No. 162.
Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish
I am able to report to you, on the best authority, the views which are entertained by the allied German governments in relation to the conditions of the peace to be established between themselves and France.
The pledges for peace contained in the plebiscite so lately adopted in France have not been made good.
Events have shown the mutability of the disposition of the French nation. The majority of the French chamber, the senate, and the organs of public opinion through the press have demanded a war of conquest against Germany so loudly that the insulated friends of peace lost all courage to oppose, and the Emperor may have thought himself justified in asserting that he had been forced into the war by public opinion. In view of these facts the German allied governments cannot find a guarantee of peace in the disposition of the French people. They must not therefore deceive themselves into the belief that there is no reason to expect after this peace a speedy renewal of an attack, whatever may be the conditions which may be demanded from France. The French nation will never forgive the series of defeats which have attended their present war of aggression. Even though the Germans were to demand no cession of territory, no indemnity, no advantage, except the glory of their arms, there would remain the wounded self-love of the French people and their hereditary desire of conquest, and they would only wait for a day when they might hope to renew the war with success. The forbearance of the German government in 1867 was due to their desire not to conjure up an era of bitterness and angry passions, but by patience and the careful culture of friendly relations between the two nations to lay the foundations of an era of peace and reciprocal good will. As this moderation failed of its effect, and as the Germans, against all their efforts, have been compelled to encounter a war of aggression, they regard it henceforward as necessary to look for some securities against the next attack other than can be found in the good will of France. The guarantees which were established in 1815 against the same ambition of the French people have lost their effect, and Germany must now rely on its own strength and its own resources. The Germans ought not to be continually exposed to the necessity of again [Page 208] making the same exertions which they have done at this time, and material securities are therefore needed for their own protection and for the preservation of the peace of Europe. These securities are to be demanded, not from any transient government of France, but from the French nation, which has shown itself ready, as the history of past centuries proves, to follow any government into war, and under any government to seek acquisitions of territory from Germany. In order, therefore, to establish peace, securities must be obtained against the next imminent attack from France, and these can be found only in the change of the present defenseless boundary of South Germany, so that the point from which future attack may emanate may be more remote, and the fortresses with which France has hitherto threatened Germany may so far be brought into the power of Germany as to constitute hereafter defensive bulwarks against invasion.
The views which I have detailed to you I know to be those which are entertained in the cabinets of the German princes. They also exist in all but irresistible strength in the minds of the German people. I will add but one remark of my own. A true guarantee for Germany against future attacks from France would be the political union of Germany itself; and the most earnest negotiations are new pending between North Germany on the one side and South Germany, especially Würtemberg and Bavaria on the other, for the accomplishment of that object; Germany, being united, will have nothing to fear from France on the one side or Prussia on the other.