Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I have now the unpleasant duty of explaining to you the reason of my long detention in this place. It is the more unpleasant as it involves the necessity of making a serious complaint against an officer high in command in the naval service of the United States. This officer is the Acting Rear-Admiral S. W. Godon, now in command of our Brazilian squadron. Briefly I will recite the facts.
On arriving at Rio de Janeiro, on the way hither, I learned that the war between Paraguay and the allied forces of Brazil, Uruguay, and the Argentine Confederation was still raging, and that little or no communication could be had between Paraguay and the mouth of the river Plate. All merchant vessels had ceased running up the river as far as Paraguay territory, and it appeared as though I should have great difficulty myself in reaching my post of duty. At this time Admiral Godon was at Rio in the flagship Susquehanna, with several other American war vessels. On arriving in the harbor I was immediately invited to visit his ship, and on that and other occasions was treated with hospitality and kindness. I conversed with the admiral on several occasions on the state of the existing war, and of the difficulties that threatened to impede my ascent of the river. He told me he should soon go to the Plate with a part of his fleet, and that if such were the state of affairs, he “must contrive some way to get me up the river.” The light-draught steamer Wasp was then daily expected to join the squadron as a tender, and it appeared that she was precisely adapted to the service of ascending the river, being fast and of light draught. Before her arrival, however, the admiral left Rio with the Susquehanna, to take an excursion down the coast to St. Catherine’s, as he then said, for the purpose of exercising the men in target practice. Another reason was subsequently alleged. In about two weeks the admiral returned, and the Wasp having safely reached Rio, I had further conversation about coming to the Plate. He said the Wasp required certain repairs that it would take some ten or twelve days to complete, and that he should start soon after that work was done. I then left for this place on an English steamer, supposing that I would not be detained [Page 555] here more than two weeks, or three at the utmost, before the expected means of conveyance up the river would be at hand.
I reached this place on the 4th of November, and found, as I had anticipated, that there was no way for me to get to Paraguay except on a war vessel of some neutral power. An Italian and a French gunboat had left for Paraguay some time before my arrival here, neither of which had then returned. So I waited the coming of the admiral, but instead of being obliged to wait till the 20th of November, as I had expected, it was the 26th of December, when I learned that the Susquehanna had arrived in Montevideo the day before. I had previously sent a letter to the admiral, to be delivered as soon as he arrived, informing him of the position I was in, and requesting him to furnish me the means of getting to my post. But without waiting for an answer to my letter, as soon as I heard the Susquehanna was in Montevideo I hastened to that place, to urge upon him that there might be no longer delay than was absolutely necessary in despatching a steamer up the river. To my great surprise, he now talked as if it was very doubtful if he sent a steamer; but he would not say positively whether he would or not. He would very probably go as far as Corrientes (twenty-one miles from Paraguay) himself, and in that case very likely two steamers, the Shawmut and the Wasp, would go up. He would not decide on anything, however, till he came to Buenos Ayres, which he said would be in a few days. So I returned, and waited for him till the 10th instant, and as he did not appear, I again went to Montevideo. He was still undecided whether he would send a steamer up the river or not, and alleged various reasons why it would not be proper for him to do so. If he did it at all, it would not be till after the arrival of Commodore Rodgers, who was expected here soon in the Vanderbilt. I observed to him that that would occasion another delay of at least a month, and that I could not and ought not to delay here that much longer. I must get to Paraguay if it were a possible thing, and I was determined to make the attempt, even if I must make the last part of the journey on horseback or buy a whale-boat, to get through the lines. He then said he would not say he would not absolutely send a steamer up before the arrival of Commodore Rodgers, but he would decide on what he could do after he got to Buenos Ayres and had talked with different parties on the position of affairs. He said then that he would positively be in Buenos Ayres in two or three days. Yesterday, the 15th of January, he arrived, and he had finally come to the conclusion not to send a steamer under any circumstances. The reasons which he gives are so various and extraordinary that I will repeat them, with the answers which I gave.
The first reason was the expense—it would take a large amount of coal for the trip. That is, as I admitted, an important reason, and were it only for my own convenience or comfort the steamer was going up, it would be sufficient; but it is not so. Whether I were to go up or not, it would be proper and expedient, as it seems to me, to send up a man-of-war. All other nations having war vessels that they could send up the river, have done so during this war, and I have always understood it was the policy of our navy to have its flag shown in the vicinity of troubled waters. There is more need of a war steamer at the Tres Bocas than anywhere and everywhere on the South Atlantic coast, and it is hard for me to explain the economy of maintaining a large fleet where it has nothing to do, when a small gunboat cannot be spared from it to do a real service because of the trifling expense incidental thereto.
Another reason given was that the American interests in Paraguay were very small, and it was just as well or better that I should remain here till a more convenient season. It is true that our interests in Paraguay are small, but that does not change my duty. The President and Secretary of State thought proper to send me there, and gave instructions what to do, and I do not conceive that it is for Admiral Godon to countermand those instructions or thwart me in executing [Page 556] them. On the contrary, it is his duty to assist me, as far as he consistently can, in carrying them into effect.
A third reason alleged is that the weather is warm, the season is unhealthy, and the mosquitoes along the river banks are numerous. It is true the weather is warm, but it is never unhealthy in Paraguay; on the contrary, it is as healthy a country as I ever saw. During a residence there of near four years I have never known any epidemic, any chills or fever, or any miasmatic influence to endanger either life or health. It is true there are some mosquitoes about, but not more than on the shores of any North American river in the summer time. But great as is the heat, and thick as are the mosquitoes, they are not sufficient to deter Mrs. Washburn from attempting the journey; and I hardly think our gallant sailors, who have won such honors for themselves and our country during the last four years, would thank the admiral for his compliment Were they to be told that what a young woman, unused to travel and exposure, would not hesitate to undertake, would be too severe for them to endure. The truth is, the trip would be an agreeable and healthy diversion for all—officers and men.
To sum up his objections, there is only one that has any validity, and that is the expense of the coal. But I do not see that Admiral Godon is at all consistent in his economy of that article; on the contrary, when it has suited his own convenience, I believe he has been very free in the use of it. As I have already mentioned, he left Rio while I was there to go on an excursion to St. Catherine’s, for the alleged purpose of giving his men practice in target-firing. What need of going to St. Catherine’s for that purpose, when he was going by there, three or four weeks later, on his way to the Plate ? Why not save the coal necessary for that trip, and have the target practice when he called there (as he did call) on his passage to Montevideo ? He has given the reason since his arrival here. It was this: Admiral H. H. Bell, of the Hartford, was expected about that time in Rio, and to avoid any question of etiquette or punctilio with him, Admiral Godon now says he took a run down to St. Catherine’s, to stay there till Admiral Bell should have come and gone. Thus for a mere matter of etiquette he could take the huge Susquehanna to St. Catherine’s, a distance of some four hundred miles; but he cannot send a little steam tender up to Paraguay, where a war vessel is absolutely needed, because it will consume too much coal. And yet I venture the opinion that the same coal that was burnt on his pleasure trip to St. Catherine’s would have been more than sufficient for two trips of the Wasp to Paraguay and back.
I will now attempt to give some of the reasons I have adduced to the admiral why he should send a steamer to Paraguay. In addition to those I have already mentioned, I have said to him that many people here have told me that they thought I might be instrumental in effecting much good there. I have been requested by scores of people here to use my good offices with President Lopez in getting their friends out of prison, and if possible out of the country. It is generally believed here, and I think by all who have any knowledge of Paraguay affairs, that President Lopez was well affected towards me personally. If I succeed in getting into the country, I shall certainly exert myself to the utmost to persuade President Lopez that it is for his interest to consent to an exchange of prisoners, and not keep unoffending men in prison for no offence but that of being citizens of the enemy’s country. I have faith to believe that I can effect something for their relief, and I think if I could go up in a war steamer, many poor unfortunates, who have long lingered in prison, would be permitted to avail themselves of it to come through the lines to the camp of their friends.
But the great and all-predominant reason I have why I think I ought to go on an American vessel is this: the hostile armies are now, and have been for a long time, at nearly a dead lock. Neither party has gained any material advantage for the last four months. The allies are in the meanwhile constantly augmenting their forces, and as yet show no signs of exhaustion nor any desire for [Page 557] peace, except on the terms of the triple alliance. The first or most important stipulation of this alliance was that no treaty of peace should ever be made by either of the allies, or all combined, except on the condition that Lopez was driven from power and from the country. The Lopez power and family must be exterminated before any peace propositions could be entertained. Now it is generally, if not universally, believed here that the final result of the war must be the expulsion of Lopez, and many think that he must himself be already aware of the fact that his cause is lost, and would be only too glad of any means of escape from the country, so that he could safely get to the United States or Europe. If he could do that, it would doubtless save many thousand lives of his own people and as many more of the allies. But if there be no means of escape open to him, (and there seems to be none, unless some neutral man-of-war will take him away,) he must from necessity fight it out to the last. Now he would not trust himself with any neutral, except it were English, French, or American, and much more readily with the last than either of the others. He would feel no security in a Portuguese, or Italian, or Spanish war vessel, that the allies would not take him out of such vessel and wreak their vengeance upon him, trusting to diplomacy to satisfy the offended power afterwards. Now I know not whether he is to the extremity to which many suppose him to be; I only know that the persons best informed in regard to him, his country and resources, believe that he is, and I have endeavored to impress this fact on the attention of Admiral Godon. It may be that these parties are mistaken, but I submit that there is sufficient reason to think otherwise to justify the admiral in having a war vessel within the call of our minister there accredited, in the event that such a contingency should arise. The admiral, however, does not see that he has anything to do in the premises, even though this should be the actual state of the case.
Under the circumstances above described I have no alternative but to endeavor to reach my post as best I can. I now propose to take a merchant steamer as far as Corrientes, and there avail myself of any chance that offers for getting into Paraguay. I think it probable that the Brazilian admiral may offer me a conveyance, under a flag of truce, to some point whence I may pass within the Paraguayan lines. If I accept it, however, I am aware that President Lopez will regard me as the friend of Brazil rather than of Paraguay, and thus I shall probably lose any influence for good I might otherwise have. I shall, therefore, try and get through in some other way, even though it be undignified and uncomfortable. I will here say that our minister at this place, the Hon. R. C. Kirk, entirely concurs with me in the propriety of sending a war steamer to Paraguay, and has used every argument he could adduce in order to prevail upon the admiral to send it. But it is labor lost, and he, as well as my-self, is left in the position of a minister whose advice is derided, and who, if he were desirous of effecting any diplomatic purpose or mediating for peace, would be without any hope of having his request acceded to by the admiral. The officers in command of the war vessels of all other nations, in this river, pay some respect to the opinions and wishes of their ministers. Not so, however, Admiral Godon, whose utter disregard of all they can say or urge is calculated to degrade and belittle the diplomatic agents of the United States in the countries to which they aire accredited. The war with Paraguay may last six months longer, and it may come to an end much sooner; but if I am to be there, I respectfully and earnestly ask that instructions may be sent out to whomsoever may be in command of our naval forces on this station, to pay some respect to my representations, if I find that the presence of an American man-of-war is needed there either to save life or promote peace. Different merchants here have urged these considerations on Admiral Godon, and have even proposed to him to furnish the coal gratuitously, necessary for the voyage, if he would only send up a vessel from his fleet. But even this appeal could not move him, though he said it was very possible that he would go up to Paraguay himself, [Page 558] about the first of April, at which time the weather will be cooler and the mosquitoes less troublesome. Neither the hot weather nor the mosquitoes, however, seem to frighten the younger officers of the squadron. On the contrary, they have expressed the strongest desire to go up to Paraguay, and if any steamer is to be sent up, they are anxious that the vessel to which they belong may be detailed for that service. They do not seem to apprehend either danger or serious discomfort from the heat or the terrible mosquitoes.
I am therefore forced to the conclusion that the only reason why Admiral Godon does not send one of the squadron to Paraguay is simply this—that it does not suit his own personal convenience. He says he has long desired to go to Paraguay himself, and means to do so when the weather shall be cooler. Whether an American war steamer will be of any use or service at that time, does not seem to be the question with the admiral; but it will suit his convenience and pleasure, and gratify his curiosity, (which he says is very great to see Paraguay,) and therefore, when the weather is cool and his duties do not require his presence with the squadron at the mouth of the river, he is going up there with I know not how many vessels.
The course of the admiral may be dictated by the highest patriotism and sincerest regard for the government service. I pronounce no judgment and report only the facts of the case. I may be allowed to say, however, that if the officers in command of our public war vessels would lend their assistance to the diplomatic representatives of the country in the execution of their official duties, especially in those cases in which no foreign complications are involved, the influence and interests of our country abroad would be greatly promoted. I had supposed that such instructions were usually given to such officers until the arrival of Admiral Godon at this port; but in view of the manner in which he has exercised his authority here, I trust that the suggestion may not be regarded as improperly offered. My next despatch will probably be from the vicinity of the allied armies, and after I have seen something of the condition of their forces, I may, perhaps, be able to make an estimate of the probable duration of the war. If I can get into Paraguay, it is a matter of great uncertainty when I shall be able to send an account of what I see and do through the lines of the hostile armies. Unless an order is sent to the admiral to send a vessel to Paraguay I shall probably be entirely cut off from all communication with the State Department. I have only to ask, in conclusion, that if the government shall think it advisable to send one of its steamers to Paraguay, the orders for it may be sent out immediately.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.