No. 77
Mr. Low
to Mr. Fish.
Peking, January 13, 1872. (Received April 1.)
Sir: I beg to thank you for your approval of my general course in the conduct of the expedition to Corea, conveyed in your dispatch No. 54.
With reference to the observation that the Department is of the opinion that my communications should have been addressed to the principal minister for foreign affairs instead of the King, I beg to state some of the reasons why a departure from the course usual in such correspondence seemed necessary.
It is proper that I should say in this connection that the mode and manner of approaching the government of Corea engaged my attention from the moment your instructions reached me, and the course pursued was decided on only after mature deliberation.
All the information obtainable, concerning the organization of that government, went to prove that such an official as a minister for foreign affairs did not exist; and it seemed altogether likely that if I addressed a communication to such an official, it would reach a very subordinate board charged with the control of the inhabitants on some of the outlying islands off the coast of that country, over whom the King exercises a military control.
A brief description of the organization of the Chinese government, of which that of Corea is a counterpart, may not prove uninteresting; it will, at the same time, illustrate what I desire to say better than it can be done in any other manner.
The supreme head of the government is the Emperor. He is assisted by several high ministers, who compose what is known as the “grand council,” whose functions are advisory simply. Subordinate to this head are the “six boards”—civil office, revenue, rites, war, punishments, and works. They rank in dignity in the order named. Each of these boards has several departments or bureaus, to each of which are confided particular duties.
In addition to the six boards before mentioned there are four inferior ones, viz: colonial office, ensorate, judicature, and education. There are also separate departments in each of these. All the business of the [Page 128] imperial government is transacted by and through these ten boards, the particular functions of each being marked with great precision and definitely defined.
Everything connected with the tributary states, such as the reception of their embassadors and tribute-bearers, is under the control of, and is managed by, a department in the board of rites, which is styled the “host and guest office.” The government of and regulation of intercourse with “external foreigners” is managed by a department in the board of colonial office.
Included under the head of “external foreigners” are the tribes of Cobdo, Ili, Mongolia, and Koko-nor. It is said that, prior to 1860, this board had also the nominal superintendence of the affairs between China and the “barbarian countries of the west,” such as England, France, the United States, &c. The Tsung-li Yamen, or foreign office, had no existence prior to 1861. It was organized in that year by imperial decree, to meet an emergency forced upon the government by the presence of resident foreign ministers in Peking, who were unwilling to transact their business with either of the boards. But even now it is not a department of the government recognized by law, nor is it mentioned in the published list of officers.
The Tsung-li Yamen is composed of seven high ministers, all of whom are presidents or vice-presidents of the six boards before referred to, with Prince Kung at the head as chief secretary for foreign affairs. The ministers’ position as members of the foreign office is ex officio simply, the business intrusted to them being in addition to their legitimate duties as officers of the several boards.
With the exception of the “grand council,” which has no existence in Corea, the organization of that government is exactly like that of China.
In view of this, it seemed probable that a communication from me, addressed to the minister for foreign affairs, would reach either the board of rites or that of colonial office; if the former, it would be considered a tacit acknowledgment that the United States consider themselves vassals of Corea; if the latter, our position would be considered on a par with the semi-savage tribes on the outlying islands. Such an impression would, I thought, be likely to prevent direct communication with any but petty officials, and thus defeat the purpose of the mission.
I was the more strongly convinced of the advisability of addressing myself to the King direct, from the fact that the Chinese officials urged no objection to it on the score of propriety. At an interview with the ministers of the foreign office, which I sought for the purpose of soliciting their friendly oil ces, in obedience to your instructions, when I made the proposal that they should send a letter, through the board of rites, from me to the King, nothing was said as to the impropriety of such a proceeding, nor could an objection on that score have been properly urged, for it is a well-known fact that the King corresponds on terms of equality with the board of rites, a board quite inferior in point of dignity to the Tsung-li Yamen, (leaving out Prince Kung,) with which the ministers of western nations transact all their business.
In addition to the considerations which might affect the result, so far as Corea was concerned, our standing and prestige in the eyes of the Chinese could not be overlooked.
It would, I thought, be a fatal mistake to assume an attitude of inferiority to Corea, looking only to the success of the expedition; and if it should prove unsuccessful, any semblance of subserviency would seriously compromise our position here. My dispatches of last spring concerning this subject clearly indicated my solicitude on this latter point; [Page 129] nor did I conceal from myself from the first that non-success was possible if not probable.
In view of these considerations I deemed it my duty to address my communications direct to the King until such time as he should designate a minister of appropriate rank with whom I could consult and correspond; nor have I found any evidence since going to prove that a different course in this particular would have had the least influence for good. I may add that no person can be more averse than myself to subordinating essentials to questions of form and ceremony; but when, as is almost invariably the case in oriental countries, essentials are buried out of sight in ceremony and etiquette, a disregard of the latter hinders, if it does not defeat entirely, the accomplishment of practical results.
The foregoing explanations will, I trust, go far to justify my proceedings in this particular in the opinion of the Department.
The statements in Mr. Drew’s note to the prefect of Fu Ping-fu, referred to in your dispatch, may have been ill advised. If so, they can be set down to an over-anxiety to accomplish the object for which the mission was sent, and a desire to spare no effort to that end.
Procrastination is the formidable weapon in diplomacy with orientals; every possible device will be resorted to to hinder and obstruct action on disagreeable subjects, hoping by this means to weary their opponents into compliance with their wishes. In view of this characteristic the announcement that we intended to make a protracted stay on the coast might, I thought, induce the government to send some one to treat with me; and besides, at the date on which the note was written it was not impossible that additional instructions might reach me by telegraph which would detain the fleet there longer than I would feel authorized to do without them, unless a favorable change in the status of affairs should occur in the mean time. The withdrawal of the fleet was not decided upon until after all reasonable efforts at peaceful negotiation, warranted by your instructions, had been exhausted, nor until I had become entirely satisfied that further delay and effort would be entirely useless. When that time had arrived I did not feel justified in keeping longer all the available vessels of the fleet on the coast of Corea, when their presence on the coasts of China and Japan might be necessary for the protection of our citizens there; to send away a portion of the vessels and remain longer myself appeared useless, and worse than useless, as the weakening of the force might induce the Coreans to commit some assault or offer insult which could not honorably be allowed to go unredressed.
In conclusion I beg leave to say that efforts to open intercourse with isolated oriental countries, whose rulers are ignorant, conceited, and exclusive, have universally been surrounded by difficulties and embarrassments, and either history nor precedent affords a safe guide for action. In these respects the mission to Corea formed no exception. That mistakes were possible, and even probable, I never for a moment doubted; and it is a source of gratification to me that, according to my present lights, so few were committed. And while I feel confident that all was done that could be, under the circumstances, it is a source of sincere regret and disappointment that the result was not all the Department hoped for and perhaps expected. But while failing to attain the main object for which the mission was sent, the ultimate results arising from it are not, I am happy to say, likely to prove as mischievous as I had feared, and at one time anticipated. The chastisement which the attack upon our vessels by the Coreans rendered necessary, [Page 130] judging from all I can see and hear, has done good?-it has convinced the Chinese as well as their vassals that insults and injuries will not be allowed to go unredressed, which has increased the respect of this government for us as a nation. A lesson has at the same time been taught the Corean government which will prove useful; it will. I feel certain, tend to guarantee humane treatment of shipwrecked people, who may be unfortunately thrown upon the mercy of that nation, more certainly than all the voluntary promises of the King heretofore made through the Peking government.
I have, &c,