Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 5, 1881

No. 575.
Mr. Hurlbut to Mr. Blaine.

Legation of the United States,
Lima, Peru, October 26, 1881.

No. 23.]

Sir: The Department of State will no doubt have been advised of the excitement in Chili, over the publication by the newspapers in that country of a copy of a “memorandum” addressed by me to Admiral Lynch, a document which I forwarded to the Department as inclosure to my dispatch No. 8, of the 27th August, 1881.

I do not know by whom the publication of this note was effected. It appeared first in the Chilian newspapers, and I presume was given to the press by the Chilian Government as a basis for the note of Mr. Valmaseda to Mr. Kilpatrick. It seems somewhat singular that although General Kilpatrick has been unable to write to me during all this time, anything more than a brief note as to his health, that he should yet have been able to answer the communication of Mr. Valmaseda on the very day of its date, and at such very considerable length.

It is not for me to criticise the act of my colleague at Santiago. I sent him a copy of the “memorandum” at the same time that I sent it to the Department.

I have not received from him any copy of the correspondence between him and the Chilian authorities, and my only knowledge of it comes from the publications in Chili and in this city.

If, however, these are to be accepted as correct, there would seem to be a radical difference between General Kilpatrick and myself, which demands the attention of the Department. Neither Mr. Kilpatrick nor the Chilian authorities have as yet attacked by argument the principles of international law laid down in the memorandum; nor do I believe that they can be successfully attacked.

They have chosen to affirm that these utterances contain a threat of active intervention on the part of the United States, which is nowhere asserted in the document. The question of what the United States may think proper to do, is one which can only he resolved by the President, and communicated when so resolved through the Department, and until so informed, it is not competent for General Kilpatrick or for me to limit the United States in any respect. I affirm that, according to my best judgment, the principles laid down in the “Lynch memorandum,” are those which do in fact control, and in right ought to control the conduct of the United States; that they are and ought to be the bases of international law on this continent, and that Chili and Peru and all other powers in America, ought to accept and be guided by them. All this, of course, although clearly my opinion and belief, is subject to the revision and final determination of the State Department, and whatever may be the decision, it will be obeyed and faithfully carried out by me, so long as I have the honor to represent the United States in my present capacity. It, however, becomes my duty to represent to the Department the results which, in my judgment, may be expected from their decision.

Upon reaching the Isthmus, on my way down, I encountered in all the newspapers of the South American Republics, an expectation and desire that the United States, as natural head of the republican forms of this continent, should, in some way or other, put an end to this war between Chili and Peru.

I found, on arriving here, the same sentiment and belief, among the Chilians in the form of apprehension, among the Peruvians in that of hope. I found the English and French legations apprehending the same thing, but diligently at work to put all obstacles in the way of its fulfillment. I have been careful never to speak or write of any action whatever, on the part of the United States, but have never hesitated on proper occasion, to state what I believed, and now believe to be our opinions on the questions involved, and have never gone beyond what is set forth in the “Lynch memorandam.”

Inasmuch as the United States had recognized Garcia Calderon as the President of Peru, I have done all I could properly do to unite Peru under his authority, and have succeeded in so doing, despite of the influences exercised against such a result by the other legations, notably those of England and France.

To-day no other government has any respectable foothold in Peru, and Piérola must either run away or fall a victim to mutiny in his own forces.

This dominant influence of the United States in Peru is now a fact, and has been acquired as I have stated.

It is, in my judgment, eminently worth while for the United States to keep this position, not only here but in all America, and their retention of this position depends upon their own action.

If the Government of the United States choose to say the word, this wretched state of things will cease. If they choose to say that the time for peace has arrived, peace will be made.

If they choose to say that the two countries should submit the question of indemnity to arbitration in case they cannot agree, such submission will be had, and the matter end honorably to both countries.

Unless the United States do take such positions, indefinite military occupation of Peru, or so much as the Chilian forces can cover, will be the result; anarchy, violence, plundering by petty war parties will dominate over the country, and the ruin of all foreign investments in the country will follow. If the United States, after denying to these people any application for aid from any European State, shall themselves refuse any help in their desperate situation, it would seem to be almost a breach of national faith. I, myself, am a profound believer in the right and duty of the United States to control the political questions of this continent, to the exclusion of any and all European dictation. This belief I understand to be held also by the American people, and to have been asserted by Congress. This I also understand to be the doctrine of the administration which sent me to this place.

The opportunity to put the doctrine into practice is now before us, and as the communication is so slow I state here the probable course of affairs, and ask for instructions.

The two Chilian plenipotentiaries, Altamirano and Novoa, have arrived to-day. They are said to have full powers. They will either recognize the Calderon government or fail to find any with which they can treat. If they do not recognize that government I shall consider such fact evidence that they do not want peace. If they do, and peace negotiations commence, I believe they will drop the word “cession” and substitute “pledge;” that they will demand an enormous indemnity, and to hold the southern provinces as pledge and security for the payment.

Peru will offer thirty to forty millions as indemnity. This will be refused, and then affairs are at a stand. Peru will then offer to submit the question of amount to arbitration. This offer, I think, will be refused.

It seems to me that the opportunity for the United States will be to insist early in the negotiation, and forcibly, that the principle of arbitration shall be accepted and acted on.

The mode of such insistance must, of course, be determined by the Department, but I feel sure that it ought to be done, and done at an early stage, and before Chili commits herself by a refusal to entertain arbitration. I have no doubt of the result if so done. Chili cannot afford to refuse it. Peru asks nothing but an impartial arbiter, and the result will place the United States where they ought to be, as the acknowledged head of the republican system of America.

Yet very prompt action is necessary for this result, of which I hope to be promptly advised by telegraph or otherwise.

I have, &c.,

S. A. HURLBUT.

[Inclosure in No. 23.—Translation.]

Señor Balmaceda to Mr. Kilpatrick.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Santiago, the 8 th of October, 1881.

Sir: The newspapers of Valparaiso and of this city have published the memorandum addressed on the 24th of August, by Mr. S. A. Hurlbut, United States minister in Lima, to the commander-in-chief of our army of occupation in that city, Rear-Admiral Lynch.

Mr. Hurlbut’s letter, accompanying the memorandum referred to, has not, however, been published; in it the said gentleman began by saying to Admiral Lynch that in the conversation alluded to in the memorandum diplomatic affairs were not discussed (no se trataba de asuntos diplomaticos.)

My government has thought it proper to draw attention to the irregularity of this conduct, disregarding the essential part of it, because they feel certain that the sentiments expressed in the memorandum are not the expressions of the wise, noble, and faithful policy observed by the United States with regard to the belligerents of the Pacific.

The strange publicity given to a document of small confidential importance, if we take into account its forms and the circumstances under which it was edited, compels me to address myself to your excellency, in order to obtain an answer that may establish officially the truth and sincerity of the relations so worthily cultivated by our respective governments.

Mr. Hurlbut’s address in presenting his credentials to the government of Señor García Calderon, now at an end; the memorandum addressed to Mr. Lynch, in which “diplomatic affairs were not discussed;” his well-known letter against Piérola, before whom Mr. Christiancy had been credited, and whose envoys met in conference in Arica, in the presence and with the full countenance of the representative of the United States; all these facts might produce deplorable disturbances and encourage our enemies uselessly, stimulating fruitless resistance without finally affecting the result of a war that in any event may become sanguinary.

Chili was provoked to war; the property of her citizens was confiscated, and they themselves inhumanly expelled from their homes; her industries were abandoned by thousands who elected to vindicate their rights and honor; enormous sums of money were expended in the maintenance of the war; the priceless blood of her sons was poured out; the enemy was routed and reduced to a radical and absolute impotency. We shall carry on the war so far as may be necessary to compel the vanquished to conclude peace, and in the adjustment of peace, practicing our rights, we shall act so far as may be necessary to obtain due reparation for the evils produced by this war, for the future security of peace, and for the permanent stability of the republic.

We shall exercise fully the primitive right which authorizes us amply to guarantee our own existence, a right confirmed at all times by the practice of European powers, and also by the United States, on this continent.

I feel confident that our rights as belligerents will be in the future as much respected by the United States as they have been to this very moment; the conduct of their representatives in Arica, and during all the course of the war; their friendly participation in the treaty resolving the boundary controversies with the Argentine Republic; their worthy international traditions, and the respect which as a powerful nation they owe specially to independent and sovereign states; all these circumstances give me a perfect security that the United States will continue to be the officious, may it be said, but always the neutral friends in this protracted struggle sustained by us against our enemies in the Pacific.

Inasmuch as motives strange to my government will have created an uncertain state of things in the public mind, which may be misunderstood and occasion therefore disagreeable emergencies in the difficult circumstances which the state of war creates to the belligerents, I hope to receive from your excellency the assurances which in accordance with your instructions you may give to my government regarding the reciprocal good understanding which exists, and that will be maintained in an invariable manner, between the republics we have the honor to represent.

I have, &c.,

J. M. BALMACEDA.