Mr. Kilpatrick to Mr. Seward.

No. 86.]

Sir: I have the honor to report that nothing of political importance has transpired at this capital since the date of my dispatch No. 82.

It is universally believed in Chili that Spain has no intention of resuming hostilities in the Pacific, and, with the exception of the work on the fortifications of Valparaiso, all warlike preparation have been suspended. Public attention is wholly occupied with the proceedings of the national Congress respecting domestic affairs, and with the progress of the revolution in Peru.

I transmit herewith a copy of the Ferrocarril, newspaper of Santiago, containing the reports of an interesting discussion in Congress, relative to the negotiations by Chili for the purchase of vessels of war in the United States.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. KILPATRICK.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[Translation.]

Reply of Mr. Errazuriz, Minister of War, to Mr. Alemparte, Deputy from Chilian.

In this war with Spain, the cabinet is accused of double dealing: I will answer for it. They say we have deceived the country and our allies, by pretending zeal and activity in the purchase of vessels and munitions of war, while we refused to buy powerful vessels that were offered to us, ordering our agents privately not to purchase, but rescind his contracts, to the loss of vast sums of money to the country.

This is confirmed, they say, by the rescission of the contracts for the purchase of the Dunderberg and Idaho from the United States, which rescissions were ordered by our government secretly. To confirm and strengthen these accusations, there is published an official note from the Peruvian minister to his government, in which the Chilian cabinet is grossly calumniated. An explanation satisfied both governments, and the sole blame was attached to the Peruvian diplomat. (Called to order.)

I will not detail the efforts made by the government to purchase ships when the war began; this is well known. You all remember that Mr. Lastarria declared positively, in a speech here, not long ago, that the government had made every effort to purchase vessels for our defense. We did get two vessels, now in our ports, and if they were not as strong as we wanted, they were the best we could get for our money. And now the government is blamed for buying those vessels! If we had purchased the famous Dunderberg, these cavilers would have blamed us for it, as they do now. What could we have done with the enormous vessel, of complicated machinery, estimated at three millions of dollars? Immense sums would have been required to keep it in order, and then we would have had to build a special dock to keep it in repair.

Now I will let official documents speak for me. The eloquent language of facts will be sufficient to show what interest the government took in preparing for the crisis, and how anxious its agents were to purchase the kind of vessels required.

On the 1st of May. 1866, the minister of marine addressed this note to Mr. Carvallo, our minister in London:

Sir: The government wishes to acquire the means of putting an end to this war [Page 312] with Spain as soon as possible. We have positive information that there are two light vessels in good condition for sale in England, the N——, and another of equal or superior power. The government charges you to buy these two vessels, as well as the ironclad Denmark, and send them to the Pacific immediately.

“You know, as the war increases, the difficulties of obtaining means to carry it on will increase, and we must, if possible, have forces stronger than any Spain can bring against us.

“Convinced of this, the government desires you to secure these elements, as soon as possible; for without them, we cannot avenge the wrongs that Spain has already inflicted upon the republic.

“The government confides in your patriotism, and places the destiny of the country in your hands. You are restricted to no limits in the execution of this charge.

“Though it is scarcely necessary to suggest to you the best way to effect this, yet it may be well to recommend you to avoid all officers of the navy, and others known to the spies of our enemies. You will know how to get these vessels out; and be sure not to let any of our naval officers return in them, even as passengers.

“Send the guns for our sloops in the vessels mentioned, or in any vessels that will be sure to land them in any of the ports of the republic. Be sure the guns are concealed in a dry place, where rust will not attack them.

“I repeat that the government must have the three vessels mentioned, or our honor will go unavenged. Our duty demands this, and the world expects it of us.

“Yours, &c.,

“JOSÉ MANUEL PINTO.”

On the 9th of May, the order was repeated in these terms:

“I gave you positive orders by the last steamer, in the name of the government, to purchase the iron-clad Denmark, and the N——, and another of the same size, for sale in England.

“I now repeat the order to buy the three vessels, as they are needed for the prompt termination of this war. It is scarcely necessary to tell you that the country depends upon you for its safety; act with energy and judgment and you will gratify the country and the government. We also need muskets: buy those you mentioned and send them to any port in Chili.

“Yours, &c.,

“JOSÉ MANUEL PINTO.”

Here is another letter of the same date, to the same address:

“A screw steamer in Glasgow, called the N——, built for a privateer, has been offered to the government. Instruct Commander Salcedo to examine it, before Mr. Edwards’s agents make an offer for it.

“If found suitable, tell the agents to buy it and send it to one of the southern ports in the republic.

“Your duty, then, in this case, is to have the vessel examined by a proper person, and then inform Edwards of the decision rendered by the inspectors.

“If you have not already shipped the guns for the sloops, you may forward them in the vessel if you think it safe to do so.

“Yours &c.,

“JOSÉ MANUEL PINTO.”

Thanks to our intelligent agents, the vessels we had contracted for began to arrive in Chili about that time, and the government soon saw that they were not large enough to contend with the Spanish squadron, though they might prove very useful as transports and dispatch-boats, and might render some service in harassing the enemy. Needing no more vessels of that kind, the government instructed its agents not to get any more so small, but to purchase some strong and powerful ones.

On the 2d of June, the government, through the minister of foreign relations, wrote thus to Mr. Vicuña Mackenna:

Santiago, June 2, 1866.

“I must inform you that we do not want any more iron steamers like the Isabella, and we regret the contract you have already made. I send yoa these instructions, in case you have not left the country, as I desired you to do.

“Yours, &c.,

“ALVARO COVARRUBIAS.

“To Mr. Benjamin V. Mackenna, “Confidential Agent of the Government of Chili

“in the United States of North America.”

On the same day Mr. Astaburuaga was addressed as follows:

Santiago, June 2, 1866.

“What our navy needs is light vessels, strongly built, with good guns, as I have [Page 313] often said to you. The Isabella, a side-wheel iron steamer, will not suit us. You will therefore refrain from purchasing any more iron steamers, not even propellers, that are not suitable for war purposes.

“ALVARO COVARRUBIAS.

“Don Francisco S. Astaburuaga, “Chilian Chargé d’Affaires in the United States of North America.

This dispatch was sent the same day to Mr. Rodriguez:

Santiago, June 2, 1866.

“The disappointment in not getting the iron-clad from Denmark is annoying. We hope you will use all your skill and energy in removing the difficulties in the way.

“I renew my former instructions to Mr. Carvallo about the steamers, N. and N. and hope you will use your best endeavors to effect their purchase. We need strong vessels, and must spare no sacrifice to obtain them.

“Yours, &c.,

“ALVARO COVARRUBIAS.

“To Mr. A. Rodriguez, “Secret Agent of the Chilian Government in Great Britain.”

The next is a communication of the same date, addressed to Mr. Carvallo:

Santiago, June 2, 1866.

“Your dispatches 77 and 78, dated the 14th and 15th of April last, have been received. I regret that you have not yet purchased the Denmark iron-clad. The chief, if not the only difficulty, is the want of funds, as the £450,000 loan comes in too late. You applied to Baring Brothers to remedy this; it is a great pity it was not done sooner. We leave the selection of the officer who is to command the vessel to you. I repeat my instructions for the purchase of the steamers——and——, which you mentioned to the minister of marine. Hurry in this, I beg you. We hope the Henrietta will arrive safely. We have not yet heard of the arrival of the Peruvian iron-clads Huascar and Independencia.

“Yours, &c.,

“ALVARO COVARRUBIAS.

“To Mr. Manuel Carvallo, “Minister Plenipotentiary of Chili in Great Britain”

On the 16th of June this letter was sent to the same minister:

Santiago, June 16, 1866.

“We are glad to hear, from your last, that you will succeed in purchasing the Denmark. The purchase money, £60,000, was furnished by the Barings, you say.

“Yours, &c.,

“ALVARO COVARRUBIAS.

“To Manuel Carvallo, “Minister Plenipotentiary of Chili in Great Britain.”

Here is a similar letter, of the same date, to Mr. Rodriguez:

Santiago, June 16, 1866.

“We are grieved that you have not yet secured the Denmark. Perhaps you may yet succeed, by adopting the plan proposed by the agent employed for that business. That is what Mr. Carvallo proposes.

“Yours &c.,

“ALVARO COVARRUBIAS.

“To Mr. A. Rodriguez, “Secret Agent of the Government of Chili in Great Britain”

The minister of marine wrote thus to Mr. Astaburuaga:

“No. 1409.]

Santiago, July 2 1866.

“Although you have succeeded in purchasing the magnificent $850,000 vessel, I wish you to try for others of the same class, either of iron or wood. You need not get any more small vessels, we have enough; but we need strong vessels, ships of the line or iron-clads. Choose the largest kind, and try to purchase them, no matter at what cost; I do not limit you to number or price. The republic must have a strong naval force to repel the enemy, and it must be got regardless of expense. Similar instructions are sent to our agents, and to Mr.——.

“Yours, &c.,

“JOSÉ MANUEL PINTO.

“To Mr. Francisco Solano Astaburuaga, “Chargé d’Affaires of Chili in the United States.”

[Page 314]

Here is a letter to Mr. Rodriguez from the same source, and of the same date:

Santiago, July 2, 1866.

“The government has determined to purchase only first-class vessels. You will therefore confine your attention to the acquisition of frigates and iron-clads. Small vessels will be of no use to us. I must also inform you that the artillery needed for our vessels and fortifications must be English, and of first-class, and of these dimensions: Fifteen of 150, fifteen of 100, and thirty of 70. I send the order for the purchase of this artillery to-day, to our minister in England, in case you are not there.

“The government implicitly trusts in you for the faithful execution of this order, for the fortunate conclusion of this war will depend much on our agents in Europe.

“JOSÉ MANUEL PINTO.

“Mr. A. Rodriguez, “The Confidential Agent of Chili in England.”

The minister of foreign affairs wrote to Mr. Carvallo as follows:

Santiago, July 9, 1866.

“The government has bought four vessels in the United States, two of which ought to be here now, and the other two must have started by this time. As we have enough small vessels, you are instructed to negotiate only for the——, if you have not contracted for the two you mentioned. The government regrets the failure of the Denmark purchase, but hopes you will succeed in getting strong vessels suitable for war purposes. We wish to be avenged for the bombardment of Valparaiso. Use all your efforts to procure proper vessels, and send them on directly. Send us the cannons you got for the Valparaiso forts, and all others you may get for the other forts and vessels. In addition to those ordered, we want ten Armstrong or Blakely guns for ship use, which you will send without delay. All the artillery you get must load by the muzzle.

“Yours, &c.,

“JOSÉ M.PINTO.”

On the same day this letter was addressed to Mr. Rodriguez:

Santiago, July 9, 1866.

“The fact that only small vessels have been purchased up to this time compels the government to instruct you to get large ones. Give your entire attention to this business. I know you will have much trouble in securing such vessels, as they are scarce, but the government trusts in your ability in being able to obtain them. We want to put an end to this war, in which our honor is concerned. I must also inform you that the artillery must be of the best kind, and you will be sure to send it out as soon as you possibly can.

“Yours &c.,

“JOSÉ MANUEL PINTO.

“Mr. A. Rodriguez, “Confidential Agent of Chili in England.”

On the 20th June, the following note from Mr. Carvallo was received by the minister of marine:

“Legation of Chili in Great Britain, “London, June 30, 1866.

“Mr. Minister: In reply to yours of the 16th May, I have the honor to say: An offer was made to us yesterday of a new Turkish iron frigate of four thousand tons, armed with fourteen cannons of 150 and one of 300, because the Sultan could not pay for it. The cost price, £370,000, with interest, is all that is asked for it. At last dates our balance with Barings was £182,196 17 06, out of which I have already drawn £16,000, and will soon have to draw £20,000 more, besides £11,000 yet due for the sloop O’Higgins, which will reduce the account to £141,000. I have instructed Marino Benavente to offer £300,000 for the sloop, if it is such as it is represented. Needing a sum to rig and furnish it, we depend upon the £77,000 of the last loan for the first payment, and the balance in Peruvian bonds, such as were offered for the Denmark.

“Yours, &c.,

“MANUEL CARVALLO.

“The Minister of Marine.”