No. 23.
Mr. Low to Mr.
Fish.
No. 31.]
Legation of the United
States, Pekin, September 26, 1870. (Received November
25.)
Sir: Referring to my dispatch No. 29, relating
to the withdrawal of the missionaries from Tungchow, I have now the
honor to inclose copies of my note, called out by this affair, to Prince
Kung, (inclosure A;) his reply thereto, (inclosure B,) and another note
from Prince Kung transmitting a decree of the Emperor, (inclosure
C.)
In view of the disturbed condition of the country, caused by rumors of
intended violence, and believing that these rumors, as well as the
hostile spirit exhibited by the natives, are caused mainly by the late
massacre at Tien-tsin, and that the delay and uncertainty in the
punishment of the guilty lead the people in other places to believe that
the riot was justifiable and meets with the implied approval of the
government rather than its condemnation, I deemed it entirely proper, as
well as my duty, to improve the occasion to review the Tien-tsin affair,
giving to the prince my opinions regarding the failure thus far of the
government to do its duty, and pointing out the peril in which the lives
and property of all foreign residents are placed in consequence of this
dilatory, halting, and uncertain policy. I also referred to the
possibility of dangerous complications growing out of this affair unless
a more rigorous course be pursued. The note is strong, though entirely
respectful, and will, I hope, have some effect for good. I beg,
most-respectfully, to refer to that document for a resumé of my opinions
upon the situation.
In this connection I desire to say that, while I believe there is danger,
I by no means consider the situation as perilous as the people generally
do; at the same time they may be right and I wrong.
The prince’s reply, while it is entirely satisfactory with regard to the
immediate subject which called it forth, the Tungchow disturbance, fails
entirely to meet the general question in a proper way. It is simply an
apology for the delay, and affords no reasonable ground for believing
that such steps will be taken as will quiet the turbulence of the
people, and reëstablish confidence among the foreign residents. He
intimates that there have been and are still difficulties in the way of
speedy action. This I am prepared to believe; but these difficulties, in
my opinion, could be surmounted if the prince and his associates would
exhibit a little more courage and resolution.
The hostile spirit of the people at Tien-tsin undoubtedly deterred the
officials from taking prompt action in the beginning, lest the attempt
at
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summary punishment of the
rioters should cause another uprising for their protection and
deliverance; and the unwise action of the French chargé d’affaires
raised such a storm of opposition in the higher official circles to
prevent a compliance with the demand made by him, that Prince Kung and
his associates were, for a time, powerless. These reasons are without
force now, and afford no apology for delay.
It is undoubtedly true, that immediately after the receipt and rejection
of what may properly be termed M. de Rochechoart’s ultimatum, the
government expected a hostile demonstration from France, and commenced
making preparations to resist an attack. Li-Hung-Chang, an able official
and a general of distinction, who was then in command of the imperial
forces operating in the west against the Mohammedan rebels, was called
to Tien-tsin, with all the troops that could be spared from the western
armies. More recently he has been appointed governor general of this
province. He has now arrived, and has, it is said, from 10,000 to 20,000
troops near him at Tien-tsin. The moving of these troops gave rise to
all sorts of rumors of an intended attack upon foreigners.
My own opinion is, however, that the ordering of these troops to
Tien-tsin was solely with a view to defense in case of attack by the
French.
The news from Europe must have dispelled all apprehensions of any hostile
movement this autumn. It has also, I am sorry to say, had the effect to
make the officials more dilatory in their actions and less inclined to
do their duty promptly and properly.
The latest intelligence from Europe via St. Petersburg announces the
defeat and surrender of a large part of the French army, with the
Emperor at its head, the overthrow of the government and the
proclamation of a new one instead. In view of this startling and
unexpected news, the French chargé called his colleagues together on the
24th instant, and asked their advice and assistance in the common
interest of all. We have taken hold of the question and shall do what we
can; but the situation now is difficult and somewhat embarrassing, and I
am not sanguine as to results. The representatives of Great Britain,
Russia, North Germany and the United States, joined in a note to Prince
Kung, on the 24th instant, but as yet no reply has been received. I
defer sending a copy or making further comments until an answer comes
and I get more light.
If I appear to overburden the Department with dispatches and papers
concerning affairs here, my apology must lie in the fact that it is
altogether probable that correspondence and consultation will be
necessary between the chief treaty powers, growing out of political
questions here; and it is my desire that the Department may be in
possession of all the information necessary to form intelligent and
correct opinions upon all the questions involved.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A.
Legation of the United
States, Pekin,
September 13,
1870.
Sir: It becomes my duty to inform you that,
in consequence of the threatening attitude of the people, and
failing to obtain from the local officials any satisfactory
assurances of protection, the American missionaries residing at
Tungchow, near Che Foo, deemed it prudent to withdraw temporarily to
the latter place. The danger to them appearing so imminent, the
ordinary routes of land travel being considered unsafe,
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and there being no other
means of transport by water available, the admiral of her Majesty’s
fleet in these waters, upon the request of the United States
vice-consul at Che Foo, kindly sent two vessels of war on the 1st
instant and transported the missionaries with their families to Che
Foo, where they now are. The number of men, women, and children
attached to the mission is eighteen, all Americans. One of the
missionaries, in advising me of their action and the causes which
led to it, asks my advice as to the proper course for them to
pursue, having in view their personal safety and the security of
their property which was necessarily left behind at Tungchow. Before
replying to this letter, I deem it proper to lay the facts in this
case before your imperial highness, and, at the same time, offer
some observations upon the unhappy state of affairs which exists at
Tungchow and other places.
It is a fact, painfully apparent to all foreign residents, that,
since the terrible tragedy at Tien-tsin, the attitude of the local
officials and the people generally there, and at many other places,
toward foreigners, has been in marked contrast to that kind and
cordial relation which should exist. It is unnecessary here to
inquire whether the outbreak at Tien-tsin was a sudden uprising of
the people to redress, by violence, fancied wrongs, and was
altogether local in its origin, or whether it was a part of a more
extended and wide-spread conspiracy, fomented by designing officials
and persons of the higher classes of civilians, without cause, other
than a purpose of gratifying a long-cherished hatred and desire for
revenge against the people of western nations; whether the wrath of
the people was directed specially against the French as a
nationality, and the Roman Catholics as a religious body, or whether
all nationalities and religions would have suffered equally, had
they resided within the territory where the mob assembled, and near
the scene of its bloody deeds. Without discussing the causes, I desire, most respectfully, to offer
to your imperial highness the result of my conclusions as to the effects which the news of this lamentable
affair at Tien-tsin has had upon the people in other places.
The tales of horrible cruelties practiced by the Roman Catholics are
now reported and believed by the people generally, notwithstanding
the report, after searching investigation, of the high officer
Tsing-Kwoh-fan to the contrary, and in opposition to the solemn
delarations of the Emperor, that all these stories are without
foundation and false. It seems scarcely possible that such opinions
can be entertained by the common people against the evidence before
referred to, upon any other hypothesis than that the local officials
and persons of rank and distinction are bringing an influence to
bear to render foreigners distasteful in the eyes of the people, and
inciting hostility which will, unless checked promptly, be likely to
bring on a collision.
There is no evidence of any change for the better in the feelings of
the inhabitants of Tien-tsin, nor are there any signs of regret for
the terrible scenes enacted on the 21st June. On the contrary, the
manufacture and sale of fans (until stopped by official action upon
the complaint of a foreign consul) bearing engravings of the burning
buildings and the murder of their inmates, show only too plainly
that the people of that city desire by illustrations of their bloody
deeds to be reminded of the eventful day when innocent and helpless
women were, with others, ruthlessly sacrificed. The failure to
punish any of the guilty actors, although nearly three months have
since elapsed, tends in no small degree to confirm the people in the
belief that the riot was a justifiable retribution, in which the
government sympathizes; and leads to the belief that similar attacks
upon foreigners will meet with official sanction and approval,
rather than condemnation and punishment. In addition to all this,
the knowledge that large bodies of troops are moving from the
western provinces eastward into Shan-tung and Chihli affords a basis
for the evil-disposed to circulate reports that the imperial
government has designs hostile to the foreign residents. This adds
to the excitement and fills with alarm the missionaries and others
residing in the two provinces before named.
It was currently reported in Tungchow during the last days in August,
that 2,000 troops were marching from the capital of the province
toward that place, preparatory to the extermination of the
missionaries, and threats were freely and openly indulged in that,
on the 10th of September all foreigners would be sacrificed. So
general was the belief that the native servants of the missionaries
were appealed to by their friends and relatives to leave their
employers before the day appointed, otherwise their lives would
probably be sacrificed with the rest. The missionaries, hearing
these reports from distinct and separate sources, felt compelled to
give heed to them, and failing to get any satisfactory refutation of
the reports, or any guarantee of safety from the local officials,
concluded to take the steps I have before indicated.
In the collective note of the 24th June, in which all the foreign
representatives joined, the danger of dilatory action on the part of
the government was pointed out, and grave apprehensions of further
trouble were felt, unless the uprising at Tien-tsin was promptly and
effectually put down; and in personal interviews which I have had
the honor to have with your imperial highness and the other members
of the Foreign Office since, I have urgently pressed upon you and
them the necessity of prompt and decided action in the way of
searching out and punishing the guilty. I have also
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pointed out the great importance of
taking every means to enlighten and instruct the people in regard to
the peaceful purposes of all foreign residents, and the missionaries
in particular; that no foreigner has been, or possibly can be,
guilty of the practices imputed to them by the ignorant and
superstitious, and that all missionaries are animated by pure and
peaceful motives, engaged in no political intrigue, and seeking only
the highest welfare of the people by striving to make them honest
and good.
Candor compels me to say that there has been a lack of promptness,
and, I believe, of earnestness, on the part of the officials deputed
by the government to ascertain and bring to punishment the guilty
persons at Tien-tsin.
Prior to the troubles, two persons at Tien-tsin, and a larger number
at Nankin, accused of kidnapping, were arrested, tried, and punished
with the extreme penalty of the law; and in the case of the latter
the extreme haste of the officials in the trials and punishment of
the criminals provoked much discussion, and, I am informed, called
forth protests against what seemed to be indecent haste. If the law
sanctioned these hasty trials and summary executions in cases where
kidnapping was the crime, I fail to see why the assassins of
peaceful foreign residents, including foreign officials and innocent
and unoffending women, should have any greater lenity shown them;
and in a place where the known participation in the riot is an honor
and its leadership a notable distinction, it ought not to be
difficult to ascertain who are the guilty ones deserving punishment.
Hence the delay appears to be without cause, and leads many to doubt
the good faith of the government. Unless a change in the status of
affairs soon occurs, which will reëstablish public confidence in the
fidelity of the government to its treaty obligations, which will
reassure the citizens and subjects of the treaty powers that their
residence in China will be safe and their property protected, grave
apprehensions may reasonably be entertained that the good will and
cordial support of some of the most influential and powerful of the
western nations will be lost to China.
The traditional policy of the United States in their intercourse with
China is peace, which it is the earnest desire of the undersigned,
as well as his Government, to maintain, and nothing will cause a
departure from this policy, except the flagrant violation of the
rights and privileges of their citizens by the people and the
failure of the imperial government to apply the proper remedy
promptly. In view of these considerations, I again most earnestly
call your attention to the condition of affairs at Tung-chow, to the
end that you will cause such measures to be adopted as will assure
citizens of the United States of their safety, and hasten the return
of the missionaries to their homes and their posts of duty.
In the foregoing I have, with entire frankness, endeavored to place
before your imperial highness a plain exposition of the situation in
which all foreigners in the empire are placed, and the danger to
which they are exposed, which will, unless speedily averted, lead to
the most unhappy consequences.
With renewed assurances of my high consideration, I have the honor to
be, your imperial highness’ obedient servant.
His Imperial Highness Prince Kung.
B.
September, 24,
1870, (Tungchow, 9th year, 8th moon, 29th day.)
Prince Kung, chief secretary of state for foreign affairs, herewith
sends a reply:
I had the honor to receive your dispatch of the 16th instant, in
which you inform me that Mr. Mateer and other American missionaries
residing at Tungchow, in Shan-tung, had written to you, stating that
rumors had been rife among the citizens there during this and last
month; that in consequence of the Tien-tsin riot, a body of troops
from the provincial capital Tsinan would reach it on the 10th of
September, whereupon their scholars and servants left them, and they
with their familes had all gone aboard ship, and temporarily removed
to Che Foo, from whence they had inquired of you whether they had
better go back to Tungchow or not; but before replying, you
concluded to bring the matter to my notice, alluding moreover to the
present state of unrest between natives and foreigners, and asking
that orders may be sent to the officials in Shan-tung to take
measures to remove the fears of the missionaries, and assure their
safe residence in Tungchow, &e., &c.
In respect to the rumors circulated at Tungchow, I have to reply that
before I had received your excellency’s dispatch orders had been
sent from the Foreign Office to the provincial governor, and to the
intendant of Tungchow, immediately to issue proclamations clearly
making known to the people that the rumors were quite groundless,
and they were to give no credence to them; and as they caused mutual
distrust and alarm, these officers were to take measures to
dissipate suspicions of this kind, so that foreigners and natives
could henceforth live peaceably together.
Further orders were yesterday sent to Governor Ting (of Shan-tung) to
enjoin upon
[Page 395]
the district
magistrate of Punglai (i.
e., Tungchow City) to adopt precautionary
measures to remove all doubt and alarm, so that when Mr. Mateer and
his associates return their safety can be assured. The day fixed by
rumor, September 10, for bringing in soldiers, and destroying the
missionaries, having long since passed over without disturbance,
plainly shows that the whole was a rumor, unworthy of belief, which
need have excited no alarm.
The doubt which your excellency expresses, that the delay in settling
the riot of Tien-tsin, and the want of energy manifested in dealing
with it, considering the serious consequences likely to result from
it, are calculated to lead all western nations to doubt the faith
and earnestness of the government, arouses in my mind the closest
attention and shows your full knowledge of the matter. In dealing
with an affair like this, that involves the relations between this
and other countries, it is indeed important that the government
should earnestly put forth its utmost energy, uniting safety with
speed in bringing it to a close. But in dealing with the
difficulties of this case we have proved the truth of the saying,
“the more haste the worse speed;” having found that the two arc
incompatible, the wisest course for us seems to be to humor things
so as to attain the end safely. Can any one doubt that government
desires to speedily bring the Tien-tsin riot and all that has grown
out of it to a close? Yet to arrest the murderers is not easy; to
find the clue to them is hard; but the hardest of all is to
reconcile the evidence obtained, for the whole affair was done on a
sudden provocation and had no leader who had planned it. When a
great crowd rushes together in a frenzy, the course of events cannot
be closely remembered, nor who it was that killed the victims be
certainly found out or known. The names of the leaders or the actual
murderers are not ascertainable, and this makes the difficulty in
arresting them. When robbers plunder and secrete their booty, it is
comparatively easy to trace them; but here all the world ran about
in commingling crowds, without order or leaders, and this is what
makes it so hard for us to get any clue to the guilty. In common
cases of robbery or murder the plunder is hid somewhere, or there is
proof of the killing; somebody has taken the lead in the act; but in
this instance there is nothing, no booty, no proof, no leader,
nothing to guide to a conviction. But the most difficult part is in
discriminating the evidence, for if the prisoners are verbally
interrogated their testimony is not true probably, and if they are
put to the question they are ready to implicate the innocent. This
shows the difficulties in the way of getting evidence. Amidst these
various obstacles, if the settlement of this affair be unduly
hurried, not only will it be hard to satisfy the Chinese people that
justice has been done, but I fear that foreigners will also be
disappointed. These are the causes which have delayed the settlement
of the Tien-tsin affair. Many guilty persons are already in custody,
among whom ten or more have been proven to be guilty and will suffer
the extreme penalty of the law. I think that their cases will be
closed in a few days and will remove all doubts as to whether
anything would be done. I have thus endeavored to state my
difficulties in conducting this affair, both toward my own
government and toward foreign nations, and I hope that your
excellency and all the other foreign ministers will appreciate the
contingencies of my position.
His Excellency F. F. Low, United States
Minister to China.
C
September 11,
1870. (Tungchow, 9th year, 8th moon, 16th day.)
Prince Kung, chief secretary of state for foreign affairs, herewith
sends a communication:
I was yesterday honored by receiving the following decree.
“Li Hung-chang having been appointed governor general of the province
of Child, let him immediately proceed to Tien-tsin, and in
conjunction with Tsang kwoh-fan, Ting Jih-chang and Chinglin,
inquire into and manage affairs there. Let Mao Changhi, the
president of the board of works, return to Pekin and resume his
duties. Respect this.”
With respect to the Tien-tsin case I may observe that during the
three months which have passed, Governor General Tsang and his
colleagues have searched out and arrested more than eighty of the
criminals engaged in the riot, and he is now employed in examining
them and taking testimony; he will, without doubt, be able to
ascertain clearly who are guilty and decide their sentences.
His excellency Li having received the above order to go to Tien-tsin,
he will join in the inquiry and hasten the matter, so that there
seems now a strong probability that this affair may ere long be
brought to a conclusion.
His Excellency Frederick F. Low,
United States Minister to China.