Mr. Blacklock to Mr. Wharton.
Apia, Samoa, December 6, 1892.
Sir: In reply to Department’s instruction No. 121, dated November 3, 1892, I have the honor to say that, with the exception of a few minor native rows in different parts of the group, affairs in Samoa remain unchanged, and there is no apparent danger from the Mataafa movement assuming an aggressive aspect at present.
This Mataafa movement is gradually losing strength, and his chiefs are getting tired of trying to get new allies, and I think have about given up the idea of attempting any active hostilities towards the Government.
Matters are just about as they have been for over a year, and as reported in my dispatch No. 149, of December 8, 1891, with respect to the King’s party wanting to attack Malie. Only to-day a messenger came to me to say that Atua, Tuamasaga, and Faasaleleaga were ready for an attak on Malie, but when I speak with them on the subject they always say that if a new chief justice and president were appointed the Malie party would break up. I give them hope that such a deliverance is possible and they postpone operations.
After my dispatch No. 216, of October 8, was written affairs took a turn for the worse among the natives, as reported in my dispatch No. 229, of November 9, 1892; now again the aspect is more peaceful; and so these changes have been taking place for years.
Ever since Mataafa’s establishment at Malie he has endeavored to gather strength, and there is not the slightest doubt, had he been successful in getting sufficient following, he would have made war upon Malietoa. He has done everything in opposing the Government except making war; he has defied its courts, obstructed its officials in the execution of their duties, harbored refugees from justice, succored and supported prisoners escaped from prison, and at the present moment is living in open defiance of the King and Government and all the laws of the country, keeping up an armed force and plundering foreigners’ plantations for subsistence.
Time and again have white officials who went to Malie with warrants for the arrest of offenders been driven away by Mataafa’s soldiers and warned against attempting any arrest under penalty of death.
Once two or three of his refugees came to Mulinuu to attend trial for some petty offense, after, however, having been sheltered by Mataafa and the officer of the [Page 666] supreme court who went to arrest them having been ordered away from Malie by Mataafa’s people. The principal offender, however, was very carefully left at Malie, and the others were dismissed for want of evidence and returned to Malie.
With the exception of this time the followers of Mataafa at Malie have never submitted to the service upon them of the processes of the supreme court.
The effect of a joint military movement at the present time would be of very little avail. In the first place, three ships are not enough; again, this is the wrong time of the year for ships to be knocking about this group; and, furthermore, any attempt at the present moment to force the natives to submit to the present Government would not only have almost the entire opposition of the white population but I fear would be the means of strengthening the Mataafa party, and, if a general disarmament was talked of, to perhaps unite the Samoans against foreign aggression.
The using of war ships against these people is a very serious matter, and one which must be gone into after most careful deliberation. It will never do to risk for a moment the minutest chance of a false step; every possible movement and attitude of the Samoans must be cautiously considered, and every precaution taken to checkmate any and every move they might make after operations are begun against them. I thoroughly agree that is is quite impossible to let things remain as they are; they will never completely right themselves.
This Mataafa movement must be stamped out once and for all, thoroughly and completely, and the natives taught that a treaty made with three powers like the United States, England, and Germany means something. What must be considered, is the best way of doing this.
At present there are many pretexts which people can set forth as good reasons for not submitting to the Government and its laws; these, however, have all grown up since Mataafa withdrew from Mulinuu; his sole reason for not remaining at the seat of government was that he was not the head.
This is his great ambition in life; he is steadfast in the hope of yet attaining this position, and in it he is constantly encouraged by whites opposed to Malietoa.
Mataafa personally has never been favorable to Malietoa being King, or any one else but himself; he has always considered that position his, and when Malietoa was again recognized as King under the treaty, although he pretended to support him, he and his followers were secretly preparing to revolt, just as they did before under Tamasese’s rule.
As long as Mataafa lives he will never give up the idea of being King of Samao
His following can easily be reduced and no danger to the peace of the country apprehended, but he will always cherish the one everlasting desire to be King.
The principal and primary point, therefore, to be gained is to weaken his support, and the easiest and best mode of accomplishing this is to strengthen the Malietoa Government by the withdrawal of useless and unnessary officials and appointing a chief justice known to be competent of dealing with a semibarbarous people and qualified as a judge capable of deciding the many and varied questions that must come before him.
* * * * * * *
Mataafa’s followers, with the exception of a few who hang close around him for the temporary rank it gives them, being really nothing or nobodies in their own right, are getting very tired of their job, the principal reason being that no results come out of that so-called Government any more than from Mulinuu.
My suggestion for the adjustment of the present existing unsatisfactory state of affairs here is, amend the, few bad parts in the treaty which have been pointed out at different times; appoint a new chief justice; dispense entirely with the office of president; let the treaty powers send here two ships each, prepared to go to the last extremity if necessary, and then the suggestions of the German Government could be carried out, as the plan of operations laid down by it is a good one, and quite practicable if sufficient force is visible.
I do not apprehend any difficulty in disarming the whole of Samoa, provided the people see some signs of a good and stable Government, but under the present existing farce I should fully expect to see the natives unite and slaughter all white residents sooner than be forced to submit to paying taxes, which all go to officials, and of which not a single cent is spent in any improvements in the country, in any shape whatever.
The act of a disarmament is the first step towards a protectorate, and the three powers will thereby bind themselves to protect Samoans from each other or any outside power. Of course the fact of Samoans being armed would not prevent any power taking the country should it so desire, but disarming them would no doubt lessen the risk of the undertaking.
On the other hand the Samoans require protection against themselves and to take away their rifles would be doing them a good service.
I have, etc.,
Vice Consul-General.