No. 492.
Mr. Schuyler to Mr. Fish.
Legation of
the United States,
St.
Petersburg, February 5, 1875.
(Received February 26.)
No. 82.]
Sir: The Russian government has finally permitted
the publication of the proceedings of the Brussels congress in the Russian
papers. Up to this time they had only been published in a supplement to the
French “Journal de Saint Petersbourg,” of which only
a limited number of copies were printed.
The publication of the dispatches in the “Invalid” is accompanied by an
official communication, a translation of which I send to you, marked 1, on a
slip cut from the London “Times,” to which paper it was telegraphed. With
the exception of an article in the “Russian World,” translated in the
accompanying’ paper, marked 2, which, as before, criticises the Brussels
congress and approves the policy of England in the matter, the Russian press
of late has done nothing more than reprint the dispatches and protocols.
Public interest on the subject seems to some extent to have died out. I may
remark that the Invalid is the official organ of
[Page 1039]
the minister of war, and that the Russian World is
managed by a clique in opposition to him.
The government of Sweden has replied to the circular of Mr. de Westmann of
September 26, (October 8,) that it accepts the final project of declaration
as agreed upon at Brussels, and will, be most happy to co-operate with the
Russian cabinet in any further measures it may take, reserving to itself,
however, the right of withholding its consent should the project be changed
in any way. This adhesion, being from one of the small states, is said to
have given great satisfaction to the imperial cabinet.
The Queen’s messenger last week brought a long dispatch from Lord Derby,
which, though in some measure anticipated, is of a more unpleasant nature.
The English government refuses to take any further steps in the matter, and
states that in case of war England and her allies will not consider
themselves bound by any propositions which may be agreed upon by other
powers, and which may in any way change the customs or usages of
international law or the laws of war, as they at present exist. I am told
that the dispatch states at great length the reasons that have led the
English cabinet to this decision, one of which is that the Government of the
United States has not taken part in the deliberations. The dispatch itself I
have not yet had an opportunity of seeing.
I have, &c.,
[Inclosure 1 in No. 82. —Translation from
the London Times.]
The Brussels conference.
[From the “Russian Invalid.”]
A few words will suffice to vindicate the aims and objects of the
conference against its adversaries. War is a last resource which no
civilized state ought to have recourse to unless honor, safety, and
existence are imperiled by tin justifiable demands on the part of an
enemy. In such cases all minor considerations are silenced by the voice
of patriotism. All European states have suffered the infliction of war,
and there is no telling when and where this terrible trial may be
renewed. Such being the case, the various governments, thanks to the
steady progress of humane ideas and the growth of international
relations, have long thought it their duty to obviate war if possible,
or at any rate to confine its fearful consequences to the narrowest
limits, if unfortunately hostilities could not be avoided. The rules and
usages developed under the influence of these philanthropic principles
are known as the laws of war, and have been much commented upon by
jurists and philosophers. Despite, however, the undeniable merit of the
professors of international law in mitigating the horrors of war,
science alone can never hope to attain the end in view. Science has no
power to enforce its verdicts, and what is worse, the opinions of its
various representatives do not always agree with each other, or are
based upon untenable premises, or in some instances unknown to those who
ought to be guided by them. Hence the laws of war, as fixed by
international usage, prove hut a very feeble and obscure code whenever
put to the test. All wars lead to mutual recriminations on the part of
the belligerents, and though certain broad principles might be generally
recognized, the mode of observing them was always a matter of doubt. The
natural result of this sorry state of things was exasperation on both
sides, and universal indulgence in barbarous reprisals. To remove these
evils must be doubly desirable at this time of all others.
The material resources of all nations having been considerably developed,
war is more intensely felt than formerly, and the means at the disposal
of the governments being so very much greater than they were, any armed
conflict in these modern days necessarily assumes a particularly cruel
and destructive character. It is, therefore, to be devoutly wished that
the laws of war be codified and rendered at once more intelligible and
obligatory. To do this was the task of the Brussels conference. The
primary object of this conference was not at all to lay down fresh
regulations to be observed in the conduct of war, but only to select
from the traditional and uncodified
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body of international law those rules and usages
adapted to the present times, and to convert them into
generally-acknowledged and binding statutes, without closing the door to
such ulterior reforms as are likely to be recommended by the progress of
civilization, the conference mainly aimed at defining old but ambiguous
rules, and giving them the dignity and force of treaty stipulations. If,
in comparing the much-con-tested principles of international law with
the exigencies of modern warfare, the members of the conference found it
difficult to agree, this only proves how very ambiguous those principles
are, and how very differently they may be interpreted. It is, therefore,
high time to do away with a state of intellectual confusion which allows
nations to go to war with one another without an exact knowledge of
their mutual rights and obligations, and which necessarily leads to
violence and arbitrary proceedings that might be easily avoided. We may
thus hope to put a stop to the practice of belligerents of charging each
other with breach of international law, and we may even aim at
preventing those measures of repression which, though sometimes harsher
than the provocation given, are yet justified by the stern necessities
of war. The draught declaration made up by the Brussels conference
begins by enumerating certain well-known and generally-recognized
principles on which the meeting easily agreed. All that was required was
to give these principles a definite and unmistakable expression,
calculated to obviate the doubts occasionally thrown upon them in time
of war. If sanctioned in their present form by the various governments,
the rights and obligations of belligerents will have been firmly
established at last. Rules which have supplied so much matter for
dispute will be laid down in a tangible shape, and effectually enforced
by officers initiated in the new code in the military schools and
ordered to observe them like any of their other instructions. Other
questions were not solved at the conference, but the various opinions to
which they gave occasion were put down in the protocol. The draught
declaration, therefore, does not presume to settle finally and
definitively all the questions mooted, the text of that document only
aiming at effecting a compromise between the various views enunciated at
the conference. The governments have since been invited to study the
materials submitted to their consideration and give utterance to any
remarks they may think it expedient to Offer. When these remarks shall
have been received, it may be necessary to hold another conference for
the final settlement of the agreement to be entered into. It is
superfluous to add that the questions mooted at the conference are not
new; they have arisen at all times in all wars. While it is impossible
to improve them, it is equally impossible to say that international law
has settled them satisfactorily and with sufficient clearness. To leave
these questions unanswered is to leave the door open to the abuse of
power and the violence of warlike passion. What the Brussels conference
wished to effect was merely to prevent useless suffering and do away
with the cruel reprisals occurring under the present régime, to define the laws and usages of war, to protect the
defenders of their country, the wounded and the prisoners from
unnecessary hardships, and to secure the unconditional recognition of
the personal rights of every soldier in acquitting himself of his
military duties. These were the only objects of the Brussels conference.
The conference likewise thought it their duty to alleviate the
sufferings of the civil population not taking an active part in the war.
It is the interest of the weak which the Brussels development of
international relations has not a little promoted by its labors.
[Inclosure 2 in No.
82.—Translation.]
The Brussels congress.
[From the “Russian World.”]
It is beyond all doubt that the suspicion entertained of the sincerity
and frankness of British diplomacy, which had some practical foundation
under the régime of Lord Palmerston and his
followers, is at the present moment extremely unjust and arbitrary; the
firm, energetic, and at the same time excessively circumspect and
restrictive mode of action of the cabinet of St. James does not justify
the doubts with which public writers of the Continent have been
accustomed to regard English policy.
The invariable sobriety of judgment, stern and inflexible, the fixity of
tendency and aim, the business-like and practical foresight, and,
lastly, the predominating lucidity of logic and common sense, all these
qualities of the English are as conspicuous in the sphere of politics as
in other provinces of human activity.
At the same time, it is just these valuable qualities of English policy
that evoke bitter accusations and reproaches; cruel egotism is discerned
in the resolute moderation of England, and apathy to the ideal of
humanity in her sound sense and worldly wisdom. Many similar reproaches
were lavished on England last year on her refusal
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to join the Brussels conference. It is
these threats that show most forcibly the complete falsity of the
traditional views of the continental public with regard to the policy of
England.
It is a well-known fact that perfect unanimity of opinion prevailed
throughout the whole English press on the question of the Brussels
conference. After a close study of all the arguments adduced in the
English papers with reference to the opinions “evoked at the conference
and the principles involved, we think it impossible to discover in them
anything but a true expression of apolitical logic and of ordinary
practical tact. England could not have been influenced by any special
motives in her resistance in view of her isolation from all the military
interests of the Continent and of the exclusion from the programme of
deliberations of the conference, of the only questions in which her
interests were involved, namely, those of maritime rights.
The criticisms of the English press against the conference, which was
summoned with the view of regulating the laws and customs of war,
clearly show that with its characteristic practical sense, it at once
perceived the weakness of some of the important points of the project,
which the continental press discussed mostly only from an abstract
humanitarian aspect, without paying attention to its expediency and to
the possible practical consequences on the mutual relations of
governments and peoples.
The question of offensive and defensive operations interests England much
less than it does the continental powers; within European limits, she is
the country least likely to play an aggressive or defensive part. The
English consequently could have no positive motives for opposing the
realization of any humanitarian projects within the region of
international law; consequently the politicians of England were in a
position to discuss the matter with calm impartiality, which,
unfortunately, in this case, did not distinguish the continental
press.
Every one who is acquainted with the present condition of international
law cannot fail to see that the opinions expressed in England on the
labors of the congress are in perfect unison with the views entertained
by the greatest authorities on the subject of the international military
problems of our time; while giving just credit to the humane initiative
of the Russian cabinet, these views point to the impractical bility of
the philanthropic intentions of Russia by the means selected. While also
indicating the inexpediency of the limitations of natural defense under
the present conditions of peace and war, they recognize only one
important and timely matter for discussion which has been brought
prominently forward by recent international political movements, and in
which English statesmen and public men have played such an active and
honorable part. This point consists in the greatest possible extension
of the principle of arbitration which has been already recognized by the
majority of European parliaments, and among them by the Parliament of
Great Britain.
The eloquent fact of the adoption of Mr. H. Richards’s resolution in the
House of Commons in 1878, with regard to international arbitration may,
it would seem, serve as a sufficiently forcible reply to the reproaches
and assertions of those who accuse England of callous, egotistical
indifference with respect to the problems and successes of real progress
in the sphere of international rights.
Had the question of international arbitration been comprised in the
programme of the Brussels conference, the people of England and her
government would of course have assumed a different attitude towards the
congress and would have been the first to respond to the call of the
great northern power. The fact alone of the recognition of the principle
of arbitration by the two most practical nations in the world, England
and America, serves to a certain extent as a guarantee of its
practicability and of the possibility of its adoption.
