vested in the Queen?
A. I believe that they want the power in themselves, but I myself and a few of us have always felt that it is an unsafe thing to give them all that power, and that is one reason why it has not been adjudged safe to give them full power—only to give them some limited power.
Q. How far did you want to go?
A. I should go down to three or four hundred income and, say, a thousand dollars’ worth of property. I presume they would be satisfied if that right were given to the Queen. Then opposition would come from the foreigners to that.
Q. You think they would be content to give up the right to vote for nobles?
A. I believe so.
Q. Is it the desire of the native population to have the Queen appoint the nobles rather than to have the right to vote for nobles themselves?
A. I think so; that is, of the mass. Now, a person like me—I would not like to see it.
Q. You want more extended suffrage?
A. Yes. I would rather the sovereign should not exercise that right. She might be influenced to appoint persons who ought not to be appointed—who would not fail, for instance, in the Legislature to vote for the measure she favored or that the cabinet favored. She might appoint very good men, like Mr. Bishop, Mr. Irving, and Mr. Damon and others.
Q. Is it that feeling of preferring the exercise of the power of creating nobles growing out of the old relationship of the masses of the people to a chief, and consequent tendency to obey a chief, rather than an appreciation of the forms of popular government?
A. Yes; I have not the least doubt that it is the desire of more than nine-tenths of the Hawaiian population, meaning native Hawaiian. They have always felt that as long as a Hawaiian was at the head of the Government—their sovereign—that they were always safe as regards the country and its general welfare. I believe if this subject were put to a popular vote I would be right in my view.
Q. Do you mean to say that you believe that they would favor the appointing of the nobles by the Queen?
A. I do.
[Page 942]Q. And would not care for an election of nobles by the people?
A. Yes.
Q. Is the preference for the appointment of nobles by the Queen the result of the fear that in an election they may sometimes lose in a contest with foreign residents, or is it independent of any fear of foreign residents, or is it a fear of their own ability to wisely elect nobles?
A. I do not think it is from a fear on their part to wisely elect nobles, but it is from a fear that the foreigners will be supreme in the elections. The result of the elections so far since this right has been taken away from the sovereign confirms what I say—the nobles nominated under this system by the foreign element have nearly all been elected.
Q. Suppose the property qualification was reduced to moderate figures, would that make any change in the sentiment of the natives on the question of preference between the appointment of nobles by the Queen and voting for them?
A. I hardly think so. I think they prefer that power left with the throne.
Q. Suppose the property qualification to vote for a noble was the same as that which obtains in the matter of electing a representative, would the native mind prefer to create nobles in that way, or would it prefer that the Crown should appoint them?
A. My impression is that they would prefer to have the right in their own hands, not distrusting the Queen, however.
Q. Why would they prefer it?
A. It would be granting them rights which they never had.
Q. You think, then, if they had the right to elect in the way that I have indicated that that old disposition to subserviency to the chief would be replaced by a disposition to select their government by popular methods. I do not mean the dethronement of the Queen, I mean in the way I have indicated?
A. I think they would use that privilege fairly. They would not be subservient to the sovereign. I think they would exercise it fairly and wisely.
Q. Then is it with them a selection between the present mode of electing nobles and the Queen’s appointing them?
A. I do not know that it would make any difference to them as to whether they exercised the right or the Queen did, for the reason that the subject has not been much discussed among them. They consider it unfair that they in their own land should not have the right to vote for nobles. That has been the contention. It has not been put in the shape you have placed it, so that I can not give you any idea in that form.
Q. Is the discontent of the native population with the mode of selecting nobles that it takes away from the natives the right to vote?
A. Yes; there is no doubt about that. That is clearly the reason why there is so much discontent. I have no hesitancy in answering that.
Q. In the fear of political aggressions by foreign residents to the disadvantage of the natives, is it true that the natives feel that they would be secure in the appointment of nobles by the Queen or by manhood suffrage?
A. It is true that they would feel more secure if the nobles were either appointed by the sovereign or by giving the native population the right to vote for them without any property qualification. It is the popular view now and the subject has been a source of discontent for years to the Hawaiian people. It appears in the newspapers and all [Page 943] over the country, in fact. The revolution of 1889, of Wilcox, was with that view mainly.
Q. With a view of doing away with that mode of electing nobles?
A. Yes, sir; and to restore it to the sovereign or popular vote. Of course this view would be very strenuously opposed by the foreign element.
Q. Is that the view of the mass of the population of the islands?
A. There is no question about it.
Q. How do a majority of the people of the islands feel toward the existing government?
A. They are opposed to it.
Q. I hear—I don’t know as to the truth of it—that a good many of the native people are signing petitions for annexation, which would indicate that they were in line with the Provisional Government?
A. I do not believe it. Those who are signing, perhaps, are those directly affected by pecuniary considerations, such as being in the employment of persons who favor annexation, and such as being in a position to receive money from them in any business way—in a legitimate way, probably—and for fear that they would be dismissed from service.
Q. Suppose the matter of sustaining the Provisional Government in its policy and purposes was submitted to a popular vote in the islands with the qualification of a person voting for representative, what would be the result, in your opinion?
A. I think they would be swamped.
Q. By how much?
A. I should say four-fifths.
Q. Of the total vote?
A. Yes. Practically speaking, they have no support. They get it simply from a business point of view. The best test as to their support would be to see their list of citizens’ oath. You will find they have two oaths. One the citizen’s oath, the other the official oath. They have a strong list of Government employés, Hawaiians, who say they are in favor of annexation. Certainly they would say so. The only independent body of natives was the Hawaiian Band. They are the only ones who stood out, notwithstanding my advice to sign the official oath. I signed one. I am a notary public. I did not sign the citizen’s oath.
Q. Did you write the communication addressed to Mr. Stevens, the American minister, on the 17th of January, 1893, signed by Samuel Parker, minister of foreign off airs; William H. Cornwell, minister of finance; John P. Colburn, minister of the interior, and A: P. Peterson, attorney-general?
A. I did.
Q. What was done with that paper; who did you deliver it to?
A. I delivered it to Hopkins. A press copy was taken. I wrote the address myself, and Mr. Hopkins was dispatched with it, and I left the room. It was written in the marshal’s office at the station house.
Q. Was there a reply from Mr. Stevens?
A. I was not there when the reply was received.
Q. A reply was received?
A. Yes; a reply was received to the effect that the Provisional Government being in possession of the Government building, treasury, and Government archives, he recognized them as a Government de facto.
Q. Up to that time was the Queen in possession of the barracks, palace, and station house?
A. She was.
[Page 944]Q. Up to that time had there been any effort on the part of the Provisional Government to take possession of them?
A. No effort whatever.
Q. After the reply of Mr. Stevens came was there any demand on the part of the Provisional Government for the surrender of these places?
A. I only know from hearsay. I saw Mr. Damon and others who came to the station house for that purpose, quite late, about half past six or seven.
Q. Was that after the reply?
A. Long after.
Q. Up to that time the people who proclaimed the Provisional Government made no aggressive movement beyond going to the Government building?
A. None whatever.
Q. After they issued the proclamation everything remained in statu quo until the recognition by Mr. Stevens of the Provisional Government?
A. Yes.
Q. Subsequent to this was the proposition on the part of the Provisional authorities to the Queen to surrender?
A. Yes; I was there when Mr. Wilson surrendered. I think they had McCandless there. He made a few remarks. He said that he would only surrender on condition that the United States troops would make demand on him, or the Queen should ask him to surrender.
Q. Now, after this response from Mr. Stevens, was there a cabinet consultation on the subject of surrender?
A. I can not tell you, either from hearsay or in anyway. After receiving that reply from Mr. Stevens it fell flat like a pancake.
Q. How much time intervened between the reception of that reply and the surrender of the station house and barracks?
A. Two hours.
Q. In these two hours, where were you?
A. Around the neighborhood of the station house in my office; within a space of say, 200 yards. Business people and everybody thronged around the station house and by Bishop’s bank.
Q. What was their object?
A. To hear the news as to whether Mr. Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government. I remember the news was brought to me that he had declined to recognize it. Then news came that he had recognized it.
Q. There was an eagerness obtaining in the minds of the people, both in the reform party and the native population, to know just what Mr. Stevens was going to do?
A. Exactly, it was the turning point of everything.
Q. And when that was ascertained?
A. It fell flat as a pancake.
Q. And when that was ascertained, the minds of all persons seemed to accept that as authority?
A. Oh, yes. It was Mr. Stevens’ attitude in the matter to which all persons looked up. Bear in mind, Mr. Blount, that the evening before I had heard from two members of the cabinet that Mr. Stevens had told them troops were landed to protect people and to keep the Queen in office, and I was surprised to hear this.
Q. Who told you this?
A. Colburn and Parker. They said they had Mr. Stevens’s word that the troops were landed to protect the Queen.
Q. Where were the troops stationed at the time of the proclamation?
[Page 945]A. Between Arion Hall and the Government building, with their field pieces out.
Q. At what point?
A. Bight in front of Arion Hall, 50 or 100 feet from the corner of Music Hall. They faced there while the proclamation was being read faced, the Government building.
Q. Were the troops formed?
A. They were formed.
Q. Where was the artillery?
A. I can not tell you whether it was on that side of Music Hall or on the other side.
Q. What street were the troops on?
A. I do not know whether it is called Wilder’s lane or Gibson’s lane. It was the lane or street between Arion Hall and the Government building.
Q. Where was the artillery?
A. With the troops on the same street.
Q. They were not in the hall, but formed on that lane or street?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was the situation when the proclamation of the Provisional Government was read?
A. It was.
Q. And nothing further was done by the Provisional Government in the matter of taking possession of the Palace, the barracks and the police quarters until Mr. Stevens had formally recognized it?
A. Nothing was done by it.
Q. And when that was made known, the recognition by Mr. Stevens, there was a feeling on the part of the native population and of foreigners that this determined the controversy?
A. Yes; the Provisional Government had a few men around the Government building.
Q. Where?
A. Around the Government building. I think there were about 30 or 40 in the inclosure of the Government building.
Q. They didn’t come out of the inclosures?
A. No.
Q. Were there any guards at the entrance of the inclosure?
A. No.
Q. Do you know anything of a visit of Mr. Parker and Mr. Colburn to Mr. Stevens on Monday?
A. I do not know of my own knowledge, except that we often sent them there.
Q. Were they sent on Monday?
A. Two or three times.
Q. What report did they bring back?
A. That the troops would be landed. That they would be landed to protect the Queen.
I have carefully read the foregoing and pronounce it an accurate report of my interview with Mr. Blount.