No. 183.
The undersigned gladly avails himself of this fresh occasion to renew to
the Hon. Hamilton Fish the assurances of his most distinguished
consideration.
Hon. Hamilton Fish,
Secretary of State of the United States, Washington.
Count Bismarck to Baron Gerolt.
Ferrières,
September 27, 1870.
Sir: The report made by Mr. Jules Favre to
his colleagues of his conversation with me on the 21st instant,
induces me to send your excellency a communication in reference to
the negotiations which took place between us, which will enable you
to form a correct idea of the same. It cannot be denied that Mr. J.
Favre has taken pains to give a generally true statement of the
matter. If he has not everywhere succeeded in doing so, this is
probably due to the length of our interviews and the circumstances
under which they took place. I must, however, point to the fact, in
opposition to the general purport of his statement, that the
question of the conclusion of peace did not occupy the foreground in
our conversation, but that of a truce, which was to precede the
conclusion of a peace. With regard to our demands for the subsequent
conclusion of a peace I expressly stated to Mr. J. Favre that I
would not express myself in relation to the boundary claimed by us
until the general principle of the cession of territory should be
recognized by France. In connection with this the formation of a new
department of the Moselle was mentioned by me, as an organization
according with our views, with the arrondissements of Saarburg,
Château Salins, Saargemund, Metz, and Thionville. In no wise,
however, did I state that no further conditions would be demanded by
us, should such seem to be necessary in consequence of the
sacrifices imposed upon us by the continuation of the war.
Strasburg, which Mr. Favre makes me describe as the key of the house, thus leaving it uncertain whether
France is thereby meant, was expressly designated by me as the key
of our house, the possession of which we were
therefore unwilling to leave in foreign hands.
Our first conference in the castle of Haute-Maison was generally kept
within the limits of an academical review of the past and present,
the real pith of which was confined to the declaration of Mr. J.
Favre that any sum of money possible (tout
l’argent que nous avons) would be paid, but that no cession
of territory could be made, After I had declared the latter to be
indispensable, he said that no negotiations for peace were possible,
his view being that cessions of territory would be degrading, nay,
even disgraceful to France. I did not succeed in convincing him that
conditions whose fulfillment France had obtained from Italy, and had
demanded of Germany, without having been at war with either of the
two countries—conditions which France, without the slightest doubt,
would have imposed upon us if we had been conquered, and which had
been the result of almost every war, even of modernt imes—could be
in no wise disgraceful to a country conquered after a brave
resistance, and that the honor of France was not of a character
different from that of other countries. Nor could I bring Mr. Favre
to see that the restoration of Strasburg, so far as the point of
honor was concerned, could be of any more consequence than that of
Landau or Saarlouis, or that the violent conquests of Louis XIV were
no more closely bound up with the honor of France than those of the
first republic or of the first empire.
It was not until we met in Ferrières that our conversations took a
more practical turn, when they were on the subject of a truce, and
the fact of this having been their exclusive subject, refutes the
assertion that I declared that I desired a truce under no
circumstances. The manner in which Mr. Favre does me the honor, in
respect to this and other questions, to introduce me as saying, “Il faudrait un armistice, et je n’en veux à aucun
prix,” together with other things of the same import,
forces me to make this correction, viz: That in such conversations I
never have expressed, and never do express myself, to the effect
that I, personally, desire, refuse, or grant
anything, but always speak only of the views and requirements of the
governments whose business I have to transact. As a preliminary to
the conclusion of a truce, the necessity was
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admitted in this conversation, on both sides,
of granting the French nation time to choose representatives who
should alone be able to establish the legitimacy of the present
government so far that the conclusion of a peace with it, in
accordance with the law of nations, might become possible. I pointed
to the fact that a truce is always attended with military
disadvantages for a victoriously advancing army, but in this case
would afford an excellent opportunity for the defense of France and
for the reorganization of its army, and that we, therefore, could
not grant a truce without a military equivalent. I designated, as
such, the surrender of the fortresses which hampered our
communication with Germany, because, in view of the prolongation of
the period for which we should have to subsist our troops, in
consequence of an intervening truce, a facilitation of this,
subsistence must be made a preliminary condition. The fortresses
alluded to were Strasburg, Toul, and a few smaller places. In
relation to Strasburg, I remarked that its capture must soon take
place, since the crowning of the glacis was complete, and we,
therefore, thought the surrender of the garrison required by the
military situation, while those of the other fortresses would be at
liberty to march out unmolested. Another difficult question was with
regard to Paris. Since we had completely shut in this city, we could
only permit its communications to be reopened if the reprovisioning
of the place, which would thus be rendered possible, would not
weaken our own military position, and lengthen the time required for
the reduction of the place by hunger. After a consultation with the
military authorities, I finally presented the following alternative,
by the most high command of his Majesty the King, with regard to the
city of Paris:
Either the position of Paris is to be given up to us by the surrender
of a controlling part of the fortifications; at this price, we are
ready to allow communication with Paris to be carried on without
hinderance, and to allow any provisioning of the city.
Or the position of Paris is not to be given up to us. In this case we
cannot consent to the raising of the blockade, but must let the maintenance of the military status quo be the
basis of a truce, since otherwise the consequence of the latter
would only be that, after the expiration of the truce, Paris, newly
provisioned and equipped, would be all the better prepared to oppose
us.
Mr. Favre rejected the first alternative, containing the surrender of
a part of the fortifications, as positively as the condition that
the garrison of Strasburg should be prisoners of war. He promised,
however, to ask the opinion of his colleagues with regard to the
second alternative, which was to maintain the military status quo before Paris. The programme which
Mr. Favre took to Paris as the result of our conversations, and
which was there rejected, contained, therefore, nothing at all with
regard to future terms of peace, but did contain an assent to a
truce of from fourteen days to three weeks, in order to allow the
election of a national assembly, on the following conditions:
1st. At and before Paris the maintenance of the military status quo.
2d. At and before Metz, continuation of hostilities within a circle
around Metz, to be more particularly defined.
3d. Surrender of Strasburg, together with the garrison as prisoners
of war; of Toul and Bitsch, their garrisons to be allowed to depart
unmolested. I think that our opinion that we made a very favorable
offer will be shared by all neutral cabinets. The French government,
by its unwillingness to take advantage of the opportunity offered it
for the choice of a national assembly, even within the portions of
France occupied by us, proclaims its determination to keep up the
difficulties in which it now is, with regard to the conclusion of a
peace, in accordance with the law of nations, and not to listen to
the voice of the French people. That general and free elections
would have resulted in favor of peace is an impression which forces
itself upon us here, and Which has, in all probability, been felt by
the authorities in Paris.
I very respectfully request your excellency to be pleased to bring
the present dispatch to the notice of the government to which you
are accredited.
