Mr. Thompson to Mr. Gresham.
Petropolis, March 19, 1894. (Received April 16.)
Sir: The surrender of Saldanha da Gama on the 13th instant, with all ships and munitions of war in his possession, will remove the revolution from the port of Rio de Janeiro, if, indeed, it does not bring it to a close. The insurgents, however, still maintain their army in the south and have possession of some territory. The main points of interest with regard to the surrender were cabled you at the time and I will here only narrate in brief the circumstances.
On Friday the 9th instant flags were displayed over the hill batteries in the city. This indicated aggressive action on the part of the Government, and on Saturday a rumor was current that a general engagement would be inaugurated the next day. Upon inquiry at the foreign office I found there was no truth in these reports and was assured that the Government would adhere to its engagement to give forty-eight hours’ notice before using the batteries in the city.
Sunday at 2 p.m. a secretary from the English legation called to show me a telegram which had just been received by Mr. Wyndham, dean of the diplomatic corps, from the minister for foreign affairs. The telegram stated that at the expiration of forty-eight hours from 12 m. of that day, the 11th instant, the Government would use the hill batteries in the city against the insurgents. I immediately communicated to you this intelligence, wired our vice-consul in Rio a notice (Inclosure No. 1 herewith) of warning to be posted at the consulate and otherwise communicated to American citizens, and requesting him to send a copy to Admiral Benham. I then conferred with other diplomatic representatives, the dean of the corps, Mr. Wyndham, the Italian minister, French chargé d’affaires, and the Portuguese chargé d’affaires. Much difficulty was experienced in communicating with the consulates on Sunday, and as the notice did not reach the diplomatic corps until several hours after 12 o’clock, the beginning of the forty-eight hour term, it was agreed that Mr. Wyndham should communicate these facts to the Government and suggest the ad visibility of an extension, to enable timely notice to be given to the public. Accordingly a telegram was sent (Inclosure No. 2) and answer received (Inclosure No. 3), which extended the notice three hours. I, however, did not think any extension would be given and proceeded accordingly. When I reached the consulate, early Monday, my telegram of Sunday afternoon had just been received by the vice-consul, who had not been able to send notice to the admiral. Having no direct communication with the squadron, at my request Vice-Consul Lewis went on a special mission conveying a letter from me to Admiral Benham, which advised him of the situation.
Early in the morning I met the Portuguese chargé d’affaires, who informed me that he had received at 11 o’clock Sunday night a telegram from the senior commander of the Portuguese naval forces [Page 142] advising him of the request of Saldanha da Gama for an asylum on his ships, which had been granted. At 10:30 o’clock I met the Portuguese chargé d’affaires again, and learned from him that da Gama had not gone on board the Mindello, but had submitted, through the Portuguese commander, terms of capitulation (wired you same day), to which he expected a response before availing himself of the asylum. The chargé d’affaires asked if I would concert with other diplomats in recommending the Government to accept the proposed terms of capitulation and I declined to do so. In response to an inquiry if Admiral Benham had been consulted about the matter I was informed that he had not, for the reason that there was not time. Subsequently I learned that the Government had rejected the proposition and advised you by wire of the same.
Tuesday the 13th all communication with the water front and principal business streets was stopped at 11 o’clock, and at 12 m., Fort Santa Cruz, Largé, San Joao, and the batteries at Nictheroy opened on Cobras, Villegaignon, and the rebel ships. No response was made by the insurgents, and at 3 p.m., precisely, the hill batteries in the city joined in the action. The fire was incessant for twenty minutes from all the Government’s fortified points and at 3:35 it ceased altogether. Having a good view of the bay, I observed at this time the French cruiser Magon passing the anchorage of our fleet in the direction of the outlet of the bay, and the Government fleet, which had remained outside, coming in. Soon after this the unconditional surrender of those who had remained on Enxadas Island, where all the insurgent forces had congregated when they left Cobras, Villegaignon, and their ships, was announced. The Government forces proceeded at once to occupy the practically abandoned forts and ships, meeting with slight resistance only from a few courageous spirits who remained at one or two points to the last. While the firing was going on, Saldanha da Gama, with about 480 of his officers and men, left Enxadas Island and went on board the Portuguese war vessels. I am informed by Admiral Benham that during the transfer da Gama was again wounded in the arm by a piece of shell. There seems to be no doubt that the refugees went on board the Portuguese ships under fire. The next day a Portuguese merchant steamer attempted to leave the harbor with some of the insurgents on board and was stopped by the Government, and the refugees, numbering about 90, were taken off.
The Government has demanded from Portugal the surrender of the refugees on board the ships of war, and the matter has become a very interesting case of asylum, which will be reported later. By consent of the Government, with the assurance of the Portuguese commander that the refugees would be held pending the settlement of the diplomatic question, on account of the yellow fever prevailing on the bay, the ships have been allowed to go temporarily beyond the barra.
I have, etc.,