Mr. Harvey to Mr. Seward.
Sir: The public mind here is still much occupied with the various and conflicting reports of the military revolt in Spain, led by General Prim, and the [Page 92] principal journals have not attempted to disguise their partiality for his success. Whatever support they might be able to give him by moral encouragement has been freely extended.
As a rigid, and even arbitrary, censorship has been established at Madrid, it is difficult to form any well-founded opinion as to the actual progress, or the ultimate fate of this revolutionary movement. But the developments thus far would seem to indicate that it has not been supported with the degree of favor that was anticipated by its projectors, counting, as they did, upon a real or supposed disaffection towards the existing dynasty, or been followed by a co-operation which was promised in various parts of the kingdom.
The government, holding as it does the military organization strong in hand, though menaced by defection, has been able to prevent a concerted rising, and for the present, at least, may be said to remain master of the situation. The experience of history is repeated, proving that a trained army properly directed, even when it may not be entirely reliable, is capable of holding an unfriendly and large civil population in check, when that population is not armed and organized for resistance or revolution. What may happen, after the stern restraint now imposed shall be removed, opens up a field of speculation, upon which it is neither my duty nor my desire to enter.
For two weeks past reports have been daily current that the insurgent troops were near the Portuguese frontier, dispirited, enfeebled by desertion, suffering from the want of supplies, and harassed by superior columns of the royal army. Yet, strange to say, they have not, up to this time, entered the territory of his Majesty, and though it is positively known that the opposing forces have been within easy range of each other, no collision of any sort is even rumored to have occurred.
The revolt has been bloodless, probably, for two reasons: on the part of the insurgents, because they are too feeble to attack; and on the part of the regular troops, because the government, for motives best known at Madrid, has shaped its policy so as to push the insurgents outside of its own and into a neighboring jurisdiction. In fact, I feel authorized to state, upon reliable information received here, that the Spanish authorities have directed their commanders to avoid by all possible means any engagement that might lead to bloody consequences, or to the capture of the chief who leads the revolted regiments. Whether this purpose is influenced by the apprehension of infidelity on the side of the government forces in the event of a collision, or by the fear of a more serious and extended commotion should General Prim be taken and subjected to the stern punishment, which is threatened in such a contingency, does not become me to say.
It is quite evident, however, that the government at Madrid would feel more at ease to see him and his followers out of Spain, and thus unable to make further mischief at this critical moment. And it is equally sure, should he be constrained to cross over into Portugal, that he will be welcomed with no stinted sympathy for the cause in which he is engaged.
If General Prim should be able to maintain himself for some time longer, even in the passive attitude which he has thus far occupied, it would at least prove a source of grave embarrassment, and might even be attended with results which have not been expected, with any degree of confidence, since the failure of a more general uprising at the outset of his enterprise.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.