No. 187.
Mr. Francis to Mr. Fish
Athens, December 23, 1871. (Received January 18, 1872.)
Sir: Brigandage is the great evil of Greece. It prevents intercommunication, retards enterprise, and paralyzes business. It exacts contributions from legitimate industry, and thus discourages agriculture. It is not surprising that, in sections where brigandage prevails, the farming interest should languish. It taxes that interest for support. Then the government exacts one-tenth of the products of the soil for its necessary revenue. Between this upper and nether millstone the cultivator of the soil certainly has a hard time of it. The great need of Greece is immunity from brigandage as a sine qua non for industrial [Page 227] progress. The government had adopted efficient and, it was supposed, successful measures to suppress brigandage. In his address to the chamber of deputies, at the beginning of the session, in October last, the King congratulated the country that the evil had been nearly extirpated, and that, with the measures adopted, it could not much longer exist in any part of the kingdom. A change of ministry soon occurred, but there is no evidence, I believe, that a change of policy followed in reference to the suppression of brigandage. Such governmental changes, however, happening so frequently as they do in Greece, tend to unsettle things, and thus impair the public security. This is conceded by all intelligent people here with whom I have conversed, including the representative statesmen of all parties. This fact, in illustration, has now appeared: The brigands, who had not been heard of for some time, recently resumed their raidings. The band of Spanos, much dreaded on account of the dare-devil cunning of its chief, appeared in the province of Amphissa, near Parnassus, some three or four weeks ago. More recently they were discovered in the provinces of Attica and Boeotia, and in the district of Marathon, about thirty miles east of Athens. The government sent a considerable military force in pursuit of them. On the 14th instant they were discovered, by a detachment of soldiers, in their place of concealment. It is stated that, in their anxiety to win honor and, possibly, pecuniary reward from the government, the soldiers fired upon the brigands at a considerable distance, when, if the affair had been properly managed, the outlaws would probably have been killed or captured. It is rumored that the chief, Spanos, with two of his band, was wounded, but of this there is no satisfactory evidence. It is certain that the band all got away. Since this affair, the government has still further increased the military force in that section, and every possible effort has been made to capture or destroy the brigands. But the pursuit has been unsuccessful, and it is feared that the band cannot now be overtaken. They have probably retired to their headquarters, whence they came, near the Turkish frontier. There they feel secure, as, in case of pursuit, they can readily, cross the border into Turkey.
The Greek government shows no mercy to persons convicted of brigandage. There have been thirteen executions by the guillotine during the present month—four at Misolonghi, one at Patras, one at Zante, and the remainder in other parts of Greece. Two other brigands, now under sentence of death, are soon to be executed.
But this criticism is made upon the policy of the government in dealing with this great evil: Punishment is not summarily inflicted, and it is assumed that delay in its infliction tends to Impair its restraining influence. For example, the fact may be stated that the brigands recently executed were captured many months ago; they had remained in prison awaiting the slow process of the civil law, and their trial, conviction, and execution, after so long a time had elapsed since their arrest, failed to create the strong impression that would have followed their trial by court-martial and prompt execution near or at their homes and where their families and friends reside. In other words, it is contended that these outlaws should be treated as persons in armed rebellion against the government, as traitors, making war against the state, and when captured they should be subjected to the severest and summary rigors of military law. Instead of that, they are accorded all the privileges of ordinary criminals, have the benefit of trial by jury before the civil courts, and in case of the disappearance of witnesses, or a technical break in the testimony from any cause, they may escape punishment [Page 228] altogether. While admitting the force of this reasoning, those in authority say that public opinion in Greece will not admit of the administration of military law as suggested, even in dealing with brigandage: that the people here are extremely jealous of the military power, and would oppose any attempt to place even the lives of captured brigands at its disposal, fearing that if so much authority were conceded it, more would be demanded, and popular liberty might soon be stricken down through military usurpation. But in reply to this it may be said that brigands are traitors of the most dangerous character. The soldiers are even offered a considerable reward for shooting them on sight. If it is allowed so much, why may not the organized military authority, for the benefit of the moral effect, be permitted to try the captured brigands, and, on conviction, promptly “shoot them on the spot?”
It should be stated in this connection that I am assured by the minister of war that there is far less of brigandage in Greece now than there was one year, or even six months ago; that the last member of Krekela’s dangerous band has just been captured near Amphissa; that no more than three bands are known to have an existence in Greece, and their extirpation is only a question of time; that as brigands discover, as they have learned in their latest venture, the great peril of attempting raids from the Turkish border into the interior, and that their criminal enterprise fails to secure them adequate reward, they will abandon their vocation, as most of this class have already done. Still, this fact cannot be denied: security is not felt for free travel, even at a distance no farther than ten to fifteen miles from Athens, especially in the direction of Marathon. The government will only assume responsibility for the safety of the tourist or traveler after he applies to the proper authority, and is furnished a military escort. There is this sense of insecurity realized in consequence of the late re-appearance of the dangerous Spanos and his band in the provinces of Attica and Boeotia, though they are probably not now within seventy-five or a hundred miles of here. At the worst, it is said by intelligent Greeks, officials and others, that there is less brigandage in this kingdom than in Italy and Turkey, though the sparse population of many districts and the peculiar topography of the country greatly favor them, and put the government to proportional disadvantage in pursuing the outlaws5 that the evil of the Ku-Klux in sections of the United States has been far greater in the excesses perpetrated, in the destruction of property and the loss of life, than all the crimes of the brigands in Greece, and that the disorders in France and not infrequent outbreaks of organized crime in Great Britain have also been far greater. There may be truth in this statement, and yet it does not absolve the Greek government from its paramount duty to assure security against any well-grounded apprehension of damage from brigandage, at least within a reasonable distance of its capital. This fact, I believe, is fully realized, and there is an honest determination to enforce the most efficient measures possible for the public safety.
I am, &c,