Señor Benitez to Mr. Washburn.
I had the honor to receive the note of your excellency of the 3d instant, in which, referring to mine of the 31st of July last, you say that after a long discussion concerning the points of difference as to whether or not Messrs. Bliss and Masterman are legally members of the legation, I gave you the most suprising information concerning the declaration of the ex-minister of foreign affairs, José Berges; that this note has caused you so much surprise and astonishment, and was of a character so serious and grave, that you confided that I would pardon you for first replying to that part of my note, leaving the other questions for another occasion— [Page 776] concluding in what relates to these that you have not taken into consideration in your note the case of Bliss and Masterman, as you were desirous of clearing up the other matter as soon as possible, and, with my permission, would delay all ulterior discussion on this point until you should hear from me again.
Respecting the grave matter of ex-Minister Berges, you observe that you profoundly regret that in a case of so serious a character I should take for facts what at best must be doubtful, and reiterate positively as if on my own knowledge what you on your own better knowledge have positively denied; that when a minister is virtually told that his words are not believed—that they are known to be false—certainly he would be excused if he should decline all further correspondence; but that, since you have promised to make known all that may be in your power to clear up of the terrible mystery by which you were surrounded, you would pass over this question of form, hoping that what you had to say might be useful to ascertain the truth.
Alluding to the declaration of Berges, you then say that it has led you to reflect and to call to mind all the incidents and circumstances which you could remember, and which can throw any light upon his strange conduct. You then go on to detail, with the aid of your diary, all that relates to the transmission of your dispatches, saying that on the 28th of April last you sent your last dispatches to Washington, passing them by flag of truce through the military lines; that you do not remember whether or not you sent any letters for other persons, but you presumed that you did, although you do not remember for whom; that you have sometimes sent letters for the Portuguese vice-consul, Yasconcellos, but that you did not remember if upon this occasion you did so.
That, on May 6, you received along with your communications from Washington a package of letters directed to you, with the name of the English secretary of legation in Buenos Ayres, G. F. Gould, on the margin; that on opening it you found that it was directed to the vice-consul of Portugal, accompanied by a note from the Portuguese chargé d’affaires in Montevideo, the Baron de Sousa, of which you send me a copy. That the said package also contained a letter for Dr. Carreras, which you brought and delivered to him, and which contained the same news as that of Vasconcellos—equally friendly towards Paraguay. That this is the only correspondence which has passed through your hands for many months from any person beyond the enemy’s lines, and that if Berges speaks the truth, the communication which he says he received from Caxias by means of your legation, it must have been in that package from the Baron de Sousa.
That none of the last letters from the captain commanding the Wasp to you were accompanied by any letter for any other individual, nor had you sent with yours to him any letter for any one else.
That you cannot find words to express your surprise at the account given you of the declaration of ex-Minister Berges; that all is false from beginning to end, and that you believed that I would easily convince myself of this. And you continue to treat of the matter at length— impugning the declarations of Berges—concluding that all which he has said in it about the delivery of a letter from Caxias, of your waiting for him to read it, of your taking up a book to read, and all the rest, every word false, as false as false can be; that you presumed, nevertheless, that he had not the ingenuity to have made up from nothing this tissue of lies, but that what really passed between him and some other individual he has declared to be the transaction between himself and yourself, reiterating that you cannot conceive any other method for the letter of Caxias [Page 777] to come, if it were not included in the above-mentioned package from the Baron de Sousa.
Your excellency adds, that if by any means you have been the channel for conveying intelligence between the enemy and the traitors, you have yourself been the victim of the most infamous perfidy and ingratitude, saying finally that you did not consider it strange that, after the declaration of Berges, the government should have regarded you and all around you with suspicion, but that you considered that it was not showing you the respect demanded by your position, your character, and your friendship, long recognized, towards Paraguay; but that, nevertheless, you would leave this matter to the sentiment of justice of the government of Paraguay, trusting that after your long and explicit statement of all you knew or even suspected concerning the treason of Berges and his accomplices, I would believe that your legation is not so dangerous a place as I had at one time suspected.
In reply to this note of your excellency’s, I must say in the first place that it is not the fault of this ministry that it has had to register in its official correspondence the declaration of the culprits, after all that I officially stated to you in the friendly visit which I made you on the 25th ultimo, and which is substantially contained in my note of the 31st. You will allow me to remark again that at the time I made you a verbal statement of all which I have since written down with regret, and that I then deplored the necessity of having to consign in notes that which you now also deplore. I had a greater interest then than any one that this should not happen, but at that time you expressed yourself very differently, and I do not wish to attribute this to any doubt of my word.
I do not think your judgment correct when you attribute to my government convictions which it has not manifested, since, without stating any opinion upon so grave a matter, I limited myself to make known to you the things which were communicated to this ministry by the proper tribunal, to support the demands required of me in the name of the national courts of justice, in the name of the preservation of the country and of its government; and you ought to persuade yourself that in fact it was very difficult for this ministry to reconcile the sentiments of friendly interest which had always been expressed in official notes by the representative of the friendly nation of the United States with the proceedings which the traitors attribute to your excellency.
I regret that you have interpreted in a sense different from the true one the significance of the just representations addressed by this ministry to the chief of the American legation upon the subjects which, in discharging its duty, it has had to treat of, and whose importance and urgency are notorious. You say that proper consideration has not been manifested to your position and character, and this ministry believes itself to have abounded in such respect as it has never done towards any minister, and that if there were any reason for complaint it would belong to this government to make it, since all that has been said to you, Mr. Minister, in demand of the criminals whom you shelter, has not been enough; and nothing more could have been said in the initiatory steps of a trial which, by its monstrosity, was scarcely creditable. I ought also to observe to you that even to-day I ought not, perhaps, to continue to make mention of the information supplied by the tribunal, for fear that something which I may say will appear to you inconsistent, not having in my power the originals of the processes; but I wish to run the risk rather than fail to give you all the light which the tribunals communicate, thus satisfying your desires, Mr. Minister, in order that you may understand the grave nature of the matter, and in order to dissipate [Page 778] by all the means in my power the darkness in which you say that you were groping.
I cannot doubt, Mr. Minister, that it will be very painful for you to learn that the persons whose honorable character and purity of sentiment you so much vaunted in your note of the 13th of July now appear before the tribunal, not only as fully acquainted with your sentiments, tendencies, and intentions, but also as having been supported by you in a directly contrary sense, as you may judge by their own words as communicated to me by the court of justice.
Dr. Antonio de las Carreras has, in a solemn declaration, said the following:
That, as to the terms of these conversations about the revolution, reference was made in the early period of his stay in the legation to the project of the revolution, to the means which were counted upon, and the probabilities of the result, and afterwards to the stupidity of the allies in their manner of conducting the operations relating to it, viz., to appear upon the Tebicuari with twelve thousand men, which was not done within the time agreed upon; to the failure or cessation of the probabilities of the success of the project; and, finally, when the imprisonment of some of the persons compromised became known, to consider the affair as discovered and its consequences as palpable.
That, speaking of the plan in general, Mr. Washburn always thought the idea a good one, and as to the details he also thought them good, provided the Brazilians (as Mr. Washburn always said, using but rarely the word, allies) should pass the Tebicuari; that is to say, that in Mr. Washburn’s opinion Marshal Lopez and the national cause were lost, and that he believed the success of the revolution easy, since when Humaita should be cut off—there not being elsewhere sufficient forces to resist a column of twelve thousand men—and the forces in the capital and other points depending upon persons who were compromised in the revolution, the pronunciamiento would be easy, since there could be no resistance, and consequently the submission of the rest of the country.
That as to the part which Mr. Washburn has taken in revolution he [the deponent] knows by what Washburn himself said to him that he [Mr. Washburn] had undertaken to forward the correspondence of the revolutionary committee to the enemy, under the seal of the consulate of Portugal, in order thus to save himself from the responsibility; telling him also that he had fulfilled his part by always sending the correspondence every time that he has had occasion to send his own to his government by flag of truce, except the last time, when he only sent a letter to the commander of the Wasp, ordering him to come up to San Fernando. That Washburn also told him that he had offered his house to Berges as an asylum for all the parties compromised in the revolution, and that he notified Berges himself of the occasions when there would be sent a flag of truce, in order that he, as well as the other members of the committee, might prepare their communications for the enemy, the deponent being one of those who had written to Caxias more times than those previously declared.
That, besides what has been said, they conversed upon the assurances which Berges and Benigno gave of counting upon the forces in the capital by bribery or other means, which project Mr. Washburn approved as a sure mode of success, avoiding the effusion of blood.
As to the time agreed upon, that in the first place it was to be when the squadron should pass above Humaita, which event had been announced by correspondence several months before, (five or six,) and after its passage the movement was announced for two or three occasions, until at last the time was fixed at about the middle of July. All which gave rise to some sarcastic expressions from Mr. Washburn; as, for example, “They are brutes;” * * * “They are more Brazilian than the Brazilians themselves;” * * * “Caxias is nothing but a good military organizer, but, for the rest, is a complete nullity;” manifesting the little confidence he had in Caxias’s promises, and regretting that the time should be lost by such stupidity on the part of the Brazilians.
That, suspecting by the imprisonments that the government had got hold of the thread of the affair, Mr. Washburn said that he lamented the fate of many persons compromised, such as Berges, Bedoya, Benigno, the deponent, Rodriguez, Bliss, and others, and that he considered the end of the war postponed, since, the revolution haying failed and the Brazilians not making any movement, affairs would return to their previous state; that he offered to the deponent, to Rodriguez, and to Bliss, to make a stand for the right of asylum in their behalf, knowing them to be compromised in the affair of the revolution, which, says the deponent, he himself, and Rodriguez, did not wish to accept.
That the reason why the deponent and Rodriguez did not wish to accept the asylum [Page 779] in which, at the last moment, Mr. Washburn wished to uphold them against the demands of the government was, precisely, because they held an opinion different from that of the minister, which opinion he (the deponent) says he made known from the day when Leite Pereira presented himself in the legation, on the occasion of consulting them (the deponent and Rodriguez) as to whether he had a right to resist the delivery of a refugee in case of being demanded as a criminal by the government; to which they replied that they thought he had no such right, citing some authors of note, such as Vattel, Martens, Wheaton, Pinheiro, Ferreira, &c., and that notwithstanding this opinion of the deponent and Rodriguez, when they had to leave on the demand of a court of justice, Mr. Washburn said to them, “If you wish to remain here I will resist;” to which, as already stated, they did not agree, having resolved to defend themselves before the authorities, making head against the charges that might be against them; that Mr. Washburn then said to them, “I hope that you will not say anything to compromise me;” to which both replied that there was no occasion to fear that, and that he might rest easy in that respect; adding the deponent, that by this was understood that they were not to betray anything relating to the revolution, and that the minister would besides hold his ground, as there was no written proof against him.
That when Mr. Washburn returned from San Fernando he said to the deponent that he had been informed that Berges was very ill, with the half of his body paralyzed, which induced him to believe, as Washburn himself said, that the revolution was not discovered.
By these detailed statements, and others relating to this grave affair, I ought to hope that you, Mr. Minister, will doubtless see with pain that far from being but a small number who declare in this sense, they comprise all those persons who have given rise to correspondence from this ministry to obtain their departure from their asylum.
It has never been my intention to seek impossibilities, as you attribute to me for my friendly visit of the 25th ultimo, whose object and tendencies were most cordial and benevolent; and as you assure me that you intended to convince me of it in your note, I have eagerly sought in it the foundation for such conviction; but I have only been able to find reiterated exception, along with some incidental circumstances relating to your correspondence with the exterior (of the military lines.)
When your excellency says that you flatter yourself that whatever may be my opinion, the Marquis de Caxias considers you as a friend of Paraguay, and such a friend as Brazilian gold is impotent to seduce, I ought to declare in my turn that whatever may be my opinion, I have never failed to recognize the friendly acts which you have performed before now in behalf of my country; and as to what Caxias may think, I can say nothing of the matter, and that I think I ought to call your attention to my correspondence with you, since, in my opinion, I have used no expression tending to depreciate you, nor emitted any opinion which can be interpreted in the sense attributed by your note, nor yet the gratuitous interpretation of your words being false, since I have not said to your excellency that your assertions were false, and that they deserved no credit. It has been precisely with a proper respect for you, Mr. Minister, and giving credence to your official words, that my government has proceeded in this grave affair with all possible circumspection and decorum, probably to the detriment of the urgency which the case demanded.
And your complaint is so much the more to be regretted when you blame my government for refusing to give credit to your positive statements as against those of an accused, convicted, and confessed traitor, while your government was debating whether or not it would make war on Brazil on account of your representations and your situation. It is beyond my power to comprehend the reason which you have for consigning in an official note an accusation as gratuitous as grave against my government, for the simple fact of having used its right in a demand which interests in a lively manner its legitimate defence, and when the [Page 780] country is in a state of open war in defense of its independence, which is menaced with destruction by the empire of Brazil and its allies, and also menaced by an internal conspiracy by agreement with them.
It is true that you, when requested to give up the package of communications which Berges says he delivered into your own hands, have stated verbally and in writing the falsity of the “assumed” fact, but the ex-minister Berges affirms and ratifies it in his sworn declarations, at the same time that you say, respecting him, that you do not suppose that he would do so through malice towards you, since you had no reason to believe that he ever cherished such sentiments towards you.
My government could not regard with indifference that statement, of so important a nature, concerning the package of communications referred to, and it could not give any ground for complaint by making use of it in official communications, much more after what has passed. I repeat that there is no reason for making such a complaint as is contained in your note.
I will ingenuously confess that I have not sufficient light on the subject to be able to interpret properly, in view of what has passed, what you say to the effect that, if you had been earlier informed of the declaration of Berges, much of this long and disagreeable correspondence might have been avoided, for even now, with a full knowledge of the facts, you oblige me to maintain this same correspondence indefinitely upon this subject, and, what is more, upon the demand made for the criminals, Bliss and Master man, whom you retain there against all justice.
In your note of the 25th of July, in giving explanation, you have had recourse to your diary, where you had recorded even the circumstance that, visiting Señora Doña Junana Carrillo de Lopez, you found her well, but “sad.” I will observe that that same diary now appears deficient, when you do not remember whether or not you sent with your correspondence of the 28th of April any letters for other persons; and supposing you to have sent such, you do not remember for whom. With your permission, I will consign here some declarations which are not foreign to the case.
Antonio de las Carreras declares—
That, on the 28th of April, he sent a letter to Caxias, under cover to D. Juan Francisco Gowland, in Buenos Ayres; that under this cover he sent a letter to Don Juan Jacinto Berges, in which was contained the said letter for Caxias; that the deponent delivered this letter to Mr. Washburn, in person, to he sent on that occasion, and that in fact the minister did send it with his correspondence, under his own seal; that when he wrote this letter the deponent said to Mr. Washburn, “I am going to improve the opportunity to write my correspondence for below;” to which the minister replied, “All right, and that he should hand in the letters the next day, as he was then going to close up his own;” the deponent stating here that although he did not expressly say to Mr. Washburn that he was going to write to Caxias, he [Mr. Washburn] so understood it to be so—that is to say, that if he did not express that idea, the minister could not be ignorant of it; but that he did not expressly state it “because” Mr. Washburn was not ignorant of it, since Mr. Washburn always knew of the correspondence exchanged between the enemy and the revolutionists; that the contents of the letter written to Caxias was an account of the situation of the country, and of the change wrought in the circumstances by the retreat of Marshal Lopez to the line of the Tebicuari, which, to a certain degree confused the previous plans of the revolutionists, and the consequent necessity of remedying this by a bold operation as soon as possible, demanding of him in that respect to send the column offered, and to move up the squadron without loss of time.
That by the gunboat Wasp he received the last letter of Caxias, which was delivered to him by Mr. Washburn, who then received a package of letters for Vasconcellos, and having gone personally to take it to him in his chacra in Trinidad. Vasconcellos there opened the package, and found in it a roll of letters for the deponent, which he delivered to the same conductor, (Washburn,) to be conveyed to the deponent at the legation; that in the roll came a letter for Anavitarte, another for Tomé, and three for the deponent, one of which was that from the Marquis of Caxias, dated the 16th or the 18th of March, and the others were, one from his brother Eduardo, and another from Bargas, the letter of Caxias coming in that of the latter.
[Page 781]This statement harmonizes with that of Vasconcellos, who says, “that he lately received by the gunboat Wasp a large letter for Carreras, which might contain about four sheets of letter paper, which came to him in the package from the Baron de Sousa, and the Minister Washburn carried it to him in his chacra at Trinidad, and, opening it in his presence, he found the said letter for Carreras, and gave it him to be delivered at the legation, as the minister did immediately upon his return,” thus resulting that correspondences have been carried on with impunity between the revolutionary conspirators and the enemy in arms against the republic. I leave to the just appreciation of your excellency this fact, and pass on.
You mention in your note that, on one occasion, when you were about to send your letters, Berges requested you to include some for him; that you refused to do so, giving for reason that it would be an abuse of the faith and confidence of the allies. I recognize in your excellency the principle of strict neutrality, which you observed in this case, by your refusal to allow Berges to send letters of the ministry which he occupied; but I ought to protest to your excellency my surprise at seeing by your own declaration, Mr. Minister, that this principle, justly observed as towards the allies, has not been so well kept in favor of the Para-guayan government and people, and that the flags of truce, afforded to the minister of a friendly nation for his official correspondence with his government and colleagues, have come to be the guaranteed sate conduct to carry on the correspondences of the enemy, and stir up treason under the guise of family letters, as you style those which you received and sent away under your seal.
“How that mysterious letter of Caxias was brought,” says your excellency, “I do not know,” adding that you cannot conceive any means but that it may have come in the package from the Baron de Sousa. On this point you will allow me to transcribe the following declarations, in addition to those which have been previously inserted from Carreras. Berges declares anew:
That Mr. Washburn, having received among his communications brought by the gunboat Wasp the last letter of the Marquis de Caxias, (directed to the deponent,) and he being in this encampment, he did not deliver it at the time of his (Mr. Washburn’s) visit to the same point, but awaited his return to the capital to carry it to him personally, as he did at his house at Salinares, as he has already declared before the tribunals, a circumstance which reveals the motive of Mr. Washburn’s knowledge (circunstaneia que revela el motivo del conocimiento) of the correspondence of the deponent with the enemy’s general.
That his reply to the first letter of Caxias went by the same channel, viz: by Mr. Washburn, to whom the deponent delivered it, (on an occasion when he had come to visit him in the ministry,) with the address to one Señor Brito, successor of Octaviano, in Buenos Ayres, not doubting, says the deponent, that Mr. Washburn knew that there was contained in it the reply to Caxias, since he already understood these communications, although they did not then speak with so much frankness and confidence on the subject of the treason to overthrow the government as at a later time, when Mr. Washburn had gone to reside in the country-house at Trinidad.
Carreras declares as follows upon this point:
That he has the most profound conviction, and would be willing to put his hands in the fire to assure that there exist in the office of the American minister, and probably in an iron safe there, the papers brought from the house of Berges, as he has previously declared.
You observe that it does not appear from the declaration of Berges that anything but expressions of courtesy passed upon your second visit of July 3. That upon that occasion, as upon the previous one, you expressed sympathy for his sufferings and desired to be of some use to him. Certainly the deponent has stated nothing very special concerning the visit of that day, except your offer as minister and as friend, [Page 782] understanding by this an offer of asylum for any unlooked-for event. Notwithstanding, he has, in his declarations, made a series of revelations of importance, which I shall allow myself to transcribe so far as they relate to your excellency with the object already mentioned. He says:
That at the time of the severe illness of his excellency the marshal in Paso Pucú, in 1866, the American minister called upon him, or wrote to him, daily, to learn his excellency’s state of health; that for this reason their relations became very frequent, and began by indicating to him the necessity of coming to terms with the allies, indicating as a person very proper for this object General Bartolomè Mitre, since he could speak with him with more frankness than with the other chieftains. That he (Mr. Washburn) went so far as to say that the motive of the war was nothing but the question of limits; that Paraguay had not the means of peopling the great deserts of her territory without calling in European colonization, which was very unlikely to come to these missions or retired places until the republics of La Plata were settled up; that the line from the Apa to the Igatmé, which was claimed by Brazil, ought to be ceded to that empire; and the Misiones beyond the Parana, as well as a part of the Chaeo, to the Argentine Republic.
That when Mr. Washburn paid his visit to the Marquis de Caxias to treat with him about peace arrangements, he carried neither the spirit nor the desire of laboring in favor of the interests of Paraguay, and, on the contrary, cherished the conviction that Paraguay would be conquered and subjugated by the allied forces; that (he said) they had great resources, being in contact with all the world, and that Paraguay, however she might rely upon the abnegation and valor of her sons, who deserved to enjoy greater liberty, could never be victorious on account of the lack of resources, and that it was pitiful that this race of brave men should disappear from the face of the earth; that if Washburn left the capital ill-disposed to treat with the enemy’s general, he returned from that camp with even worse dispositions, which that general had succeeded in producing.
That it is the deponent’s opinion that when Mr. Washburn made such efforts to return to this country it was all a farce, in order to deceive the Paraguayan government, and that his real desire was to labor in behalf of the allies, by agreement with his colleague in Rio Jeneiro, the general who is the American minister at that court. In addition to the conversations which the deponent has had with Washburn, who always endeavored to discourage him, there are the revelations which the English minister, Mathews, made to his government, and which certainly place Washburn in a tight place, (dejan colgado á Washburn.) To which should be added that here he has never been willing to give credit to the papers of the country when they gave news of the brilliant feats of arms and partial episodes of the war, saying that they were not only incredible but ridiculously fabulous, and that these exaggerations could pass current only among the Paraguayans, who were for the most part a rustic and ignorant herd. He would never credit any news favorable to Paraguay in all the course of the war; even at the time of the defeat of the enemy at Curupayti he pretended that it was simply a retreat of the enemy, referring to information given him by Mr. Cochelet, who had received it from the French agent, who was present at that combat.
That, in fine, the spirit of Mr. Washburn is completely hostile to Paraguay and to its government, and that he constantly sought for some occasion of controversy in order to get away from the country, which the deponent has been able to elude by calming down, by means of his personal friendship, Mr. Washburn’s constant tendency to produce a breach.
That no one is ignorant of the hostility which the ex-consul of France, Mr. Cochelet, always manifested, delighting in creating obstacles of every kind for the government of the republic, and Cochelet was an intimate friend of Washburn’s, who lamented that he had been replaced by a man so null, so informal, and of so little credit as Mr. Cuverville; that he also regretted that the Italian consul, Mr. Chaperon, should be so much under the influence of Cuverville, who carried him always in tow; that he also regretted that there was no agent of the English government in Asuncion, since a concert of the four might have made a fine opposition to the evacuation of the capital, and would have put the Paraguayan government to its trumps (hubieranpuesto en prensa) before they would have abandoned their posts.
That, in the opinion of the deponent, Mr. Washburn has received money from the government of Brazil, and desired to get some out of the Paraguayan government, to make his market with friend and foe, and since he has not succeeded in this, his constant and daily views have been to work against the interests of the country, endeavoring to produce discouragement among its sons.
That after the return of Mr. Washburn from the enemy’s camp, on the occasion of having gone there for the peace arrangements referred to, in one of the visits which he made to the deponent in the office of his ministry, he asked for a map, and pointed out the ease with which Caxias could extend his line of circumvallation so as to leave Paso Pucú and Humaita blockaded by land, adding, “When Humaita is taken, all is over.” [Page 783] That to this the deponent replied, “We should still have the line of the Tebicuari, that of the Paray in Villetta, the Cordillera, and, finally, the war of resources such as Juarez waged against Maximilian,” and that Washburn replied, “Juarez deserved the sympathy of all the world, and, above all, that of the American government, and you have not; he received supplies from all parts, which you are destitute of.” That the deponent again insisted on the advantages of the line of the Cordillera, saying, “that we should there be in contact with the agricultural departments, the most productive of the country, and that it is on the Upper Paraguay that we have the greatest abundance of cattle, to which he added the nature of the ground, which would afford a defensive position at every step,” and Washburn, picking up his hat, said, laughingly, “You are very brave,” (es V. muy guapo,) and withdraw.
That he frequently came to the ministry to ask news from the army, its state, and that of the war; and as the deponent generally replied that there was nothing of importance, he used generally to say something calculated to discourage us, as, for example, “that he knew there was much desertion in the Paraguayan army; that Caxias had received great reinforcements; that more iron-clads had arrived from Europe to the Rio de la Plata; that the war was very popular in Brazil; that public spirit in the Argentine Republic had arisen; that the allies could get all the money they wanted; that the national cause had no sympathy in Europe, where the enemy’s press drowned the voices of our few agents beyond the sea.” That the deponent asked where he got such items of information, and Washburn replied, jokingly, “The birds have told me,” and that the deponent some time afterwards made use of this expression, asking him, “What do the birds say?” To which Washburn sometimes replied, “The birds are dumb at present, but they will have much to say about our bad situation.” That since Mr. Washburn went to live at Trinidad his visits became less frequent to the ministry, but his relations were more frank. That the object of his visits was to ask for news from the army, and when the deponent said to him that he knew of nothing decisive, but only partial engagements, he, Washburn, would reply furiously against the allies, with the following or similar expressions: “They are unworthy to conquer; they lose the best opportunity of subjugating Paraguay, now that you are ready to support them, or rather to do all; Brazil ought to be struck from the catalogue of nations for the nullity of its rulers and generals.” That he could not understand why they did not improve the rise of the river to bring up a force in their iron-clads and other vessels to land in the neighborhood of the city; that he also marvelled and lamented that the movement by land against Caapucu by the pass of the Tebicuari should have failed: that sometimes he thought Caxias distrusted the persons who had written to him; and, after all, said he, these are old men’s proceedings, men who are incompetent to undertake anything of consequence.
That several visits passed after this fashion, Washburn always deploring the inactivity of the allies, until one day he came to the ministry smiling and in good humor, saying to the deponent, “So then, at last, they have made the movement by the Tebicuari, for I have learned that the allies have taken two ‘partidos’ on the coast of the Tebicuari (Guazuca and San Juan) without any resistance from the Paraguayans; we now look for the movement of the fleet, and you (the revolutionists) ought not to go to sleep, but get ready to formally second the movement.”
That on this same occasion he inquired of the deponent if Caxias had not written to the committee or to Don Benigno to inform them of this movement, and when he replied in the negative, Washburn doubted what he said, remarking, “You have no confidence in me: you always make use of Paraguayan distrust, although you have been in North America, where you ought to have learned something of our frank and sincere habits.” To which the deponent replied that his information was, that there had only been a scouting party to bring in cattle; and the minister replied, “Incursions into an enemy’s country always begin in that manner, by sending small bodies to explore the ground and calculate the resistance which may be made;” and that although the deponent endeavored to show that this was hot the movement waited for by the revolutionists, the minister was so blinded with this idea, that he continued to expect the prompt appearance on the Tebicuari of the principal body of the allied force which was announced.
That on another occasion, after the minister had gone to his country residence, he had another conversation with the deponent in the ministry, and said to him that by a strange coincidence all interests were placed outside of the country; that he (Washburn) remained here to support the insurgent Paraguayans, doing without the most necessary things, such as sugar, brandy, coffee, wine, maccaroni, and even clothing, and that he had nothing to drink but the cana of the country; that the deponent replied, “As I have been told, you do not fare so badly at Yvyray, and, besides, with money and yerba you can buy a turkey,” alluding to the fact that Washburn frequently asked the deponent for yerba, and received it in tercios from the treasury to buy fowls and eggs, and that the expression a turkey was one of the minister’s ways of expressing himself, the deponent here adding that this is a genuine Yankee expression.
That in one of his visits to the deponent, in his house in Salinares, after returning [Page 784] from his last visit to the army, the minister, said to him, “Don’t you see how this is?” (alluding to the fact that the line of the Tebicuari was already fortified without having giving time to the revolutionists.) “I shall perhaps be obliged to leave the country temporarily, to accompany my wife, but there [out of the country] I can be more useful to you [the revolutionist] by laboring in your behalf, [in favor of the revolution, as was understood, says the deponent, since the minister did not wish to use openly the words revolution or conspiracy;] and I hope to be back within a year;” that the deponent replied, “When you are out of the country endeavor to be sent to Chile as minister, as you yourself told me you had written to Mr. Seward, proposing that exchange;” to which he replied, “By no means would I do such an act of baseness, being compromised with you to support the movement,” (revolution.)
That Mr. Washburn said to the deponent, after returning from the enemy’s camp, that he was going to write to Mr. Seward, and say to him that the government of Marshal Lopez was losing much of its popularity through the events of the war, and that even its best friends were falling off from it; which, according to the deponent’s opinion, Mr. Washburn intended to write, in order to prepare his government for the revolutionary movement agreed upon.
That, in referring to this incident, deponent wishes to make known how far Mr. Washburn was then opposed to this republic and its government, after his conversation with the enemy’s general, under pretext of a peace arrangement.
That at the same time he also said that the war ought to be terminated; that the Argentine government, in case of the triumph of the allies, which he regarded as sure, would necessarily take all the missions up to Tebicuari, and the country would be left about as big as my hand, (opening his hand at the word;) and Brazil would take the rest of the country for the expenses of the war, adding that Brazil spent a million a day; adding that Paraguay having to pay this immense debt, it would fall to Brazil, and form part of that empire, and would thus be better off than when a colony; that the deponent objected that it was not possible that Brazil should spend a million a day, since even North America in the great civil war had not spent more; to which Washburn replied that that was at the beginning, but that later the expenses had amounted to three millions a day; adding, “Above all, they steal a great deal in Brazil, so as to make up the million a day, and they will show for it the accounts of the Great Captain.”
I thank your excellency for having had the kindness to make known to me the note of the Baron de Sousa, chargé d’affaires of Portugal, and for all which you have been pleased to set forth in your long communication, in fulfillment of the desire which you have manifested of clearing up the facts relative to the treason of Berges and his accomplices.
I confidently hope that with these new items of information, taken textually from the declarations of the criminals, you will become convinced of the grave nature of the affair which forms the subject of our correspondence, and that, taking into consideration my previous note of July 31, will also admit the reasons alleged by this ministry to show that Porter Cornelius Bliss and George F. Masterman are not members of the legation of the United States of America, but treacherous criminals, who, like others, have attempted to abuse your good faith, and that, as such, they will be expelled, to appear in satisfaction of the requirements of justice, fulfilling in this manner also your excellency’s desires, that if there have been persons who have thus abused your confidence and hospitality, it did not become you to ask for their pardon, but rather to demand their summary punishment.
I embrace this occasion to renew to your excellency the assurance of my distinguished consideration.
His Excellency Charles A. Washburn, Minister Resident of the United States of America.