No. 149.
Mr. Angell
to Mr. Evarts.
[Extract.]
Legation of
the United States,
Peking, January 25, 1881.
(Received March 25.)
No. 103.]
Sir: On the 19th instant Mr. Shishido, the Japanese
minister, called to take his leave of me before his departure for home. He
took the opportunity to have a very interesting confidential conversation
with me concerning the proceedings of the Chinese Government which had
rendered it necessary, in his opinion, for him to withdraw from this
capital. He also left with me a written argument on the subject, which I
enclose. This also was given to me confidentially; Mr. Shishido informed me
that he was confiding this information to none of the other foreign
ministers here, but that, as the negotiations might be said to [Page 230] have been begun at the suggestion of
General Grant, he was desirous that this legation should be advised of what
had really happened.
The substance of his verbal statement was as follows:
General Grant, after interviews with high officials, both of China and of
Japan, recommended that the two nations should appoint commissioners to
adjust by treaty the difficulties which had arisen concerning the Lew Chew
Islands. China requested Japan to join with her in complying with this
recommendation. Japan accordingly appointed Mr. Shishido, the minister at
Peking, as its high commissioner, and the foreign office here informed him
that Prince Kung andthe ministers of the Tsung-li Yamên were appointed as
the high commissioners of China. Negotiations were begun, and after three
months’work a treaty was agreed on. On the 21st of October the Tsung-li
Yamên agreed to sign the treaty in ten days. At the expiration of the time
they were not ready to sign, and on the 20th of November they announced to
him that an imperial decree had been issued, referring the whole subject to
the northern and southern superintendents of trade for consideration and
report. He had waited until now in vain for any further progress on the part
of the Chinese Government, and felt that it was due to his office and to his
government that he should withdraw from this court and return to his own
country.
* * * * * * *
In answer to my inquiry Mr. Shishido said he had not been formally recalled
by his government. I was therefore, in error in the statement I made on that
point in my No. 96, of January 17. He added that his government had left it
to his discretion to determine whether and when he should leave Peking.
* * * * * * *
Mr. Shishido desired my opinion concerning his course in the negotiations,
and especially concerning his departure. I told him that I could not venture
to say anything touching the main question under consideration by China and
Japan, but that assuredly, if in the recent negotiations of our commission,
the Chinese commissioners had refused to sign our treaties after they had
agreed to sign them, I should have withdrawn from the capital.
Mr. Shishido informed me that the secretary of legation, Mr. Tanabe, who
accompanied him on the visit, would be left in charge of the legation for
the present.
The argument, which Mr. Shishido left, goes over the ground which he
traversed in his interview with me, but presents his points with somewhat
more precision and sharpness than characterized the verbal statement, at
least as it reached me through his interpreter, whose knowledge of English
is very limited. I have no reason to doubt its acuracy, though I have heard
no counter statement of the Tsung-li Yamên.
I know that some members of the Yamên have admitted that the subject was
referred to the superintendents of trade. But the foreign office do not seem
to be at all disturbed by the departure of the Japanese minister. The
members speak of it rather jocosely. Whether in their elation at the escape
from war with Russia they underrate the possible significance of this event,
or whether having nothing further to fear from Russia they are now quite
ready to meet the claim of Japan to the Lew Chew Islands with a bold front,
I will not undertake to decide. But, certainly, even if they have justice on
their side in opposing the seizure of the islands by Japan, they could not
well contrive a better way to alienate the sympathy of all civilized nations
from them in their [Page 231] assertion of
their rights than by the course, which, if we accept the statement of Mr.
Shishido, they have now been fit to take in their negotiations with
Japan.
I am, &c.,
[Inclosure in No.
103.—Translation.]
[Extract.]
An argument on the differences between the two governments (Japan and
China) with a view to the preservation of peace and to avoid
bloodshed.
- Section I discusses the correspondence had between the two
governments.
- Section II narrates the course of negotiations between the envoys
appointed, and section III shows that one government has rejected
its own propositions.
The two governments of Japan and China having appointed high
commissioners by mutual agreement to negotiate and close the Lew Chew
question, and these high commissioners having reached a point of
agreement, it was not expected that China would make these negotiations
ridiculous, and thus render difficult a satisfactory adjustment of the
question.
According to the rules of international law, when two powers appoint
representatives for purposes of negotiation, such persons are to be
provided with full powers, in order that the representatives so
appointed may be enabled, each for his own government, in negotiation to
represent fully the desire of the appointing power. After the given
negotiation has come to a satisfactory issue the representatives are to
affix their hands and seals as a witness to its validity. The
appointment of representatives without full powers is not merely idle,
but is abundantly calculated to develop a growth of mutual
entanglements, and to promote hostile feeling.
If one power appoints a representative with full powers and the other
power are points a representative without such full powers, this other
power in so doing not only violates the provisions of international law
and treats discourteously the representative Of the other power
concerned, but, having at the inception of negotiations notified the
other government that power to negotiate had been received, and then,
when negotiations had been successfully concluded, to maintain that no
authority to sign had been given, this evasion, what is it but an
attempt to trifle with the other representative and an insult to his
government?
If it be asserted that the signatures can only be affixed after the
receipt of a decree authorizing it, and that this is the rule of
procedure, is not this course detrimental to the full powers of the
representatives? For the universal practice is that the representatives
on either side having concluded their negotiations, affix their seals
and signatures in witness, and thereafter
mutually seek the ratifications of their respective governments in final
conclusion of the treaty made. It is not the practice in any government
to seek the ratification of the head of the government prior to signing and sealing the treaty as concluded. For one
representative to delay signing and sealing the treaty until he has
secured the ratification of his government is to subject the other
representatives to delay, and to force him to discard the authority
given him. Thus the interests of one, party alone are conserved, both
are not alike regarded, and this is not in accord with international
law.
The appointment of commissioners by the two governments to discuss and
settle this question was in accordance with the thought which originated
with the ex-President of the United States (General Grant). General
Grant, in a letter to Prince Kung, suggested “the appointment, by mutual
consent, of high commissioners to discuss and conclude this question,
&c.” Can it be held that his idea was to appoint representatives
without full powers, and thus to indulge in a great amount of useless
discussion? That China was not at the outset deceived as to the purport
of this suggestion from General Grant is abundantly proved by what
follows:
The proposition that the two governments should act on this suggestion of
General Grant came, in the first instance, from China. For upon the 14th
of December, 1879, the Chinese foreign office began by addressing the
foreign office of Japan in a dispatch which declared that China desired
to act upon the suggestion contained in General Grant’s letter for the
settlement of all questions involved. Thereafter, April 19, 1880, the
Chinese foreign office inquired what person would be appointed by my
government for the negotiations. Upon Ming Chik, 13th year, 6th moon,
29th day (Japanese) my government appointed the undersigned, being
Japanese minister at Peking, [Page 232]
as its high commissioner for the purposes above mentioned, with full
powers, by an imperial decree, which was duly reported by the Japanese
foreign office to the Chinese foreign office for its information.
Thereafter, Ming Chik, 13th year, 7th moon, 26th day (Japanese), I again
notified the foreign office here of my appointment and inquired what
persons had been appointed and where our negotiations should be
conducted.
August 5, 1880, the Chinese foreign office informed the Japanese foreign
office and me that an imperial decree had been received saying, “Get the
prince and the ministers of Yamên concerned negotiate and settle the
questions, etc., etc.” This carefulness on both sides shows clearly that
the object of the appointment of commissioners was, as stated above, to
negotiate upon this business.
The high commissioners having, in obedience to their several edicts of
appointment, discussed and debated matters for about three months, at
last reached an agreement. October 10, 1880, the foreign office wrote
me, saying, “Our opinions upon the several points are in accord,
&c., &c.”
October 21, 1880, the ministers of the foreign office stated to me in
conversation that in the treaty negotiations they had mentioned three
matters: 1st. A settlement of the Lew Chew question; 2d. An addition to
the former treaty between the two powers; and 3d. A modification of the
form of ratification. These three matters were combined together. At the
outset I opened the discussion upon these matters, and the Chinese
foreign office agreed in the conclusions which were reached; the final
draft of the treaty was written by the Tsung-li Yamên, to which I had no
objection. At that time it was understood that the treaty was to be
signed and sealed within ten days. The Chinese ministers informed me
that after signing and sealing the treaty it would be necessary to ask
for the ratification of the treaty in the matters of the settlement of
the Lew Chew question and the addition to the former treaty. I estimated
that three months must be allowed for the transmission of the treaty to
Japan and the return of it as ratified, when the certificates of
ratification might be exchanged at Peking.
* * * * * * *
Thus four sections in all were finished as completing the treaty, and the
dates of exchange of ratifications and of putting the treaty into effect
were alldetermined.
After all this I was confident that the Yamên would sign and seal the
treaty upon the day named, and I wrote to the ministers three or four
times, urging them, but they delayed and gave me no answer. Much to my
surprise, on the 20th December, 1880, I received a dispatch from the
Chinese foreign office, stating that an imperial decree had been
received in the following terms: “Let the project for the settlement of
the Lew Chew question, as submitted to us by the foreign office, with
all the papers, be referred to the northern and southern superintendents
of foreign trade, for reports. After their reports have been received we
will issue our further commands. Respect this.”
Judging from the language of this dispatch the authority to arrange the
Lew Chew matter did not rest with the prince and ministers of the
foreign office alone, but the northern and southern superintendents of
foreign trade were also included. The prince and ministers had not the
authority to deal with these questions; they had the full power to make
a fair copy of the treaty, but not the authority to sign it.
At the outset China expressed her desire to act in accordance with the
suggestion of General Grant, and appointed high commissioners to
negotiate, but later she declared that the high commissioners so
appointed had not the authority alone to sign the result of their
negotiations. At the Outset she informed Japan that the prince and
ministers of the Yamén should deal with the questions, but later she
declared that the northern and southern superintendents of trade must
consider these same questions and report to the throne.
My government accepted the suggestion of General Grant, and in accordance
with international law clothed her high commissioner with full power to
dispose of the questions at issue.
But the other government appointed commissioners having no power, and
opened up a useless discussion.
* * * * * * *
