No. 213.
Mr. Jay to Mr. Fish.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the Department dispatch No. 51, dated the 5th of July, from Mr. Davis, Assistant Secretary, and your dispatch No. 53, dated the 11th of July, both in reference to the cable messages sent by me on the subject of Mr. Bancroft’s dispatch on the internal affairs of Austria.
* * * * * * * *
After the treaty of Prague, in 1866, Austria, thenceforth excluded from Germany, accepted the situation adopted under de Beust, a policy of free constitutional government, and devoted herself to the work of reconstruction. Hungary was first reconciled, and the recent bitter feuds were replaced by warm devotion, and Andrapy, proscribed in 1849, is to-day its chief minister. In Cisleitha the work is still progressing under difficulties of which the Department has been steadily advised, and the rivalry between Prussia and Austria * * * * * * * * * had not ceased with Sadowa. The non-execution of the fourth and fifth articles of the treaty of Prague had not tended to establish perfect confidence; the memory of the Count de Bismarck’s declaration to the Austrian ambassador that Austria was an eastern and not a western power, and that her capital was Pesth, and not Vienna, was not forgotton; the disclosure, by General la Marmora in the Italian Chambers, of the letter of the Prussian ambassador, in June 1866, declaring that it was necessary to “strike the Austrian power to the heart,” had made a profound impression as coming from their ancient ally, and reminders were constantly supplied by the German press of the intent, still cherished under color of German nationality, to strip Austria of her provinces wherever Germans might be found, however few in number, from her northern border to the Adriatic Sea, When Mr. Bancroft’s dispatch appeared, dated at Berlin, with a reference to its colored map to prove Pesth “the exact central point of the totality of the whole empire,” with hints of the coming superiority of Pesth over Vienna, and with its intimation that, unless the Austrian cabinet should be governed by the wishes of its German subjects, it might lose its German-Austrian provinces, as it lost Venice and Milan, it is not difficult to understand that such a document, at a critical moment, appearing with a color of American authority, was calculated to surprise rather than to charm the cabinet at Vienna. I say a critical moment, for you will remember that, at the date of Mr. Bancroft’s dispatch, when, to give an idea of the existing state of Austria, [Page 299] he says that it was for the Germans to reconstruct a constitution, they were oppressed with a mournful feeling of regret and discontent increasing their difficulty in this work, while Cisleitha was tending to decomposition, owing to the refusal of the Austrian government to promote the union of Germany, and that any new policy to be adopted after the fall of the Giskra ministry must arise out of a sort of chaos; at this time, the actual state of things * * * * * * * * * * * * * was, in its essential features, materially different.
Before the date of that dispatch, (April 18,) I had advised the Department that Count Potocki, a Polish gentleman of high character and large wealth, of moderate views and great respectability, had been placed at the head of the ministry, and charged with the scheme of reconstruction; and my dispatches No. 106 (of April 8,) No. 108, (of April 16,) No. 109, (April 18,) No. 116, (April 27,) while advising you minutely and exactly of the progress of things, showed that the policy of the chancellor and of the Count Potocki, instead of being chaotic, was clearly defined. Indeed, in my dispatch on the 8th of April, ten days before Mr. Bancroft wrote, I advised you that the chancellor feared no reaction against the liberal policy he had inaugurated, for, as you are aware, the work of constructing a constitution for Austria, which Mr. Bancroft says the Germans in their grief are going at with so little heart, has been for four years steadily advancing. On this point especially, at which Mr. Bancroft, by his remark that “they began well,” seems to leave it to be inferred that only the beginning was well, I prefer, instead of placing my own opinion in opposition to those of my distinguished colleague, to quote some facts cited in the North British Review for October 1869, in an article on the “Constitutional Development of Austria:”
Austria at the close of 1867 was already one of the freest constitutional monarchies on the continent, * * and now were added the equality of all subjects before the law, the admission to public office of any capable subject, the free enjoyment of property, domestic and personal liberty, the liberty of the press, the inviolability of letters in the post office, liberty of creeds, conscience, and science, the separation of judicial from administrative functions, the independence of the judge, the oath to the constitution required from all officials and their responsibility for all unconstitutional measures, the right of the representation of the people on all matters of taxation and military conscription, the creation of an imperial parliamentary tribunal, and, lastly, the enumeration in the delegation law of all the public and common concerns of the different provinces and the method of their treatment. * * * Austria, though far from her ideal, has, since Sadowa, accomplished wonders. The regeneration of the empire, upon the bold scheme of Beust, is progressing with ample strides. And it must not be forgotten that it proceeds upon the natural, historical, and traditional condition of the empire, verified by the modern spirit of the age. No other political body of the continent keeps pace with Austria in the development of its public life; she is rapidly making compensation for the errors and negligences of centuries, and in her progress are to be found the germs of the political revival of the nations of Central Europe.
In the same letter of the 10th of May, I said that Count de Beust hoped to satisfy the nationalities whose opposing demands had created so much trouble, by constitutional amendments in the direction of a federative system, which, while increasing the extent of self-government in the provinces, and recognizing to a greater extent the autonomy of Gallicia and Bohemia, will attach them more closely to the empire and increase the national strength of the imperial government.
On the 16th of April, still before the date of Mr. Bancroft’s dispatch, you were advised of the unavailing character of the efforts which had been made to induce the German federalists to enter the ministry, headed by the Count Potocki; that Hungary had protested against a continuance of ministerial crises as detrimental to the dual empire; and [Page 300] that the Emperor had resolved to devote himself to the work of conciliation, and remain in Vienna until the autumn. I then described the situation of the new ministry as one unusually complicated, delicate, and difficult, and remarked: “It now looks as if the coming election will be perhaps the most important that has ever occurred in the empire, as exercising a decisive influence upon constitutional questions of first-class importance. All parties, according to the Viennese journals, appreciate the significance of the situation, and are preparing to open the electoral campaign with manifestation and reunions, and thus the empire seems to take an onward step in the progress of constitutional and popular governments.”
That dispatch referred at its close to the idea, which had been thrown out, that the federal programme would result in the overthrow of German civilization, and stated that the idea of such danger from the extension of political rights and means of education in their own language to other races, was ridiculed by some of the Viennese papers, including the Press and the Wanderer.
The next Vienna dispatch (107) on the political situation was dated curiously enough on the very same day, April 18, with that from Berlin; and the difference in their advice is sufficiently startling. It advised the government that the Polish head of the ministry, Count Potocki, a warm admirer of our republic, of its schools and its finances, had declared that the principal changes which he proposed to introduce were borrowed from the American Constitution.
The Vienna dispatch announced a programme of reconstruction, based upon the American Constitution, to be submitted by a Polish minister to a Reichsrath to be elected for the purpose by the people, and to the importance of whose election the people were alive.
The Berlin dispatch announced that the Germans had to do the work of reconstruction; that they were to do it with sad hearts; that any new policy that might be adopted “must arise out of a sort of chaos;” that “the distraction seemed hopeless,” and that unless the government adopted the policy recommended in the dispatch, as approved at Berlin, it might expect to lose the Austro-German provinces. * * * When Mr. Bancroft charges the government of Cisleytha with seeking to impede the union of the rest of Germany, he ignores three important facts: 1st. That, by the treaty of Prague, Prussia had consented with Austria that there should be formed a South German Confederation, so that by the law of the situation Prussia had no right to demand a unification of the whole of Germany. 2d. That Count de Beust had distinctly, in his dispatch to the Austrian ministers at Munich and Stuttgard, disavowed all interference with the question, whatever their wishes on the subject. 3d. That it was the government at Berlin and not that at Vienna which presented obstacles to the union. Würtemberg, for instance, having declared her conviction in 1867 that “the North German Confederation does not offer the necessary guarantees for the enjoyment of civil rights and the progress of liberty;” yet notwithstanding treaty stipulations, notwithstanding Austria’s non-interference, however strong her interests or her rights; notwithstanding the substantial reasons assigned by the southern states themselves, Mr. Bancroft declares that unless Austria reconciles herself to the idea of an united Germany, she may expect to be deprived of her German provinces. It is quite true that there is nothing in the least degree novel in the suggestions themselves.
Similar threats of spoilation had been already hinted at in diplomacy and openly uttered by the press. Take, for example, a pamphlet entitled [Page 301] “Der Zerfall Oesterreichs,” von einem Deutsch-Oesterreicher, “The Decay of Austria,” by a German-Austrian, published at Leipsic in 1867. This writer, whose views and language in the following passage are not in discord with that of Mr. Bancroft, and who uses the same illustration of Venetia, says: “The unified German state (Einheitsstaat) can only then be consolidated when it shall include all the German provinces of Austria, like as the consolidation of the Italian unified state required the possession of Venetia.” Among these German provinces that are to be thus snatched from Austria, this writer includes Bohemia and Moravia. He declares that the Germans will never consent to give up these countries; and he declares further that it is imperatively necessary that the German empire should extend to the Adriatic, and include Trieste and Istria!
Another German writer, Von Wolfgang Menzel, the author of “Der deutsche Krieg im Jahr 1866, (“The German war in 1866,”) says quite as distinctly: “A mere glance at the map will show that Bohemia is German land, which the great German nation, at no price, can part with. Its inhabitants are partly Germans and partly Germanized slaves. And merely to gratify a small remnant of Czechisch barbarians,** who have not yet learned German and are wanting in every element of culture, this important country will never be given up;” and he proceeds to show, with the same blending of fondness for the Hungarians with displeasure at the Austrians, which is also conspicuous in Mr. Bancroft’s dispatch, that in this spoliation of Austria there is “for Germans and Hungarians but one and the same interest.” * * * What is to be the fate of this ancient monarchy, whether it is to be dominated, by Panslavism under the lead of Russia on the one hand, or whether it is to be absorbed in great part by the military power of an united Germany on the other, or whether, escaping these dangers, it will be able to succeed in the difficult task “of satisfying its various nationalities and consolidating them,[Page 302]with all their differences of race, language, and religion, into a harmonious empire,” no man can foresee. The effect of the war now commencing upon the destinies of Europe is equally unknown, and no one can say if Austria will be able to rest in her present position of neutrality, or whether she will be called upon to ally herself with France to protect her Austro-Germanic provinces from the German absorption, which Mr. Bancroft intimates is all but inevitable, unless the cabinet of Vienna will consent to be guided by Berlin.
But whatever the future may bring to light, the Austrian government is now developing a system of constitutional government and popular freedom which, while it encounters sneers and dislikes on the part of the military despotisms of Europe, entitles it certainly to the respectful consideration of the Government at Washington, especially at a moment when it proposes to base the empire on federative principles, akin to those embodied in the American Constitution, and when, in its extension of popular freedom, it borrows its inspiration from the American people. * * * * * *
-
Of this “small remnant of Czechish barbarians” in Bohemia, the proportion being 3,200,000 Czechs to 2,000,000 Germans, while of the entire area 64 per cent. belongs to the Czechs and 36 to the Germans, some interesting particulars are given in the Westminster Review for July 1870. Ninety-seven per cent. of the children in Bohemia attend school. The Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia have twenty-two political newspapers, two-thirds being daily, three illustrated weekly papers, seven journals and reviews on educational subjects, five on scientific subjects, one on jurisprudence, two on agriculture, two industrial, two commercial, one on pomology, one on chemistry, one medical gazette, two journals of fashion, twelve theological journals, (seven Catholic, and five Protestant,) bringing the Czechish periodical publications to a total of seventy-one. The same review mentions, as not devoid of interest, that four newspapers in the Czechish language are published in the United States.
The investigations of Dr. A. Weisbach on “the weight of the brains of the different peoples in Austria” show the Czechs to have larger and heavier brains, particularly in the upper and frontal regions, than the Germans or any other of the Austrian nations.
Mr. Bancroft says, (on page 5 of his dispatch,) after discussing the reconstruction of Hungary in regard to Cisleythanian Austria, (the other duality of the Austro-Hungarian dominions,) “here the Germans were to play the same part as the Magyars in Hungary,” and it is upon this assumption that his argument proceeds, although he admits that they constitute “but about one-third of the whole population of Cisleytha.”
The able and thoroughly advised author of the paper in the North British Review for July 1870, entitled “The Cisleythan Constitutional Crisis,” (pp. 493 and 494,) remarks, in a passage that directly answers the assertion:
“In Hungary this problem (that of determining the exact limits between the autonomy of the provinces and the prerogatives of the ruling powers) has not been solved, it is only less prominent. The constitution of 1848 grants the Magyars a predominance, and the annexed provinces are weak in proportion to the energy and recklessness with which the dominant nation enforces its privileges. But in the Cisleythan part of the empire there is no such predominance of a single nationality, and not only the constitution of December 1867, but also the previous one of February, is based on the principle of equality, and the largest possible autonomy of the single provinces.”
↩