No. 329.
Mr. Blaine
to Mr. Lowell.
Washington, June 24, 1881.
Sir: It has fallen under the observation of the President, through the current statements of the European press and other usual channels of communication, that the great powers of Europe may possibly be considering the subject of jointly guaranteeing the neutrality of the interoceanic canal now projected across the Isthmus of Panama.
The United States recognizes a proper guarantee of neutrality as essential to the construction and successful operation of any highway across the Isthmus of Panama, and in the last generation every step was taken by this government that is deemed requisite in the premises. The necessity was foreseen and abundantly provided for, long in advance of any possible call for the actual exercise of power.
In 1846 a memorable and important treaty was negotiated and signed between the United States of America and the, Republic of New Granada, now the United States of Colombia. By the thirty-fifth article of that treaty, in exchange for certain concessions made to the United States we guaranteed “positively and efficaciously” the perfect neutrality of the isthmus and of any interoceanic communications that might be constructed upon or over it for the maintenance of free transit from sea to sea; and we also guaranteed the rights of sovereignty and property of the United States of Colombia over the territory of the isthmus as included within the borders of the State of Panama.
In the judgment of the President this guarantee, given by the United States of America, does not require re-enforcement, or accession, or assent from any other power. In more than one instance this government [Page 538] has been called upon to vindicate the neutrality thus guaranteed, and there is no contingency now foreseen or apprehended in which such vindication would not be within the power of this nation.
There has never been the slightest doubt on the part of the United States as to the purpose or extent of the obligation then assumed, by which it became surety alike for the free transit of the world’s commerce over whatever land-way or water-way might be opened from sea to sea, and for the protection of the territorial rights of Colombia from aggression or interference of any kind. Nor has there ever been room to question the full extent of the advantages and benefits, naturally due to its geographical position and political relations on the Western continent, which the United States obtained from the owner of the isthmian territory in exchange for that far-reaching and responsible guarantee.
If the foreshadowed action of the European powers should assume tangible shape, it would be well for you to bring to the notice of Lord Granville the provisions of the treaty of 1846, and especially of its thirty-fifth article, and to intimate to him that any movement in the sense of supplementing the guarantee contained therein would necessarily be regarded by this government as an uncalled-for intrusion into a field where the local and general interests of the United States of America must be considered before those of any other power save those of the United States of Colombia alone, which has already derived and will continue to derive such eminent advantages from the guarantee of this government.
The President deems it due to frankness to be still more explicit on this subject, and to elucidate the views of the United States Government with somewhat of detail to the end that no uncertainty shall subsist as to the integrity of our motives or the distinctness of our aims.
It is not the wish or the purpose of the United States to interfere with any commercial enterprise in which the citizens or subjects of any foreign power may see fit to embark under a lawful privilege. The fact of the stock and franchises of the Panama Canal or the Panama Railway being owned in Europe, either in whole or principally, is no more a subject of complaint on the part of the United States than is the circumstance that the stock of many of its own great lines of railway is largely held abroad. Such ownership, with its attendant rights, is in the United States amply secured by the laws of the land, and on the Isthmus is doubly secured by the local laws of Colombia, under the superior guarantee of the United States.
Nor, in time of peace, does the United States seek to have any exclusive privileges accorded to American ships in respect to precedence or tolls through an interoceanic canal any more than it has sought like privileges for American goods in transit over the Panama Railway, under the exclusive control of an American corporation. The extent of the privileges of American citizens and ships is measurable under the treaty of 1846 by those of Colombian citizens and ships. It would be our earnest desire and expectation to see the world’s peaceful commerce enjoy the same just, liberal, and rational treatment.
It is as regards the political control of such a canal, as distinguished from its merely administrative or commercial regulation, that the President feels called upon to speak with directness and with emphasis. During any war to which the United States of America or the United States of Colombia might be a party, the passage of armed vessels of a hostile nation through the canal at Panama would be no more admissible than would the passage of the armed forces of a hostile nation over [Page 539] the railway lines joining the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United States or of Colombia. And the United States of America will insist upon her right to take all needful precautions against the possibility of the Isthmus transit being in any event used offensively against her interests upon the land or upon the sea.
The two republics between which the guarantee of neutrality and possession exists have analogous conditions with respect to their territorial extension. Both have a long line of coast on either ocean to protect as well as to improve. The possessions of the United States upon the Pacific coast are imperial in extent and of extraordinary growth. Even at their present stage of development they would supply the larger part of the traffic which would seek the advantages of the canal. The States of California and Oregon, and the Territory of Washington, larger in area than England and France, produce for export more than a ton of wheat for each inhabitant, and the entire freights demanding water transportation eastward, already enormous, are augmenting each year with an accelerating ratio. While the population and products of the Pacific slope are thus increasing upon a vast scale, the railway system connecting the Gulf of Mexico with the interior and with the Great Lakes is being rapidly extended, thus affording additional facilities for enlarging the commerce that must seek the coastline to the Pacific of which the projected canal at Panama will form a part, and be as truly a channel of communication between the Eastern and far Western States as our own transcontinental railways. It is the perception of this domestic function of the long-sought water-way between the two seas that border the republic, which has caused the project to be regarded as of vital importance by this government. The history of the enterprise is marked from the outset by the numerous expeditions which have, from time to time, been sent out by the United States at large expense to explore the various routes, and thus facilitate the work when the time should be ripe and the vast capital be forthcoming for the undertaking.
If the proposed canal were a channel of communication near to the countries of the Old World, and employed wholly, or almost wholly, by their commerce, it might very properly be urged that the influence of the European powers should be commensurate with their interests. With the exercise of such influence, the United States could find no fault, especially if assured of equal participation in the peaceable enjoyment of the commercial facilities so afforded. The case, however, is here reversed, and an agreement between the European states to jointly guarantee the neutrality and in effect control the political character of a highway of commerce, remote from them and near to us, forming substantially a part of our coast-line and promising to become the chief means of transportation between our Atlantic and Pacific States, would be viewed by this government with the gravest concern.
The policy of the United States is one of peace and friendly intercourse with every government and people. This disposition is frankly avowed, and is moreover abundantly shown in the fact that our armaments by land and sea are kept within such limits as to afford no ground for distrust or suspicion of menace to other nations. The guarantee entered into by this government in 1846 was manifestly in the interest of peace, and the necessity imposed by circumstances upon the United States of America to watch over a highway between its two coasts was so imperative that the resultant guarantee was the simplest justice to the chief interests concerned. Any attempt to supersede that guarantee by an agreement between European powers, which maintain vast [Page 540] armies and patrol the sea with immense fleets, and whose interest in the canal and its operation can never be so vital and supreme as ours, would partake of the nature of an alliance against the United States and would be regarded by this government as an indication of unfriendly feeling. It would be but an inadequate response to the good-will we bear them and to our cheerful and constant recognition of their own rights of domestic policy, as well as those resulting from proximity or springing from neighborly interest.
The great European powers have repeatedly united in agreements such as guarantees of neutrality touching the political condition of states like Luxembourg, Belgium, Switzerland, and parts of the Orient, where the localities were adjacent or where the interests involved concerned them nearly and deeply. Recognizing these facts the United States has never offered to take part in such agreements or to make any agreements supplementary to them.
While thus observing the strictest neutrality with respect to complications abroad, it is the long-settled conviction of this government that any extension to our shores of the political system by which the great powers have controlled and determined events in Europe would be attended with danger to the peace and welfare of this nation.
While the Government of the United States has no intention of initiating any discussion upon this subject, it is proper that you should be prepared, in case of concerted action or conference or exchange of opinions thereon between the great powers of Europe, to communicate to the government to which you are accredited the views of the President as frankly and as fully as they are herein set forth. And at suitable times in your personal and friendly intercourse with your colleagues of the diplomatic body at London, you may find it proper to give discreet expression to the policy and motives of your government in the premises.
You will be careful, in any conversations you may have, not to represent the position of the United States as the development of a new policy or the inauguration of any advanced, aggressive steps to be taken by this government. It is nothing more than the pronounced adherence of the United States to principles long since enunciated by the highest authority of the government, and now, in the judgment of the President, firmly in woven as an integral and important part of our national policy.
In his address upon taking the oath of office the President distinctly proclaimed the position which the Government of the United States would hold upon this question, and if the European cabinets have failed to observe or give due heed to the declarations then made, it may be well for you on some proper occasion to call the attention of the minister of foreign affairs to the language used by the President.
I am, &c.,
Sent mutatis mutandis to United States ministers in Europe.