No. 62.
Mr. Trescot
to Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Washington, D. C., June 5, 1882.
Sir: In dispatch No. 24, dated Lima, May 3, 1882, I inclosed an account of my interviews with Señor Alvarez, the Peruvian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the letter which in consequence I addressed to the Chilian Government.
The purpose of that letter was to urge upon the Chilian Government the acceptance of the preliminary conditions which the Peruvian Government thought necessary to the initiation of a serious negotiation for peace.
The conditions were:
- 1.
- That General Montero should be recognized as the executive head of an actual government.
- 2.
- That, under the provisions of a short truce, he should be afforded the opportunity to convene the National Congress at Arequipa, in order that he might receive from it the authority necessary for the conclusion of a peace.
My reasons for the representation made to the Chilian Government in this connection have been so fully stated in my dispatch to the Department, and in the communication to the Chilian Government, that they need not now be repeated.
It only remains for me to state what consideration has so far been given to the proposed conditions.
For reasons which have been stated in former dispatches, I was obliged to leave Lima before my communication in its formal shape could reach the Chilian Government at Santiago. But that government has in Lima a diplomatic representative in the person of Señor Novoa, who is authorized to consider any propositions tending to a negotiation for peace.
The whole subject was fully discussed with him and General Lynch, the military commander of the Chilian army of occupation, and the propositions, [Page 104] with the substance of the conference, were telegraphed by Señor Novoa to his government.
I do not regard the telegraphic reply which was communicated by Señor Novoa as conclusive. My dispatches had not yet reached the Chilian Government, and I think it clear that the bare statement of the propositions had not put the Chilian Government in full possession of the considerations which recommended their adoption. I have other reasons for believing that the question is still an open one.
The reply of the Government of Chili, as communicated by Señor Novoa, intimated:
- 1.
- That as no active military operations were being conducted by the Chilian army, there was no apparent necessity for a truce. But it is obvious that, as Arequipa is open at any moment to occupation by the Chilian troops from Mollendo, the Peruvian Congress would naturally and properly require some guarantee that its deliberations should be free and uninterrupted. A repetition of the dissolution of Congress because its deliberations were not agreeable to the Chilian Government is a contingency which the Congress, in view of the past, could scarcely disregard, and which would make any effort at negotiation only another unfortunate failure. Beside which, if there are, and are to be, no active military operations, there can be no possible danger or inconvenience to Chili in giving such a condition of things the sanction of a formal agreement by a short notice.
- 2.
- While the Chilian Government desired peace, it was unwilling to enter upon negotiation without distinct agreement in advance of the terms which must be accepted. It was dissatisfied with the experience of its former attempts at negotiation with the Calderon government and was indisposed to renew the effort without the certainty of a successful result. It was willing, therefore, to negotiate informally with General Montero, and upon the signature of satisfactory preliminaries would recognize the existence of the Peruvian Government, pari passu, with the execution of the treaty.
But the Congress which had authorized General Montero to negotiate had expressly forbidden any cesson of territory, and it was, therefore, simply impossible for General Montero to sign a treaty containing such provisions. After some discussion Señor Novoa expressed his willingness to accept a preliminary agreement by which General Montero would bind himself to submit for approval, to the National Congress, such a treaty as he and Señor Novoa could agree upon, and to recognize General Montero’s government upon the execution of such an instrument. This would have afforded an opportunity for the opening of negotiations, but Señor Novoa added the limitation that if the Congress did not approve the treaty so submitted, the recognition would be withdrawn. This was simply an impossible condition. The recognition of the Montero government had to be positive. If Congress failed to approve, Chili could still prosecute the war until Peru was compelled to accept her terms, but such a contingent recognition was in fact only the old proposition of a treaty before recognition in another and much more illogical and embarrassing shape. Señor Novoa was willing to adopt another method. He would sign a treaty with General Montero to be submitted and approved by the municipalities; that is, by the local authorities of the separate provinces. Such a method was entirely beyond General Montero’s constitutional powers, and would, I think, have led to the renewal of the differences between the various parties in Peru, who, accepting General Montero as the legitimate representative of the government, would acquiesce in the regular action of the Executive and Congress.
[Page 105]As Señor Novoa was either indisposed or unauthorized to move out of this vicious circle, our conferences terminated.
I regret this the more as I think the propositions offered a fair prospect of a serious negotiation. Chili cannot obtain a peace which will give sanction and title to her acquisition of territory without the recognition of a legitimate government in Peru. Without a treaty with such authority the acquisition will be simply one of force to be maintained as it has been acquired. The recognition of General Montero’s government will place upon him, and upon the people of Peru, the responsibility of making or rejecting peace, while the calling of Congress will afford the opportunity to those who desire peace to do what they cannot do under present circumstances—organize a party which can exert its influence directly, effectively, and legitimately in the Congress itself.
But I cannot with justice conclude this dispatch without saying that I believe the reason which induces the hesitation of Chili is that she believes that, so long as the Peruvians are convinced that the United States will finally intervene, they never will negotiate in earnest.
It is unquestionably true that the Peruvian Government does believe that the United States will intervene; at any rate they consider that the question of intervention, as one of their leading officials expressed it to me, was still a pending question.
It is obvious that neither Chili nor Peru will approach the solution of their difficulties in the proper spirit, or with any hope of a result satisfactory to both, as long as this impression lasts.
If the United States intend to intervene effectively to prevent the disintegration of Peru, the time has come when that intention should be avowed. If it does not, still more urgent is the necessity that Chili and Peru should understand exactly where the action of the United States ends. It would be entirely beyond my duty to discuss the character or the consequences of either line of conduct, but I trust that you will not deem that I am going beyond that duty in impressing upon the government that the present position of the United States is an embarrassment to all the belligerents, and that it should be terminated as promptly as possible.
There is another conviction which it is clearly my duty to express. I believe that whenever the United States formally withdraws from further intervention, Peru will apply to the European powers, and that a joint intervention of two or more is probable. It is not for me to anticipate what view the Department will take of such a possibility.
I have, &c.,