Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress

Mr. Nelson to Mr. Seward.

No. 231.]

Legation of the United States, Santiago de Chili, October 31, 1865.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit you herewith, at the request of his excellency the secretary of foreign relations of the republic of Chili, a copy of the counter-manifesto of his government addressed to friendly nations, for the purpose of informing them of the true antecedents of the present war been Chili and Spain.

I also transmit a copy of the note of enclosure; and have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS H. NELSON.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[Translation.]

Mr. Covarrubias to Mr. Nelson.

Department of Foreign Relations, Santiago de Chili, Santiago, October 29, 1865.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit to your excellency two copies of the counter-manifesto which, by order of his Excellency the President of the republic, I have the honor to address to friendly nations, to show to them the true causes and antecedents of the present war between Chili and Spain.

I dare to hope that your excellency will be pleased to transmit one of the accompanying copies to your government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to offer to your excellency the reiterated expression of my distinguished consideration, with which I am your excellency’s most obedient servant,

ALVARO COVARRUBIAS.

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of North America.

Counter-manifest of the minister of foreign relations of Chili on the present war between the republic and Spain.

[Translation.]

From the 14th of April of the year last past the Pacific has been the theatre of hostilities, without justification or excuse whatever, practiced by the naval forces of Spain against different American states.

At that date a small Spanish squadron took possession of the Chincha islands, belonging to the republic of Peru, with the purpose not to return them to their owner until after an occupation of ten months, and in exchange for a sum of three millions of dollars, grasped at upon the most trivial pretexts.

At this time the commander of the Spanish squadron in these seas has just declared the ports of Chili to be blockaded, committing hostilities against some of them with the ships under his command, and his aggression has kindled a war between the republic and Spain. The cabinet of Madrid has not cared even to gloss with the appearance of justice this aggressive and violent policy. If she had not found her motive in forbidden designs of usurpation and aggrandizement, this can only be explained by the wish to make a facile ostentation of maritime preponderance over nations which, caught by surprise in the midst of the confidence and of the beneficent activity of peace, find themselves almost disarmed and without naval strength.

But such puerile desire was not motive sufficient to determine the conduct of the government of Spain. Little as might be the discretion attributed to her, motives more powerful must have influenced her, and in reality have done so. The existence of settled designs appears evident when antecedents and the history of events are remembered, and when the tortuous course which Spanish policy has pursued in America is observed with attention.

For some time back the daily press of the peninsula has diffused opinions adverse to the external security of Peru, and fostered projects of reconquest and of monarchizing the American states which were colonies of Spain. At the same time the cabinet of Madrid undertook, through blood and fire, the annexation of the republic of Santo Domingo; took part in the expedition against Mexico; and sent a small squadron to the Pacific, which had on board an illusory scientific commission to cover up the true objects of the voyage. Under such auspices, Don Eu ebio de Salazar y Mazzaredo, special commissioner extraordinary of her Catholic Majesty, arrived at Lima in March, 1864. The unwonted title under which this agent came accredited suggested some doubts to the Peruvian government, which deemed proper to hint them to Señor Salazar y Mazzaredo to the extent of signifying to him their good disposition to encourage him in the character of confidential agent. The Spanish commissioner repelled this conciliatory measure by vain threats, and closed the door against every sort of friendly explanation by forthwith abandoning Lima, and going to embark at Callao on board the despatch boat of the small Spanish squadron. Although precipitate to appearance, his conduct was no other than the effect of preconceived determination. For this purpose it was that he had in anticipation summoned into the Peruvian waters the two frigates which, united with the aforesaid steam despatch boat, formed the squadron of General Pinzon. Setting out from Callao, he went and joined with those ships which had, without delay, left the roadstead of Valparaiso, and were already waiting for him in the latitude of the Chinch a islands. Two days after Señor Salazar y Mazzaredo left Lima, the Peruvian government was surprised by the news that those islands were in the possession of the Spanish squadron. The commander thereof and the commissioner of her Catholic Majesty had occupied them on the 14th April, in the name of Spain, by hauling down the flag of Peru, and causing the flag of their country to wave over them. On the same day they issued a declaration intended to set forth the considerations on which they founded their procedure. On the one hand they alleged the necessity for compelling Peru by means of force to fulfil the sacred obligations she had with Spain. They pretended on the other hand that even yet the war of emancipation was not complete in Peru, between which and her ancient mistress existed only a truce in fact, and that the Crown of Castile might revindicate its ownership of those islands. Such considerations, far from justifying the occupation, impressed it with a character so much the more dangerous as it was less definite. At one time the fact might be regarded as an act of reprisal; at another, as the beginning of a reconquest. Under the one or the other aspect it was a sad abuse of force, as offensive to the dignity and rights of Peru, threatening to the safety of the other American republics, and deserving the censure of all civilized nations. If the Spanish agents only sought to obtain from the Peruvian government satisfaction for wrongs or pending obligations, before employing coercive measures they should have set out their demand, and if these were rejected or eluded, have presented an ultimatum—addressed some intimation. They did nothing of the sort, but rather aggravated the anomaly of their proceedings by putting on it the stamp of a surprise, incompatible with international integrity. Considered as an act of reprisals the Spanish occupation trampled upon all the guarantees which the law of nations offers to weak states, as safeguards of their legitimate interests, and consequently affected those American republics which, like Peru, are in want of a military marine, powerful enough to preserve them from the aggressions of a foreign squadron. In this point of view the cause of Peru was the cause of all the other nations of the continent. With more reason would it be so if the occupation of the Chinchas imported the renewal of the war for independence, in which the ancient Spanish colonies of America had indissolubly bound together their power and their destinies. The victory they achieved in that long sustained and glorious struggle gave them a common title to be counted among sovereign and independent nations; independent, above all, because the consummated act was recognized by all civilized states, and was accepted by Spain herself explicitly in respect of Chili, and in a manner implicit, but incontestable, in respect of Peru.

Again, to call in doubt the force of that act, to resuscitate extinguished rights, to rekindle an ended war, the Spanish government would have to blot out the history of half a century of international relations between America and Europe, and have to place herself in contradiction with her own acts. In such event the American republics, faithful to the first alliance, would have to fight for the independence of Peru, in order to maintain the integrity of the principle of their political existence. As is seen, the unexpected aggression of the Spanish agents had a range disastrous to the repose and stability of America. So the people and governments of this continent felt it to be. The news of the fact roused among them a profound agitation and the most energetic protests. Even the diplomatic representatives of nations foreign to America associated themselves with their American colleagues, resident in Lima, to protest against the occupation, and against the foundations on which it rested.

The deforciants of the Peruvian islands then comprehended that they had gone too far, and endeavored to extenuate the gravity of their first step. In consequence they declared that they had taken possession of Chincha without authority from their government, whose instructions they would await, retaining themselves meantime possession of the islands under the title of reprisals, but not of revindication. This assertion, incompatible with the first declaration of the 14th of April, is so likewise with the circumspection which should be attributed to the functionaries of a respectable government. It is scarcely conceivable that Spanish agents could occupy a part of the Peruvian territory, and for that purpose had invoked decayed and inadmissible titles, and at the risk of drawing upon themselves mortifying rebuke and serious responsibilities, without being authorized to do so. Nor can their conduct be attributed to an act of heedless precipitancy, because it has already been observed that it obeyed a premeditated and irrevocable purpose. That this odious design had emanated from the cabinet of Madrid is not at this day matter of doubt, although at that time the American governments, placing in the honor of that cabinet a confidence most grievously abused at a later day, resisted the belief that it could participate in the irregularities of its agents. Nevertheless, events have accused it from the beginning. If it had aspired only to obtain from Peru what was due to it, it would have adopted the frank course, straightforward and honorable, which is always followed by one who reclaims what is just. It would have sent to the Pacific naval forces, without cautiously hiding the object of its expedition; it would have manifested through the organs of diplomacy its legitimate pretensions; have required their fulfilment; and if that were not attained, have appealed to the employment of force. It would not have ordered into these seas a small squadron under pretext of scientific expeditions; it would not have accredited to the Peruvian government a commissioner, whose title and whose acts were calculated to excite a conflict. In the range of honest intentions its policy of simulation was so much the less comprehensible, inasmuch as having at disposal a maritime power much superior to that of Peru, it was not necessary for it to take precautions against the naval armament of the Peruvian government. It could not then have any other object than to lull asleep the foresight of the American States, in order to execute without resistance lawless projects injurious to all of them. Thus is explained the retraction which the Spanish agents hastened to make of their first declaration. Thus also is explained the precipitation with which the cabinet of Madrid disapproved the conduct of those very agents on the faith of a simple common rumor before having received any official communication. For the sake of the honor of the functionaries of Spain, and of the dictates of the most ordinary prudence, it should have abstained from such disapproval, and have suspended its judgment until it found itself possessed of authentic information. By not doing so the cabinet of Madrid caused to be understood very clearly that it had good reason to regard at once as very likely to be true the news of what had happened; a likelihood which it would not have hit upon if its agents had occupied the Chincha islands, and invoked the right of revindication without competent instructions.

Thus, therefore, when it disapproved the consummated occupation and the right of revindication, declaring them to be foreign to its views in respect of Peru, it obeyed only the suggestions of an unscrupulous policy. Like its agents, it comprehended that the step taken was premature and unskilful, and that it was matter of urgency to silence the protests of the American nations, whose coalition might paralyze the execution of its forbidden and secret purposes. Its want of sincerity was betrayed by its later acts. The commander who had taken possession of the Peruvian islands, and had pretended to revindicate them, was retained in his post—the occupation was itself continued. In this way it not merely left unpunished an agent unfaithful to the instructions of his government, but the fruit of his offence was taken to advantage. The connivance of the cabinet of Madrid in the abuses of its agents could not be doubted when it was seen to be regardless of the most absolute duties of honor and of public morality.

To give some show of justice to the permanency of the occupation, it laid hands on an unexpected expedient a few days after the islands were occupied. The commissioner, Mr. Salazar y Mazzaredo, had determined to return to Spain, and embarked on board one of the packets of the Pacific Navigation Company. During the transit from Callao to Panama he imagined, or made believe that he imagined, that his life was the object of murderous machinations, planned by emissaries of the Peruvian government, and on reaching Madrid he presented to the minister of state a report stating the imaginary dangers he had run. No civilized government could be in complicity with so base and shameless a scheme; yet, notwithstanding, the Spanish minister found in that fancied and improbable adventure the pretext which he needed to palliate the continuance of the occupation of Chincha. In his circular of June 24, 1864, he said to the diplomatic agents of Spain in foreign countries that his government required from that of Peru, before the return of the islands to her, that it should protest and give satisfactory explanations of its innocence in respect of the attempts on the life of Mr. Salazar y Mazzaredo. This did not prevent him from giving assurance at the same time that he dared not, would not, could not, accuse the government of Peru of such attempts.

On the 23d of August, 1864, the minister of foreign relations of Peru addressed to the legations of his country abroad a circular, the contents of which, sustained on trustworthy testimony, demonstrated in the clearest manner that those dangers were entirely chimerical.

This pretext which was prolonging the occupation being destroyed, an end was put to it on that account. Very much to the contrary, the Spanish government, by sending to the Pacific fresh ships, converted the small squadron of Admiral Pinzon into a considerable fleet, and continued in possession of the islands without addressing any reclamation to Peru, without trying any way of solution.

Meantime, months were running on, and the Peruvian government, giving up the recovery of the detained islands by force, at length saw itself compelled to go and seek a pacific settlement on board of the Spanish squadrons, the command of which Admiral Pareja had assumed a short time previously. This commander sold peace to Peru in exchange for three millions of dollars, and a preliminary convention which would open enticing fields to the covetousness of the cabinet of Madrid, for that cabinet on giving up the Chincha islands had not abandoned its former intents. By keeping in the Pacific a powerful squadron it would be able to occupy them again without any difficulty, and by reserving, through said convention, to a later agreement the settlement of its claims and demands on Peru, nothing would be easier for it than to look for new pretexts to renew the occupation.

It now appears to be indubitable that the pecuniary demands made by the Spanish government on the minister of Peru at the court of Madrid are exorbitant, and import to the Peruvian nation not less than the loss of their deposits of guano. The appropriation of these deposits would not only relieve the utter insolvency of the Spanish treasury, but would aid Spain to establish a secure foothold on the Pacific, and to contemplate materially, from the Chincha islands, a field of much-coveted conquests in the fertile valleys of the Peruvian coast. Such a prospective could no less than seduce a state which has left in America deep traces of unbridled covetousness and ambition. But, taught by experience, the cabinet of Madrid now proposes to realize its projects step by step, and by appeasing opposition and inquietude to divide the American nations, to reduce them to inaction by means of false promises, of threats, and of hostilities. Such is the first task it has undertaken. Hence is derived the origin of the aggression which it has just directed against Chili, whose steadfast care for the interests and union of America thwarted its designs, and by which, perhaps, its wounded vanity intends to satiate a sad revenge.

Such are the true causes of the rupture which has supervened between Chili and Spain As to the ostensible motives which the Spanish government has alleged for opening hostilities against the republic, they are narrowed down to accusing it of conduct systematically adverse to the peninsula during the Hispano-Peruvian conflict.

The simple statement of the facts suffices to demonstrate that the policy of Chili, generous, friendly, and fairly honest towards Spain before the conflict above mentioned, has not changed its character since. As soon as the war of independence ended, the subjects of Spain began to find in Chili the same frank and willing hospitality which is dispensed to every foreigner; not only might they freely remain, addict themselves to the occupations of industry and commerce, acquire property, but also have access to public office. The Chilian government did not wait to conclude with that of Spain a treaty of peace and friendship in order to acknowledge as her own the debts contracted by the Spanish government during the war, and to recognize the credits resulting from sequestrations and embargoes of Spanish property.

The ulterior conclusion of that treaty gives birth to diplomatic relations between the two countries, in which the best understanding ever prevailed. The legation of her Catholic Majesty, resident at Santiago, never had to trouble itself much to watch over the persons and interests of its countrymen established in the republic, who found in the laws, in the authorities, and in the temper of the country, protection, security, sympathy, personal consideration, and the means for living and for gain. When the small squadron of Admiral Pinzon reached the port of Valparaiso, rumors were already in circulation which denounced the odious objects of his voyage; notwithstanding that, and despite the commander aforesaid had marked his entrance into Chilian waters by an act of rude discourtesy, he and his companions enjoyed a cordial reception in this capital and at Valparaiso.

The kindly dispositions of Chili in favor of Spain, if they became less warm, as was natural, because of the occupation of Chincha, have not disappeared, much less given place to any feeling hostile to the peninsula. The news of that event produced in the republic a universal excitement, called forth energetic protests, inspired demonstrations of fraternal sympathy with Peru, of patriotic interest in the safety of Chili, of ardent adhesion to the common and vital interests of America. This movement of public opinion was proper to a people whose first virtue is patriotism, who love their independence and their free institutions, who comprehend American solidarity, and believed that it saw the fortunes of this continent threatened by a monarchical reconquest. But this was unaccompanied by any hostile feeling against Spain, for it was impossible to forget the advantages and safe condition in which Spanish subjects, residents of Chili, continued to be situated. They have been able to live in quiet and devote themselves to their customary pursuits, while the policy of their government was sowing in this country disturbances and differences, and despite the indiscreet and provoking, conduct themselves indulged.

If the attitude of the Chilian people was far from any feeling of hostility against Spain, the acts of the government of the republic gave, at the same time, evidence of frank and sincere friendship for the cabinet of Madrid. Sharing in the public sentiment, comprehending the dangerous scope of the procedure of the agents of her Catholic Majesty in Peru, the government of Chili did not hesitate to address the other cabinets of America, protesting against the measure of causeless and abusive force which those agents had employed; but, while doing so, did not omit to express its confidence that the cabinet of Madrid would disapprove the measure. So, also, it signified to the minister of Spain in Chili, when, to quiet the excitement of feeling, explanations were asked from him about the event, which were only rendered in terms vague and indefinite.

This confidence was more clearly a proof of its friendly spirit because the antecedents of the occupation of Chincha involved, as is shown above, grave charges against the probity and frankness of the Spanish government. Its friendly dispositions towards that government were not changed through all the discussion of the Peruvio-Spanish complications, during which it endeavored to reconcile its duties in regard to Peru, to America, and to Chili, with the continuance of its cordial relations with Spain. To attain this, it labored incessantly to avoid a definitive rupture between Peru and the peninsula, and to promote a pacific settlement, which should satisfy the dignity and the interests of the two parties interested. Evident proofs of this are all the steps which, in the progress of the question, were taken by the diplomatic agents of Chili in Lima; so, also, are the acts of the Chilian government, whose sound policy has been misrepresented by affecting disregard of the different circumstances under which it had to conduct its action. In fact, the Hispano-Peruvian conflict presented in succession very different phases to which it was necessary to subordinate the progress of the Chilian policy.

The occupation of Chincha was a commencement of hostilities which in strictness should at once produce a state of war between Peru and Spain. Notwithstanding such occupation a state of peace was maintained during the first months in consequence of the dispositions which were manifested on one side and the other. On the one part, the Peruvian government, trusting, like that of Chili, that the cabinet of Madrid would disapprove the conduct of its agents, and would restore to it the possession of the territory occupied by them, appeared to be disposed not to employ, in the mean time, force to recover it; so its official declarations left to be understood, as well as its passive attitude in respect to the small Spanish squadron. The commander of that squadron, on the other hand, gave assurance that he had proceeded to the occupation on his own responsibility, without express orders, and that until he received instructions from his government would remain on the defensive. Finally, the minister of Spain in Chili thought the question was about an isolated act and susceptible of the disapproval of the cabinet of Madrid. All this tended to keep the affair within the conditions of peace. The unexpected and adverse determination of the Spanish government completely changed the aspect of things. Its humiliating requisitions on Peru were rejected, its squadron was considerably re-enforced, its decision to sustain by arms its unjust pretensions was no longer doubtful. At the same time the Peruvian government, deceived in its expectation, showed its resolution to use force to remove the Spanish ships from Chincha. The congress of Peru did not think it necessary for this purpose to authorize it to declare war against Spain, but prescribed to it by the law of the 7th of September, 1864, the employment of every sort of means “to defend by force the integrity of the national territory from every aggression or consummated usurpation, or which might henceforward be attempted to be consummated.” On this subject the minister of foreign relations of Peru said, in a circular to the diplomatic corps of his country, dated the 11th of said month, “Reparation for the offence, however, does not hinder the, government, nevertheless, from keeping its attention fixed on the act of usurpation of territory begun on the 14th of April and prolonged until the present time. To repel the aggressors a declaration of war was not necessary, nor even a special resolution of Congress. If mention has been made of it in the law, it is only for the purpose of strengthening the action of the government, and, above all, in order to remove obstacles by which it might be obstructed in the use of the means and employment of the resources needful to attain the object. The government has not desisted, nor will it ever desist, from its purpose to repel the aggressors by force. It will do so as soon as the warlike preparations it is making are concluded.” Without waiting for this, the Peruvian government seemed disposed finally to give battle, at disadvantage, to the squadron of Admiral Pinzon, which was opposed by a meeting of the American plenipotentiaries at that time officiating at Lima. Such acts loudly proclaimed that the state of war had in fact supervened between Peru and Spain.

These vicissitudes in the matter naturally had influence upon the conduct of the government of Chili. Designing to keep possession of the Chincha islands, the cabinet of Madrid, as has been shown, caused the state of war to surge up. By such decisions it accorded very ill with the expectations of the government of the republic, notwithstanding its protestations of respect for the autonomy and stability of the American nations.

Notwithstanding, the Chilian government still trusted in the good faith of that government, and previously to the state of war determined to assume a neutral attitude, awaiting the development of events to give to it the measure of the pretensions and true value of the promises of Spain. But its neutrality could not be passive. The continuance of the anomalous occupation of Chincha, although a decent appearance had been given to it, left existent all the dangers and mischiefs which the act had from the commencement wrought upon the American states, and especially on Chili, next neighbor of Peru. To cause the disappearance of that act, irregular, and menacing to America, it was the duty of the government of the republic to bring into play, as in fact it did, within the bounds of impartiality and its prerogatives as neutral, such means as it deemed efficacious. Therefore, while its diplomatic representative in Peru, in union with other Americans resident there, directed his action toward obtaining the pacific giving up of the occupation of the islands and the adjustment of a satisfactory settlement, which would prevent a definitive rupture between the belligerents, they were forbidden to take in any Chilian ports any article contraband of war, and in particular fossil coal. The want of fuel would increase the difficulty of the operations of maritime warfare carried on by steamers endeavoring to prevent war. The Chilian government sought the only means by which it could maintain its good understanding with the cabinet of Madrid without abandoning the dearest and legitimate interests of Chili and of America.

This policy of conciliation and generosity is what has been Chargéd with being systematically hostile to Spain, because it was not agreeable to confess that the firmness and attempered energy of the republic in defence of the rights of America embarrassed the execution of shameful projects To give some likelihood to the accusation, the reclamations which the minister of her Catholic Majesty in Chili, Mr. Taveira, had addressed to the government of the republic during the development of the Hispano-Peruvian conflict were relied on. Drawn up in the midst of the excitement of events, inspired by excessive solicitude in favor of Spanish interests, those reclamations fell back at times on isolated facts, independent of the action of the Chilian government, and at times on acts of that government utterly inoffensive to the honor and rights of the Peninsula. The charges they involved have been done away by explanations which were seasonably given. Nearly a year elapsed without return to the agitation of the first of those reclamations, and during that time the government of her Catholic Majesty continued to offer unequivocal proots that its good understanding and friendship with the republic was not interrupted, as will presently be seen. It seems, therefore, that it had regarded the reclamations to be unfounded, and the explanations given about them satisfactory.

Never theless, on the 13th of May last, Mr. Taviera addressed to the undersigned, minister of foreign relations of Chili, a communication in which, by order of his government, he set forth the causes of complaint which Spain alleged for the belief that she was affronted by the republic, and the good disposition of the cabinet of Madrid to accept the solemn declarations which the case required, provided they were compatible with her honor. The former reclamations of the Spanish diplomatist had been converted into grounds of complaint by disregarding the explanations before mentioned.

The undersigned is going to set forth and examine, one by one, these causes of complaint, in order that the real merit of charges which he has already had the honor more than once to refute, may be adjudged.

First charge: Insults to the Spanish flag. These insults rest on an incident which took place on the 1st of May, 1864, at the door of the house of the Spanish legation. Four days after it happened, Mr. Taveira informed the predecessor of the undersigned about it, signifying that it had been very painful to him, and that he would lay the matter before his government, but without making formal reclamation, without requiring any reparation.

In virtue of that communication from the representative of her Catholic Majesty due investigations were made from which the following version of the fact came in evidence. On that day there took place at the Teatro Municipal de Santiago a popular assembly, got up by the most respectable inhabitants, and intended to manifest the deep and general alarm which the news of the occupation of Chincha, received only a few hours previously, had occasioned. A part of the crowd which was going to the meeting had to pass on its way before the house of the Spanish legation, and on finding themselves in front of it, there issued from its midst isolated cries, “Death to Spain;” “Death to Godos;” “Down with the flag.” Such cries found no echo from the majority of the assemblage, and when one of them attempted to touch the Spanish flag, which was waving from its staff, he was compelled to desist from his purpose by his companions. The crowd lost no time in pressing forward, urged on by a battalion of the national guard, which, as it was defiling at the time by the place of the occurrence in the direction of the field of Mars, thought it prudent to mark time in the rear of the crowd for the purpose of repressing any disorderliness, and, above all, any serious threat of insult to the flag of Spain.

The incident mentioned is explained naturally, by calling to mind that at the time it happened there was in the minds of men a lively and general agitation, because of the recent news from Peru; and that in numerous assemblages there are never wanting many people incapable of bridling their excitement. Beyond doubt that scene was very disagreeable, but also it was impossible to anticipate it, and it involved no insult to the Spanish flag.

Affronts to the national flag are of such nature and gravity that until reparation is made it is impossible there should exist any kind of pacific and friendly relations between the offender and the offended, provided the latter has any self-respect. If Spain had received such from Chili, the conduct would be inexplicable within the rules of honor which, after the incident of the 1st of May, Mr. Taveria, the government of the Peninsula, the chief who now blockades the Chilian ports, and Mr. Roberts, who succeeded temporarily to Mr. Taveira on the eve of the Spanish aggression, continued to observe toward the republic. These are the facts when the minister of her Catholic Majesty in Chili called the attention of the government of the undersigned to the incident in question. He did not give it the character of an outrage to his flag, because he did not ask for any satisfaction, nor even make formal reclamation. On the contrary, he continued to reside in the country, cultivating official relations with the Chilian government. At a later period, in May of this year, he again raised his flag, which he had omitted to do for some time.

Six months after this event, in October of the year last past, the same diplomatic agent placed in the hands of his Excellency the President of the republic, three letters from his sovereign, by which his Excellency was informed of events, as well auspicious as painful, which had occurred in her royal family; at the same time she reiterated the expression of her friendship. The replies of the President to these letters were despatched to the minister of state of her Catholic Majesty, who, on the 25th of January of the present year, announced to the undersigned that he had preferred them to their high address.

A little before this, on the 22d December, 1864, the Queen of Spain, on opening the Cortes of the kingdom, addressed to them a speech, in which may be read the following words: “In inaugurating the duties which must contribute to so praiseworthy a purpose, I should say that our relations with foreign powers continue to be satisfactory, with nothing more than a lamentable exception in respect of Peru, whose government will, without doubt, become convinced of the justice of our cause. I nourish the hope that there will thereby be re-established between Spain and that republic the most cordial understanding without abatement of our honor.” The relations with Chili were therefore then satisfactory.

The commander of the squadron which now blockades the Chilian ports adjusted at the beginning of the present year a convention for giving up the occupation of the Chincha islands, as has before been mentioned. In that convention the Spanish admiral called Chili a friendly nation, and the government of her Catholic Majesty ratified the treaty, in which appeared a qualification whose truth has not been controverted by any later event, until the moment when the present war broke out.

Six days before that commander opened hostilities against the republic, the 18th of September last past, the anniversary of the independence of this country, the Spanish flag might be seen waving at the door of the house of Mr. Roberts, charge d’affaires ad interim of her Catholic Majesty. That could mean nothing else than the friendly participation of the diplomatic agent of Spain in the great national festival of the glorious independence of Chili.

Such facts are demonstrating that not only there did not exist between Chili and Spain the deep offence treated of, but not even any serious causes of complaint or misunderstanding capable of producing a rupture. To think in a contrary manner it would be necessary to admit that the cabinet of Madrid disregarded the primordial duties of the dignity and honor of governments, or that, knowing them, it fell short of their observance with shameless and culpable duplicity.

Second charge: Circular of the government of the republic to other American governments, dated 4th of May, 1864. The undersigned has already previously shown the impressions made on the mind of his government by the anomalous and forcible retention of the Chincha islands, and the protest he thought it necessary to draw up on that subject. This protest, contained in said circular, is what appears to be considered as an act of hostility to Spain. For this purpose it excludes from consideration that the government of Chili, in protesting against the act, signified its confidence that the cabinet of Madrid would disapprove it; a confidence in respect of which events have rigidly proven how much of friendliness, of indulgence, and of good will it entertained toward that cabinet.

Such a circumstance was sufficient to deprive the protest referred to of any hostile character, although it had not been so well founded as it was in reality. But the Spanish government itself did full justice to the apprehensions and foresight which had inspired it, by disapproving, in a manner as ostensible as wanting in good faith, the conduct of its agents in Peru. Shortly after that disapproval the first secretary of state of her Catholic Majesty said, in his circular of the 24th June, 1864, already cited: “I need not speak to you either of the agitation which, from the results of the matter referred to, (the occupation of Chincha,) has been excited as well in Peru as in other places in America, nor of the useless steps taken by various diplomatic agents (among them that of Chili) residing in Lima for the purpose of bringing about an agreement between that government and Messrs. Pinzon and Salazar. As for these measures, her Majesty’s government is thankful for them, although they have not produced any effect. As for that agitation, it having been mainly occasioned by the idea that it was intended to revindicate ancient rights, it was natural, and is, that it should have become calmed, or would be calmed, as soon as it should be known in America that Spain and its government did not permit, but rather disapproved, such revindication.” The government of Spain, therefore, considered as well founded the agitation which the blameworthy conduct of her agents had awakened in America, and, without falling into flagrant inconsistency, could not attribute to hostile sentiments a protest which faithfully interpreted that agitation.

Nevertheless, it has not only fallen into such inconsistency, but into another more serious, if possible. While it reclaimed satisfaction for the protest of Chili, it allowed to pass in silence, as it could not do less, the complete and open adhesion which the governments of other American nations gave to it, with which nations it has continued till this time in relations of friendship and in perfect accord.

Third charge: The government of the undersigned did not attempt to correct the extravagance of public opinion. It has just been seen how explicitly the cabinet of Madrid justified the excitement of the American people in consequence of the Spanish occupation. Public opinion in Chili, under the control of this excitement, revealed its apprehensions and suspicions with the energy peculiar to a free and manly people. If these did not disappear with the declarations of the Spanish government, it must not seem strange, since the weak and contradictory censure of the occupation gave a just cause for suspicion, even after the disapproval of the considerations, while the fact upon which they were founded, and which had been the cause of the first alarms, was still maintained.

The expression of sentiments so natural—the judgment given upon such contradictory, irregular, and anomalous acts—is what they term the extravagance of public opinion. The freedom of speech and of the press enjoyed in Chili permitted such expressions to be made with too much earnestness on certain occasions, and the opinion was expressed with noble independence, as happens in all free countries, even in countries like Spain, where freedom in this particular is controlled. To make out a charge against the Chilian government for this is not only unusual and unreasonable, but incompatible with the uninterrupted impunity the Spanish press has enjoyed in its intemperate abuse of American governments and people.

Fourth charge: Having permitted the Peruvian war steamer Lerzunde to take on coal, provisions, and powder at Valparaiso, and enlist marines there. When the above vessel was at Valparaiso the Spanish-Peruvian difficulty was obscure and undefined, as the undersigned has already mentioned. As Spain and Peru could not then be considered at war with each other, there was no reason for preventing the vessels of the republic from taking stores and making enlistments in Chilian ports.

The Spanish government, by pretending there was war with Peru when it did not exist, and by denying it later, when it actually existed, undertakes to sustain two charges that destroy each other—the one now under consideration, and that relating to coal, which the undersigned will examine presently.

Moreover, the present charge is wanting in accuracy. The Chilian authorities, moved by sentiments of scrupulous delicacy and kind feelings towards Spain, only permitted the Lerzunde to take at Valparaiso men enough to complete the crew, and the provisions indispensable to the voyage. Such is the truth of the case, although Admiral Pareja has lately tried to destroy the value of this fact by an unjust denial, on the faith of a word in which the cabinet of Madrid has already brought us to place little confidence.

Fifth charge: Having permitted an expedition of armed volunteers to leave Valparaiso for Peru on a small merchant vessel, the Dart. The undersigned has already stated that the war between Peru and Spain had not broken out when this expedition left. Notwithstanding this, the volunteers were not permitted to leave until the authorities of Valparaiso saw that they were not armed. The Chilian government was prompted to these precautions by the same benevolent and prudent sentiments that actuated it in the case of the Lerzunde, and not by the duties of a neutrality, for which there was yet no occasion, and which the republic doubted if it would assume at a later day.

The departure of unarmed volunteers would have been harmless, even in times of war, for the passengers on the Dart were not unlike those that go regularly from Valparaiso to Peru on the steamers of the English company of the Pacific.

The departure of armed volunteers only could have been hostile to Spain if we consider as probable the very unlikely intention some fancied to attribute to them, of going to attack the squadron of Admiral Pinzen with a trading schooner like the Dart.

The government of the republic, though it did not credit the report, which was subsequently found to be false, took care that the expedition should start, as it did, completely unarmed, so as to remove every pretence for malevolent accusations.

Sixth charge: Not having taken measures to allay the fears infused into the peaceful inhabitants of Chili by the anathemas fulminated in a newspaper (the San Martin) against those who supplied provisions to the Spanish squadron or to its agents. The little importance attached to the threats of any paper published in a country where there is full freedom of discussion is a fact known to everybody; at least nobody in Chili would think of being frightened at such threats. If we take into account that the anathema in question came from a paper like the San Martin, remarkable for the extravagance of its language and severity of its attacks, we can comprehend its little importance and judge rightly that it would pass unnoticed by the government of the republic; besides, the government has too much respect for itself and the good sense of the people to feel any uneasiness about the consequences of an anathema, the puerility of which can only be compared to that of the charge to which it gave rise.

When such charges are advanced it shows the want of real causes of complaint, as well as the desire to invent pretexts to promote difficulties and complications.

Seventh charge: The hostile treatment of the Spanish war schooner Vencedora by the mariime authority of Lota. This vessel entered that port about the end of September, 1864, to take water and provisions and renew her deposits of stone coal. The holders of this combustible refused to furnish the required quantity; and on account of this refusal the commander of the schooner applied to the naval sub-delegate of Lota, asking his assistance in getting out coal. As the local authority told him he could not do violence to the will of the owners of the combustible, the commander made a protest against him and the owners of the stone coal. The Spanish minister afterwards repeated the protest to the government of the undersigned in Santiago, and it was rejected as unreasonable. In fact, there was no reason in pretending that the naval sub-delegate of Lota ought to have compelled the owners of the coal to sell it, when they had spontaneously refused. In refusing they exercised an unquestionable right, which he was bound to respect. By disregarding this obligation the sub-delegate would have committed an abuse of power deserving the severest punishment, and by it he would have violated respect to property, freedom of trade, and personal guarantees enjoyed practically and legally by the inhabitants of Chili.

Yet this irreproachable conduct of a subordinate authority is taken as a pretext to say that the Vencedora was treated as an enemy at Lota. If what has been shown is not sufficient to annul this charge, it is abated by remembering that the Spanish schooner, though she got no coal in Lota, was repaired and took on water, provisions, and ballast there. This serves to refute the capricious insinuation that the refusal of the owners of the coal was prompted by the naval sub-delegate. If he had wanted to oppose the Vencedora his influence might have prevented her not only from coaling, but might have deprived her of the means indispensable to the continuation of the voyage. From the incident in question another charge against the government of Chili is deduced, namely, the approval of the conduct of the authority of Lota. This approbation is already justified, and it only remains to add that if it was given in explicit terms it was because it concerned a subordinate agent who aspired to know the opinion of the government on his conduct in a serious affair, and one unusual in his modest sphere of action.

Eighth charge: The decree of 27th of September, 1864, issued by the government of Chili, prohibiting the exportation of stone coal, and declaring it contraband of war if intended for the public vessels of a state engaged in hostile operations. The undersigned has already said that the Spanish-Peruvian difficulty presented two distinct stages in its development—first a state of peace, afterwards a state of war. He has also stated that, when the dispute had reached the second stage, his government determined to assume a neutral attitude without renouncing the right, as far as neutrality would permit, of trying to persuade the Spanish squadron to evacuate Peruvian territory, and thus prevent a definite rupture between Peru and Spain. Its effort to prevent this latter emergency was both legitimate and laudable, for a war of that kind endangered the peace and safety of America for those whose duty was to guard it, and made the continuation of friendly relations with the government of the Peninsula, so much to be desired, utterly impossible.

The difficulty of obtaining stone coal would naturally embarrass the impending war, as it could only be maritime. For this reason the government of Chili determined to forbid the exportation of this combustible whenever it was to be used for the promotion of hostile operations; hence the mentioned declaration by which the cabinet of Madrid made a charge against the republic.

The undersigned proceeds to examine the arguments upon which the charge is founded:

In the first place, it is alleged that the Chilian government had no right to consider Peru and Spain as belligerents before they had declared themselves such. The allegation makes it necessary to sustain that no war can exist without a preliminary declaration, and, of course, confers no duties or rights on neutrals; yet the history of the civilized world records many wars commenced de facto, without a previous declaration, in which neutrals have not waited to be notified in order to exercise private acts of neutrality. Even the cabinet of Madrid contradicts its own allegation by accusing the republic of intended infractions of the duties of a neutral in this Spanish-Peruvian difficulty, and founds upon it some of the complaints the undersigned has already examined.

Furthermore, by acknowledging that there were hostilities de facto, and, of course, belligerents, the government of the republic only yielded to the evidence of events and the authority of official declarations, as has been previously shown. Nor can the right to make this acknowledgment, even against the will of the contending parties, be questioned when we call to mind the example offered by France and Great Britain in the recent war in the United States, although they found themselves in presence of an internal struggle. (See the edict of the Queen of, Great Britain, of the 13th of May, 1861, and the declaration of neutrality of the Emperor of the French, of the 10th of June of the same year.)

In the second place, it is alleged that the government of the undersigned contradicted its own acts by regarding the two nations as belligerents on the 27th of September, 1864, and considering them at peace on the 4th of July of the same year. These various phases of the Spanish-Peruvian difficulty which we have shown, while they explain the imaginary contradiction they reveal the flagrant one of the government of Spain by supposing a state of war in the case of the Lerzundi when there was none, and denying its existence in the present case when it had begun.

In the third place, it is alleged that the declaration mentioned was a hostile measure, as it could only injure Spain. Although the damages that the measure might cause could injure only one of the belligerents, it could not be termed hostile or partial if applied equally, as in this case, for the Peruvian war vessels were deprived of Chilian stone-coal as well as the Spanish. But that exclusive damage did not exist, for as Peru has no coal mines in her territory, she was forced to apply to the same markets and resort to the same means of transportation as the Spanish squadron to provide fuel, and consequently the damages were the same as those to her adversary.

It is also alleged that it is the peculiar faculty of belligerents to say what articles shall be considered as contraband of war. This allegation is inconsistent with state sovereignty, in use of which any declarations may be made they think proper, provided they do not violate the rights of any other nation and prohibit the exportation of goods of any kind they choose. Besides, the declaration in question is authorized by a similar act of the government of her Britannic Majesty. On the 31st of January, 1862, Lord John Russell addressed divers instructions, relative to the neutrality of his country in the war of the United States, to the lords commissioners of the admiralty, in the last of which he denounced stone-coal used in warlike expeditions and prohibited its exportation.

Finally, it is alleged that the declaration of the 27th September was contrary to international usage and against the principles of the laws of nations, as stone-coal, in the opinion of both parties, is at all times an article of lawful commerce. This affirmation is far from being exact. If in truth there are some maritime nations that always consider this combustible as an innocent article of trade, there are others that regard it as contraband of war when used in hostilities. Among the last is Great Britain, as we have shown and as is proven in the case of the Flambeau, a vessel of the United States navy, which the English authorities of Nassau (a town in one of the Bahama islands) hindered from taking coal, while that privilege was granted to a merchant steamer of the rebel States. (See Russell’s note to Mr. Adams, United States minister in England, dated 25th March, 1862.) The opinion of the British government in this case, which was a precedent of the decree of 27th September of the government of Chili, is not only sustained by the teachings of several commentators on international law, among whom the eminent English jurist Phillimore, (vol. 3, No. CCLXVI of his Commentaries,) but is supported by the general principles of the same law. Since steam has superseded wind in navigation, stone-coal has assumed the part of canvas at sea, and is considered everywhere as contraband. (Bello, part 2d, chap. VIII, §4.)

The same differences of opinion and practice prevailing on this subject have communicated to the measure in question a loyal and proper character, altogether incompatible with the partial and hostile spirit which they pretend to believe was the cause of it.

Ninth charge: Not having extended the prohibition of the export of stone-coal, and other contraband articles, to the vessels of the French squadron, while the French empire is at war with the Mexican republic. The fact upon which this charge is founded is wanting in accuracy, particularly in an official and diplomatic view. The trouble that existed in that country, and which still exists, was not an international war, was not a war between France and Mexico but an internal struggle between the constitutional republican government and an imperialist faction dependent upon foreign arms for its support.

On the other hand, when the charge was made no proofs were adduced to sustain it; no vessel of the French squadron was mentioned as having taken contraband articles from Chili to be used to make war on Mexico.

France, on the contrary, has had a permanent naval station for many years in these seas, and her ships have been in the habit of provisioning in Chilian ports. It would have been impossible for the government of the undersigned to find out which of these vessels were engaged in or intended for hostile operations. An inaccuracy and a supposition can afford a foundation for no charge.

Tenth charge: Having permitted the Peruvian government to export horses from Chili. On making this charge, the cabinet of Madrid again plainly recognizes the existence of war, disavowed at the time of the declaration about the stone-coal, which was contemporaneous with the exportation of horses to Peru. And this new contradiction is useless, for the charge disappears at once when we remember that it was a maritime war, in which horses could not be used. And even if it had been a question of war on land, it would have still been lawful to permit Peru to bring an article from Chili which had always been obtained in that country, not only for its army but for peaceable and industrial purposes, thus placing it under the protection of customary law. (See Bello, part 2d, chap. VII, § 3.)

Eleventh charge: Impunity of the newspaper called the San Martin. This publication, as has already been mentioned, soon lost its reputation with the public and disappeared in a few months for want of readers, in consequence of the excessive acrimony of its style when censuring the defects of the Spanish nation, and its attacks upon the Queen and royal family of the Peninsula. The Spanish representation in Chili several times called the attention of the government of the republic to the many insults of the San Martin, and the undersigned told him, the first time he spoke of it, how much displeased the government was with that paper, and asked him if he would have it prosecuted in the courts that have jurisdiction of such offences. The Spanish minister gave no categorical answer to this question, but continued to protest eagerly against the virulence of the San Martin. Without an affirmative answer on his part, it was not lawful to prosecute a paper for libel by article 22 of the statute in force on the abuse of the freedom of the press, which says, “Printed slanders may be prosecuted, at the instance of the offended party, by the state’s attorney or his agents, or the city attorney, whenever made against the President of the republic, heads of foreign governments, or diplomatic agents accredited near the government of the state.” And even if this previous and indispensable condition had not existed, the government of the undersigned would have hesitated to have the insults given by the San Martin to the Queen of Spain discussed in a public court, particularly as they were sufficiently avenged by public disapproval. His hesitation would have been prompted entirely by a sentiment of delicacy, respect, and amity for the sovereign of a friendly nation, and that sovereign a woman.

This charge was so unfounded that the Spanish government could do no less than modify it. Subsequently, Admiral Pareja limited it, in his ultimatum of the 17th of September last, to blaming the government of Chili for not having expressly condemned the offending articles of the San Martin in the official paper. If such omission needs justification, it is justified by the character of the official paper of Chili, that inserts only orders and official documents, and never admits political discussion. But this omission was fully atoned for by the explicit condemnation of that paper’s abuse, in the notes of the undersigned to Mr. Taveira on that subject, and in the last address of his Excellency the President of the republic to the legislative body, all of which were published and expressed the opinion of the government of Chili in the most official and authentic manner.

The motive of the government of Madrid in misunderstanding the unequivocal language of these documents, while complaining of the silence of the official paper, is very easy to explain; any frivolous excuse for accusing the republic was to be hunted up. The undersigned has now finished the examination of the charges against his government, under the form of causes of complaint, after they had already been refuted under the form of reclamations which they first assumed.

The examination just concluded permits us to presume how easy it would have been for the undersigned to have made in his communication to Mr. Taveira on the 16th of May last, not only the solemn declarations consistent with the dignity of the Spanish government, exacted from the republic, but also satisfactory explanations. These were so satisfactory that the minister resident of her Catholic Majesty informed the undersigned, on the 20th of said month, that in his opinion they removed all the causes of complaint alleged by his government, and he hoped they would contribute to strengthen the relations between the two countries.

Such a positive declaration, without reservation, made by the same functionary who framed the charges and saw their consequences, was soon confirmed by a very significant act—the Spanish flag again waved from Mr Taveira’s house in token of perfect friendship.

The acts and official language of the representative of her Catholic Majesty then left no room for doubt; all causes of discord between Chili and Spain had disappeared. The government of the undersigned rejoiced at it, and if it desired Mr. Taveira to obtain the complete approbation of his government, it was only because of the cordial relations between the two countries, as both would suffer if the minister’s conduct were disapproved. But it never imagined the disapproval could revive past disagreements.

If governments reserve to themselves the ratification of the contracts made by their diplomatic agents in certain cases, the arrangement of treaties or conventions for instance this condition is expressly stipulated. As the declaration of the minister resident of her Catholic Majesty contained no such reservation, the government of Chili was bound to consider it irrevocable.

This opinion was so common that even Mr. Roberts, Mr. Taveira’s successor as temporary charge of Spain, entertained it, although he knew that his predecessor’s conduct had been disapproved by his government. He clearly signified as much by hoisting the Spanish flag over the door of his house on the 18th of September last, the anniversary of Chilian independence, which act could only be interpreted as an assurance that the friendship and good intelligence between the two nations had survived the disapprobation.

Yet, by one of those frequent contradictions in Spanish policy that makes the world doubt its judgment and good faith, that same day—18th September—the undersigned received the ultimatum of the Spanish naval forces in the Pacific, who had only been two days in the port of Valparaiso, with a part of his squadron. Admiral Pareja declared in his ultimatum that Mr. Taveira had not complied with the spirit and letter of his instructions when he accepted the explanations contained in the note of the undersigned of the 16th of May last, and had thus incurred the displeasure of his government; and consequently the cabinet of Madrid considered things in the same state as they were before the acceptation, and demanded satisfactory explanations of the republic, with a salute of twenty-one guns to the Spanish flag; at the same time he intimated that if the demand was not complied with, diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off, and if his forces were called into action he would claim indemnity for injuries sustained by the Spanish squadron in consequence of these decrees of the government of Chili.

Thus the same government that had not scrupled to profit by the occupation of Chincha, effected by a pretended treachery of its agents in Peru, neither hesitated to afflict the republic with the consequences of another faithless act of its official, for whom it had asked entire faith and credit from the government of Chili.

If this precedent could have any value in international relations, enlightened states would certainly renounce all intercourse with the diplomatic agents of her Catholic Majesty unless they showed the original text of their instructions; else they would run the risk of falling into a net of engagements which would be annulled, or only tend to lull their suspicions and divert their resolutions.

The undersigned therefore protests, in the name of his government, against the adoption of a precedent that perverts and annihilates the noble profession of diplomacy, and which, applied to the present case, would lead to the absurd conclusion that there is actually a war between Chili and Spain, provoked by the chief of the Spanish squadron with instructions from his government. It is superfluous to say that the government of the republic accepts no such conclusion, and yet it is just as fair to presume that Admiral Pareja did not comply with his instructions as it was to doubt that Mr. Taveira had carried out his.

In fact, the long career and honorable character of this diplomatic agent makes the accusation of faithlessness, as applied to him, very unlikely; while the disapproval of his conduct is readily explained by the late ministerial change in the Peninsula. The ministry whose orders Mr. Taveira had to carry out seemed disposed to eliminate the policy of ambitious adventurers and duplicity that had possessed the country, and is shown by the conclusion of the war in St. Domingo.

This ministry lasted but a short time; and the succeeding one brought back the same men into the Queen’s counsel, who had sent Commissioner Mazzarredo and Admiral Pinzon to America to break old treaties and claim foreign territory. The conclusion that Mr Taveira had given in the mean time to the equitable and reparatory instructions of the former cabinet, displeased the new one, and it decided to resume its old plans of avarice and reconquest in America by embarrassing him in his efforts to re-establish friendly relations between Chili and Spain. The ministry, under the presidency of O’Donnell, did not then hesitate to sacrifice the honor and reputation of an old functionary upon the altar of its sinister designs, just as it had blamed Mazzarredo and Pinzon to excuse a contemptible recantation, and cover derelictions of probity and political penetration; and, although the first explanation did not seem as plausible as it actually was, although Mr. Taveira did not conform to his instructions, causing the republic to suffer for his misconduct; and, the same causes of complaint of the 13th of May last still existing, the demands to which they gave rise have not been modified. The cabinet of Madrid then ordered the Chilian government to make solemn declaration consistent with the dignity of that cabinet Why demand satisfactory explanations, and before they were received and examined, enact a statute that would have been superfluous had the explanations been satisfactory?

To make these unauthorized and inconsistent exactions more inadmissible, if possible, they were condensed into an ultimatum, insulting to the dignity and offensive to the finer feelings of the people and government of Chili. It was signed by a chief of a squadron, instead of the Spanish diplomatic agent then resident in Santiago, and acting, as has been mentioned, and who was the proper medium of communication with the cabinet of Madrid. Even the appearances of conciliation were neglected in it, and the injustice and arrogance of its pretensions were mingled with intemperate menaces; and, finally, it was presented to the undersigned at a time when the whole country was celebrating the fifty-fifth anniversary of the birth of the republic.

The spirit that dictated this document was evident from its contents. It was intended at all hazards to mock, humiliate, and subjugate Chili, whose indefatigable solicitude for American interests and unionizing influence in America were impediments to the secret and disgraceful projects of Spain already attempted on this continent.

It is hardly necessary for the undersigned to say that his government promptly rejected, and with proper indignation, the dishonor offered in these propositions by the Spanish government to the republic in exchange for a precarious peace. This ultimatum was presented a second time by Admiral Pareja, and was again rejected the 23d September last. The chief of the Spanish squadron blockaded the port of Valparaiso the next day, and declared a blockade of the other ports of the republic.

Never was there a more rude and impudent abuse of power over a defenceless people. But never did a defenceless nation respond with more decision and energy to the insults of a power under the shadow of impunity to divine justice and the opinion of civilized humanity.

Through its rulers and the will of the people, the republic accepted, without hesitation, the wager of battle forced upon it by an aggression deeply mortifying to its dignity and rights, and threatening to its present and future security.

In making this grave decision it could not refrain from regretting to give up a long flourishing and glorious peace. But it could not retract, and was forced to take the only road left open for the vindication of its honor. Neither has the contemplation of an unequal struggle, with a nation of many armies and a large fleet, had any influence in this decision.

Chili is ready to suffer patiently the unavoidable desolation of Spanish power, and wait the moment to show the mother country she has not forgotten the art of improvising conquering armies and victorious fleets.

And now the undersigned declares to friendly nations that his government has undertaken the present war with the firm determination not to end it till the Spanish government shall offer due satisfaction for the insults and injuries inflicted by an inexcusable aggression, and give solid guarantees that the independence and repose of American republics will never again be disturbed by the unjust attacks of the cabinet of Madrid.

If in this contest the government of the undersigned has to struggle alone, without allies, it trusts that its struggle will not be in vain. This is the courageous promise of the constant and self-denying citizens of the country. This is the promise of the uprightness of the intentions and the justice of a cause that deserves the protection of God and the sympathies of every enlightened and generous country.

But there is no fear of the republic being alone; it is rather certain that the American states will measure the extent of a war the result of which will decide their fate, and will embrace the cause of Chili as a common cause, repealing the memorable and powerful alliance to which they are united by their historical antecedents and present political necessities.

The result of a victory in this contest will not be the empty satisfaction of self-love to the republic; the future fate of the Spanish American states depends upon it; and not only of those now independent, but those bending under foreign yoke.

To secure this triumph no sacrifice must be spared, but a rapid, constant, and decided action must accomplish it.

If its anxiety to return to peace, which it gave up with such profound regret, were not a powerful inducement to carry on the war under such conditions, the sincere solicitude for the interests of neutrals compromised by the contest would be, as well as the desire to see the extensive mercantile and manufacturing relations that foreign nations have with this country relieved from its incubus.

In endeavoring promptly to establish a secure and lasting peace by means of arms, the government of the undersigned thinks to render the greatest homage to these relations—to humanity and civilization, and justly appreciates the flattering interest that all the friendly states represented in Chili have already shown to the country, under these trying circumstances, through their worthy diplomatic ministers.

It has already given an unequivocal proof of its favorable sentiments in regard to neutral goods, by the instructions given to its war vessels, public or private, that are sent to capture Spanish property at sea. By these instructions neutral property will be respected under the enemy’s flag; and goods of the enemy, if not contraband of war, will be protected by a neutral flag. The Chilian government has thus conformed to the second and third of the principles of maritime law proclaimed by the international congress of Paris in 1856.

This liberality contrasts singularly with the contrary conduct of the chief of the enemy’s squadron. While he confesses himself bound by the instructions of his government to observe the fourth principle of the law alluded to, he breaks it openly by undertaking to blockade all the Chilian ports with four frigates and two smaller vessels, not enough to blockade effectually four of the fifty-three ports of entry along the extensive Chilian coast.

The repeated observations and protests that have been addressed to him on this subject by the diplomatic and consular agents of the neutral powers have not succeeded in diverting him from a determination that not only opposes the declaration of the congress of Paris, but requires a revival of the paper blockade already condemned by all enlightened nations.

They will know how to judge of a proceeding so characteristic of the international policy of Spain. But the undersigned cannot pass in silence two other acts of the same chief that affect the immediate relations of the belligerents. By the instructions given to the Spanish cruisers, they are ordered to treat all Chilian war vessels as pirates, if the majority of their crews are not citizens of the republic. The government of the undersigned solemly protests against this whimsical prescription, as it will be followed by severe reprisals if carried into effect.

His protests are not less earnest against the threat to bombard Valparaiso, made by Admiral Pareja in a recent communication to her Britannic Majesty’s chargé d’affaires, and made public by him. As Valparaiso is an unfortified city and a place of great trade, its bombardment could have no excuse in the object of the war; it would be a measure of useless barbarism, in violation of the law of nations, and against the sentiments of enlightened humanity. The uselessness of such an odious act would be aggravated if its intention was to destroy the public edifices, as the Spanish admiral intimated, that deserve especial respect, even in the bombardment of fortified places. If this is done the Chilian, government will certainly resort to the painful duty of reprisals in order to equalize the mode of warfare.

The preceding expositions show how Spain can deviate from the usages and observed practices in civil war. This sad discovery has prompted, and justifies, the resolution of the government of the undersigned to forbid Spanish subjects from leaving Chili, to assemble them in this city, and subject them to the direct vigilance of the local authorities.

The bombardment of Valparaiso, and other rash acts of the enemy, will not tend to weaken the resistance of the republic, but may alter its intention to wage a just and effective war.

In concluding this long exposition the undersigned believes he has shown the justness of the Chilian cause, and yet the best argument in its favor remains, namely, the position the country has assumed and will maintain. Chili, the mark of unexpected aggression, wanting a large army, naval forces, and fortified coasts, has not hesitated to defy without arms the hostilities of a powerful adversary.

While preparations for defence are making, it supports with manly courage and spirit, with calmness, dignity, and noble patriotism, all the evils of war, without any of its advantages.

Divine Providence only grants this courage to those whose cause is just.

ALVARO COVARRUBIAS.