Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.
Sir: Since the date of my last despatch, of February 1, I have visited the camp of the allied forces, or rather the camp of the general-in-chief, President Mitre. It is situate about seven leagues from here, and about two from the Paso de la Patria. I left here in company with two others, both Americans, on the morning of the 6th instant, and reached the headquarters of the commanding general at about 5 p. m. I immediately sent him my card, and was invited at once to his tent. He received me with much frankness and apparent pleasure, and treated me, as well as my fellow-travellers, with great kindness and cordiality.
We very soon fell into a discussion of the present war, and the probabilities of its duration. The entire forces in the field, under him, as commander-in-chief, were about the same as given in my last despatch—say from sixty to sixty-five thousand, of which the larger half are Brazilians.
The fleet, consisting of some sixteen war steamers and sixty transports, [Page 561] nearly all belongs to Brazil. General Mitre spoke of the slow progress of the war, and attributed it to the Brazilian admiral, Baron Tamandare, whose preparations are on so extensive a scale that they require much time to complete them. He expressed entire faith in his allies, however, and was confident they were acting with wise caution in collecting such ample forces as to render the result entirely secure when the advance should finally be made. But he was evidently weary of the long inaction, and eager to move against the enemy. His troops are under as good discipline as they can ever be made without active fighting service, and his part of the army, the Argentine, is composed of apparently very good material. The health in his camp is remarkable, for he assured me that the sick, except those wounded in battle, did not exceed three-fifths of one per cent.; and yet the only food of the troops is beef. No bread, no potatoes, no farinaceous food of any kind—only fresh beef. And yet the health of the troops is as I have said; a fact that argues much for the discipline, system, and cleanliness of the camp.
Three days before my arrival, an action of some importance took place between an unknown number of Paraguayans and a body of Argentine troops. The former crossed over at the Paso de la Patria and attacked the advanced post of the latter, where, being warmly received, they retreated into the woods, into which they were imprudently pursued by the Argentines, for when under the protection of the forest, they quickly reformed and severely punished their pursuers, picking off their officers in great numbers. No less than forty-eight officers of the Argentine army were either killed or wounded in this engagement. As the troops which fought this battle were from the city of Buenos Ayres, there were among the officers many young men of fortune and family, and several such were killed and more wounded. It is here thought that the news of this battle will be received with great dissatisfaction in Buenos Ayres, as it has long been the complaint that the Brazilians are never present when there is any fighting to be done, and that all such sport somehow always falls to the Argentines and Orientals. One result of this engagement has been, that the allies have had a new proof of the fighting qualities of the Paraguayans. All admit that they fought with a courage never excelled. They do not surrender, even though inevitable death be the consequence of refusal. When told to surrender and save their lives, they reply, their orders are to fight and not to surrender, and they literally obey this command. Their enemies say that this blind desperation results from a superstitious fear, and belief that if they fail to obey orders to the fullest extent they will sooner or later fall into the hands of Lopez, and then be put to inconceivable torture. They say, also, that Lopez has a system of vicarious punishment, and that he visits on the families of all who, by surrendering, escape from his power, the most terrible cruelties. But what-ever the cause, they admit that the Paraguayans fight with wonderful courage and endurance.
General Mitre invited me to take a survey of his camp, and accompanied me on a quiet review of the same. The camp is finely situated on slightly elevated ground, dotted with a great many lakes, or ponds, that afford excellent facilities for bathing to the soldiers, and consequently contribute very much to the general health. We galloped through the different parts of the camp, unaccompanied by an escort, and though no notice was given of our approach, we found order, regularity, and cleanliness in every part. General Mitre is evidently regarded by all, officers and men, as so far above all other military men in this country that he has no occasion to fear the rivalries or jealousies of subordinate chieftains. With him in the field there can be but one chief; without him there would be many. He is his country’s pride, not only as a soldier, but as a poet, historian, and politician, having distinguished himself in all these diverse walks of life, each of which requires the highest kind of talent in order to excel.
[Page 562]In my last despatch I alluded to the fact that the Brazilians were collecting a fleet in the Parana of so formidable proportions that the Emperor would have his allies at his mercy whenever the war with Paraguay should be concluded. The danger that the allies were incurring from this cause had struct many be-sides myself, and after the dinner which followed my ride with him (General Mitre,) I took occasion, in a manner half playful hut all earnest, to suggest that it might he somewhat difficult to settle with Brazil the numerous questions of expense, responsibility, and spoils, that would grow out of the war with Paraguay, if, as would probably be the case, Brazil had so powerful a fleet in the river that she could blockade every city and town from Paraguay to the Atlantic, and hold them under tribute at her pleasure. His answer was that, from his knowledge of the views of the Emperor, he had no fears of his taking advantage of the accidental position of his fleet to extort unjust terms from his allies, as it was patent to all the world that without them he never could have succeeded against Paraguay. But if it should so happen that war should follow the alliance between Brazil and the Argentine Republic, it would be found that the latter had not yet, in its war against Paraguay, begun to put forth its strength; that if Brazil were found to be acting in bad faith, there would be such a general, spontaneous uprising that every vestige of Brazilian power would be quickly driven from the river.
I next led President Mitre to speak of the probable continuation of monarchical principles and institutions in South America, and found that he was of the opinion that with the present Emperor, Don Pedro II, would expire the last vestige of imperialism in South America. He said, also, that such was the impression and belief of the Emperor himself; that he fully realized that republican ideas were each year growing stronger and stronger within his empire; and that as he had no male heir, his people would be slow to accept a woman or a foreign prince to rule over them. These ideas President Mitre said he gathered from the Emperor himself, during the time the Emperor was in the camp with the allied army.
These general views, above stated, were expressed during my stay at President Mitre’s camp, at different interviews, but, preliminary to the most of the conversation, I took occasion to allude to the anomalous position in which I found myself, and of the duty I was under to get to my post, if it were a possible thing. Possible or impossible, it was my duty to make the effort, and such effort I should certainly make. General Mitre at once admitted that I had, as a minister of a friendly and neutral power, a perfect right to pass through the lines and go to Paraguay. But he strongly deprecated the passage of any of our war vessels above the “Tres Bocas,” for he feared that with such a refuge Lopez would prolong the war much longer than he would if he knew that when his means of resistance were exhausted he had no, means of escape. He said that the English, French, and Italian gunboats had been allowed to pass up and down; but he thought the same privilege might be denied to out national war vessels—following our own precedent in refusing foreign men-of-war to enter the southern ports at the time of the blockade. I replied that he was misinformed on that point, but that if foreign vessels of war had any good reason for entering the blockaded ports, they were permitted to do so, and in some instances certainly did enter them. I also said, that as there could be no object in sending an American war vessel up to Paraguay, unless it were to take me to my post, I was not disposed to press that question of the right to do so, if by other means I could reach my destination. Our government was so anxious to avoid all complications in this war, and was so particularly well-dis-posed towards the Argentine Republic, that I would submit to much personal inconvenience rather than be the cause of any embarrassment that might prolong the war, or influence its result. I had only my simple duty to go to Par aguay, and go I should, unless prevented by means above my control.
[Page 563]General Mitre admitted that my right to pass through the lines could not be questioned, and said, in his opinion, the proper thing to do would be not to prevent me, but to grant me every facility for doing so. But as I was a minister of a friendly nation, he could only give his opinion as President of the republic and commander-in-chief of the army; that he would communicate his views to his ministers, and a conference should be held with his Brazilian allies, and he had no doubt but I should have all the facilities granted for reaching my post that I might desire. As it will require some two or three weeks, however, for this correspondence to take place, I have determined to return to Buenos Ayres, and come back to this place, and after that I shall pass over to Paraguay, if I can.
The real objection, as I believe, and as others believe, to my going to Paraguay at this time, is this: It is thought that Lopez would take courage were I to return; that now he is weak and disheartened, and must see, by this time, that all the world is against him, as there is no diplomatic representative there of any country, and my return would lead him to renewed efforts that would prolong the war, as then he would think he was not entirely neglected and forgotten These reasons have been assigned to me on several occasions why I should not go up to Paraguay till the war is concluded, and they may be good and valid as far as the interests of the allies are concerned. But I do not yet see that it is my duty to conform to the interests of the allies. The United States is not a member of the alliance, and to do any act seemingly unfriendly to Paraguay in order to comply with the wishes of her enemies, would be at least a passive violation of neutrality, and I should be wanting in good faith to the government to which I have been accredited.
I shall start on my return to Buenos Ayres in a few days. If I find that the views of President Mitre are accepted by his ministers, I shall return here immediately, and I shall come prepared to go through to Paraguay with my wife and servants. If not, and Admiral Godon still refuses to aid me in going to my post of duty, I shall be compelled to wait till the war is over, or till I receive instructions from home, or else till such time as the mosquitoes shall be less formidable to the gallant admiral.
Up to this time there has been no blockade of any port of Paraguay. The whole Brazilian squadron is lying off this city, and vessels of all nations are fallowed to come thus far without interruption or question. The Argentine government has never declared any of its rivers or ports blockaded, and if there be a blockade of any Paraguayan port, it must be of that kind that is never seen except on paper. On the left or eastern bank of the Parana are numerous forts, above Corrientes, to which small vessels have been accustomed to go, and though they are not allowed to do so now, for fear that when far above the fleet they should run up the Paraguay, yet it is clear they have the right to do it, according to the laws of nations. But as this question will probably never be seriously discussed, since the most of the vessels engaged in the traffic carry the flag of the country, I allude to the circumstance only to prove that the pretence of a blockade is untenable and absurd. In my own case, the Argentine government will probably adopt the views of President Mitre, and I have no doubt that within three or four weeks I shall be safely arrived at my post of duty; and once there, if I can have any influence towards putting an end to the slaughter, I shall certainly exercise it.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.