Mr. Tuckerman to Mr. Seward.
Sir: The affairs of Crete have assumed a new phase, which, viewed from this point, is significant. An assembly calling: itself “the representatives [Page 137] of the Cretan people,” took place recently at Lividia, province of Milopotamo, in Crete, at which an address to the foreign ministers at Constantinople was signed by certain chiefs among the insurgents.
I inclose a translation of this address, or petition, which has not yet appeared in print. The chief point, as you will perceive, is, that these insurrectionary leaders express themselves willing, under certain guarantees, to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Sultan, and to abandon the project of the annexation of Crete to Greece. Although this appeal is signed by a portion only of the Cretan chiefs, while such prominent men as Criari, Koraka, Spakiaraki, and other chiefs of the insurrection, have not signed it, and very likely will publicly repudiate it, it cannot be denied that the moral effect of the measure will seriously prejudice the cause of the insurgents. The division of sentiment among those who direct their military affairs is of itself sufficient to awaken grave doubts as to further important successes in arms. With the great object of ultimate independence removed from before their eyes, it can scarcely be supposed that the vigor and determination which have heretofore characterized the insurrection will be sustained. The public admission on the part of even a small number of the chiefs, that annexation to Greece is no longer to be regarded as a sine qua non, will serve to relax the efforts of Greece in behalf of the insurgents, without whose inspiration the insurrection would never have been commenced, and without whose aid it would long since have failed from inanition. This movement in Crete is doubtless the result of English counsel, and shows it to be recognized as the expression of the general desire of the Christian population of the island. An effort will doubtless be made by the powers to effect a compromise with the Porte. It remains to be seen how far the more important leaders in the insurrection will be able to neutralize the effect of this action by a more emphatic declaration of their own intention to prosecute the war until the independence of Crete is acknowledged by Turkey. Meanwhile, notwithstanding an effort which is made here to treat this affair as of no particular significance, it is evident that unusual exertions will be required on the part of the insurgents in Crete, and the friends of “the cause” here, to overcome the public disappointment which the reception of this news has caused. But disappointment is not the word to express the feeling which would be aroused in Greece should the long-cherished idea of Cretan annexation to Greece fall to the ground in consequence of this appeal. Too many millions of drachmas and too much political energy have been expended by Greece, during the last two years, to achieve an object which, if frustrated without some compensating advantage, would lead to internal dissensions threatening the very safety of the state. It is easy to foresee that in the event of the Cretan failure, causes will be assigned not wholly consistent with the facts of the case, and that the shafts of the opposition will be leveled with redoubled power against the Greek government. This party has not hesitated for many months past to attribute the languishing condition of the Cretan warfare to the apathy of the present ministry, if not, indeed, to the premeditated intention of the prime minister to support the British policy. However bitter might be the feeling of the people of Greece towards their fellow-countrymen of Crete for having unnecessarily and ungratefully abandoned the contest, which if persistently pursued might have led to independence and annexation, they would probably refrain from irritating accusations, in the hope of yet attaining the desired object under more favorable circumstances. Certainly Greece will never abandon a claim which her sympathies and material interests have caused her to labor for with such persistent devotion for so long a period, and which her [Page 138] personal sacrifices have in a manner established as her right. Under these circumstances, I do not believe that any compromising measures can secure to the Cretan question a permanent solution, or that any form of allegiance to a government which these people detest can secure permanent peace to the nation or satisfy the requirements of the protecting powers. As the United States have openly advocated the right and the necessity of Cretan independence, so I believe it will be found that any measures short of this will, in the end, be unsatisfactory to Europe. Great Britain is, from her present position, the most fitting arbiter, so far as her influence upon the Ottoman government is concerned, in the question of Crete. Unfortunately, Great Britain entertains a contrary opinion, believing that her own interests are better conserved by the maintainance of the status quo. In this policy she apparently forgets the teaching of one of her own eminent statesmen, and which political experience has most thoroughly exemplified in the case of the Greek and the Turk, viz, that “forms and stipulations can never unite populations which are dissevered by sympathy.” I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.