[Historical Note.—1818 to 1846.]

1818.

In 1818 an agreement was come to between the Government of His Britannic Majesty and that of the United States respecting the boundary line between the British and United States territories in Northwestern America.

It was agreed in substance that for the space extending from the Lake of the Woods westward to the Rocky (then called the Stony) Mountains, the boundary line should be the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude.

With respect to any country that might be claimed by either party on the northwest coast, westward of the Rocky Mountains, it was agreed that for ten years the same, with its harbors and the navigation of its rivers, should be free and open to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two Powers; with a proviso that the agreement was not to prejudice any claim which either party might have to any part of that country.

This agreement was embodied in a Treaty made at London, 20th October, 1818.

The district between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific, or part of it, came to be known as Oregon or the Oregon Territory or district, the name being taken from the Oregon River, now usually called the Columbia.

The northern boundary of this district, as it was in question between the two Governments, was the parallel of 54° 40′ north latitude, being the southern boundary of the Russian territory, as recognized by Treaty. The southern boundary was the parallel of 42° north latitude, being the northern boundary of the Spanish territory, as recognized by Treaty.

The British Plenipotentiaries who negotiated the Treaty of 1818 acceded to the arrangement relating to the country west of the Rocky Mountains in the hope that by thus leaving that country open to the trade of both nations, they substantially secured every present advantage, while removing all prospect of immediate collision, without precluding any further discussion for a definite settlement. In their judgment the American Plenipotentiaries were not authorized to admit any territorial claim of Great Britain in that quarter to the southward of the Straits of Fuca, although they would have consented to leave those straits and the waters connected with them in the possession of Great Britain.

1824.

In 1824 negotiations were resumed for the settlement of questions between the two nations, including the question of the boundary west of the Rocky Mountains.

The British Plenipotentiaries contended for the right of British subjects to make settlements in the disputed territory, a right which they [Page 218] maintained was derived not only from discovery, but also from use, occupancy, and settlement. They proposed that Article III *of the Treaty of London of 1818 should cease to have effect, and that the boundary line west of the Rocky Mountains should be drawn due west to the point where the forty-ninth parallel strikes the great northeasternmost branch of the Oregon or Columbia River, marked on the maps as McGillivray’s River, thence down along the middle of that river, and down along the middle of the Oregon or Columbia to its junction with the Pacific Ocean.[ii]

The proposal of the United States Plenipotentiaries was to the effect that the term of ten years limited in Article III of the Treaty of 1818 should be extended to ten years from the date of a new Treaty, but that the rights of settlement and other rights should be restricted during the new term, so that the citizens of the United States should form no settlements to the north of the forty-ninth parallel, and that British subjects should form no settlements to the south of that parallel, or to the north of the fifty-fourth.

Terms were not agreed on, and the Conference came to an end in July, 1824.

1826, 1827.

In November, 1826, negotiations were again resumed.

The United States proposal was, that if the forty-ninth parallel should be found to intersect the Oregon or McGillivray’s River at a navigable point, the whole course of that river thence to the ocean should be made perpetually free to British vessels and subjects.

The British Plenipotentiaries were authorized to offer that if the United States would consent to the Columbia being the southern British frontier, the United States should have the harbor in De Fuca Strait, called by Vancouver Port Discovery, with land five miles in breadth encircling it.

Should this offer not fully satisfy the United States, the British Plenipotentiaries were then authorized to extend the proposition, so as to include the cession by Great Britain to the United States of the whole peninsula comprised within lines described by the Pacific to the west, De Fuca’s Inlet to the north, Hood’s Canal (so called in Vancouver’s charts) to the east, and a line drawn from the southern point of Hood’s Canal to a point ten miles south of Gray’s Harbor to the south, by which arrangement the United States would possess that peninsula in exclusive sovereignty, and would divide the possession of Admiralty Inlet with Great Britain, the entrance being free to both parties.

The negotiations ended in a Convention dated 6th August, 1827. This Convention continued Article III of the Treaty of 1818 indefinitely, but with power to either party to put an end to it on twelve months’ notice, (after 20th October, 1828.)

The Convention also contained a saving for the claims of either party to any part of the country west of the Rocky Mountains.

1827–1842.

Negotiations on the Oregon question remained in abeyance until the special mission of Lord Ashburton to the United States in 1842, when he received the following instructions on this subject:

Your lordship may, therefore, propose to the Government of the United States, as a fair and equitable adjustment of their [the two Governments] respective claims, a line [Page 219] of boundary commencing at the mouth of the Columbia River; thence by a line drawn along the middle of that river to its point of confluence with the Great Snake River; thence by a line carried due east of the Rocky or Stony Mountains; and thence by a line drawn in a northerly direction along the said mountains until it strikes the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude. The southern bank of the Columbia River would thus be *left to the Americans and the northern bank to the English, the navigation of the river being free to both, it being understood that neither party should form any new settlement within the limits assigned to each on the north or south side of the river respectively.[iii]

Should your lordship find it impracticable to obtain the line of boundary above described, Her Majesty’s Government would not refuse their assent to a line of boundary commencing at the Rocky or Stony Mountains at the point where the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude strikes those mountains; thence along that parallel to the point where it strikes the great northeasternmost branch of the Columbia River, marked in the map as McGillivray’s River; thence down the middle of that river and down the middle of the Columbia River to its junction with the ocean. But your lordship will reject the proposal formerly made by the American Government, in case it should be repeated, of following the forty-ninth parallel of latitude from the Rocky Mountains to the Ocean, as the boundary of the territory of the two States.

If the Government of the United States should refuse the proposed compromise, and should nevertheless determine to annul the Convention of 1827, the rights of the British Government to the whole of the territory in dispute must be considered as unimpaired.

This mission resulted in the Treaty of Washington of 9th August, 1842, which contained no arrangement respecting Oregon. The main reason that induced Lord Ashburton to abstain from proposing to carry on the discussion on this subject was the apprehension that thereby the settlement of the far more important matter of the Northeastern boundary might be impeded or exposed to the hazard of failure.

1843.

In August, 1843, Mr. Fox, Her Majesty’s Minister at Washington, was asked whether the United States Government were taking any steps in furtherance of the Oregon Boundary negotiation, and to state that Her Majesty’s Government were willing to transfer the negotiation to Washington should the United States Government object to London.

In October instructions were sent to Mr. Everett, the United States Minister in London, to treat with Her Majesty’s Government for the adjustment of the Boundary. In the mean time Mr. Pakenham had been appointed Her Majesty’s Minister to the United States in succession to Mr. Fox. Before his appointment had been gazetted, Mr. Everett informed Lord Aberdeen orally that he had received powers to negotiate the Oregon question in London. Lord Aberdeen, however, stated to him that a new Minister had already been appointed by Her Majesty to negotiate at Washington.

In consequence of this arrangement the negotiations were removed to Washington, and Mr. Everett stated in a dispatch to his Government 11 that he would use his best efforts to produce such an impression on Lord Aberdeen’s mind as to the prominent points of the question as might have a favorable influence in the preparation of the instructions to be given to Mr. Pakenham.

In an interview with Lord Aberdeen, Mr. Everett urged that the boundary should be carried along the forty-ninth parallel to the sea. Lord Aberdeen said that this proposal had been made in 1824 and 1826, and rejected, and that there was no reason for believing that this country, more than the United States, would then agree to terms which had been previously declined, and that consequently there must be concession [Page 220] on both sides, on which principle Lord Aberdeen expressed himself willing to act.

In December Mr. Pakenham was authorized to re-open negotiations at Washington on the Oregon question. He was directed to make substantially the same proposals for the settlement of the boundary as had been made by Great Britain in 1826.

He was authorized to add, should that proposition be found to be unacceptable, that *Her Majesty’s Government would be willing to convert into a free port any harbor, either on the main-land or on Vancouver’s Island, south of the forty-ninth parallel, which the United States Government might desire.[iv]

Further, if he should think that the extension of the privilege would lead to the final adjustment of the question, he was authorized to declare that Her Majesty’s Government would be willing to make all the ports within De Fuca’s Inlet, and south of the forty-ninth parallel, free ports.

Should these proposals be rejected, he was then to propose that the whole question should be referred to the arbitration of a friendly Sovereign State.

In the event of the United States Government refusing to agree to arbitration, he was then to propose that the Treaty of 1818–27 should be renewed for a further period of ten years.

In the event of negotiations being broken off, he was then to declare to the United States Government that Her Majesty’s Government still asserted and would maintain an equal right with the United States to the occupation of the whole of the territory in dispute, and that as Her Majesty’s Government would carefully and scrupulously abstain and cause Her Majesty’s subjects to abstain from any act which might be justly considered as an encroachment on the rights of the United States, so they expected that the Government of the United States would exhibit and enforce on their part an equal forbearance with respect to the rights of Great Britain, which rights, believing them to be just, Great Britain would be prepared to defend.

1844.

In February, 1844, Mr. Pakenham addressed a note to the United States Secretary of State proposing a renewal of the negotiations, which proposal was favorably received by him.

On 22nd August, Mr. Pakenham received a notification from Mr. Calhoun, then the Secretary of State, that he was prepared to proceed with the negotiation.

At a conference on the 26th, Mr. Pakenham laid before Mr. Calhoun the proposal authorized by his instructions relative to a free port either on the main-land or on Vancouver’s Island south of the forty-ninth parallel.

This proposal was declined by Mr. Calhoun. He afterwards presented a paper (dated September 3) stating his reasons. The paper began thus:

The Undersigned American Plenipotentiary declines the proposal of the British Plenipotentiary, on the ground that it would have the effect of restricting the possessions of the United States to limits far more circumscribed than their claims clearly entitle them to. It proposes to limit their northern boundary by a line drawn from the Rocky Mountains along the forty-ninth parallel of latitude to the northeasternmost branch of the Columbia River, and thence down the middle of that river to the sea, giving to Great Britain all the country north, and to the United States all south of that line, except a detached territory extending on the Pacific and the Straits of [Page 221] Fuca, from Bullfinch’s Harbor to Hood’s Canal. To which it is proposed in addition to make free to the United States any port which the United States Government might desire, either on the main-land or on Vancouver’s Island south of latitude 49°.

By turning to the map hereto annexed, and on which the proposed boundary is marked in pencil, it will be seen that it assigns to Great Britain almost the entire region on its north side drained by the Columbia River, and lying on its northern bank. It is not deemed necessary to state at large the claims of the United States to this territory, and the grounds on which they rest, in order to make good the assertion that it restricts the possessions of the United States within narrower bounds than they are clearly entitled to. It will be sufficient for this purpose to show that they are fairly entitled to the entire region drained by the river; and to the establishment of this point, the Undersigned proposes accordingly to limit his remarks at present.

The paper proceeded with arguments, and ended thus:

* Such are our claims to that portion of the territory, and the grounds on which they rest. The Undersigned believes them to be well founded, and trusts that the British Plenipotentiary will see in them sufficient reasons why he should decline his proposal.[v]

The Undersigned Plenipotentiary abstains, for the present, from presenting the claims which the United States may have to other portions of the territory.

The Undersigned, &c.

In answer to this statement, Mr. Pakenham delivered a paper (marked D, and dated September 12) of which it is sufficient for the present purpose to state the concluding passages:

In fine, the present state of the question between the two Governments appears to be this: Great Britain possesses and exercises, in common with the United States, a right of joint occupancy in the Oregon Territory, of which right she can be divested, with respect to any part of that territory, only by an equitable partition of the whole between the two Powers.

It is, for obvious reasons, desirable that such a partition should take place as soon as possible, and the difficulty appears to be in devising a line of demarkation which shall leave to each party that precise portion of the territory best suited to its interest and convenience.

The British Government entertained the hope that by the proposal lately submitted for the consideration of the American Government, that object would have been accomplished. According to the arrangements therein contemplated, the Northern Boundary of the United States west of the Rocky Mountains would, for a considerable distance, be carried along the same parallel of latitude which forms their Northern boundary on the eastern side of those mountains, thus uniting the present Eastern Boundary of the Oregon Territory with the Western Boundary of the United States, from the forty-ninth parallel downwards. From the point where the 49° of latitude intersects the northeastern branch of the Columbia River, called in that part of its course McGillivray’s River, the proposed line of boundary would be along the middle of that river till it joins the Columbia, then along the middle of the Columbia to the ocean, the navigation of the river remaining perpetually free to both parties.

In addition Great Britain offers a separate territory on the Pacific, possessing an excellent harbor, with a further understanding that any port or ports, whether on Vancouver’s Island or on the Continent, south of the forty-ninth parallel, to which the United States might desire to have access, shall be made free ports.

It is believed that by this arrangement, ample justice would be done to the claims of the United States, on whatever ground advanced, with relation to the Oregon Territory. As regards extent of territory, they would obtain, acre for acre, nearly half of the entire territory to be divided. As relates to the navigation of the principal river, they would enjoy a perfect equality of right with Great Britain; and, with respect to harbors, it will be seen that Great Britain shows every disposition to consult their convenience in that particular.

On the other hand, were Great Britain to abandon the line of the Columbia as a frontier, and to surrender her right to the navigation of that river, the prejudice occasioned to her by such an arrangement would, beyond all proportion, exceed the advantage accruing to the United States from the possession of a few more square miles of territory. It must be obvious to every impartial investigator of the subject that, in adhering to the line of the Columbia, Great Britain is not influenced by motives of ambition with reference to extent of territory, but by considerations of utility, not to say necessity, which cannot be lost sight of, and for which allowance ought to be made in an arrangement professing to be based on considerations of mutual convenience and advantage.

The Undersigned believes that he has now noticed all the arguments advanced by the American Plenipotentiary in order to show that the United States are fairly entitled [Page 222] to the entire region drained by the Columbia River. He sincerely regrets that their views on this subject should differ in so many essential respects.

It remains for him to request that, as the American Plenipotentiary declines the proposal offered on the part of Great Britain, he will have the goodness to state what arrangement he is on the part of the United States prepared to propose for an equitable adjustment of the question; and more especially, that he will have the goodness to define the nature and extent of the claims which the United States may have to other portions of the territory, to which allusion is made in the concluding part of his statement, as it is obvious that no arrangement can be made with respect to part of the territory in dispute, while a claim is reserved to any portion of the remainder.

The Undersigned, &c.

*Mr. Calhoun then presented a paper, (dated September 20,) in which he said he had read with attention the counter-statement of the British Plenipotentiary, but without weakening his confidence in the validity of the title of the United States, and, after arguments, concluded thus:[vi]

The Undersigned cannot consent to the conclusion to which, on a review of the whole ground, the counter-statement arrives, that the present state of the question is, that Great Britain possesses and exercises, in common with the United States, a right of joint occupancy in the Oregon Territory, of which she can be divested only by an equitable partition of the whole between the two Powers. He claims, and he thinks he has shown, a clear title on the part of the United States to the whole region drained by the Columbia, with the right of being reinstated and considered the party in possession while treating of the title, in which character he must insist on their being considered in conformity with positive Treaty stipulations. He cannot, therefore, consent that they shall be regarded, during the negotiation, merely as occupants in common with Great Britain, nor can he, while thus regarding their rights, present a counter-proposal based on the supposition of a joint occupancy, merely until the question of title to the territory is fully discussed. It is, in his opinion, only after a discussion which shall fully present the titles of the parties respectively to the territory, that their claims to it can be fairly and satisfactorily adjusted. The United States desire only what they may deem themselves justly entitled to, and are unwilling to take less. With their present opinion of their title, the British Plenipotentiary must see that the proposal which he made at the second Conference, and which he more fully sets forth in his counter-statement, falls far short of what they believe themselves justly entitled to.

In reply to the request of the British Plenipotentiary that the Undersigned should define the nature and extent of the claims which the United States have to the other portions of the territory, and to which allusion is made in the concluding part of Statement A, he has the honor to inform him in general terms that they are derived from Spain by the Florida Treaty, and are founded on the discoveries and explorations of her navigators, and which they must regard as giving them a right to the extent to which they can be established, unless a better can be opposed.

In various informal conversations between Mr. Pakenham and Mr. Calhoun, when Mr. Calhoun insisted on the parallel of 49° as the very lowest terms which the United States would accept, Mr. Pakenham told him that, if he wished Her Majesty’s Government even to take into consideration a proposal founded on that basis, it must be accompanied by some indications of a desire on the part of the United States Government to make some corresponding sacrifice to accommodate the interest and convenience of Great Britain; that Her Majesty’s Government had already gone very far in the way of concession, while the United States Government had as yet shown no disposition to recede from their original proposal. To which Mr. Calhoun replied, on one occasion, that for his part he should have no objection to give up absolutely the free navigation of the Columbia, which had before been offered only conditionally; on another occasion, he said that if Great Britain would consent to the parallel of 49° on the Continent, perhaps the United States might be willing to leave to Great Britain the entire possession of Vancouver’s Island, Fuca’s Inlet, and the passage northwards from it to the Pacific remaining an open sea to both countries; but he never said that he would be ready to yield both these points. In fact, he said that he [Page 223] was not authorized to make any proposal of the kind, nor should he until he had ascertained that such an arrangement would find favor with the Senate.

1845.

In January, 1845, in answer to a proposal, made by Mr. Pakenham, to submit the question to arbitration, Mr. Calhoun said that, while the President united with Her Majesty’s Government in the desire to see the question settled as early as might be practicable, he could not accede to the offer; adding this:

*Waiving all other reasons for declining it, it is sufficient to state, that he continues to entertain the hope that the question may be settled by the negotiation now pending between the two countries; and that he is of opinion it would be unadvisable to entertain a proposal to resort to any other mode, so long as there is hope of arriving at a satisfactory settlement by negotiation; and especially to one which might rather retard than expedite its final adjustment.[vii]

On the 3d of April, Lord Aberdeen addressed to Mr. Pakenham the following dispatch, the tone and contents of which show the seriousness of the position in which the controversy then was, and the determination of Her Majesty’s Government to maintain their claims:

April 3, 1845.

Sir: The inaugural speech of President Polk has impressed a very serious character on our actual relations with the United States; and the manner in which he has referred to the Oregon question, so different from the language of his predecessor, leaves little reason to hope for any favorable result of the existing negotiation.

I presume that you will have acted upon my instruction of the 3d of March, and have repeated to the new Secretary of State the proposal of an arbitration, which you were directed to make to his predecessor. If this should be declined by Mr. Polk’s Government in the same manner and for the same reason as assigned by Mr. Tyler, namely, the hope that the matter might yet be favorably terminated by negotiation, such a mode of refusal would at least display a friendly spirit, and would not close the door against all further attempts to arrive at such a conclusion. On the other hand, if the proposal should be simply rejected, and the rejection should not be accompanied by any specific proposition on the part of the Government of the United States, we must consider the negotiation as entirely at an end. Indeed, we could scarcely, under such circumstances, take any further step with a due regard to our honor and consistency.

In the event of arbitration being rejected, and the failure of every endeavor to effect a partition of the territory on a principle of mutual concession, you were directed, in my dispatch of the 18th of November, to propose the further extension for a fixed term of years of the existing Convention. This, it is true, would have been an imperfect and unsatisfactory arrangement; but it might have been tolerated in the hope that the prevalence of friendly feelings, and the admitted interest of both parties, would in due time have led to a permanent settlement of an amicable description. The recent declarations of Mr. Polk forbid any such hope; and there is too much reason to believe that the extension of the Convention for a fixed period would be employed in active preparation for future hostility.

You will, therefore, consider this portion of my instructions, to which I have now referred, as canceled.

Judging from the language of Mr. Polk, I presume we must expect that the American Government will renounce the Treaty without delay. In this case, unless the question be speedily settled, a local collision will be liable to take place, which may involve the countries in serious difficulty, and not improbably lead to war itself.

At all events, whatever may be the course of the United States Government, the time is come when we must be prepared for every contingency. Our naval force in the Pacific is amply sufficient to maintain our supremacy in that sea; and Sir George Seymour has been instructed to repair without delay to the coasts of the Oregon Territory.

You will hold a temperate, but firm, language to the members of the Government and to all those with whom you may converse. We are still ready to adhere to the principle of an equitable compromise; but we are perfectly determined to concede nothing to force or menace, and are fully prepared to maintain our rights. This is the spirit in which Her Majesty’s Government have declared themselves in Parliament, and to this they will adhere.

[Page 224]

I thought it so important that our intentions should be clearly known and understood in the United States without delay, that I detained the last American mail, in order that a correct report of the proceedings in Parliament on the Oregon question might reach Washington as early as possible.

Nothing can be more encouraging and satisfactory than the spirit which has been exhibited on this occasion, both in Parliament and in the country generally; and it is evident that Her Majesty’s Government will be warmly supported in whatever measures may be considered really just and necessary.

I am, &c.,

ABERDEEN.

* Before this dispatch reached Mr. Pakenham, Mr. Buchanan had been appointed Mr. Calhoun’s successor in the office of Secretary of State. Mr. Pakenham informed Mr. Buchanan of the instructions which he had received, again to press on the Government of the United States the expediency of arbitration. But Mr. Buchanan said on one occasion that he did not despair of effecting a settlement by negotiation, by adopting (to use his own words) the principle of giving and taking; and on another occasion that settlement by arbitration did not meet with the concurrence of the President and his Cabinet, that they all entertained objections to that course of proceeding, and that they preferred negotiation, hoping, as they did hope, that by negotiation a satisfactory result would at last be attained.[viii]

On the 16th July, Mr. Buchanan delivered to Mr. Pakenham a paper (marked J. B.) containing his proposal for settlement. It began thus:

The Undersigned, &c., now proceeds to resume the negotiation on the Oregon question at the point where it was left by his predecessor.

The British Plenipotentiary, in his note to Mr. Calhoun of the 12th September last, requests “that as the American Plenipotentiary declines the proposal offered on the part of Great Britain, he will have the goodness to state what arrangement he is, on the part of the United States, prepared to propose for an equitable adjustment of the question, and more especially that he will have the goodness to define the nature and extent of the claims which the United States may have to other portions of the territory to which allusion is made in the concluding part of his statement, as it is obvious that no arrangement can be made with respect to a part of the territory in dispute, while a claim is reserved to any portion of the remainder.”

The Secretary of State will now proceed (reversing the order in which these requests have been made,) in the first place, to present the title of the United States to the territory north of the valley of the Columbia; and will then propose on the part of the President the terms upon which, in his opinion, this long-pending controversy may be justly and equitably terminated between the parties.

The paper (after a lengthened argument) ended thus:

Such being the opinion of the President in regard to the title of the United States, he would not have consented to yield any portion of the Oregon Territory, had he not found himself embarrassed, if not committed, by the acts of his predecessors. They had uniformly proceeded upon the principle of compromise in all their negotiations. Indeed, the first question presented to him, after entering upon the duties of his office was, whether he should abruptly terminate the negotiation which had been commenced and conducted between Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Pakenham on the principle avowed in the first Protocol, not of contending for the whole territory in dispute, but of treating of the respective claims of the Parties, “with the view to establish a permanent boundary between the two countries, westward of the Rocky Mountains.”

In view of these facts, the President has determined to pursue the present negotiation to its conclusion, upon the principle of compromise in which it commenced, and to make one more effort to adjust this long-pending controversy. In this determination he trusts that the British Government will recognize his sincere and anxious desire to cultivate the most friendly relations between the two countries, and to manifest to the world that he is actuated by a spirit of moderation. He has, therefore, instructed the Undersigned again to propose to the Government of Great Britain that the Oregon Territory shall be divided between the two countries by the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean; offering, at the same time, to make free to Great Britain any port or ports on Vancouver’s Island, south of this parallel, which the British Government may desire. He trusts that Great Britain may receive this proposition in the friendly spirit in which it was dictated, and that it may prove the stable foundation of lasting peace and harmony between the two [Page 225] countries. The line proposed will carry out the principle of continuity equally for both parties, by extending the limits both of ancient Louisiana and Canada to the Pacific, along the same parallel of latitude which divides them east of the Rock Mountains, and it will secure to each a sufficient number of commodious harbors on the northwest coast of America.

The Undersigned, &c.

Thereupon, Mr. Pakenham presented a paper, dated 29th July, beginning thus:

* Notwithstanding the prolix discussion which the subject has already under gone, the Undersigned, &c., feels obliged to place on record a few observations in reply to the statement marked J. B., which he had the honor to receive on the 16th of this month from the hands of the Secretary of State of the United States, terminating with a proposition on the part of the United States for the settlement of the Oregon question.[ix]

Mr. Pakenham ended this paper as follows:

After this exposition of the views entertained by the British Government, respecting the relative value and importance of the British and American claims, the American Plenipotentiary will not be surprised to hear that the Undersigned does not feel at liberty to accept the proposal offered by the American Plenipotentiary for the settlement of the question.

This proposal, in fact, offers less than that tendered by the American Plenipotentiaries in the Negotiation of 1826, and declined by the British Government.

On that occasion it was proposed that the navigation of the Columbia should be made free to both parties. On this point nothing is said in the proposal to which the Undersigned has now the honor to reply; while with respect to the proposed freedom of the ports on Vancouver’s Island, south of latitude 49°, the facts which have been appealed to in this paper, as giving to Great Britain the strongest claim to the possession of the whole island, whole island, would seem to deprive such proposal of any value.

The Undersigned therefore trusts that the American Plenipotentiary will be prepared to offer some further proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question more consistent with fairness and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British Government, as defined in the statement marked D, which the Undersigned had the honor to present to the American Plenipotentiary at the early part of the present negotiation.

The Undersigned, &c.

Mr. Pakenham had thus declined to accept the proposal of the United States Government. Mr. Buchanan thereupon delivered another paper dated 30th August, in which, after further arguments, he withdrew that proposal. The concluding passages of this paper were as follows:

Upon the whole, from the most careful and ample examination which the Undersigned has been able to bestow upon the subject, he is satisfied that the Spanish-American title now held by the United States, embracing the whole territory between the parallelof 42° and 54° 40′, is the best in existence to this entire region, and that the claim of Great Britain to any portion of it has no sufficient foundation.

Notwithstanding that such was, and still is, the opinion of the President, yet, in the spirit of compromise and concession, and in deference to the action of his predecessors the Undersigned, in obedience to his instructions, proposed to the British Plenipotentiary to settle the controversy by dividing the territory in dispute by the forty-ninth parallel of latitude, offering, at the same time, to make free to Great Britain any port or ports on Vancouver s Island, south of this latitude, which the British Government might desire. The British Plenipotentiary has correctly suggested that the free navigation of the Columbia River was not embraced in this proposal to Great Britain, but, on the other hand, the use of free ports on the southern extremity of this island had not been included in former offers.

Such a proposition as that which has been made, never would have been authorized by the President, had this been a new question.

Upon his accession to office he found the present negotiation pending. It had been instituted in the spirit and upon the principle of compromise. Its object was as avowed by the negotiators, not to demand the whole territory in dispute for either country; but, in the language of the first Protocol, “to treat of the respective claims of the two countries to the Oregon Territory, with a view to establish a permanent boundary between them, westward of the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean.”

Placed in this position, and considering that Presidents Monroe and Adams had, on former occasions, offered to divide the territory in dispute by extending the forty-ninth [Page 226] parallel of latitude to the Pacific Ocean, he felt it to be his duty not abruptly to arrest the negotiation, but so far to yield his own opinion as once more to make a similar offer.

Not only respect for the conduct of his predecessors, but a sincere and anxious desire to promote peace and harmony between the two countries influenced him to pursue this course. The Oregon question presents the only cloud which intercepts the prospect of a long career of mutual friendship and beneficial commerce between the two nations, and this cloud he desired to remove.

*These are the reasons which actuated the President to offer a proposition so liberal to Great Britain.[x]

And how has the proposition been received by the British Plenipotentiary? It has been rejected without even a reference to his own Government. Nay, more, the British Plenipotentiary, to use his own language, “trusts that the American Plenipotentiary will be prepared to offer some further proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question more consistent with fairness and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British Government.”

Under such circumstances the Undersigned is instructed by the President to say that he owes it to his own country, and a just appreciation of her title to the Oregon Territory, to withdraw this proposition to the British Government which had been made under his direction, and it is hereby accordingly withdrawn.

In taking this necessary step, the President still cherishes the hope that this longpending controversy may yet be finally adjusted in such a manner as not to disturb the peace or interrupt the harmony now so happily subsisting between the two countries.

The Undersigned, &c.

1846.

On 9th February, 1846, the House of Representatives, and on 17th April the Senate, of the United States passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to give the requisite year’s notice to put an end to the Convention of 1827. The notice was dated the 28th of April; it reached the United States Minister at London on the 15th of May, and was by him sent to Lord Aberdeen on the 20th.

Meantime, on the 18th of May, Lord Aberdeen addressed the following instructions to Mr. Pakenham:

No. 18.]

Sir: In the critical state of the negotiation for the settlement of the Oregon Boundary, it has become my duty carefully to review the whole course of our proceedings, and to consider what further steps in the present juncture it may be proper to take with the view of removing existing difficulties, and of promoting, if possible, an amicable termination of the question.

I willingly abstain from renewing a discussion, the matter for which is already exhausted, and from repeating arguments with which you have long been familiar; but I think it is not too much to assert that, to any observer looking impartially at the different stages of this negotiation, it will appear that the conduct of Great Britain has throughout been moderate, conciliatory, and just. Can it truly be said that the Government of the United States have advanced to meet us in the path of mutual concession?

The terms of the settlement proposed by the British Plenipotentiaries to Mr. Gallatin in the year 1826, were much more advantageous to the United States than those which had been offered to Mr. Rush in the previous negotiation of 1824; and on your own departure from this country you were authorized still further to augment these advantageous conditions. The United States, on the other hand, have not only recently made, through Mr. Buchanan, a proposal less favorable to Great Britain than that formerly offered by Mr. Gallatin, but, when this was rejected by you, they withdrew it altogether.

In truth, the pretensions of the United States have gradually increased during the progress of these negotiations. Acting in manifest violation of the spirit of the Conventions of 1818 and 1827, it is now formally and officially asserted that the right of the United States to the whole territory in dispute is “clear and unquestionable.” The principle, however, of these Conventions plainly recognized the claims of both parties, as indeed was fully admitted by the American Plenipotentiary himself; and it was only on failure of the attempt to effect an equitable partition of the territory that the joint occupancy was established.

Such pretensions, whatever may have been their effect in the United States, cannot in any manner invalidate or diminish our own just claims. With respect to these we have never varied. We have always maintained that we possess the right to establish [Page 227] ourselves in any part of the country not previously occupied; but we have fully acknowledged in the United States the existence of the same right; and we have also at all times been ready, by au equitable compromise and partition, to put an end to a species of occupation which is but too likely to lead to disputes and collision.

Despairing of arriving at any agreement by means of direct negotiation, we have been urgent in *pressing the reference of the whole matter to an arbitration. We have been willing to submit, either the abstract title of the two parties, or the equitable division of the territory, to the judgment of any Tribunal which could justly inspire confidence, and which might prove agreeable to the United States. All this, however, has been peremptorily refused; the progress of the negotiation has been entirely arrested, and, in fact, it now remains without aay admitted or intelligible basis whatever.[xi]

The United States have recently expressed their determination to put an end to the Convention which, for the last thirty years, has regulated the mode of occupation of Oregon by the subjects of both countries; but as this power was reserved to each party by the terms of the Convention, the decision cannot reasonably be questioned. Neither is there anything necessarily unfriendly in the act itself; but, as both parties would thus be replaced in their former position, each retaining all its claims and asserting all its rights, which each would freely exercise, it is obvious that, in proportion as the country became settled, local differences would arise which must speedily lead to the most serious consequences.

In this state of affairs it is matter of some anxiety and doubt what step, with a view to an amicable settlement of the question, may be most consistent with the dignity and the interests of Great Britain. After all the efforts we have made, and the course we have pursued, we might perhaps most naturally pause, and leave to the United States the office of renewing a negotiation which had been interrupted under such circumstances. But Her Majesty’s Government would feel themselves to be criminal if they permitted considerations of diplomatic punctilio or etiquette to prevent them from making every proper exertion to avert the danger of calamities which they are unwilling to contemplate, but the magnitude of which scarcely admits of exaggeration.

I think that an opportunity has now arisen when we may reasonably lay aside those formal considerations by which, under ordinary circumstances, we might have been precluded from making any fresh overture or demonstration on this subject.

In complying with the recommendation of the President to terminate the Convention under which the Oregon Territory is at present occupied, the Legislature of the United States have accompanied their decision by resolutions of a pacific and conciliatory character; and have clearly signified to the Executive Government their desire that this step should not lead to the rupture of amicable negotiations for the settlement of the question. I can scarcely doubt that the Government of the United States will be duly influenced by the desire thus unequivocally expressed by Congress; and it is in this hope and belief that I now proceed to instruct you to make another, and, I trust, final proposition to the American Secretary of State for the solution of these long-existing difficulties.

I avail myself of this opportunity the more readily, because, although Her Majesty’s Government have strongly pressed a reference of the whole subject to arbitration, they are by no means insensible to the inconvenience attending such a mode of proceeding, and would willingly avoid it if possible. Nothing, indeed, but the apprehension that an amicable settlement by means of direct negotiation was entirely hopeless, would have led them so decidedly to adopt this course; and they are still of opinion that, with such a prospect of failure before them, it would be their duty to adhere as earnestly as ever to this recommendation. Nor can they believe that any Christian Government could ultimately persevere in rejecting a proposal of this nature, whatever might be their objections to its adoption, and in the face of the civilized world deliberately recur to the dreadful alternative of war.

The boundary having been fixed by the Convention of 1818, between the possessions of Great Britain and the United States, and the line of demarkation having been carried along the forty-ninth parallel of latitude for a distance of eight hundred or one thousand miles through an unfrequented and unknown country, from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky Mountains, it appeared to the Government of the United States that it was a natural and reasonable suggestion that this line should be continued along the same parallel, for about half that distance, and through a country as little known or frequented, from the Rocky Mountains to the sea. And, indeed, with reference to such a country, the extension of any line of boundary already fixed might equally have been suggested, whether it had been carried along the forty-ninth or any other parallel of latitude.

On the other hand, however, it may justly be observed that any division of territory in which both parties possess equal rights ought to proceed on a principle of mutual convenience, rather than on the adherence to an imaginary geographical line; and in this respect it must be confessed that the boundary thus proposed would be manifestly defective. It would exclude us from every commodious and accessible harbor on the [Page 228] coast; it would deprive us of our long-established means of water-communication with the interior for the prosecution of our trade; and it would interfere with the possessions of British colonists resident in a district in which it is believed that scarcely an American citizen, as a settler, has ever set his foot.[xii]

*If, therefore, the forty-ninth parallel of latitude be adopted as the basis of an agreement, it will be incumbent upon us to obviate these objections, which, I trust in great measure, may be successfully accomplished.

You will accordingly propose to the American Secretary of State that the line of demarkation should be continued along the forty-ninth parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the sea-coast; and from thence in a southerly direction through the center of King George’s Sound and the Straits of Juan de Fuca, to the Pacific Ocean, leaving the whole of Vancouver’s Island, with its ports and harbors, in the possession of Great Britain.

You will also stipulate that from the point at which the forty-ninth parallel of latitude shall intersect the principal northern branch of the Columbia River, called Macgillivray’s River in the maps, the navigation shall be free and open to the Hudson’s Bay Company, and to the subjects of Great Britain trading with the said Company, until its junction with the Columbia, and from thence to the mouth of the river, with free access into and through the same; British subjects, with their goods, merchandise, and produce, to be dealt with as citizens of the United States; it being always understood, however, that nothing shall interfere to prevent the American Government from making any regulations respecting the navigation of the river, not inconsistent with the terms of the proposed Convention.

In the future appropriation of land, the possessory rights of all British settlers will of course be respected. The Hudson’s Bay Company should be confirmed in the occupation of Fort Vancouver, and the adjacent lands of which the Company have been in possession for many years. They would also retain such other stations as were necessary for the convenient transit of their commerce along the line of the Columbia; but all other stations, or trading-posts, connected with their present exclusive rights of hunting and of traffic with the natives, within the territory south of the forty-ninth degree of latitude, would in all probability forthwith be abandoned.

The Puget Sound Agricultural Company have expended considerable sums of money in the cultivation and improvement of land on the north of the Columbia River. They occupy two extensive farms, on which they possess large stocks of cattle and sheep. These parties would also be entitled to be confirmed in the quiet enjoyment of their land; but if the situation of the farms should be of public and political importance, and it should be desired by the Government of the United States, the whole property might be transferred to them at a fair valuation.

I think that these proposals for an adjustment of the whole question at issue would be honorable and advantageous to both parties. It can scarcely be expected that either of them should now acquiesce in conditions less favorable than had been previously offered; and it may reasonably be presumed that each will at the present moment be prepared to make larger concessions than heretofore for the sake of peace. By this settlement, in addition to the terms proposed to us by Mr. Gallatin in 1826, we should obtain the harbors necessary for our commerce, as well as an increased security for our settlers and their possessions; and in lieu of the detached district, with its single harbor, offered by the British Plenipotentiaries on that occasion, the United States would acquire the whole coast, with its various harbors, and all the territory north of the Columbia, as far as the forty-ninth degree of latitude.

I am not disposed to weigh very minutely the precise amount of compensation or equivalent which may be received by either party in the course of this negotiation, but am content to leave such estimate to be made by a reference to higher considerations than the mere balance of territorial loss or gain. We have sought peace in the spirit of peace, and we have acted in the persuasion that it would be cheaply purchased by both countries at the expense of any sacrifice which should not tarnish the honor or affect the essential interests of either.

I have now, therefore, only to instruct you to inform the American Secretary of State that you have been authorized and are prepared to conclude a Convention, without delay, founded on the conditions set forth in this dispatch.

I am, &c.,

ABERDEEN.

On the same day the following dispatch was also addressed to Mr. Pakenham by Lord Aberdeen, inclosing the draught or project of the Treaty:

No. 19.]

Sir: With reference to my dispatch No. 18 of this date, I transmit to you herewith the draught or project of a Treaty, such, at least in its essential parts, as Her Majesty’s [Page 229] Government are prepared to conclude with the United States for the final settlement of the Oregon question.

That project may be understood to embody all the conditions which are considered by us as *indispensable. The wording of the Articles may be altered as may be deemed expedient, but their substance must be preserved, nor can any essential departure from that substance be admitted on the part of Great Britain.[xiii]

The preamble may be considered as open to any alteration which may be proposed, and which you may think expedient. In the project which I have sent you, the definition of territory adopted in the Convention of 1827 has been adhered to. That definition appears to be the most suitable and open to the least objection.

If the United States Government should agree to our terms, such or nearly such as they are now proposed, you will do well to hasten as much as possible the conclusion of the Treaty, since the present constitution of the Senate appears to offer a greater chance of acquiescence of that important body in those conditions than might be presented at any future period.

If, on the other hand, the President should decline to accept those terms, and should make any counter-proposition essentially at variance with their substance, you will express regret that you possess no power to admit any such modification, and, without absolutely rejecting whatever proposal may be submitted on the part of the United States, you will refer the whole matter to your Government.

I am, &c.,

ABERDEEN.

The draught or project was, as regards the description of the boundary now in question, identical with the Treaty as ultimately ratified.

On the same day, also, Mr. MacLane, who had before this time succeeded Mr. Everett as the United States Minister at London, addressed a letter to Mr. Buchanan, as follows:

Sir: I received, late in the day, on the 15th instant, (Friday,) your dispatch No. 27, dated the 28th of April, 1846, transmitting a notice for the abrogation of the Convention of the 6th of August, 1827, between the United States and Great Britain, in accordance with the terms prescribed in the IInd Article, instructing me to deliver the notice to Her Britannic Majesty in person, or to Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as will be most agreeable to Her Majesty’s wishes, and at the same time leaving the mode of the delivery of the notice entirely at my own discretion.

I will of course execute your instructions at the earliest practicable moment. As, however, I could only ascertain Her Majesty’s wishes, which I am directed to consult, through the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, sufficient time has not yet been afforded for that purpose; and, in the midst of the preparation of my dispatches for the steamer of to-morrow, and of my engagements at the Foreign Office connected with one of the topics of this letter, it has not been in my power to give to a subject of so much importance that deliberation which I am sensible a proper exercise of the discretion confided to me requires. To-morrow, however, I propose to seek an interview with Lord Aberdeen for the purpose, and without loss of time finally to execute your instructions in the mode that may be deemed most effectual. I may add, that although it is altogether probable that the presentation of the notice to Her Majesty in person will not be admissible, and that where a Treaty may be annulled upon notice by one party, the mode of delivering the notice need not be dependent upon the assent of the other; yet, in the present instance, I do not apprehend there will be any difficulty in giving and receiving the notice in a mode mutually satisfactory, and in conformity with usage in such cases.

In my last dispatch, (No. 43,) dated on the 3d instant, after an interview with Lord Aberdeen, I informed you that as soon as he received official intelligence of the Senate’s vote upon the resolution of notice he would proceed finally to consider the subject of Oregon, and direct Mr. Pakenham to submit a further proposition upon the part of this Government, and also that it was understood that he would not be prevented from taking this course by any disagreement between the two Houses as to the form of the notice.

I have now to acquaint you that, after the receipt of your dispatches on the 15th instant by the Caledonia, I had a lengthened conference with Lord Aberdeen; on which occasion the resumption of the negotiation for an amicable settlement of the Oregon question, and the nature of the proposition he contemplated submitting for that purpose, formed the subject of a full and free conversation.

I have now to state that instructions will be transmitted to Mr. Pakenham by the steamer of to-morrow, to submit a new and further proposition on the part of this Government, for a partition of the territory in dispute.

*The proposition, most probably, will offer substantially:[xiv]

[Page 230]

First, to divide the territory by the extension of the line on the parallel of 49 to the sea; that is to say, to the arm of the sea called Birch’s Bay, thence by the Canal de Arro and Straits of Fuca to the Ocean, and confirming to the United States what, indeed, they would possess without any special confirmation, the right freely to use and navigate the Strait throughout its extent.

Second, to secure to the British subjects occupying lands, forts, and stations anywhere in the region north of the Columbia and south of the forty-ninth parallel, a perpetual title to all their lands and stations of which they may be in actual occupation; liable, however, in all respects, as I understand, to the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United States as citizens of the United States. Similar privileges will be offered to be extended to citizens of the United States who may have settlements north of the forty-ninth parallel; though I presume it is pretty well understood that there are no settlements upon which this nominal mutuality could operate, I have no means of accurately ascertaining the extent of the present British settlements between the Columbia and the forty-ninth parallel. They are not believed by Lord Aberdeen to be numerous, however; consisting, as he supposes, of a few private farms and two or three forts and stations. I have already, in a previous dispatch, taken the liberty to remind you that by their Charter the Hudson’s Bay Company are prohibited from acquiring title to lands, and that the occupations to be affected by this reservation have been made either by the squatters of that Company, or by the Puget’s Sound Land Company, for the purpose of evading the prohibition of the Hudson’s Bay Charter.

They are, in point of fact also, according to Captain Wilkes’s account, cultivated and used chiefly by the persons employed in the service of the former Company, and as auxiliary to their general business of hunting and trapping, rather than with a view, as it has been generally supposed, of colonizing or of permanent settlement.

Lastly, the proposition will demand for the Hudson’s Bay Company the right of freely navigating the Columbia River.

It will, however, as I understand, disclaim the idea of sovereignty or of the right of exercising any jurisdiction or police whatever on the part of this Government or of the Company, and will contemplate only the right of navigating the river upon the same footing and according to the same regulations as may be applicable to the citizens of the United States.

I have already acquainted you that Lord Aberdeen has very positively and explicitly declined to treat of the navigation of the St. Lawrence in connection with that of the Columbia; and that even if it were desirable to us to propose to offer one for the other, he would on no account enter into any negotiation in regard to the St. Lawrence.

From the date of a private letter to the President in August, I have seen no cause to change the opinion that, in any attempt to divide the Oregon territory, the obligation felt by this Government to protect the rights of their subjects which may have been acquired or have grown up during the joint occupation, would most probably interpose the greatest difficulty in the way of an amicable adjustment. And it is now obvious that the proposed reservation of the right to the Hudson’s Bay Company of freely navigating the Columbia, and that in favor of the British occupants north of the river, proceed from this source; although it is probable that more or less pride may be felt at giving up now, without what they may deem an adequate equivalent, what has been hitherto tendered by our negotiators.

In fact, except in the surrender to the United States of the title of the lands not occupied by British subjects between the Columbia and the forty-ninth parallel, and also the surrender of the jurisdiction over the river and the country within the same limits, I am afraid it may, with some plausibility, be contended that there is no very material difference between the present proposition and that offered to Mr. Gallatin by Messrs. Addington and Huskisson, the British negotiators in 1827.

It is scarcely necessary for me to state that the proposition, as now submitted, has not received my countenance. Although it has been no easy task, under all the circumstances, to lead to a re-opening of the negotiation by any proposition from this Government, and to induce it to adopt the parallel of forty-nine as the basis of a boundary, nevertheless I hoped it would have been in my power to give the present proposition a less objectionable shape, and I most deeply lament my inability to accomplish it. I have, therefore, felt it my duty to discourage any expectation that it would be accepted by the President; or, if submitted to that body, approved by the Senate.

I do not think there can be much doubt, however, that an impression has been produced here that the Senate would accept the proposition now offered, at least without any material modification, and that the President would not take the responsibility of rejecting it without consulting the Senate. If *there be any reasonable ground to entertain such an impression, however erroneous, an offer less ob jectionable, in the first instance at least, could hardly be expected.[xv]

It may be considered certain, also, in my opinion, that the offer now to be made is not to be submitted as an ultimatum, and is not intended as such; though I have reason to know that Mr. Pakenham will not be authorized to accept or reject any [Page 231] modification that may be proposed on our part; but that he will, in such case, be instructed to refer the modification to his Government.

It is not to be disguised that, since the President’s annual message, and the public discussion that has subsequently taken place in the Senate, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct the negotiation in its future stages without reference to the opinion of Senators, or free from speculation as to the degree of control they may exercise over the result. Whatever, therefore, might be prudent and regular in the ordinary course of things, I think it of the utmost importance, upon the present occasion, if the President should think proper to propose any modification of the offer to be made by Mr. Pakenham, that the modification should be understood as possessing the concurrence of the co-ordinate branch of the Treaty Power.

It is not easy to conjecture, with any certainty, the extent to which this Government might be induced to modify the proposition, even if they should be assured that the Senate, no less than the President, demanded it. It must not escape observation that, during the preceding administration of our Government, the extension of the line on the forty-ninth parallel to the Strait of Fuca, as now proposed by Lord Aberdeen, was actually suggested by my immediate predecessor as one he thought his Government might accept; and that, in regard to those English subjects who would be left within American jurisdiction by adopting that boundary, he considered that the provisions of Article II of Jay’s Treaty as a precedent for a convenient mode of dealing with them. By Article II of Jay’s Treaty, however, British subjects would not only be secured in the absolute title to all their lands and effects as fully as by Lord Aberdeen’s proposition, but would be allowed the option to continue as British subjects, and without any allegiance to the Government of the United States; which, according to Lord Aberdeen’s offer, as I understand it, they would not possess. In point of fact, therefore, the substantial points of the present offer, and those which may be expected to be regarded as most objectionable, are little more than the embodiment of the various offers or suggestions which, at different times, have, in some form or other, proceeded from our own negotiators.

I have myself always believed, if the extension of the line of boundary on the forty-ninth parallel by the Strait of Fuca to the sea would be acceptable to our Government, that the demand of a right freely to navigate the Columbia River would be compromised upon a point of time, by conceding it for such period as might be necessary for the trade of the Hudson’s Bay Company north or south of the forty-ninth parallel. Entertaining great confidence in that opinion, and deeming it only reasonable, I confess that, from an early period, I have used every argument and persuasion in my power to reconcile Lord Aberdeen to such a limitation, and, although I am quite aware that, with a portion of the British public, an importance which it by no means deserves is attached to the navigation of the Columbia River, and in that of others it is undeservedly regarded as a point of pride, I have been disappointed by the pertinacity with which it has been, at so much risk, insisted upon. Feeling very sure, however, that the present offer is not made or intended as an ultimatum, I think it only reasonable to infer an expectation on the part of those who are offering it, not only that modifications may be suggested, but that they may be reasonably required. And therefore I still entertain the opinion, that although, from a variety of causes—in part, perhaps, from an expectation that in the United States this point may not be absolutely insisted upon, and in part from deference to interests and impressions at home—they could not be induced in the first instance to make an offer with such a qualification; yet, if the adjustment of the question should be found to depend upon this point only, they would yield the demand to the permanent navigation of the river, and be content to accept it for such a number of years as would afford all the substantial advantages to those interests they have particularly in view that could be reasonably desired. If the only question upon which the adjustment of the Oregon question depended should be whether the navigation of the Columbia River should be granted for a period sufficient to subserve all the purposes of British subjects within the disputed territory, or whether the right should be extended indefinitely to a particular class of British subjects, I must believe that no English statesman, in the face of his denial of a similar privilege to American citizens in regard to the St. Lawrence, would take the hazard upon this point alone of disturbing the peace of the world. Indeed, if the same Ministry from whom the present offer proceeds should continue masters of their own proposition by remaining in office until the qualification I am adverting to would have to be dealt with, I should feel entire confidence in the belief I have now expressed.

I regret to say, however, that I have not the least expectation that a less reservation than is *proposed in favor of the occupants of land between the Columbia and the forty-ninth parallel would be assented to. I may repeat my convic tion, founded upon all the discussions in which I have been engaged here, that in making partition of the Oregon Territory, the protection of those interests which have grown up during the joint occupation is regarded as an indispensable obligation on the score of honor, and as impossible to be neglected. I am quite sure that it was at one time in contemplation to insist upon the free navigation of the Columbia River for [Page 232] British subjects and British commerce generally, and that it has been ultimately confined to the Hudson s Bay Company, after great resistance, and, in the end, most reluctantly. Being so confined, however, it would be only reasonable to limit the enjoyment of the right to a period beyond which the company might have no great object to use the river for the purposes of their trade. But the interests of the British subjects who have settled upon and are occupying lands north of the forty-ninth, are considered as permanent, and entitled, when passing under a new jurisdiction, to have their possession secured. This, at least, is the view taken of the subject by this Government, and not at all likely, in my opinion, to be changed.[xvi]

I may add, too, that I have not the least reason to suppose it would be possible to obtain the extension of the forty-ninth parallel to the Sea, so as to give the southern cape of Vancouver’s Island to the United States.

It may not be amiss, before leaving this subject, to call your attention to the position of the present Ministry. The success of their measures respecting the proposed commercial relaxations is quite certain; and the Corn Bill, having now finally passed the House of Commons, may be expected, at no remote day, to pass the Lords by a majority no less decisive. From that time, however, the tie which has hitherto kept the Whig party in support of Sir Robert Peel will be dissolved; and the determination of the Protectionist party, who suppose themselves to have been betrayed, to drive him from office, has lost none of its vigor or power. Indeed, it is confidently reported, in quarters entitled to great respect, that they have even offered to the leader of the Whig party to select his own time, and that, when he is ready, they will be no less prepared to force Ministers to resign.

I have reason to know that, at present, Ministers themselves believe a change to be inevitable, and are considering only the mode and the time in which it will be most likely to happen. It will not be long, after the success of the measures for the repeal of the Corn Laws, before opportunities enough for the accomplishment of the object will occur. The Factory Bill, regulating the hours of labor, will afford one, and most probably that on which the change will take place. With a knowledge that the change, sooner or later, must be unavoidable, and that the offer has been made to the probable head of a new Ministry to select his own time, may it not be expected that, instead of waiting quietly to allow the Whig leader to select the time of coming in, the present Premier will rather select his own time and mode of going out, and, with his usual sagacity, so regulate his retirement as to leave as few obstacles as possible to his restoration to power? In that case it is not very unlikely he would prefer going out upon the Factory Bill, before taking ground upon more important measures; and, if so, it will not surprise me to witness the coming in of a new Ministry by the end of June, or earlier. With a knowledge of the proposition now to be made, I am not prepared to say that one more objectionable might have been apprehended from a Whig Ministry; unless, indeed, the present Government may be supposed to be prepared to accept qualifications, when proposed by the President, which it was un willing at first to offer. Upon that supposition, it might be desirable that the modifications should be offered before the coming in of a new Minister, who, finding only the acts of his predecessor, without a knowledge of his intentions, might not be so ready to take the responsibility of assenting to a change. 12 * * * * * *

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MacLANE.

The following was Mr. Pakenham’s report after receiving Lord Aberdeen’s dispatches of 18th May:

[No. 68.]

My Lord: Her Majesty’s Government will necessarily be anxious to hear as soon as possible the result of my first communications with the United States Government, in pursuance with your Lordship’s instructions of the 18th of May, on the subject of Oregon.

*I accordingly take advantage of the departure of the Great Britain steamship to acquaint your Lordship that I had yesterday morning a conference, by appointment, with Mr. Buchanan, when the negotiation for the settlement of the Oregon Question was formally resumed.[xvii]

As the best explanation which I could offer of the motives which had induced Her Majesty’s Government to instruct me to make a fresh, and, as your Lordship hoped, a final, proposition for the solution of these long-existing difficulties, I read to Mr. Buchanan an extract from your Lordship’s dispatch No. 18, beginning with the words, “In this state of affairs, it is a matter of some anxiety and doubt what steps,” &c., to the end of the dispatch. It seemed to me that there was nothing in the observations [Page 233] contained in this part of your Lordship’s instructions which might not be advantageously made known to the American Government.

Your Lordship’s language appeared to make a good deal of impression upon Mr. Buchanan. After I read to him the extract which I had prepared from the dispatch, he requested to be allowed to read it over himself, in my presence, with which request I of course complied. I thought it best not to leave a copy of it in his hands, having in view the possible, although not probable, failure of the negotiation which might render it desirable to deliver to him a copy at length of the dispatch, with a view to its ultimate publication.

I then laid before him a copy of the draught of a Convention which accompanied your Lordship’s dispatch No. 19, which Mr. Buchanan said he would immediately submit to the President for his consideration. A minute of what passed between us was then drawn up and signed, with the draught of the proposed Convention formally annexed to it.

Mr. Buchanan frankly told me that, in his opinion, the only part of the proposed arrangement likely to occasion any serious difficulty, was that relating to the navigation of the Columbia, for he said that the strongest objection existed to granting the perpetual freedom of the navigation of that river. I did not fail to point out to him the great difference which existed between a perpetual and general freedom of navigation, and the qualified right of navigation contemplated in your Lordship’s proposition. He admitted the force of my observations in this sense, but I collect, from what fell from him on this point, that an attempt will be made to limit the proposed concession to the duration to the existing charter of the Hudson’s Bay Company.

At 4 o’clock yesterday evening I again met Mr. Buchanan, by appointment, when he told me that the President had come to the determination to submit our whole proposition to the Senate for their advice, and that it would accordingly be sent to the Senate at an early day with a Message, which Message might, and probably would, suggest some modifications of it. What these modifications might be, Mr. Buchanan said, had not yet been determined; but I imagine they will not involve anything essentially hostile to the adoption of the proposed arrangement, or which may not be overcome by friendly negotiation and explanation between the two Governments.

As relates to the Senate, my Lord, when we consider the moderate and conciliatory spirit in which the entire question of Oregon has been treated by a large majority of that body since the opening of the present session of Congress, I think it may be fairly expected that their advice to the President on the reference which is about to be made to them will rather favor than impede an early and satisfactory termination of the Oregon difficulties.

I should add that, in addition to what Mr. Buchanan said about the navigation of the Columbia, he gave it as his opinion that it would be necessary, and even advisable, with the view to avoid future misunderstanding, to define, or provide for the early definition of, the limits of the farms and lands now in the occupation of the Puget Sound Agricultural Company, and which it is proposed shall be confirmed to the Association in perpetuity. To such a proviso, if conceived in a spirit of liberality and fairness, I imagine that Her Majesty’s Government will have no objection. But upon this point, as well as what relates to the navigation of the Columbia, I will act with due caution, and, to the best of my humble judgment and ability, in conformity with the spirit and intention of your Lordship’s instructions, as set forth in your Lordship’s dispatch No. 19.

I have, &c.,

R. PAKENHAM.

On the 10th of June, the President of the United States sent this Message to the Senate:

I lay before the Senate a proposal, in the form of a Convention, presented to the Secretary of State on the 6th instant, by the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty, for the adjustment of the Oregon question, together with a protocol of this proceeding. I *submit this proposal to the consideration of the Senate, and request their advice as to the action which, in their judgment, it may be proper to take in reference to it.[xviii]

In the early periods of the Government, the opinion and advice of the Senate were often taken in advance upon important questions of our foreign policy. General Washington repeatedly consulted the Senate, and asked their previous advice upon pending negotiations with foreign Powers; and the Senate in every instance responded to this call by giving their advice, to which he always conformed his action. This practice, though rarely resorted to in latter times, was, in my judgment, eminently wise, and may, on occasions of great importance, be properly revived. The Senate are a branch of the Treaty-making Power; and by consulting them in advance of his own action upon important measures of foreign policy which may ultimately come before them for their consideration, the President secures harmony of action between that [Page 234] body and himself. The Senate are, moreover, a branch of the war-making Power, and it may be eminently proper for the Executive to take the opinion and advice of that body in advance upon any great question which may involve in its decision the issue of peace or war. On the present occasion, the magnitude of the subject would induce me under any circumstances to desire the previous advice of the Senate; and that desire is increased by the recent debates and proceedings in Congress, which render it, in my judgment, not only respectful to the Senate, but necessary and proper, if not indispensable, to insure harmonious action between that body and the Executive. In conferring on the Executive the authority to give the notice for the abrogation of the Convention of 1827, the Senate acted publicly so large a part, that a decision on the proposal now made by the British Government, without a definite knowledge of the views of that body in reference to it, might render the question still more complicated and difficult of adjustment. For these reasons I invite the consideration of the Senate to the proposal of the British Government for the settlement of the Oregon question, and ask their advice on the subject.

My opinions and my action on the Oregon question were fully made known to Congress in my annual Message of the 2d of December last; and the opinions therein expressed remain unchanged.

Should the Senate, by the constitutional majority required for the ratification of Treaties, advise the acceptance of this proposition, or advise it with such modifications as they may, upon full deliberation, deem proper, I shall conform my action to their advice. Should the Senate, however, decline by such constitutional majority to give such advice, or to express an opinion on the subject, I shall consider it my duty to reject the offer.

I also communicate herewith an extract from a dispatch of the Secretary of State to the Minister of the United States at London, under date of the 28th of April last, directing him, in accordance with the joint resolution of Congress “concerning the Oregon Territory,” to deliver the notice to the British Government for the abrogation of the Convention of the 6th of August, 1827; and also a copy of the notice transmitted to him for that purpose, together with extracts from a dispatch of that Minister to the Secretary of State, bearing date on the 18th day of May last.

JAMES K. POLK.

On the same day the President’s Message was considered, and a motion that the Message and documents communicated therewith be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations was negatived, as was also a motion to postpone the further consideration thereof until 15th June.

On the two next following days the consideration of the Message was continued, and an amendment proposing the addition of a proviso to Article II was moved; 13 but ultimately it was resolved on a division, by 38 votes to 12, that the President should be advised to accept the proposal of the British Government.

On 13th June Mr. Pakenham reported to his Government as follows:

No. 77.]

My Lord: In conformity with what I had the honor to state in my dispatch No. 68, of the 7th instant, the President sent a Message on Wednesday last to the Senate submitting for the opinion of that body the draught of a Convention for the settlement of the Oregon question, which I was instructed by your *Lordship’s dispatch No. 19, of the 18th of May, to propose for the acceptance of the United States.[xix]

After a few hours’ deliberation on each of the three days, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, the Senate, by a majority of 38 votes to 12, adopted, yesterday evening, a resolution advising the President to accept the terms proposed by Her Majesty’s Government. The President did not hesitate to act on this advice, and Mr. Buchanan accordingly sent for me this morning, and informed me that the conditions offered by Her Majesty’s Government were accepted by the Government of the United States, without the addition or alteration of a single word.

At the beginning of our conversation, Mr. Buchanan observed to me that the privilege of navigating the Columbia River, which, by the second Article of the Convention, is secured to the Hudson’s Bay Company, and to British subjects trading with the same, was understood by the Senate to be limited to the duration of the license under which the Company now carry on their operations in the country west of the Rocky Mountains; to which I replied, that the Article proposed by Her Majesty’s Government spoke for itself; that any alteration from the precise wording of that Article which [Page 235] the United States Government might wish, to introduce would involve the necessity of a reference to England, and consequently, to say the least of it, some delay in the termination of the business. This, he seemed to think, under all the circumstances of the case, had better he avoided, and it was finally agreed that fair copies of the Convention should he prepared, and the signature take place on Monday next. 14

On Tuesday, probably, the Convention will he submitted to the Senate, where its approval may now he considered as a matter of course, so that the Treaty, with the President’s ratification, may be forwarded to England by the Great Western steam-packet, appointed to sail from New York on the 25th of this month.

I have, &c.,

R. PAKENHAM.

On 16th June a further Message was sent by the President to the Senate, stating that, in accordance with the resolution of the Senate, a Convention was concluded and signed on 15th June, and that Convention he then laid before the Senate for their consideration, with a view to its ratification.

On the same day and the two next following days the Message was before the Senate. Mr. Benton’s speech was made on the 18th. Ultimately, on a division, by a majority of 41 votes to 14, it was resolved that the Senate advised and consented to the ratification of the Treaty.

Mr. Pakenham then further reported as follows:

No. 79.]

My Lord: I have the honor herewith to transmit a Convention for the settlement of the Oregon Boundary, which was signed by the United States Secretary of State and myself, on Monday, the 15th of this month. The terms of this Convention, it will be seen, are in the strictest conformity with your Lordship’s late instructions.

On Tuesday, the 16th, the Convention was communicated to the Senate, and on Thursday, the 18th, it received the approval of that body by a vote of 41 to 14.

The American counterpart of the Convention, with the President’s ratification of it, is forwarded to London by a special messenger, to whose care, with Mr. Buchanan’s permission, I commit the present dispatch.

I have, &c.,

R. PAKENHAM.

Lord Aberdeen’s dispatch, in answer to Mr. Pakenham’s of 13th June, was as follows. It is the document which proves that Mr. MacLane had seen the project of the Treaty:

*No. 30.]

Sir: Her Majesty’s Government have received this day, with the greatest satisfaction, your dispatch No. 77, of the 13th instant, in which you announce the acceptance by the Senate of the draught of Treaty for the settlement of the Oregon question, which was conveyed to you in my dispatch No. 19, of the 18th of May, and also the intention of the President to proceed forthwith to the completion of the proposed Convention.

In your dispatch you state that Mr. Buchanan had observed to you that the privilege of navigating the Columbia River, which, by the second Article of the Convention, is secured to the Hudson’s Bay Company, and to British subjects trading with the same, was understood by the Senate to be limited to the duration of the license under which the Company now carry on their operations in the country west of the Rocky Mountains; to which observation you very properly replied that the Article proposed by Her Majesty’s Government spoke for itself.

Nothing, in fact, can well be clearer than the language of that Article. In drawing, it up I had not the smallest intention of restricting the British right to navigate the Columbia in the manner supposed, nor can I comprehend how such a supposition could have been entertained by the Senate, for I have reason to know that Mr. MacLane fully and faithfully reported to his Government all that passed between himself and me respecting the navigation of the Columbia. In every conversation that we held on the subject of the proposed Treaty, I not only declared to Mr. MacLane that we must insist on the permanent right being secured to us to navigate the Columbia, but I even showed him the project of the Treaty, and, on his expressing an apprehension that the provision contained in the second Article would not be accepted unless the right of navigation were limited to a term of years, I positively declined to accede to this suggestion.

[Page 236]

I think it right to state these facts, in order to obviate any misapprehension which might possibly hereafter be raised on the construction of the second Article of the Oregon Treaty.

I am, &c.,

ABERDEEN.

P. S. July 1.—Since writing this dispatch I have held a conversation with Mr. MacLane, in which he has freely and fully confirmed all that I have stated above with reference to his own understanding of the intent of the second Article of the Oregon Treaty.

A.

Two subsequent dispatches of Mr. Pakenham to Viscount Palmerston (who had succeeded Lord Aberdeen as Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) are as follows:

No. 100.]

My Lord: Owing to one of those irregularities which are not unfrequently witnessed in this country, the President’s Message to the Senate, submitting, for the advice and opinion of that body, the proposition lately made by Her Majesty’s Government for the settlement of the Oregon Question, and various other papers connected with that transaction, have found their way into the public papers, notwithstanding that the injunction of secrecy has not yet been removed.

Amongst other papers thus published, the collection of which I have the honor to inclose, 15 will be found a dispatch from Mr. MacLane to his Government, reporting what had passed between the Earl of Aberdeen and himself with relation to the proposition which Lord Aberdeen was about to make to this Government, for the partition of the Oregon Territory.

It would appear from this dispatch that Mr. MacLane had no expectation that the terms proposed by Her Majesty’s Government would be accepted here; that he discouraged any such expectation on the part of Her Majesty’s Government, considering as “erroneous” an impression, which he found had been produced in England, “that the Senate would accept the proposition now offered, at least without any material modification, and that the President would not take the responsibility of rejecting it without consulting the Senate;” and, finally, that he gave it as his opinion to the American Government that the offer then made was not submitted as an “ultimatum,” nor intended as such; in short, that some modification of its terms would, without much difficulty, be acceded to by England.

*It is most providential, my Lord, that Mr. MacLane’s suggestions did not succeed, either in England, in deterring Lord Aberdeen from making his offer, ac cording to his original intention, or here, in inducing the American Government to stand out for some modification of that offer when it was made; for, in either case, all would have been spoiled.[xxi]

The President’s Message, transmitting the proposition of Her Majesty’s Government for the consideration of the Senate, is very guarded—upon the whole, rather deprecating than encouraging the acceptance of the offer; but in this course the President ran no risk and incurred no responsibility whatever, for every one in Washington, at all acquainted with the disposition of the Senate, knew that such a proposition would be accepted by that body, by a large majority.

I have, &c.,

R. PAKENHAM.
No. 106.]

My Lord: The injunction of secrecy having been removed by a resolution of the Senate, I have the honor herewith to transmit three numbers of the Union, official newspaper, containing, in an authentic form, (Union of 7th August,) the papers relative to the conclusion of the Oregon negotiation which I had the honor to transmit in an unauthorized form with my dispatch No. 100, and also (Unions of 8th and 10th August) two Messages from the President to the Senate, the first communicating for approval the Treaty signed here on the 15th of June, the second communicating documents not before communicated to the Senate relative to the Oregon Territory, in answer to a resolution of the Senate of the 17th June last.

Among the papers thus made public, the one which I should most particularly recommend to your Lordship’s attention, is a dispatch from Mr. Buchanan to Mr. MacLane, dated the 12th of July, 1845, (Union of 8th August,) setting forth the terms on which the President was willing, at that time, to settle the Oregon question, but evidently with little or no expectation that those terms would be accepted by Great Britain, I might almost say with an expectation scarcely concealed that they would be rejected, [Page 237] when, to use Mr. Buchanan’s own words, the President would “be relieved from the embarrassment in which he has been involved by the acts, offers, and declarations of his predecessors,” and be justified in going to war for the whole territory.

The remarkable thing in this dispatch is the confidence which it betrays that, in the course which the President had made up bis mind to follow with reference to the Oregon question, he would receive the countenance and support of the Senate and the country, even to the extremity of a war with England. The result has shown that, in this expectation, he did not do justice either to the wisdom and integrity of the Senate, or to the intelligence and good sense of the American people.

Within a few days after the opening of the late session of Congress it became evident that Mr. Polk’s policy respecting Oregon was viewed with no favor by a large majority of the Senate, nor was the war cry raised by the more ardent partisans of the Administration responded to in any part of the country.

In process of time this conclusion forced itself on the mind of the President and his advisers, and hence your Lordship will find in the ulterior dispatches of Mr. Buchanan to Mr. MacLane a far more moderate and subdued tone, until at last they exhibit a positive and conciliatory desire to settle the question by compromise, the title of the United States to “the whole of Oregon” having apparently been forgotten.

If further proof were wanted of the anxiety of this Government to be extricated from the mistaken position in which they had placed themselves, it would be found in the alacrity in which the terms last proposed by Her Majesty’s Government for the settlement of the controversy were accepted.

Sufficient time has now elapsed since the promulgation of the Treaty to enable us to judge of the light in which the transaction has been viewed throughout the country, and it is gratifying to say that it has been everywhere received with satisfaction and applause.

No evidence whatever of a contrary feeling has come within my observation, except it be among the disappointed advocates of a war policy, who had staked their political fortune upon the adoption of extreme measures, and even in these quarters, I am bound in truth to say that the irritation is rather against the President and his ministers for having, as they say, deceived and betrayed them, than from any express condemnation of the Treaty itself.

I have, &c.,

R. PAKENHAM.
  1. Appendix No. 19 to Mr. Bancroft’s Memorial.
  2. The last three paragraphs of this letter are omitted here. They have no relation to the question before the Arbitrator, and they have not (as far as Her Majesty’s Government know) been published by the United States Government.
  3. Appendix No. 5.
  4. Appendix No. 5.
  5. There was inclosed in the dispatch a copy of the Baltimore Sun newspaper of 23d July, 1846.